A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 18, 19 -- Offer of possession made on 04.02.2014 -- ADA issued reminders to the appellant on 22.09.2014, 21.11.2014 and 17.01.2018 -- Additionally, ADA accepted the appellant's payment of Rs. 3,43,178/- on 20.06.2019 without any reservations -- NCDRC correctly applied Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which extend the limitation period where part payments or acknowledgments are made -- Consequently, the cause of action continued to exist, and the filing of the complaint in July 2020 is within the limitation period.

(Para 16)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Pecuniary jurisdiction -- Respondent ADA challenged the pecuniary jurisdiction of the NCDRC, contending that the total payment made by the appellant amounted to Rs. 59,97,178/-, which was less than Rs. 1 crore -- Claim made by the appellant also included compensation for mental agony, harassment, and loss of income, which brought the total claim well above Rs. 1 crore -- In consumer disputes, the value of the claim is determined not just by the amount deposited but by the aggregate relief sought, which includes compensation and other claims -- NCDRC rightly held that it had the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and this Court affirms that finding.

(Para 18, 19)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 19(10) -- Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction, Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010 (U.P. Act No. 16 of 2010), Section 4(5) -- Offer of possession -- Completion certificate -- Firefighting clearance certificate – Requirement of -- A developer must obtain these certificates before offering possession -- Possession offered without the requisite completion certificate is illegal, and a purchaser cannot be compelled to take possession in such circumstances -- ADA’s failure to provide the required certificates justifies the appellant’s refusal to take possession --  Entire amount deposited by the appellant ordered to be refunded with interest 9% per annum from the date of complaint till the date of refund, the ADA is directed to pay an additional amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakhs only) to the appellant.

(Para 20-23)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(g), 17 –Deficiency in service by Hospital -- Dead body of father of complainant handed over to another family – That family cremated the said body – Appellants-Hospital could not have avoided their liability on account of deficiency of service -- NCDRC directed the appellant-Hospital to pay only a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the complainants and with a further direction that a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- be deposited with the Consumer Legal Aid Account of the State Commission – Held, no justification for passing such an order – Rs.25,00,000/- compensation awarded by SCDRC affirmed to be paid to respondent/ complainant with interest.

(Para 8-12)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C – Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 42 -- Public Utility service – Electricity billing dispute – Alternative dispute redressal mechanism -- Prima facie the dispute does not pertain to ‘supply of electricity and rather it is a ‘billing dispute’ – Being the technical dispute the legislature provided for the dispute redressal mechanism under the Act – Dispute essentially and primarily required to be raised before the forum so prescribed under the Statute – Proceedings before Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services) not maintainable.

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Investment in partnership firm – Consumer complaint – Maintainability of -- Investment made by the complainant was for deriving benefit by getting an interest @ 18% per annum, therefore, it would be an investment for profit/gain -- It was a commercial transaction and therefore also would be outside the purview of the 1986 Act -- Commercial disputes cannot be decided in summary proceeding under the 1986 Act but the appropriate remedy for recovery of the said amount, if any, admissible to the complainant-respondent No.1, would be before the Civil Court -- Complaint was thus not maintainable.

(Para 7)

B. Partnership firm – Death of partner – Liability of Legal heirs -- Legal heirs of a deceased partner do not become liable for any liability of the firm upon the death of the partner.

(Para 8)

A. Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (11 of 1995), Section 45 – Residual claim left over by RERA – Maintainability of revision before Government -- When the respondent left aside the residual claims and restricted her prayers in consonance with the provisions of the RERA Act only, specifically u/s  18 thereof, then it could be said that filing of revision petition before the Government u/s 45 of the PRTPD Act was the only appropriate alternative remedy -- No challenge to the order passed by the Chief Administrator, PUDA was made as projected by the appellant -- Such objection was neither taken by the appellant before the Authority nor before the Appellate Tribunal and was raised for the first time at this belated stage only does not hold any substance and therefore, challenge on this ground cannot be sustained.

(Para 14)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 2(zk) – Promoter – Development Authority -- Definition of promoter explicitly covers “Development Authority”, therefore, there remains no doubt that appellant was very well covered within the ambit of promoter as stipulated under the RERA Act.

(Para 16)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 18 -- Delay in possession – Interest for delayed period -- Basic amenities – Requirement of – “as is where is” basis – Effect of -- Appellate Tribunal held respondent entitle to interest on delayed possession -- If on account of presence of this clause in the allotment letter, appellant could be absolved of any liability, then there was no need for it to invest its resources and time in this work -- “development work” was the responsibility of the appellant -- Mere physical possession without any basic amenities would serve no purpose as to carry out construction work and commercial activity over the site in question, the respondent required all necessary basic amenities -- To start the construction work at a site, many machineries require supply of electricity which was a basic amenity, therefore, Appellate Tribunal rightly held that the sites were ready for possession on 19.10.2017 only -- No concession can be claimed by the appellant/ Development Authority being State in comparison to a private promoter -- Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, upheld.

(Para 2, 17-23)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Consumer complaint -- Non-filing of written version by opposite party – Right to argue -- Although the opposite party had not filed its version and may not have participated in the proceedings before the NCDRC, nevertheless, had the right to address final arguments before the NCDRC -- Since the request for adjournment was refused and only the complainant was heard on merits, there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice -- Impugned orders set aside, matter remanded to the NCDRC to grant a reasonable opportunity to both sides to address arguments on merits.

(Para 9)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Revision – Delay of 854 day – Condonation of delay – District Forum allowed the complaint directing the HUDA to issue the allotment letter – Appeal dismissed by State Commission – HUDA had taken a decision that the Revision Petition not be filed – When notice was issued to the HUDA in the execution proceedings, the Revision Petition was filed with a delay of 854 days – NCDRC was of the opinion that such delay cannot be condoned – No reason to interfere with the impugned order.

(Para 2-5)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Second complaint -- Withdrawal of the earlier complaint – Bar to second complaint -- Having not argued, before the State Commission, the point of the present complaint being barred in view of the withdrawal of the earlier complaint, the National Commission was not justified, in allowing the respondent-Insurance Company to urge that point therefrom.

(Para 5)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 1(4) -- Theft of vehicle --Withdrawal of the complaint – Maintainability of second complaint – Complaint filed after theft due to non-settlement of claim by the Insurance Company -- Repudiation of the claim was made during the pendency of the said complaint -- Complaint withdrawn by the advocate on the pretext of the case being prolonged by the advocate of the Insurance Company, without having express instructions for withdrawal of the said complaint -- For the fault of the advocate, the complainant cannot be made to suffer -- Complaint cannot be thrown out on the threshold of Order XXIII Rule (1)(4) CPC and in the peculiar facts, it requires consideration on merits.

(Para 8)

C. Insurance law -- Theft of vehicle -- Repudiation of claim -- Non-standard claim -- Vehicle left unattended by driver with keys inside -- It is not the case of the Insurance Company that the Claimant consented or connived in the removal of the vehicle, would not be theft, in the eye of law -- Time gap between the driver alighting from the vehicle and noticing the theft, is very short as is clear from the facts of the case -- It was not a fundamental breach of Condition warranting total repudiation -- 75% ought to have been awarded on a non-standard basis.

(Para 11-16)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12, 17, 21 -- Manufacturing defect in vehicle – Refund -- Being an admitted fact that the vehicle had some manufacturing defects and despite replacement of the engine, the vehicle has been alleged to be not road worthy, Court directed:

-- the appellant/ manufacturer to pay a sum of Rs.42,00,000/- to the respondent/ complainant  minus Rs.6,00,000/- already paid.

-- the appellant/ manufacturer shall also pay a sum of Rs.87,000/- towards insurance of the vehicle which the respondent/ complainant has already paid to the insurance company.

-- on receipt of amount of Rs.36,87,000/- from the appellant, the respondent/ complainant shall handover the subject-vehicle to the appellant/ manufacturer.

(Para 6)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Theft of money from railway passenger -- If the passenger is not able to protect his own belongings, the Railways cannot be held responsible.

(Para 4, 5)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Insurance claim – Damage to tractor in fire incident -- Tractor cannot be restricted in its use only within the purchaser’s premises -- When the tractor-in-question got damaged in a fire incident it was actually employed in agricultural pursuits -- Insurance cover specifically provides that the policy does not cover use of tractor for organized racing, pace making, reliability trails and speed testing -- Tractor-in-question was not being used for any such thing at the time of incident -- Further, the insurance certificate specifically covers the fire allied perils; therefore, the insurance company cannot be absolved of its liability to indemnify the insured.

(Para 7)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Insurance claim -- Commercial use of tractor – Violation of terms and conditions of insurance policy -- Evidence -- Contention that at the time of incident the tractor-in-question was being used for threshing the wheat of one SS on hire and reward purposes, which was against and in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy -- Wife sworn an affidavit specifically deposing that his deceased husband had sold the standing wheat crop to claimant and said claimant was threshing the same being his personal property when the incident of fire had taken place -- Nine more witnesses have deposed the same thing -- Thus, it cannot be said that claimant was using his tractor for hire and reward purposes -- Award of rupees four lacs on 08.06.2012 and till now more than eleven years have elapsed -- Awarded amount shall carry 6% interest from the date of filing of the complaint.

(Para 8)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12(1)(c) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 8 – Representative complaint -- Joint consumer complaint – Need for the application of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which speaks of a plaintiff representing the other public as a whole would be required only in a case involving a complaint under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1986 Act – It does not have any application when similarly placed complainants jointly make a complaint seeking the very same relief -- In such a case, there is no question of Order I Rule 8 CPC being complied with as they do not represent the others, particularly when there is no larger public interest involved -- Such complainants seek reliefs for themselves and nothing beyond.

(Para 17)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(b)(i) – Consumer -- Definition of ‘complainant’ under Section 2(b)(i) of the 1986 Act, will include multiple consumers.

(Para 19)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(g) – Deficiency in service – There was no wilful fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the discharge of the duty on the part of the employees of the appellants’ bank, which could be termed as “deficiency in service” under Section 2(1)(g) of the said Act – Complaint dismissed.

(Para 11-13)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(g) – Deficiency in service – Fraud – Tort -- Proceedings before the Commission being summary in nature, the complaints involving highly disputed questions of facts or the cases involving tortious acts or criminality like fraud or cheating, could not be decided by the Forum/Commission under the said Act -- “deficiency in service” has to be distinguished from the criminal acts or tortious acts.

(Para 12)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(g) – Deficiency in service – Burdon of proof -- There could not be any presumption with regard to the wilful fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance in service, as contemplated in Section 2(1)(g) of the Act -- Burden of proving the deficiency in service would always be upon the person alleging it.

(Para 12)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Standard fire and special perils policy – Devastating fire in factory premises – Repudiation of claim – Reason for repudiation on the premise that appellant failed to submit the required documents which is in breach of condition no. 6(b) of the policy – Held, whatever the material documents available with the insured were indisputedly made available to the Surveyor – Once assessment has been made regarding the loss/damage which took place due to fire and that was not disputed by the respondent Company, repudiating the claim invoking clause 6(b) of the policy was unfair and is not legally sustainable.

(Para 1, 2, 16)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 23 – Long time in decision -- NCDRC took in excess of 10 (ten) months to dismiss the complaint after it reserved the same for passing orders – Held, long delay in passing the order on the complaint did have its own effect on the ultimate decision of the NCDRC.

(Para 8)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(r), 23 -- Unfair trade practice -- Non-providing of amenities by builder -- It was the duty of the NCDRC to ascertain, based on the materials on record, whether if at all and to what extent facilities and amenities as promised were offered and/or whether there was any deficiency of service – Once the NCDRC arrived at a finding that the respondents were casual in their approach and had even resorted to unfair trade practice, it was its obligation to consider the appellants’ grievance objectively and upon application of mind and thereafter give its reasoned decision – Matter remanded back to NCDRC.

(Para 8-12, 20)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(r) -- Unfair trade practice -- Non-providing of amenities by builder – Registration of sale deed – Forfeiture of rights – Appellants had not forfeited any right by registration of the sale deeds and if indeed the respondents were remiss in providing any of the facilities/ amenities as promised in the brochure/ advertisement, it was the duty of the NCDRC to set things right.

(Para 12)

D. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(r) -- Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (LIX of 1980), Section 393, 394, 403 -- Calcutta Municipal Corporation Buildings Rules, 1990, Rule 26 --  Completion certificate – It is the obligation of the person intending to erect a building or to execute works to apply for completion certificate -- It is no part of the flat owner’s duty to apply for a completion certificate – Respondents/ builder have been let off by the NCDRC in a manner contrary to law – Matter remitted back to NCDRC.

(Para 17-20)

E. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(r), 23 -- Unfair trade practice -- Compensation -- Appellants failed to give detailed particulars and have also been on the wrong side of law by taking possession of their respective flats without the completion certificate, that chapter closed

(Para 21)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 – Deficiency in service – Faulty haircut of Model by saloon -- Compensation of Rs. 2 crores awarded by NCDRC without there being any material to substantiate and support – NCDRC do not find reference to or discussion on any material evidence to quantify the compensation -- Amount of Rs. 2 Crores would be extremely excessive and disproportionate -- Matter remitted to NCDRC to lead evidence with respect to claim – NCDRC to take decision afresh thereafter.

(Para 11-16)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 43(5) – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- RERA Appeal – Withdrawal of -- Maintainability of writ thereafter -- Petitioners preferred an appeal which they withdrew after arguing the matter at length before the Appellate Tribunal -- Petitioners not been able to justify the filing of the writ petition after the withdrawal of the appeal  -- Held, once the RERA had given a decision against the petitioners and the appeal against the same had been withdrawn, the petitioners would have no right to file a writ petition -- Writ petition is totally misconceived and devoid of merit, dismissed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21, Rule 4 – Cancellation of allotment of flat – Refund of amount -- Denial to receive Pay order -- Complainant cannot claim interest from the developer, who had returned the Pay Order -- Complainant’s argument that on account of the omission of the developer, she was wronged, and was thus entitled to receive interest, cannot prevail.

(Para 32-34)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21, Rule 4 – Deposit made in Judicial Forums, Tribunal, Court, Authority, Agency etc. – Directions issued to frame rules -- All courts and judicial forums should frame guidelines in cases where amounts are deposited with the office / registry of the court / tribunal, that such amounts should mandatorily be deposited in a bank or some financial institution, to ensure that no loss is caused in the future -- Such guidelines should also cover situations where the concerned litigant merely files the instrument (Pay Order, Demand Draft, Banker’s Cheque, etc.) without seeking any order -- These guidelines should be embodied in the form of appropriate rules, or regulations of each court, tribunal, commission, authority, agency, etc. exercising adjudicatory power.

(Para 35)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 17 -- Deficiency in service -- Insurance law – Refund of premium after death – Repudiation of insurance claim – Medical test on 30.7.2017, death by cardiac arrest soon thereafter on 8.8.2017 -- Pre-condition for the home loan was that life of the borrower will have to be insured -- Loan amount was sanctioned, the premium amount was kept aside and was credited to the insurance Company and the insured was subjected to a medical test which showed normal health status -- Entire procedure would suggest, at least from the insurer’s perspective, that the insurance process was complete & all mandatory requirements were met -- No contrary communication by the LIC indicating otherwise as well -- When the death information was conveyed to the respondents, Insurance company issued a back dated letter deferring the insurance process, which was followed by refund of the premium a few days later, and then the repudiation after that – Case shows clear malafide on the part of LIC -- Clear case of deficiency of service and a non-bonafide conduct by the LIC – LIC directed to process the complainant’s insurance claim and remit the payable sum.

(Para 1, 5, 25-27)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 2(zk), 43(5) – Owner of land – Engagement of Contractor to construct and develop – Whether land-owner will come in definition of Promoter – Appellant/owner helped the Contractor in taking loan from the Corporation Bank -- As per Clause (3) and (10) of the MOU, the appellant authorized the Contractor to sell, market and allot the flats to the respective buyers on the terms and conditions agreed between the Contractor and the allottees – A power of attorney was also given to a representative of the Contractor, by the appellant to receive and deposit all the relevant documents and the pending dues, as and when demanded by the related department in relation to the above-mentioned land as well as to sign, verify and submit all kinds of applications, affidavits etc. with the concerned government departments in relation to the land – Held, appellant cannot claim that it does not fall within the definition of the term “Promoter” as used in Section 43(5) of the 2016 Act.

(Para 11-15)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d)(ii) -- Consumer -- Appellant availed services provided by the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and respondent No. 4 is a beneficiary of such services, therefore the appellant would fall under the definition of a ‘consumer’ as is under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act of 1986.

(Para 33)

B. Letter of credit -- A letter of credit is a document issued by a bank (issuing bank) on behalf of a party (applicant) in favour of another party (beneficiary) under which, the issuing bank undertakes to pay to the beneficiary, certain sums of money subject to compliance of the terms and conditions of the letter of credit.

(Para 34)

C. Letter of credit -- In an international transaction, the beneficiary is the seller who requests the applicant (buyer) to furnish a letter of credit from any bank which is recognized worldwide (issuing bank) -- Letter of credit is issued in favour of a beneficiary on the request of an applicant after furnishing securities as may be demanded by the issuing bank -- A seller can ask the issuing bank to honour the letter of credit to his own bank (confirming bank) within a certain maturity date -- Seller is required to produce certain documents regarding proof of delivery of goods, commercial invoice, bill of lading, insurance documents etc. before the confirming bank -- On scrutiny the confirming bank would ask for advice of the issuing bank to confirm whether the documents produced by the beneficiary is compliant to the terms and conditions of the letter of credit -- Once the issuing bank confirms the document, the confirming bank is obligated to pay to the beneficiary on demand, the credit amount and in turn recover the same from the issuing bank.

(Para 34)

D. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(g), 17 -- Letter of credit -- Deficiency in service – Despite clear instructions, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 negligently recorded the port of loading to be JNPT Bombay -- It is due to this negligence as well as deficiency in service of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 that the respondent No. 4 Bank refused to accept/honour the documents including the FCR and the same was returned to the bank of the appellant – Due to refusal of honouring the said documents, the sale consideration was not paid to the appellant who suffered loss as well as mental harassment and agony -- National Commission vide impugned order has reduced the amount of compensation to Rs.10,000/- as against the amount granted by the State Commission to be paid to the appellant i.e., a sum of Rs.13,79,901/-, together with compensation of Rs.50,000/- and cost of litigation amounting to Rs.10,000/- – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the National Commission set aside and the judgment and order passed by the State Commission restored.

(Para 3, 36-41)

A. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2002, Clause 3(ii), 3(iv) – Exclusion clause in insurance policy – Disclosure/ Notice to insured --  It is the foremost duty of the insurer to give effect to a due disclosure and notice in its true letter and spirit – Non-disclosure and a failure to furnish a copy of the said contract by following the procedure required by statute, would make the said clause redundant and non-existent -- Any non-compliance would take away their right to plead repudiation of contract by placing reliance upon any of the terms and conditions included thereunder.

(Para 15, 42)

B. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2002, Clause 3(ii), 3(iv) -- Insurance policy – Duty of insurance company -- Insurer and his agent are duty bound to provide all material information in respect of a policy to the insured – If proposal form is not filled by the insured, a certificate has to be incorporated at the end of the said form that all the contents of the form and documents have been fully explained to the insured and made him to understand – It is duty upon the insurer to furnish a copy of the proposal form within thirty days of the acceptance, free of charge -- Any non-compliance, offending clause, be it an exclusion clause, cannot be pressed into service by the insurer.

(Para 21)

C. Doctrine of Blue Pencil --  Insurance policy – Offending clauses -- Doctrine of “blue pencil” which strikes off the offending clause being void ab initio, has to be pressed into service – Said clause being repugnant to the main contract, and thus destroying it without even a need for adjudication, certainly has to be eschewed by the Court, requires an effacement in the form of declaration of its non-existence, warranting a decision by the Court accordingly.

(Para 22)

D. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12, 17, 21 -- Consumer – Plaintiff in a suit -- Consumer under C.P. Act, 1986 is at an elevated place than the plaintiff in a suit -- A dispute before the Consumer Commission is to be seen primarily from the point of view of the consumer as against the civil suit -- It is only to avoid any possible bottleneck in granting the relief.

(Para 28)

E. Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (35 of 2019), Section 2(46)(47), 47, 49 58, 59 -- Unfair contract – Unfair trade practice – Power of State Commission/ National Commission -- Section 47 and 58 of the 2019 Act have been introduced to facilitate the State Commission and the National Commission to exercise jurisdiction over a contract which is unfair – The power is not only with respect to identifying a contract as unfair or not, but also to grant the consequential relief -- Under sub-section (2) of Section 49 and 59 of the 2019 Act, the State Commission and the National Commission, respectively, may declare any terms of the contract being unfair to any consumer to be null and void -- In these provisions, there exists ample power to declare any terms of the contract as unfair by the State Commission and the National Commission – Consequence of the declaration of that term as unfair, would make the contract active and executable to the benefit of the consumer -- Therefore, this provision takes care of a possible mischief by the insurer as against the consumer.

(Para 29-34)

F. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2002, Clause 3(ii), 3(iv) –– Exclusion clause in Insurance policy -- Unfair contract -- Both the forums concurrently held that respondent No. 1/ Insurer was conscious of the fact that the contract was entered into for insuring a shop situated in the basement -- Even as per the common law principle of acquiescence and estoppel, respondent No. 1/ Insurer  cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong, if any -- Non-compliance of Clauses (3) and (4) of the IRDA Regulation, 2002 preceded by unilateral inclusion, and thereafter followed by the execution of the contract, receiving benefits, and repudiation after knowing that it was entered into for a basement, would certainly be an act of unfair trade practice.

(Para 37-39)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Illegal seizure of Hypothecated vehicle – Compensation to owner -- Complainant shall be entitled to the compensation/loss suffered because of not plying of the vehicle seized and sold illegally -- Nothing on record regarding loss suffered because of not plying the vehicle -- Appellant directed to pay the compensation/damages towards loss suffered because of not plying of the vehicle at Rs. 5000/- per month from the date of the picking up of the vehicle i.e., 19.12.2004 till 31.12.2007 with interest @ 7.5% from December, 2004 till the actual payment within a period of six weeks.

(Para 3-5)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 23 – Purchase of flat – Default payment carry interest @ 18% p.a. -- Refund of amount – Interest thereupon -- Once, under the agreement, in the event of default, the appellant's/purchaser’s liability to pay interest on the defaulted amount could go up to 18%, it would be just and proper in the facts of the case that 18% interest be awarded on the refund amount.

(Paras 11)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 1, 18, 19 -- Refund of amount with interest – Expeditious disposal – Object of -- Complaint decided by the Adjudicating Officer, however, the Appellate Tribunal held that such matter fell within the jurisdiction of the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) – Complaint filed by the appellant remained pending before the authorities for quite some time -- Parliament enacted the 2016 Act, in order to facilitate expeditious disposal of such matters – Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) requested to finally decide the matter within a period of 3 months, positively.

(Para 2-5)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 58 – Interest on delay possession -- Delay due to non-issuance of occupancy certificate – Ground of -- Apartment-buyer held entitled to interest for the delayed delivery of possession of the apartment – Contention of the appellant that the project was completed within the time prescribed, however, the government did not issue the occupancy certificate to the promoter – Held, This is a matter between the appellant and the government, apartment-buyer cannot be penalized for the same – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 2-6)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(g) – Deficiency in service -- Delay in survey report – Delay in repudiation of claim – Consumer Forum which has a limited jurisdiction to find out if there was any deficiency in service, could not have allowed the complaint on the basis of sketchy pleadings supported by doubtful evidence -- Delay on the part of the Insurance Company in securing the Final Survey Report and the further delay in issuing the letter of repudiation, cannot per se lead to the complaint being allowed -- Delay in processing the claim and delay in repudiation could be one of the several factors for holding an insurer guilty of deficiency in service -- But it cannot be the only factor -- No categorical evidence of any deficiency in service on the part of the appellant-Insurance Company -- Hence the appeal allowed and the impugned order of the National Commission set aside.

(Para 24, 25)

Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 58 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- RERA Appeal in High Court – Substantial question of law -- Appeal u/s 58 of the RERA, 2016, is maintainable only on one or more grounds specified in Section 100 of the CPC which provides for the substantial question of law.

(Para 2-5)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Delay of 67 days in revision – Condonation of delay -- NCDRC dismissed the application for condonation of delay – Held, delay in filing the revision was not huge, that should not have been condoned under the Consumer Protection Act, 1985 -- Question of limitation is not to be examined with a view to decline the condonation, but to do substantial justice -- Appeal allowed, order passed by the NCDRC set aside, delay in filing the revision condoned, matter remitted back to the NCDRC for decision on merits.

(Para 2-5)

A. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 1 -- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 1 --  Interpretation of statute – RERA Act – Consumer Act – Both Acts neither exclude nor contradict each other and they must be read harmoniously to subserve their common purpose.

(Para 1)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 18 -- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Sections 14, 23 -- Apartment Buyer’s Agreement – One-sided clauses – Refund of amount with interest – Right of -- Commission is correct in its approach in holding that the clauses of the agreement are one-sided and that the Consumer is not bound to accept the possession of the apartment and can seek refund of the amount deposited by her with interest.

(Para 10)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 18 -- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Sections 14, 23 -- Consumer Protection Act and the RERA Act neither exclude nor contradict each other -- They are concurrent remedies operating independently and without primacy – When Statutes provide more than one judicial fora for effectuating a right or to enforce a duty-obligation, it is a feature of remedial choices offered by the State for an effective access to justice -- While interpreting statutes provisioning plurality of remedies, it is necessary for Courts to harmonise the provisions in a constructive manner – A consumer invoking the jurisdiction of the Commission can seek such reliefs as he/she considers appropriate -- A consumer can pray for refund of the money with interest and compensation -- Consumer could also ask for possession of the apartment with compensation -- Consumer can also make a prayer for both in the alternative -- Position is similar to the mandate u/s of the RERA Act -- Freedom to choose the necessary relief is of the Consumer and it is the duty of the Courts to honour it.

(Para 11, 19)

D. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 18 -- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Sections 14, 23 -- Refund of amount with interest -- Consumer prayed for the solitary relief for return of the amount paid towards purchase of the apartment without a prayer for alternate relief –Commission correctly exercises its power and jurisdiction in passing the directions for refund of the amount with interest -- Interest payable on the amount deposited to be restitutionary and also compensatory, interest has to be paid from the date of the deposit of the amounts -- Commission in the order impugned has granted interest from the date of last deposit – Held, this does not amount to restitution – Direction given that the interest on the refund shall be payable from the dates of deposit -- Interest of 9 per cent granted by the Commission is fair and just.

(Para 18-22)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Theft of vehicle – Delay in informing and lodging its claim before the Insurance Company – Repudiation of claim – Legality of -- When the complainant had lodged the FIR immediately after the theft of the vehicle, and when the police after the investigation had arrested the accused and also filed challan before the concerned Court, and when the claim of the insured was not found to be not genuine, the Insurance Company could not have repudiated the claim merely on the ground that there was a delay in intimating the Insurance Company about the occurrence of the theft.

(Para 9)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 13(2)(a) -- Consumer complaint -- Delay in filing written statement -- Condonation of delay – Application was filed prior to the judgment of the Constitution Bench – Held, said application for condonation of delay ought to have been considered on merits and should not have been dismissed on the basis of the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited, (2020) 5 SCC 757, because the said judgment was to operate prospectively.

(Para 2)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- Consumer dispute – Written statement after 45 days – Rejection of application for condonation of delay -- Consumer fora has no jurisdiction and/or power to accept the written statement beyond the stipulated prescribed period of 45 days -- No reason to interfere with the impugned order – Petition dismissed. J.J. Merchant’s case (2002) 6 SCC 635 and Hilli Multipurpose’s case (2020) 5 SCC 757 relied.

(Para 5)

Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (35 of 2019), Section 38 – Time to file reply for 45 (30 + 15) days -- Delay of four days in filing the written statements during Covid-19 period -- Extension of time -- Period of limitation of 30 days to file the written statement had expired on 12.08.2020 and the extended period of 15 days expired on 27.08.2020 – Interim order 23.03.2020 passed by Supreme Court in Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, SMW(C) No.3 of 2020 was continuing – Held, limitation for filing the written statement before the National Commission would be deemed to have been extended as it is clear from the order dated 23.03.2020 that the extended period of limitation was applicable to all petitions/applications/suits/appeals and all other proceedings – Appeals allowed – Direction given that the written statement filed by the appellant shall be taken on record.

(Para 10-14)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Delayed possession of flat – Compensation for -- Dispute relates to a construction project in Delhi -- Flat buyer agreements provide compensation of Rs 10 per square foot per month -- Flat buyers had to suffer on account of a substantial delay on the part of the appellants -- In such a situation, they cannot be constrained to the compensation of Rs 10 per square foot provided by the agreements for flat purchase -- However, having regard to all the facts and circumstances, Court viewed that the compensation on account of delay should be brought down from 7% to 6%.

(Para 9-12)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(c), (d), 12, 17, 21 -- Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 79 – Real estate development project -- Consumer Complaint – RERA dispute – Jurisdiction of -- Whether proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 / CPA can be commenced by home buyers (or allottees of properties in proposed real estate development projects) against developers, after the commencement of the RERA – High Court held that remedies available to the respondents/ home buyers  under CPA and RERA are concurrent – In Imperia Structures Ltd.’s case, Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15624 it was held that Section 79 of the RERA Act would not in any way bar the Commission or Forum under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act to entertain any complaint on behalf of an allottee – SLP dismissed.

(Para 1-6)

A. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 4(2)(l)(C), 5(3) – Interpretation of Statute -- Declaration by promoter -- Registration of Real Estate Project – Validity of -- It is settled law that while interpreting a Statute, its plain meaning must be given effect to in case there is no ambiguity -- A perusal of sub-section 3 of Section 5 of the Act leaves no manner of doubt that registration granted u/s 5 of the Act shall be valid for a period declared by the promoter u/s 4(2)(l)(C) -- This is the plain and clear meaning of the words used therein -- Thus, no other interpretation is possible.

(Para 9)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 5 – Registration of project – Refusal by Authority – Opportunity of hearing – Authority has the power either to register a project or to refuse registration but before refusal, an opportunity of hearing must be granted -- There could be many reasons for refusing to register a project and one of them could be an arbitrary time period mentioned in the declaration -- During the course of hearing, the promoter would be in a position either to justify the period or to accept the objections of the Authority and modify the period.

(Para 10)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 5 – Registration of project -- Declaration by promoter – Reduction in time -- Power/ Jurisdiction of Authority --- Authority has no power or jurisdiction to reduce the time period mentioned in the declaration -- If it feels that the period mentioned is arbitrary or unacceptable due to any reasons, a notice to show cause for rejection of the application must be given.

(Para 13)

A. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 71(1) -- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12, 17, 21, 23 -- Pending complaints before Consumer Forums/Commission – RERA came into force – Effect on complaints -- Proviso of Section 71(1) gives a right or an option to the concerned complainant but does not statutorily force him to withdraw such complaint nor do the provisions of the RERA Act create any mechanism for transfer of such pending proceedings to authorities under the RERA Act.

(Para 28)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 18, 79, 88 -- Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12, 17, 21, 23 -- Consumer complaint after coming into force of RERA Act – Maintainability of -- Cases where such proceedings under the CP Act are initiated after the provisions of the RERA Act came into force, there is nothing in the RERA Act which bars such initiation -- Absence of bar u/s 79 to the initiation of proceedings before a fora which cannot be called a Civil Court and express saving u/s 88 of the RERA Act, make the position quite clear -- Further, Section 18 itself specifies that the remedy under said Section is “without prejudice to any other remedy available” -- Thus, the parliamentary intent is clear that a choice or discretion is given to the allottee whether he wishes to initiate appropriate proceedings under the CP Act or file an application under the RERA Act.

(Para 28)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 18 – Buyer-seller agreement – Registration under RERA Act -- Effect of -- Construction was to be completed in 42 months -- Period had expired well before the Project was registered under the provisions of the RERA Act – Held, merely because the registration under the RERA Act is valid till 31.12.2020 does not mean that the entitlement of the concerned allottees to maintain an action stands deferred -- For the purposes of Section 18, the period has to be reckoned in terms of the agreement and not the registration -- Entitlement of the Complainants must be considered in the light of the terms of the Builder Buyer Agreements.

(Para 33)

A. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 43(5) – Proviso for pre-deposit in appeal – Challenge to -- Requirement of pre-deposit of the amount, as set out in the proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Act, cannot be held to be unreasonable or arbitrary -- Challenge to the proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Act must fail -- Prayer in that regard rejected.

(Para 12)

B. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 43(5), 44 -- Proviso for pre-deposit in Appeal – Sections 43 and 44 of the Act are to be read harmoniously -- There to be no inconsistency in the wording of Section 43 (5) and Section 44 of the Act -- An appeal filed by the promoter, the requirement under the proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Act, will have to be mandatorily fulfilled, even for the purposes of the Appellate Tribunal having to pass orders in terms of Section 44 of the Act -- Proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Act clearly states that the pre-deposit is required to be made “before the said appeal is heard.” -- Appellate Tribunal is not obliged to proceed to ‘entertain’ or hear an appeal that has been filed before it, if the promoter, who has filed such appeal, fails to comply with the direction for making the pre-deposit in terms of the proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Act.

(Para 14)

C. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 43(5), 44 -- Proviso for pre-deposit in appeal – Waiver of – Appellate Tribunal has no power to waive the requirement of the making of a pre-deposit as mandated by the proviso to Section 43 (5) of the Act.

(Para 15)

D. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 43(5), 44 -- Proviso for pre-deposit in appeal – Release of – All the appeals before it, the Appellate Tribunal would order the placing of the pre-deposit amount in a fixed deposit pending the final decision in the appeal – If it were to order release of the whole or part of the amount to the allottee, that would have to be upon the furnishing of adequate security – This would be necessary as in the event of the appellant succeeding, the amount pre-deposited would be required to be refunded.

(Para 23)

E. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 4(2)(i)(C), 18(1)(2)(3), 19 (4) – Delay in possession – Remedy for allottee – Section 19 (4) of the Act states that in the event of a promoter failing to comply or being unable to give possession of the apartment, plot or building in accordance with the terms of agreement for sale or due to discontinuance of his business as a developer on account of suspension or revocation of his registration under the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder, the allottee shall be entitled: (a) to claim refund of the amount paid along with interest at such rate as has been prescribed; and (b) the compensation in the manner provided under the Act – To that extent Section 19 (4) of the Act can be said to be a ‘mirror provision’ of Section 18 (1) to (3) of the Act -- Both these provisions recognize a right of an allottee to distinct remedies, viz., refund of the amount together with interest, interest for delayed handing over of possession and compensation.

(Para 35)

F. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 31 – Jurisdiction/ Power of RERA Authority/ Adjudicating officer --  Complaints can be filed either with the Authority or the AO for violation or contravention of the provisions of the Act or the Rules and Regulations -- Such complaint can be filed against “any promoter, allottee or real estate agent”, as the case may be -- Such complaint can be filed by “any aggrieved person” -- The Explanation to Section 31 (1) of the Act states that for the purposes of said sub-section “person” shall include an association of allottees or any voluntary consumer association registered under any law for the time being in force.

(Para 36)

G. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 34(f), 35(1)(2) – Functions/ Power of Power of RERA Authority -- Section 34 (f) of the Act states that the functions of the Authority shall include ensuring “compliance of its regulations cast upon the promoters, the allottees and the real estate agents under this Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder” – U/s 35 of the Act the Authority can, either on a complaint or suo moto by an order, call upon any promoter or allottee or real estate agent to furnish in writing such information or explanation relating to its affairs as the Authority may require – U/s 35(1) Authority can appoint one or more persons to make an inquiry into the affairs of any promoter or allottee or the real estate agent, as the case maybe – U/s 35 (2) of the Act, the Authority is given all the powers vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit and this includes the discovery and production of books of account and other documents; summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and examining them; issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents and “any other matter which may be prescribed.”

(Para 37, 38)

H. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 36, 37 -- Enquiry by RERA Authority – Power of – Scope of -- Section 36 of the Act recognizes the power of the authority during an inquiry, to make interim orders restraining any promoter, allottee or real estate agent from carrying on any act in contravention of the Act, until the conclusion of such inquiry and without giving notice to such party, where the Authority deems it necessary -- Section 37 of the Act is widely worded and states that the Authority may, for the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act or Rules or Regulations “issue such directions from time to time, to the promoters or allottees or real estate agents, as the case may be, as it may consider necessary” and such directions shall be binding on all concerned.

(Para 39)

I. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Section 38 -- Penalty and interest – Power of RERA Authority -- Section 38 talks about the power of the Authority to impose penalty or interest, in regard to any contravention of obligations cast upon the promoters, the allottees and the real estate agents.

(Para 40)

J. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 31, 34(f), 35, 36, 37, 38, 71 -- Power of RERA Authority/ Adjudicating officer – Plea that the power and scope of the functions of the Authority are limited to determining penalty or interest u/s 38 of the Act is rejected as it overlooks the wide range of powers of the Authority on a collective reading of Sections 31, 34 (f), Sections 35, 36 and 37 -- Power to issue interim orders u/s 36 of the Act and the power to issue directions u/s 37 of the Act are not made available to the AO u/s 71 of the Act -- Powers of the Authority u/s 35 of the Act are also of a wide nature -- While discharging those functions, it will be open to the Authority to even require the AO to conduct the inquiry -- Section 35 (2) of the Act also makes its plain that the Authority will have the same powers as a civil Court -- Legislative intent is, therefore, not to diminish the adjudicatory functions of the Authority but rather to provide it with all the trappings of a quasi-judicial/judicial authority while inquiring into the complaints and issuing directions.

(Para 61, 62)

K. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 31, 34(f), 35, 36, 37, 71, 72 – Refund of amount – Compensation and interest -- Jurisdiction  of RERA Authority/ Adjudicating officer – Act does use distinct expressions like ‘refund’, ‘interest’, ‘penalty’ and ‘compensation’, a collective reading of the provisions makes it apparent that when it comes to refund of the amount, and interest on the refund amount, or directing payment of interest for delayed delivery of possession, or penalty and interest thereon, it is the Authority which has the power to examine and determine the outcome of a complaint -- Expression ‘interest’ as used in Section 18 of the Act is a pre-determined rate, as may be fixed by the government, and is distinct from the interest by way of compensation that has to be computed by the AO in terms of Section 71 (3) keeping in view the factors outlined in Section 72 of the Act -- When it comes to the question of seeking the relief of compensation or interest by way of compensation, the AO alone has the power to determine it on a collective reading of Sections 71 and 72 of the Act -- If Sections 71 and 72 of the Act are read together, it is plain that the AO has to adjudge the ‘quantum of compensation’.

(Para 63, 64)

L. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 31, 34(f), 35, 36, 37, 71, 88 – Refund of amount – Compensation and interest -- Jurisdiction  of RERA Authority/ Adjudicating officer – Pendency of Consumer Complaint – Effect upon -- It is not mandatory for a person, who has a complaint before the consumer fora to have his complaint transferred to the AO -- He can pursue both the remedies simultaneously on the strength of Section 88 of the Act -- If, however, such person opts to withdraw his complaint before the consumer fora to come to the AO, the scope of the relief he seeks would be limited to the compensation or interest -- He will, therefore, have to take a conscious decision -- If the relief he is seeking in the complaint before the consumer fora is in addition to seeking compensation or interest in the form of compensation, for instance refund of the amount and interest thereon, then he will have to take a conscious decision on restricting his relief before the AO to one of compensation or interest by way of compensation -- For the remaining reliefs, he will have to go before the Authority.

(Para 65)

M. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 12, 14, 18, 19 – Haryana Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017, Rule 29 -- Compensation or interest by way of compensation -- If a complainant is seeking only compensation or interest by way of compensation simpliciter with no other relief, then obviously the complainant would straightway file a complaint before the AO -- Complaint will be filed in form CAO and will be referrable to Rule 29 of the Haryana Rules -- AO in such instance would proceed to determine whether there is a violation of Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act.

(Para 66)

N. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 12, 14, 18, 19, 35, 36, 37, 71, 72 -- Compensation and payment of interest – Power of RERA Authority/ Adjudicating officer -- Single complaint seeking a combination of reliefs with one of the reliefs being relief of compensation and payment of interest -- In such instance, the complaint will first be examined by the Authority which will determine if there is a violation of the provisions of the Act -- If such complaint is by the allottee and against the promoter and if the Authority comes to an affirmative conclusion regarding the violations it will then, for the limited purpose of adjudging the quantum of compensation or interest by way of compensation, refer the complaint for that limited purpose to the AO -- With the Authority already having found in favour of the complainant as regards violation by the promoter of Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act, clearly the AO will not further examine that question -- The AO will only proceed to determine the quantum of compensation or interest keeping in view the factors outlined in Section 72 of the Act -- This way the powers of the Authority under Section 31 read with Sections 35 to 37 of the Act will not overlap the functions of the AO under Section 71 of the Act. Both sets of provisions are, therefore, capable of being harmonized.

(Para 68)

O. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 12, 14, 18, 19, 35, 36, 37, 71, 72 – Haryana Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017, Rule 28, 29 -- Compensation and payment of interest – Power of RERA Authority/ Adjudicating officer -- Amended Rules 28 and 29, or the amendments to Forms CRA and CAO are not ultra vires the Act.

(Para 69)

P. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 -- Haryana Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017, Rule 28, 29 -- Prospective application of the amended Rules 28 and 29 of the Haryana Rules -- Change of forum would be ‘procedural’ – As long as the complaint is yet to be decided as on the date of the notification publishing the Haryana Amendment Rules 2019, that will now be decided consistent with the procedure outlined under the amended Rules 28 and 29 of the Haryana Rules -- If the Authority finds there to be a violation of Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 of the Act by the promoter, and the complaint is by the allottee, then for determining the quantum of compensation such complaint will be referred by the Authority to the AO in terms of the amended Rule 28 of the Haryana Rules -- A complaint that has already been adjudicated prior to the coming into force of the amended Rules 28 and 29 of the Haryana, and the decision has attained finality, will not stand reopened.

(Para 72)

Q. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 2 (q)(zf)(zn) – Haryana Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017, Rule 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 -- Ongoing projects – Retroactive application of the Act to ‘ongoing projects’ -- The Act is intended to apply even to ‘ongoing’ Real Estate Projects -- The expression ‘Completion Certificate’ has been defined under Section 2 (q) of the Act – The expression ‘occupancy certificate’ is defined u/s 2 (zf) of the Act – It is plain that the legislative intent was to make the Act applicable to not only to the projects which were to commence after the Act became operational but also to ongoing projects -- Court rejected the challenge to Sections 13, 18 (1) and 19 (4) of the Act and Rules 3 to 16 of the Haryana Rules as regards their retroactive applicability to ‘ongoing projects’.

(Para 73-81)

R. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (16 of 2016), Sections 2(a)(c)(o)(zn), 3(2)(b), 13, 18(1), 19(4) -- Haryana Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017, Rules 8, 15 -- Ongoing project – Retrospective effect – Vires of Section 13, 18(1), 19(4) of RERA Act -- Vires of Rule 8, 15 of Haryana Rules – Concept of ‘ongoing project’ is unique to the Act -- The legislature was conscious of the impact that the Act would have on such ‘ongoing projects’ -- A collective reading of Section 3 with Section 2 (o) and 2 (zn) indicates that care was taken to specify which of the projects would stand exempted -- Section 3 (2) (b) of the Act is categorical that no registration of the project would be required where “the promoter has received completion certificate for real estate project prior to the commencement of this Act.” -- It cannot thus be argued that without satisfying the above requirement or the other two contingencies in Sections 2 (a) and 2 (c) of the Act, a promoter can avoid registering an ‘ongoing’ project under the Act -- Held, Sections 13, 18 (1) and 19 (4) of the Act and Rules 8 and 15 of the Haryana Rules do not fall foul of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution on account of the their retroactive applicability to ‘ongoing’ projects.

(Para 84, 85)

Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934), Section 5-A, 6 -- Aircraft Rules, 1937, 133-A – Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Covid-19 pandemic situation -- Refund of Air Fare – Batch of cases disposed of with the following directions:

1. If a passenger has booked a ticket during the lockdown period (from 25th March, 2020 to 24th May, 2020) for travel during lockdown period and the airline has received payment for booking of air ticket for travel during the same period, for both domestic and international air travel and the refund is sought by the passenger against that booking being cancelled, the airline shall refund the full amount collected without any cancellation charges. The refund shall be made within a period of three weeks from the date of cancellation.

2. If the tickets have been booked during the lockdown period through a travel agent for a travel within the lockdown period, in all such cases full refund shall be given by the airlines immediately. On such refund, the amount shall be passed on immediately by the agent to the passengers.

3. Passengers who booked tickets at any period of time but for travel after 24th May, 2020 – refund of fares to the passengers covered under this category shall be governed by the provisions of Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR).

4. Even for international travel, when the tickets have been booked on an Indian carrier and the booking is ex-India, if the tickets have been booked during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period, immediate refund shall be made.

5. If the tickets are booked for international travel on a foreign carrier and the booking is ex-India during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period, full refund shall be given by the airlines and said amount shall be passed on immediately by the agent to the passengers, wherever such tickets are booked through agents. In all other cases airline shall refund the collected amount to the passenger within a period of three weeks.

6. In all other cases, the airlines shall make all endeavours to refund the collected amount to the passenger within 15 days from today. If on account of financial distress, any airline / airlines are not able to do so, they shall provide credit shell, equal to the amount of fare collected, in the name of passenger when the booking is done either directly by the passenger or through travel agent so as to consume the same on or before 31st March, 2021. It is open to the passenger either to utilize such credit shell upto 31st March, 2021 on any route of his choice or the passenger can transfer the credit shell to any person including the travel agent through whom he / she has booked the ticket and the airlines shall honour such a transfer.

6.1. The credit shell issued in the name of the passenger shall be transferable which can be utilized upto 31st March, 2021 and the concerned airline shall honour such a transfer by devising a mechanism to facilitate such a transfer. It is also made clear that such credit shell can be utilized by the concerned agent through whom the ticket is booked, for third party use. It is also made clear that even in cases where credit shell is transferred to third party, same is to be utilized only through the agent who has booked the ticket at the first instance.

7. In cases where passengers have purchased the ticket through an agent, and credit shell is issued in the name of passenger, such credit shell is to be utilized only through the agent who has booked the ticket. In cases where tickets are booked through agent, credit shell as issued in the name of the passenger which is not utilized by 31st March, 2021, refund of the fare collected shall be made to the same account from which account amount was received by the airline.

8. In all cases where credit shell is issued there shall be an incentive to compensate the passenger from the date of cancellation upto 30th June, 2020 in which event the credit shell shall be enhanced by 0.5% of the face value (the amount of fare collected) for every month or part thereof between the date of cancellation and 30th June, 2020. Thereafter the value of the credit shell shall be enhanced by 0.75% of the face value per month upto 31st March, 2021.

Further, the Directorate, shall ensure strict compliance of the directions referred above, by issuing necessary instructions to the all concerned.

(Para 19)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 – Delay in possession -- Force majeure – Pleading of – Non-consideration of -- Though the NCDRC noted that the developer pleaded force majeure on the ground that (i) the construction of the flats could not proceed due to a stay granted by the National Green Tribunal on construction during the winter months; and (ii) demonetization affected the real estate industry resulting in delays in completion, the submission has not been dealt with – Second submission that in similar other cases, the NCDRC has condoned the delay in handing over possession – Held, it would be appropriate to restore the appeal to the NCDRC for consideration afresh -- Rights and contentions of the parties on the issues involved in the appeal are kept open to be addressed before the NCDRC.

(Para 6-8)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 23, 25 – Consumer Complaint – Executing order -- Appeals filed against the order passed in execution by NCDRC – Appeal held to be not maintainable u/s 23 of the Act, 1986.

(Para 1,10)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(o) – Apartment/ Flat developer -- Deficiency in service -- Failure of the developer to comply with the contractual obligation to provide the flat to a flat purchaser within a contractually stipulated period amounts to a deficiency -- Expression “service” in Section 2 (1) (o) means a service of any description which is made available to potential users including the provision of facilities in connection with (among other things) housing construction.

(Para 24)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 14(1)(e) – Apartment/ Flat developer – Unfair bargain -- Power of Consumer Courts -- Flat purchasers make legitimate assessments in regard to the future course of their lives based on the flat which has been purchased being available for use and occupation -- These legitimate expectations are belied when the developer is guilty of a delay of years in the fulfilment of a contractual obligation -- There has been a gross delay in the handing over of possession beyond the contractually stipulated debt -- Jurisdiction of the consumer forum to award just and reasonable compensation as an incident of its power to direct the removal of a deficiency in service is not constrained by the terms of a rate which is prescribed in an unfair bargain.

(Para 24)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Compensation for delayed possession – Execution of conveyance deed and handing over possession – Effect of -- Developer has undertaken to provide a service in the nature of developing residential flats with certain amenities and remains amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora – Court did not subscribe the view of the NCDRC that flat purchasers who obtained possession or executed Deeds of Conveyance have lost their right to make a claim for compensation for the delayed handing over of the flats.

(Para 36)

D. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Delay in possession -- Re-sale of apartment by allottee – Subsequent buyer – Rights of -- Appellants transferred their title, right and interest in the apartments would not be entitled to the benefit since they have sold their interest in the apartments to third parties -- It cannot be said that the subsequent transferees suffered any agony and harassment comparable to that of the first buyers, as a result of the delay in the delivery of possession in order to be entitled to compensation.

(Para 38)

E. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Purchase of Apartment/ Flat -- Amenities -- Flat purchasers cannot be left in the lurch or be told that the absence of facilities which were to be provided by the developer is compensated by other amenities which are available in the area -- Developer must be held accountable to its representation -- Representation held out by the developer cannot be dismissed as chaff -- Difficult for the court to quantify the exact nature of the compensation that should be provided to the flat buyers -- Difficulties in determining the measure of compensation cannot however dilute the liability to pay -- A developer should be held accountable to the process of law -- To allow the developer to escape their obligation would put a premium on false assurances and representations made to the flat purchasers -- Dismissal of the complaint by the NCDRC was erroneous.

(Para 43-55)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2, 21 -- Insurance of hypothecated securities by Bank – Part of hypothecated securities left out from coverage -- Deficiency in service – If the bank had exercised liberty to effect insurance, it was their duty to take out policies covering the entire set of hypothecated assets -- Effecting insurance was not their absolute obligation -- But such obligation they had taken it upon themselves -- Commission was right in holding that the complainant had suffered loss because of inaction and negligence on the part of the Bank -- This constituted deficiency in service -- Any loss arising out of such deficiency was compensable under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

(Para 14,15)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Deficiency in service – Loss in transit -- Burdon of proof -- Mere assertion that the loss incurred during the course of transit is not sufficient -- Burden of proof lies on the Complainant to show that the loss incurred was covered within the terms of the policy and that on a balance of probabilities there existed a proximate cause between the loss incurred and the helicopter being in transit -- No proximate cause has been shown between the damage to the helicopter and the helicopter being in a state of transit -- Hence, it is difficult for this Court to come to the conclusion that the damage to the helicopter incurred during the course of transit.

(Para 36-38)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 – Interpretation of Insurance contract -- While construing a contract of insurance, it is not permissible for a court to substitute the terms of the contract -- Court should always interpret the words used in a contract in a manner that will best express the intention of the parties.

(Para 39)

A. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 13(2)(a)(b) – Service of summons without complaint – Written statement – Non-receipt of complaint with summons – Objection of -- Objection of not having received a copy of the complaint along with the notice should be raised on the first date itself and not thereafter, otherwise if permitted to be raised at any point later would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which is to provide simple and speedy redressal of consumer disputes. Judgment to operate prospectively.

(Para 40)

B. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 13 – Written statement by opposite party – Extension of time – Power of District Forum -- District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act -- Judgment to operate prospectively. Referred questions answered.

(Para 41)

C. Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 13 – Written statement by opposite party – Commencing date -- Commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint -- Judgment to operate prospectively. Referred questions answered.

(Para 41)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 23 -- Delay in possession -- Breach of the Development Agreement is attributable to both, CHB and the Developer, the failure to hand over possession of the flat to the buyer cannot be said to be on account of the non-performance of the obligation of the Developer alone – Sale proceeds from the flat buyers were apportioned in the ratio of 70:30 between the Developer and CHB – Amount directed to be paid by the National Commission in the impugned order must be paid by the Developer and CHB in the ratio of 70:30 -- Developer and CHB to pay the principal sum of Rs. 1,03,31,250/- with interest at 10% p.a. to the Complainant -- Direction to pay Rs. 2 lakhs in toto towards mental harassment and litigation costs in the ratio of 70:30 between the Developer and CHB, is also held to be correct.

(Para 2, 10-15)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 21 -- Delay in possession – Compensation for -- Respondents/complainants had paid 85% of the total agreed consideration, together with the agreement to sell, and even the balance at the time of the sale deed -- Having paid the consideration, it was evidently not in their interest to delay the receipt of possession -- Agreement provides Rs.5/- per sq.mt for delay upto 6 months – Agreement did not make any provision for delay thereafter – Consequently, the appellant would be liable to pay reasonable compensation to the respondents for the period in addition to the contractual payment due -- Compensation @ Rs.5/- per Square ft. in terms of agreement clause as well as Interest @ 6% p.a. (lump sum of Rs.10 lakhs) for other than contractual payment due awarded.

(Para 11-14)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 12 -- UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad-Registration and Allotment of Plots and Houses Rules, 1979, Rule 15, 30 -- Registration for flat – Allotment of flat – Right of --  Clause 5 of the Registration Booklet indicates that mere registration does not confer a right for allotment -- Rule 15 to the effect that the Board is not bound to allot a house or plot to every registered holder -- Rule 30 indicates that after the Board advertises the availability of a scheme in the newspaper, every registered applicant is at liberty to submit a consent letter for participation in the draw of lots – Applicant must show readiness and willingness to participate in a draw of lots in respect of a specified scheme – After depositing Rs.500/- in 1982 and Rs.500/- in 1985, the respondent did not pursue any remedies until 1993 – NCDRC directed the appellant to allot a flat to respondent for an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- -- Held, respondent/consumer had no vested right to seek an allotment -- Appellant, as a public authority, could not have been compelled to enter into a contract with the respondent -- There was no contractual entitlement of the respondent/consumer to the allotment of a flat much less for an allotment at a specified price – NCDRC adopted a view which is contrary to the basic principle of contract governing the law of subject – Impugned order of the NCDRC set aside.

(Para 15-16)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 2(1)(d) – Consumer – Booking of 4 flats – Fact that an individual has booked four flats may not by itself be a circumstance on the basis of which a conclusive presumption can be drawn that he or she is not a consumer in the absence of evidence regarding the purpose of the purchase -- Ultimately, it is a matter to be decided on the basis of evidence whether, as the appellant pleads, the flats were booked not for the purposes of resale, but for the members of his family -- Absent such an exercise, the decision of the NCDRC rests purely on assumption or surmise – Impugned order set aside, Consumer Complaint restored.

(Para 8-10)