Search By Topic: Corruption Law

1. (SC) 09-08-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Bail – Principles – Court observed, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment -- On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, Supreme Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency -- Trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail -- Trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.

(Para 53)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 45 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 7A, 8, 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 201, 120B -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Corruption case -- Regular bail – Bar contained in Section 45 of PMLA – Prolonged incarnation – Speedy trial – Right of -- Long incarceration running for around 17 months, trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial – Right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights – 493 witnesses have been named, the case involves thousands of pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents -- Not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future – Keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail allowed, stringent conditions imposed.

(Para 49-58)

5. (SC) 03-08-2023

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the trial -- Such issue of course, could be raised before the Court in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the powers of such court would be subject to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act.

(Para 10)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution – Validity of -- Competence of the court trying the accused would be dependent upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of validity of sanction at the earliest point of time -- In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law.

(Para 10)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution from Superior authority – Validity of – Challenge to -- Special Judge, while dismissing the third application filed by the respondent seeking discharge after examination of 17 witnesses by the prosecution, specifically held that the sanction accorded by the government which was a superior authority to the Karnataka Water Supply Board, of which the respondent was an employee, was proper and valid -- Such findings recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent challenging the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused as contemplated in the said sub-section (3).

(Para 14)

D. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 -- Corruption case – Sanction for prosecution -- Discharge of accused -- Interlocutory application seeking discharge in the midst of trial would not be maintainable -- Once the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge and the charge was framed against the accused, the trial could neither have been stayed nor scuttled in the midst of it in view of Section 19(3) of the said Act -- Issue of validity of sanction was raised at the earlier point of time, the same was not pressed for -- Only stage open to the accused in that situation was to raise the said issue at the final arguments in the trial in accordance with law.

(Para 15)

8. (SC) 28-04-2023

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 173(2)(i), 190, 200, 202 – Submission of Final report – Role of Magistrate -- Magistrate may either:

(1) accept the report and take cognizance of offence and issue process,

(2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or may take cognizance on the basis of report/material submitted by the investigation officer,

(3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require police to make a report as per Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

(4) may treat the protest complaint as a complaint, and proceed under Sections 200 and 202 of the CrPC.

(Para 49)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2)(i), 173(8) – Final Police Report -- Further investigation – Delay -- Mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further investigation if that would help the court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial and effective justice.

(Para 50)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1) -- Final Police Report – Cognizance by Magistrate -- Further investigation – Power of police -- Sub section (8) of Section 173 of the CrPC permits further investigation, and even dehors any direction from the court, it is open to the police to conduct proper investigation, even after the court takes cognizance of any offence on the strength of a police report earlier submitted.

(Para 64)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), 190(1) -- Final Police Report – Acceptance by Magistrate – Further investigation – Double jeopardy – Hearing to accused -- There is no bar against conducting further investigation u/s 173(8) of the CrPC after the final report submitted u/s 173(2) of the CrPC has been accepted:

-- Prior to carrying out further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC it is not necessary that the order accepting the final report should be reviewed, recalled or quashed.

-- Further investigation is merely a continuation of the earlier investigation, hence it cannot be said that the accused are being subjected to investigation twice over. Moreover, investigation cannot be put at par with prosecution and punishment so as to fall within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution. The principle of double jeopardy would, therefore, not be applicable to further investigation.

-- There is nothing in the CrPC to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused while considering an application for further investigation under Section 173(8) of the CrPC.

(Para 64-77)

E. Precedents – High Court order -- Contrary view from co-ordinate Bench – Sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers – Ground of Per incuriam – While it is open to a learned Judge to differ with a view of a Co-ordinate Bench the sequitur is to make a reference to a larger Bench on papers being placed before the learned Chief Justice -- The learned Judge cannot simply say "with due respect, I do not agree to the ratio..." or “the decision is per incuriam as a binding judgment of the Supreme Court has not been considered….” and proceed to take a contrary view as done in the impugned order -- Such an approach would result in conflicting opinions of Co-ordinate Benches, resulting in judicial chaos and is, thus, improper -- This is something atrocious and unacceptable.

(Para 24, 81)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173(2), 173(8), Section 173(2), 173(8) -- Further investigation after long lapse of time -- It is settled law that the criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the Society even though it has been committed against an individual -- Normally, in serious offences, prosecution is launched by the State and a Court of law has no power to throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay -- Mere delay in approaching a Court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case -- Though it may be a relevant circumstance in reaching a final verdict -- Assurance of a fair trial is to be the first imperative in the dispensation of justice.

(Para 84-86)

G. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(e), 17 – Criminal misconduct by public servant -- Investigation by police – Consent order from Superintendent of police or and higher officer in rank – Nature of -- A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for such offence is commenced -- Before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is necessary.

(Para 88)

15. (P&H HC) 19-10-2022

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 197 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of -- Cognizance by court – Power of – Nature of -- Even at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., while directing an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate -- Court concerned cannot act in a mechanical and mindless manner -- Application of mind should be reflected in the order -- Mere statement, that he (Presiding Officer) has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant as reflected in the impugned order will not be sufficient and on this sole ground the impugned order being vitiated, deserves to be set aside.

(Para 26)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 11, 12, 13(1)d, 13(2), 15, 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Corruption case -- Cognizance by Magistrate/ Special court -- Sanction from Government – Requirement of – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, no Court can take congnizance of offences punishable u/s 7, 11, 13 and 15 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government --  Order directing investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of a valid sanction u/s 19 of the Act, 1988 -- No such previous sanction/approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 25, 27)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Money Laundering case -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, police cannot investigate offences punishable u/s 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government in this regard -- Further, the police cannot take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government by general or a special order -- Respondent No.2 failed to produce copy of any such general or special order passed by the Central Government -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 3, 6, 12 – Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 10,11, 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) –Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Sanction is required to prosecute the public servants under various provisions of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 – No such previous sanction/ approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal is hereby set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 27, 28)

E. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 21,22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 -- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), Section 11,15, 16,17, 19, 25 -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45-A, 46, 47, 48, 49 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by Court – Power of -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- No Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act 1986; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 except on a complaint made by a Board or any officer authorized in this behalf -- No prior notice was issued by respondent No.2 to prosecute the petitioners as required -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22, 27)

F. Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 250, 251, 260, 265, 309, 310, 380, 382, 384 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by court – Power of -- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 except on the complaint made by the competent authority.

(Para 21)

16. (SC) 11-10-2022

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 – Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (45 of 2003), Section 8(1)(f) -- Sanction of prosecution of public servant – Accountability of -- Accountability has three essential constituent dimensions. (i) responsibility, (ii) answerability and (iii) enforceability -- Responsibility requires the identification of duties and performance obligations of individuals in authority and with authorities -- Answerability requires reasoned decision-making so that those affected by their decisions, including the public, are aware of the same -- Enforceability requires appropriate corrective and remedial action against lack of responsibility and accountability to be taken -- Responsibility for grant of sanction for prosecution of a public servant u/s Section 19 of the PC Act is always vested in the appointing authority -- Identification of appointing authority is always clear and straightforward -- The 2018 amendment in fact, evidences legislative incorporation of answerability, the second constituent of accountability -- For enforceability, Parliament has expressly empowered the Central Vigilance Commission under Section 8(1)(f) of the CVC Act to review the progress of the applications pending with the competent authorities, and this function must take within its sweep the power to deal with the consequences of failure of the competent authority to comply with its statutory duty.

(Para 33-36)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19 – Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 (45 of 2003), Section 8(1)(f) -- Sanction of prosecution of public servant – Non-compliance of -- Upon expiry of the three months and the additional one-month period, the aggrieved party, be it the complainant, accused or victim, would be entitled to approach the concerned writ court to seek appropriate remedies, including directions for action on the request for sanction and for the corrective measure on accountability that the sanctioning authority bears – Period of three months, extended by one more month for legal consultation, is mandatory -- Consequence of non-compliance with this mandatory requirement shall not be quashing of the criminal proceeding for that very reason -- Competent authority shall be Accountable for the delay and be subject to judicial review and administrative action by the CVC under Section 8(1)(f) of the CVC Act.

(Para 37, 38)