Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4(2), 5 (n), 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376(3), 376 (2)(n) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 439 -- POCSO – Rape – Regular bail – Applicant submitted hat the victim in her examination u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C. has stated that she was known to the applicant and she on her own left her house and joined the company of the applicant and they did not establish any physical relationship -- These facts admitted by State -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3(a), 4(2), 5 (l), 6– Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376 (2) (n), 376 (3) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 164, 439 -- POCSO – Rape – Regular bail – In statement u/s 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., victim stated that the victim and the applicant both were in relationship and their relations were consensual – State submitted that the victim is a minor – Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 376D, 363, 366A, 120B -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO -- Short term bail – Liver transplantation of father – Applicant proposed to donate his liver -- Applicant ordered to be released on short term bail for a period of six weeks on humanitarian ground.

(Para 3, 5, 6)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 506 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 483 – POCSO – Rape – Regular bail -- Petitioner is behind bars since 4.9.2022 – One is deemed to be innocent, till the time, his/her guilt is proved in accordance with law -- Guilt, if any, of the bail petitioner is yet to be proved in accordance with law -- No reason to let the bail petitioner incarcerate in jail, for an indefinite period, especially when co-accused stands enlarged on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 22-29)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to stand -- However as a rule of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other dependable evidence on record -- It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his/her evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable -- The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because he/she is susceptible to tutoring.

(Para 23)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- Incident taken place on 13.10.2014 whereas the FIR was lodged on 05.12.2014 -- Delay in lodging the FIR could not be explained by the prosecution which creates a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution -- Since the evidence of the parents of the victim has been discredited by the defence in their cross- examination and there is no corroboration to the evidence of the child victim (PW12), therefore, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of the child victim to convict the appellants.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Medical evidence – Acquittal -- Doctor had given the opinion that the possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled-out, but on that day the victim was not produced before her -- As per the FSL report, no blood and semen were detected on the shirt, pajama/ slacks, underwear, brassiere, vests, perineal swab and vaginal swab of the victim --  As there is no medical evidence on record to support the theory of the prosecution that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, it becomes difficult to uphold the conviction granted by the trial Court.

(Para 30)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 29 – POCSO – Presumption – Rebuttal of presumption -- It cannot be countenanced that the presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute -- Unless the prosecution is able to prove foundational facts in the context of the allegations made against the accused under the POCSO Act, the presumption u/s 29 of the said Act would not operate against the accused -- Statutory presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act must be understood and tested on the anvil of the golden thread which runs through web of our criminal jurisprudence system that an accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 33-35)

E. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(xii) &3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Offence u/s 3(1) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, would be attracted only if the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will are promoted or attempted to be promoted against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a class and not on criticizing an individual member -- An offence u/s 3(1) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of the scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

(Para 37, 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death -- Suicide with in seven years of marriage -- Deceased faced cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband which compelled her to commit suicide -- However, witnesses did not state that such cruelty and harassment was in connection with the demand for dowry -- With respect to the demand for dowry, witnesses have just made some general statements -- It has not been proved by the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with the demand of dowry -- Trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not established.

-- A case of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of IPC and cruelty u/s 498A of IPC made out against the husband, although the offence u/s 304B is not made out and consequently, conviction u/s 304B of IPC set aside – Appellant/ husband convicted u/s 306 and 498A of IPC, sentenced to three years of R.I. and a fine of Rs. 25000/- on each count -- Both the sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 4-8)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Rape -- Bail to juvenile in conflict with law/ CCL – Right of -- Penetrative sexual assault on minor prosecutrix --  Word “shall”, suggests that normally, prayer, if any, made for grant of bail deserves to be allowed -- No material worth credence was ever adduced on record by the prosecution to suggest that in the event of CCL being enlarged on bail, he may not only come in contact of hardened criminals but may again indulge in such activities – Principle of non-stigmatizing semantics is required to be followed -- Bail allowed with conditions.

(Para 8-18)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354, 506  -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 9, 10 – POCSO -- Bail to juvenile in conflict with law – Right of -- A juvenile in conflict with law has to be necessarily released on bail unless proviso is applicable -- No finding recorded by JJ Board that the proviso to sub-Section 1 of Section 12 is applicable to the facts of the case -- Without recording the said finding, bail could not have been denied -- Psychological Assessment Report of the Juvenile records that the juvenile does not belong to high risk category and against the column “worry list of child” it is mentioned that there was “no worry” – Bail allowed.

(Para 6-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cruelty -- Matrimonial dispute – Anticipatory bail – Enormous conditions -- Purpose of putting conditions while granting pre-arrest bail is to secure the presence of the accused to ensure a fair trial and also for the smooth flow of the investigating process – Courts have to be very cautious in imposing conditions while granting bail upon finding pre-arrest bail to be grantable – Condition for release of petitioner on the provisional bail to give undertaking that the appellant would fulfil all physical and financial requirements by way of an affidavit set aside.

(Para 4-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482, 401 -- Outraging modesty of women – Female accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A female cannot be an accused under Section 354A of the IPC -- This offence is gender specific and only a male can be prosecuted under this offence – Proceedings against petitioner quashed.

(Para 2a, 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 113B -- Dowry death – Presumption – Onus of proof -- Deceased subjected to harassment and cruelty and death occurred within seven years of marriage sustaining 100% burn injuries inside her matrimonial home -- Onus was on the appellants/ accused to establish that it was not a dowry death -- Section 106 of the Evidence Act also put burden on the appellant no.1-husband who went to sleep with her in the same room, but escaped unscathed to explain as to how the death had occurred -- High Court arrived at the rightful conclusion reversing the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court and in convicting and sentencing the appellants.

(Para 7-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Offence u/s 304-B IPC is such wherein presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act may be drawn against the accused and the onus to establish innocence shifts upon the accused -- The necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC may be spelt out as follows:

(i) that deceased died due to burning or bodily injury or any other un-natural death;

(ii) that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;

(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in connection with demand of dowry;

(v) that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption – Death within 7 years of marriage – Proof of -- Nikahnama assailed by the accused on the ground that the same has not been duly proved, but no such objection as regards exhibiting of said document was raised when the same was exhibited -- Although the DW examined by the accused has attempted to project that the marriage of deceased was solemnized more than 7 years prior to date of death, but there is no documentary evidence to support the said assertion – Nikahnama accepted so as to hold that death occurred within less than 7 years of marriage of the deceased.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty by father-in-law – Acquittal -- A perusal of the FIR would show that when the husband had come to take back his wife from her parental home, it was he who raised the demand of Rs.10,000/- -- Whenever any mishap occurs, it is very common that parents and relatives of the deceased-girl, would name not only her husband who would be the prime accused, but other members of the family also so as to wreak vengeance -- Father-in-law given benefit of doubt, his conviction for offence u/s 498-A set aside.

(Para 21, 26, 27)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Demand of cash post marriage – Whether qualify as dowry -- Demands of cash would qualify to be termed as ‘demand of dowry’ and that any such demand even if made post marriage would not lose the character of ‘demand of dowry’.

(Para 23)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Marriage had taken place barely about 4 years prior to the death -- As per the testimony of the witnesses, whenever the deceased/ husband used to come to her parental home she used to disclose the demand of Rs.10,000/- by the accused -- It is further borne out from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-4 that the deceased had last visited her parental home about 2 months back and even at that time she had disclosed about the demand of dowry made by the accused -- Demand of dowry which were raised even two months prior to her death cannot escape from his liability on account of unnatural death of the deceased in matrimonial home on account of poison which will fully qualify to be termed as a ‘dowry death’.

(Para 24-26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 376-D, 320, 506 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(g), 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Gang rape – POCSO case -- Regular bail -- In the FIR, the applicants are named, and according to the victim, she was taken from her house -- In her statement u/s 164 of the Code, the victim tells that she was forcibly taken from a public road, when the applicants introduced themselves to her -- In her medical examination, she did not name the applicants and told that unknown persons took her -- Prior to the medical examination of the victim, the FIR had already been lodged – If the victim did not know the name of the applicants when she was medically examine, how could she name the applicants in the FIR -- Bail allowed.

(Para 7-10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32 – Dying declaration – Circumstances related to death -- Victim did not give any history of the consumption of the poison and the Medical Officer could not find any symptom of the poisoning --  Therefore, he did not treat the victim for poisoning --  Statement made by the victim nowhere states that the accused had forced her to consume the poison -- She stated that one black pill was taken from the bag of accused, which was consumed -- She fell asleep thereafter -- She has not specifically stated whether the victim had herself taken the medicine or it was administered to her -- There is no proof that the pill consumed by the victim was aluminium phosphide -- Statement made by the victim cannot constitute the circumstances relating to her death and the same cannot be admitted as a dying declaration.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(g) – Rape with  minor – Acquittal -- Medical evidence does not show that the victim was subjected to recent sexual intercourse -- Heavy reliance was placed upon the human semen detected on the bed sheet -- However, the same was not subjected to further examination to find out whether it belonged to accused or not -- Further, no semen was detected on the clothes of the victim or the accused -- Therefore, nothing much can be made out of the human semen detected on the bed sheet -- Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view by holding that no case of commission of an offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of IPC was made out.

(Para 28-30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 305 -- Abetment of suicide of child -- No evidence to show when the poison was taken by the deceased -- Her statement does not show that the accused had created any circumstance forcing her to consume poison -- There is no evidence that the deceased had consumed poison while she was with the accused -- Hence, the offence punishable u/s 305 of IPC is not made out against the accused.

(Para 31)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Birth certificate – Age of victim -- Mere fact that the entry was not made immediately but was made subsequently as per the order of the SDM will not take away their effect -- The entries were made ante litem mortem and are to be treated as correct -- Entry was based on the Panchayat certificate, which was not brought will not take away the effect of the entry which was made before the dispute had arisen – Age of victim was about 14 years on the date of the incident, proved.

(Para 33)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Victim was going to Nahan from where she was taken to the house of SR -- No evidence that the consent of her guardian was taken -- Hence, the offence of kidnapping was duly established.

(Para 37)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 216 -- Kidnapping – Charge u/s 366 of IPC – Punishment u/s 363 IPC – Permissibility of -- Accused was not charged with the commission of an offence punishable u/ 363 of the IPC but with Section 366 of the IPC, which is an aggravated form of Section 363 of the IPC -- Hence, the accused can be convicted of the commission of offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC despite the absence of charge as no prejudice has been caused to him.

(Para 38)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have married each other, the petition is allowed -- FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed.

(Para 1-4)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Victim’s age – Birth and death register of Gram Panchayat -- Proof of -- Victim’s date of birth was recorded as 28.10.2002 -- During cross-examination of the victim, on the suggestion given to her, she had specifically stated that her date of birth was 28.10.2002, which corroborates the entry in the birth and death register of the concerned Gram Panchayat – Held,  the evidence led by the prosecution is conclusive to prove that the date of birth of the victim was 28.10.2002.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Sole witness of prosecutrix -- Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without corroboration from any other evidence -- If the Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial which would lend assurance to her testimony.

(Para 14)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape – Victim travelled a long distance in the company of accused persons throughout the night and had many opportunities to disclose her fate to the world at large --  As per her statement recorded u/s 164, Cr.PC, a police man met her at some place at Una-Hoshiarpur road, however, she had not disclosed anything to the police man also -- This conduct of the victim is unusual -- Statement of victim u/s 164 Cr.P.C. is not in consistence with her deposition before the Court -- Her deposition does not inspire confidence.

(Para 21, 39)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- It is not a substantive piece of evidence and such tests are meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency in order to ensure that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding in the right direction -- The Test Identification Parade is not a substantive evidence but it can only be used in corroboration of the statements in Court

(Para 32)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- When the accused persons were produced before the ACJM, the photographs of the accused persons were annexed to the conviction slip -- Thus the possibility of the victim having seen the photographs of accused persons during their custody with the police and also subsequently before the TIP cannot be ruled out -- There is no record to suggest that non-suspected selected for the parade were of the same age, height, general appearance and position as that of the accused persons -- Moreover, there is a delay in conducting the TIP as the accused persons were taken in custody on 13.02.2018, but the application for conducting of TIP was moved by the Investigating Officer on 16.02.2018, which delay the prosecution has failed to explain -- Father of the victim, in his cross-examination, admitted that a lady police having two stars on her shoulders, was also present at the time of TIP -- Thus, it cannot be said the TIP was conducted in accordance with the guidelines -- As such, it cannot be held to be sustainable in the eyes of law and no reliance could be placed upon the Test Identification Parades.

(Para 33-37)

F. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Acquittal of accused – Disciplinary action against Investigation Agency -- Investigation in the case was conducted in a casual and perfunctory manner -- Prosecution has withheld the CCTV footage, SFSL reports with respect to the medical examinations of the victim as well as the accused persons and also with respect to the articles which were seized from the vehicles allegedly involved in the commission of the crime in order to connect the accused persons with the commission of the offence -- Director General of Police directed to take appropriate disciplinary and departmental inquiry against the erring police officials for having conducted a shoddy investigation, that eventually led to the acquittal of the appellants herein.

(Para 46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 376, 376 (2n) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO -- Rape with minor – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Complainant and the victim (19 year old) on oath stated that the FIR sought to be quashed, is the result of misunderstanding same the was lodged in a hot haste, without realizing the consequences of the same -- Both victim and the petitioner were in touch with each other, but there is no allegation of sexual assault, if any -- At the time of alleged offence, the victim was 17 and ½ years old – Victim in her statement recorded u/s 161 CrPC specifically denied factum with regard to her abduction and kidnapping by petitioner, coupled with the fact that she does not want to pursue the criminal proceedings – Since the matter stands compromised and they are no more interested in pursuing the criminal proceedings against each other, no fruitful purpose would be served in case criminal proceedings are allowed to continue – FIR as well as consequent proceedings ordered to be quashed and set-aside.

(Para 4-7, 13, 14)

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 18(3) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012) Section 5(j)(ii), 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3), 506 -- POCSO – Rape -- Child in conflict with law – Bail under juvenile law – Even if a CIL is transferred for trial as an adult under Section 18(3) of the Act, his bail application shall be entertained under Section 12 of the Act -- Bail to a CIL may be denied if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that his release is likely to bring him into association with any known criminal or expose him to any moral, physical or psychological danger, or his release would defeat the ends of justice.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 12, 18(3) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012) Section 5(j)(ii), 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(3), 506 -- POCSO – Rape -- Child in conflict with law – Bail – Both the CIL and the victim were neighbours -- Both were young, the CIL was 17 years of age, whereas, the victim has stated her age as 15 years -- Victim has already been examined at trial -- After 6 months of pregnancy, the incident could be revealed -- FIR records that 4/5 times, the relationship were established -- Various questions would find deliberation during trial, which includes whether the relationship were consensual? Whether the parties were in relationship? If for the first time the offence was done, why the victim did not raise any alarm? Where the incident took place? etc. -- Social Investigation Report does not reveal anything adverse against the CIL -- The CIL was a student at the relevant time studying in class XII -- His conduct was good with everyone -- Fit case for bail and the CIL deserves to be enlarged on bail – Bail allowed.

(Para 14-16)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 188, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty – Quashing of police report -- Entire allegations, which would attract offences u/s 498A of IPC alleged to be committed by the 1st accused is outside India -- Matter would come with the ambit of Section 188 of Cr.P.C -- Therefore, proceedings without obtaining prior sanction as contemplated u/s 188 Cr.P.C. is vitiated -- Petition allowed, criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 1, 12, 13)

Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Petitioner continued to indulge in sexual relationship with prosecutrix on the pretext of marriage for the last 3-4 years -- She lodged the FIR only because the petitioner had betrayed and left her -- Prosecutrix was 26 years of age when her statement u/s 164 Cr. P. C. was recorded -- She is a grown-up and mature lady capable of understanding the consequences of the acts in which she had indulged with the petitioner – No offence u/s 376 IPC is made out against the petitioner and if the investigation in the FIR impugned is allowed to be continued, it would amount to abuse of process of law -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural sex by husband – Quashing of FIR/ charge -- Consent -- Respondent no.2/wife was residing with her husband during the subsistence of their marriage and as per amended definition of "rape" u/s 375 of IPC by which insertion of penis in the mouth of a woman has also been included in the definition of "rape" and any sexual intercourse or act, by the husband with his wife not below the age of fifteen years is not a rape, therefore, consent is immaterial – Held, allegations made in the FIR does not constitute offence u/s 377 of IPC against the petitioner no.1 -- Offence u/s 377 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 5, 15, 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Obscene act in any public place -- Prima facie, there is no evidence available on record by which it can be ascertained that the accused persons have committed any obscene act in any public place – Said incidents have been occurred in the premises of the house which is surrounded by walls, hence offence u/s 294 of IPC is not made out against the petitioners -- Offence u/s 294 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 16, 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation – Quashing of FIR -- An omnibus statement regarding threatening to kill, which is not sufficient to establish the charge of offence u/s 506 of IPC because the said threaten must consist the ingredients of fear and frightening -- Allegations not containing any date, time and place -- Respondent no.2 had never stated that she was frightened by said threatening, hence offence u/s 506 of IPC not made out against the petitioners -- Offence u/s 506 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 17, 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty – Dowry case -- To make out an offence u/s 498A IPC complainant has not only to allege demand for dowry but also that she was subjected to cruelty by her husband or relatives of the husband for non-fulfilment of their unlawful demand.

(Para 18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry death – Appeal against acquittal -- Parents-in-law -- They were residing separately and had no occasion to harass the deceased -- Difficult to believe the prosecution case that parent-in-paw used to harass the deceased on account of dowry soon before her death – Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the complicity of the parents-in-law of the deceased was not established based on the evidence led before it – High Court will not interfere with the same even if an alternative view is possible – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 30-33)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 406, 384, 420, 120(B) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Matrimonial dispute  -- Quashing of FIR – Misue of State machinery – One FIR at Hisar – Other at Udaipur – Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 misusing their official position by lodging complaints one after the other – Further, their conduct of neither appearing before the Trial Court at Hisar nor withdrawing their complaint at Hisar, would show that their only intention was to harass the appellant by first making him face a trial at Hisar and then again at Udaipur – Argument that no offence was committed in Hisar but only at Udaipur was also not correct – Court deprecated this practice of state machinery being misused for ulterior motives, imposed cost of Rs. 5,00,000/- on the respondent No.2 – FIR at Udaipur quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 205, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 469, 471, 180, 120-B -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 23 -- Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Section 67B -- POCSO -- Permanent exemption from personal appearance – Charges framed on 14.07.2023 and only 5 PWs out of 15, have been examined so far – Personal appearance of the petitioners before the learned trial Court exempted subject to conditions.

(Para 6, 7)

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 15, 18 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 342, 302, 201 – Acquittal -- POCSO – Murder -- Child in conflict with law/ CCIL – Preliminary assessment – Mandate of – Investigating Officer and Trial Court was aware of the fact that Accused/ appellant was juvenile -- In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused – Held, procedure adopted by the Sessions Court in conducting the trial of the accused appellant is de hors the mandatory requirements of JJ Act -- Entire proceedings stand vitiated – Such an exercise at this stage would be sheer futility because now the appellant is nearly 23 years of age – Impugned judgment quashed and set aside -- Appellant ordered to be released forthwith.

(Para 25, 26, 38-51)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 501, 182, 183 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 -- Discharge in rape case – Defamation -- Discharged by holding that there is no incriminating evidence  -- No finding that the petitioner had been falsely implicated on the basis of false statements and fabrication of evidence – No finding of any Court or any Investigating Officer that false statements had been made – For offence u/s 193 IPC, the provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. were to be resorted to which had not been done -- Offence u/s 182 IPC is also not made out -- Even otherwise, the charge were framed -- No evidence of the filing of a false complaint to defame the petitioner – Dismissal of complaint upheld.

(Para 10, 11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – Regular bail -- Speedy trial -- “Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception” -- Right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained person -- However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal jurisprudence, which is “the presumption of innocence”, besides the gravity of offence(s) involved.

(Para 8)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 18 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO -- Attempt to unnatural offence -- Regular bail -- Petitioner is not involved in any other criminal case -- Statement of victim (minor child), recorded u/s 164 Cr.P.C, does not support the case of prosecution -- No fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars, who has faced incarceration of about 07 months and 10 days -- Trial is not likely to conclude anytime soon – Bail allowed.

(Para 1, 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3/4, 5(d)/6, 42 -- Rape of minor girl aged 7 years – Sentence of punishment -- Appellant was aged 40 year at the time of offence -- High Court commuted Capital sentence to life sentence -- Court are also to take into account the present age of the petitioner and the fact that he has already undergone the incarceration – Life sentence modified to a fixed term of sentence of 30 years with fine of Rs.1 lac.

(Para 7, 16, 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 376 AB – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3/4, 5(d)/6, 42 -- Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age – Sentence for 30 years -- Fine for medical expenses -- When a sentence of imprisonment for a term not less than 20 years which may extend upto life imprisonment is imposed, the convict is also liable to suffer a sentence of fine which shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim which quantified as Rupees One Lakh and the same shall be paid to the victim with respect to the conviction u/s 363, IPC -- No separate sentence for the aforesaid offence under POCSO Act is to be imposed on the petitioner-convict.

(Para 11, 16, 17, 20)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(8), 190 – Further investigation – Protest petition -- Second respondent was not put up for trial for offences u/s 376, 417 and 420 of IPC – Appellant, instead of moving protest petition, moved an application captioned as “under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C.” -- Averments made in that application reveal that the appellant protested against deletion of charges u/s 376, 417 and 420 of IPC and she made an endeavour to bring on record the material which would prima facie establish the commission of these offences – Magistrate can treat it as Protest Petition and then decide the same on merits -- A technicality like the caption of the application/petition could not be an impediment.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 325, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Summoning to husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law – Quashing of :

-- Complainant alleged that she was beaten up and a fracture was caused in her hand, no medical documents were produced by her either before the Magistrate or with the counter affidavit filed in this Court to support this contention.

-- Stated in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. that she was treated with great affection and respect by the grandfather of the applicant no.1 and her ill treatment and harassment started after his death, in the statement recorded u/s 200 Cr.P.C., the opposite party no.2/complainant stated that she was harassed for demanding dowry from the day following the date of her marriage.

-- At the same time, in the counter affidavit filed before this court, she stated that after the marriage, she had gone with her husband for honeymoon to Dubai and both of them had a very pleasant trip.

-- Complaint application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C filed after receipt of summon of the suit and after the suit filed under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act and after the Family Court had granted last opportunity to the opposite party no.2 to file her written statement and even after the date of that last opportunity had expired.

The learned Magistrate erred in summoning the applicants to face the trial without there being any specific allegation of commission of any act by the applicant nos. 2 and 3 which may amount to an offence -- Moreover, there is absolutely no material to support the allegations against the applicant no. 1 – Summoning order/ complaint quashed.

(Para 19-33

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 9 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) -- Restitution of conjugal rights – Criminal proceedings – Opposite party no.2/ complainant/ wife filed the application u/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. merely to put pressure on the applicants and other members of their family for restitution of her matrimonial relationship with the applicant no.1/ husband -- However, she had filed a suit u/s 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act with the same objective, which has been dismissed by the Family Court -- Criminal prosecution cannot be allowed to be misused for ulterior objective to put undue pressure on the husband, his family members and relatives for restitution of conjugal rights.

(Para 30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Rape – False promise to marry -- If the consent of the victim is based on misconception, such consent is immaterial as it is not a voluntary consent -- If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2), 377, 504, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – False promise to marry – Quashing of charge-sheet -- Physical relationship started in 2012, though prosecutrix claimed that it was a forced relationship, she did not make any grievance about it till February 2018 -- In February 2013 and in December 2017, the prosecutrix was pregnant -- It is not the case of the prosecutrix that from February 2013 to December 2017, the appellant forced the second respondent to maintain the physical relationship -- In July 2017, there was an engagement ceremony between the appellant and the prosecutrix – Taking the prosecution case as correct, it is not possible to accept that the prosecutrix maintained a physical relationship only because the appellant had given a promise of marriage – Charge-sheet and further proceedings quashed.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 – Cruelty to wife -- Anticipatory bail – Non-performing of conjugal rights – Ground of -- High Court dismissed the petition by observing that in view of the adamant attitude of the appellant in not resuming the conjugal life with the opposite party No.2 in the house of the appellant, where the opposite party No.2 was staying, his petition could not be considered – Held, neither such condition should have been imposed by the High Court while granting an anticipatory bail, nor such could be a ground for rejection of the petition filed by the appellant – Order set aside, in case of arrest of the appellant, he ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 Exception 2, 294, 376(2)(n), 377, 498A, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape/ Unnatural offence – Husband and wife – Second marriage without divorce -- Quashing of FIR -- As per the amended definition of section 375 (2013), if offender and victim are husband and wife then consent is immaterial and no offence u/s 375 is made out and as such there is no punishment u/s 376 of IPC -- There is repugnancy in the situation when everything is repealed u/s 375 then how offence u/s 377 would be attracted if it is committed between husband and wife.

-- Marriage was solemnized between petitioner and complainant as per Adivasi customs and approval to second marriage for tribes and considered its legal sanctity, the marriage of the petitioner even though divorce from first wife did not take place, cannot be considered to be illegal act on the part of the petitioner as also respondent No.2 has admitted that she is the wife of the petitioner.

-- Petitioner is not punitive for the offence punishable u/s 376(2)(n) and Section 377 of IPC -- For constituting offence u/s 498-A IPC, there is no allegation of any demand of dowry -- For other offences i.e. Sections 294 and 506 of IPC, no date, place and time has been disclosed and as such the complaint is a malicious prosecution as there was inter se dispute between husband and wife.

Petition allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 11-22)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 406, 34 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Matrimonial dispute -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- It was a matrimonial dispute which has been amicably settled and thus the parties must be given a chance to move on with their lives -- FIR and consequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Mediation settlement – Printed Performa -- Settlement agreements drafted by the Mediation Centres on a printed proforma – Settlement on the printed proforma sometimes gives an impression that there is no application of mind and the settlement deed has been drafted mechanically -- Mediation Centres and the Family Courts directed to ensure that the settlement deeds are drafted properly and it should not be on a printed proforma.

(Para 11)

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005),  Section 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Domestic violence case – Speedy disposal – Case of 2019 -- Petitioner is a senior citizen of 82 years of age, falls in a distinctive category, qua which directions have been given by High Court, from time to time, for expeditious disposal of the matters relating to the senior citizens i.e. who are 65 years of age or above – Ld. Lower Court shall remain sensitized about the said instructions and proceed further to decide the application for interim relief and to hear the arguments on the application on 04.08.2023 and if not possible to hear the arguments on the said date, the same shall be heard and decided, within a period of one week thereafter – Ld. Lower Court shall ensure expeditious disposal of the main petition.

(Para 4, 5)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366 -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Penetrative sexual assault – Marriage with minor girl – Acquittal -- In statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC, the victim deposed that she was in love with the appellant, had consumed poison, and had even been hospitalized because she was adamant to live with the appellant -- No doubt, she resiled from her statement, yet, the medical evidence indicated that the victim had a ruptured hymen; there was no external injury at her private parts – Prosecution was not able to establish that there was any penetrative sexual assault as a result of coercion or compulsion on the part of the appellant – Held, M’s statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC contained a truthful narration of the events -- Impugned judgment set aside the charge u/s 366 IPC against the appellant -- Charges u/s 6 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, cannot be sustained -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 20-22)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376AB, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Penetrative sexual assault -- Rape on woman under 12 years of age/Section 376AB IPC – Regular bail -- During the trial, victim aged about 14 years (PW1) and informant (PW2), mother of the victim, have been examined – Victim (PW1) and her mother (PW2) did not support the case of the prosecution and applicant has no criminal history – Held, there is no reason to keep the applicant behind the bars for an indefinite period, therefore, without expressing any opinion as to the merit of the case, applicant deserves bail at this stage -- Bail allowed.

(Para 4-7)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 363, 377, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – POCSO matter – Regular bail -- FSL report has shown the offence having been committed by the petitioner -- However, it is not disputed that the complainant and the father of the victim have not supported the case of the prosecution and that the petitioner is in custody for the past about more than two years and two months -- No other case -- Petitioner ordered to be released on bail pending trial.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Aggravated penetrative sexual assault – Punishment – Amendment of 2019 – Effect of -- On the date of the commission of the offence, R.I. for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed -- From 16th August 2019, the minimum sentence has been enhanced to twenty years -- However, the amended provision will not apply as the incident has taken place prior to 16th August 2019.

(Para 10)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Less than minimum sentence – Power of Court -- When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than….”, the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence - - Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence -- No such provision in the POCSO Act -- No question of showing any leniency.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Rape – Ingredients -- Consent of the opposite sex -- If there is an element of consent available or is apparently made out from allegations, it cannot be termed to be a rape -- It is only when the ingredient of Section 375 of the IPC is satisfied in the FIR registered by the complainant, that a person could be punished for the penal provisions provided under Section 376 of the IPC, and not otherwise.

(Para 4, 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal case -- Consensual sex on pretext of marriage -- For over the last 1-1/2 decades, prosecutrix was in an intimate relationship with the applicant -- Physical relationship was established at the residence of both the parties and even after, when the applicant had even got married with some other lady -- When the complainant had voluntarily established a relationship even after knowing the fact, that the applicant is already a married person, the element of consent itself imbibes in it -- Falsity of an assurance of marriage is to be tested at its initial stage of inception, and not at a subsequent stage -- Initial stage, cannot be said to have been prolonged for 15 years, and even continued after the marriage of the applicant – Criminal case quashed.

(Para 6-14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of Final report/ Police report -- Consensual relationship – Prosecutrix was a married woman having her husband and children and was fully aware that the petitioner was also a married man -- She maintained sexual relationship with the accused on many occasions and stayed with the petitioner/ accused in a room in a hotel -- It is difficult to conclude that the prosecutrix had not given consent for the sexual relationship -- Impugned criminal proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed, exercising the inherent power conferred on the Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. – Petition allowed.

(Para 22-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Delay of 28 days in giving the complaint – To commit the offence punishable u/s 376 IPC no sane person would take two accomplices, that too after committing a similar offence earlier -- Complainant was not present on both the occasions -- There is no attempt to recover the knife from the appellant as it is a specific case of the prosecution that he committed the offence by threatening to harm the prosecutrix -- No reason as to why the sole eye-witness has not been examined – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 8-13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Statement of prosecutrix -- Evidence of the prosecutrix will have to be kept at a higher pedestal but then, such a testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court -- It has to be seen contextually in the light of the other evidence available.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(N), 506, 294, 323 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 – Rape – Quashing of FIR – Delay in lodging of FIR – Long standing relationship between prosecutrix and petitioner – There is no allegation that there was false promise to marry – There is also FIR against other men by prosecutrix which shows that FIR has been lodged malafidely due to break in their relationship or for some other ulterior motives – FIR quashed, writ petition allowed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 325 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Miscarriage – No medical evidence -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though wife of the complainant, was pregnant, there is absolutely no evidence on record of a miscarriage having taken place on account of beatings being meted out by the petitioners and their co-accused -- Similarly, there is absolutely no evidence of the injured suffering an injury attracting Section 325 IPC -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 342, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful confinement -- House trespass – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Complainant party and the accused reside on different floors of the same house -- Therefore, while on the one hand, it is doubtful if either of the offence was made out, on the other hand, it would be a travesty of justice to allow the instant proceedings to continue against the petitioners given the fact that there are multiple litigations pending between the parties, and therefore, their false implication cannot be ruled out – Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Hurt – Long delay -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though prima facie, the medical evidence would suggest that an offence is made out, however, the occurrence pertains to September 2006, the present complaint came to be instituted in June 2012, the summoning order came to be passed in August 2016 and the matter has come up for hearing now in May 2023 -- Therefore, it would be a travesty of justice to permit the prosecution of the petitioners for an offence u/s 323 IPC alone after 17 years of the alleged occurrence -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 438 -- Anticipatory bail -- Rape – Consenting party --  Misrepresentation -- In statement u/s 164 prosecutrix has categorically stated that they became friends through Facebook; he told her that he is Hindu and on his Facebook profile also he used his surname as “Dixit” and at the inception of the relationship applicant/ accused misrepresented himself and trapped the prosecutrix in his love; had applicant/accused not misrepresented to be of her faith, the prosecutrix would not have given in to the applicant/accused – Anticipatory Bail rejected.

(Para 4-6)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Proof -- It is a basic rule of the criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however, strong cannot take place of proof – In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof -- Large distance between “may be true” and “must be true”, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution.

(Para 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Acquittal -- Dowry death – Demand of dowry – Presumption -- Prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassed by the appellants for or in connection with any demand of dowry – In order to presume the dowry death, it is a condition precedent that there must be unimpeachable evidence in relation to dowry demand -- As per evidence on record, there is no positive and cogent evidence about demand of dowry, and, nexus between demand of dowry and harassment could not be established -- Therefore, conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 38-41)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6, 19, 21 -- Child rape victim – Marital status -- There is no distinct category within child victims of rape as those who are married and those who are not.

(Para 12)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19, 21, 42A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198(1), 198(3) – Child victim -- Mandatory reporting of an offence -- Held, Section 19 read with Section 21 of the POCSO Act shall override the restrictions imposed under Section 198(1) read with Section 198(3) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 16)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 19, 21 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 472, 473 -- Child victim – Delay in reporting of offence – Extension of limitation -- In appropriate cases where minor victims are not able to file their complaints within time, the Trial Court has the power to extend the period of limitation, if it deems appropriate.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)