A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A, 24(2), 25(3) -- Return of plaint – Transfer of petition – De novo trial or not – Power of -- In cases dealing with transfer of proceedings from a Court having jurisdiction to another Court, the discretion vested in the Court by Sections 24(2) and 25(3) either to retry the proceedings or proceed from the point at which such proceeding was transferred or withdrawn, is in marked contrast to the scheme under Order VII Rule 10 read with Rule 10-A where no such discretion is given and the proceeding has to commence de novo.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A – Constitution of India, Article 136, 142 -- Return of plaint -- De novo trial or not – Power of -- High Court by the impugned order held that the suit at Delhi shall proceed from the stage at which it was pending at Gurgaon before return of the plaint and not de novo – Held, presentation of the plaint at Gurgaon was certainly not before a court having jurisdiction in the matter -- Suit has to proceed afresh before the proper court – Because the appellant did not raise the objection under clause 16B of the agreement at the very first opportunity -- Pleadings of the parties have been completed, evidence led, and that the matter was fixed for final argument – In exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and in order to do complete and substantial justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution Court decline to set aside the order of the High Court.

(Para 3, 27)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c) – Recovery of cannabis -- Prima facie case should be beyond reasonable doubt – Burden of proof on accused shift thereafter -- Stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such as Section 37, the minimum sentence of 10 years, absence of any provision for remission do not dispense with the requirements of prosecution to establish a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only where after which the burden of proof shall shift to the accused -- Gravity of the sentence and the stringency of the provisions will therefore call for a heightened scrutiny of the evidence for establishment of foundational facts by the prosecution.

(Para 2, 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c), 37 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Recovery of cannabis from house -- Conscious possession of contraband – Proof of -- Fair trial – Right of -- Appellant produced the sale agreement of house in question, Exhibit P.28 with promptness the very next day -- It was never investigated for its genuineness by the police and neither were the panchayat records verified -- Voters list entry of 2008 being prior to the sale is of no consequence -- Conscious possession not established so as to attribute the presumption under the NDPS Act against him with regard to recovery of the contraband -- Conviction could not be based on a foundation of conjectures and surmises to conclude on a preponderance of probabilities, the guilt of the appellant without establishing the same beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellant has been denied the right to a fair investigation, which is but a facet of a fair trial guaranteed to every accused under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Conviction of the appellant held to be unsustainable and is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted.

(Para 2, 12-17)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ through SPA -- Property purchased after SPA – SPA would only cover the properties owned by as on the date of their execution and they would not cover or extend to properties purchased on a later date – These were not General Powers of Attorney executed in relation to the properties owned and that may be owned in future, but restricted Special Powers of Attorney in relation to properties already owned by him in a particular Tehsil – Writ petition, instituted through the SPA is therefore defective in its very inception.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(iv), 41 -- Writ of habeas corpus – Foster care order by Child Welfare Committee with incomplete coram on gazetted holiday – Colourable exercise of powers –Order passed by the Child Welfare Committee is totally silent about the factum of petitioner and his family being unfit or incapacitated for taking care and for protection and well-being of the child -- Counselling report would show that the Counsellor interacted with the minor and found that the minor was living happily with her father and also wanted to reside with him – Since the order passed by the Child Welfare Committee is found to be the result of colourable exercise of powers, therefore, Court deemed it appropriate to restore the custody of the minor in favour of the petitioner -- In the event of filing any petition under the relevant statute for custody of minor in regular proceedings, the same shall be decided in accordance with law -- Custody of the child ordered to be handed over to the petitioner.

(Para 19-23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail – Delay in furnishing bail bonds – Effect of -- Petitioner did “avail of” his right u/s 167(2) of the Code and furnished personal bail bond with surety, which was accepted and attested by the Court, he would be deemed to have been released from custody -- Petitioner was not released because two other cases were pending against him – Surety withdrew the surety furnished by him -- Court permitted the petitioner to furnish fresh bail bond with surety -- Since he was in custody in other cases, therefore, he did not furnish the fresh bail bond with surety – After granted bail in other cases, petitioner requested the Court to accept the personal bail bond with surety as directed vide earlier order, which was declined – Held, mere delay in furnishing personal bail bonds/surety cannot visit the petitioner with adverse consequences and the order granting bail u/s 167(2) of the Code does not cease to exist or comes to an end or stand eclipsed -- Petitioner is directed to furnish personal bail bonds with surety and thereafter ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 141 – Judgment passed by Supreme Court of India -- Courts below ignoring the judgment by saying not applicable, without discussion – Permissibility of -- Ld. Court below, in the order has taken notice of the judgment, but refuses to follow the same by observing that “these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case” – Held, a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India -- No doubt, the ratio decidendi laid down in a judgment is binding and not obiter dicta -- However, before distinguishing judgment, the Court is required to analyse that what is the ratio laid down in the judgment and thereafter, proceed to explain the same -- Manner in which the ld. Court below has ignored the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not appreciable.

(Para 11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 139A – Withdrawal/Transfer of case from High Court – Pre-requisite -- Provision of Article 139A of the Constitution relating to withdrawal of a case from a High Court to this Court on the ground of pendency before this Court of a case involving same or similar questions of law contemplates fulfilment of two conditions.

-- First, in the case pending before Supreme Court, the questions of law involved ought to be the same or substantially the same as those involved in the case in the High Court, the withdrawal of which can be asked for.

-- Secondly, while exercising the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 139A of the Constitution must be satisfied that such questions are substantial questions of general importance.

Such satisfaction can be on Supreme Court’s own motion, on an application made by the Attorney General or on the basis of an application made by a party to any such case.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 139A – Transfer of High Court petition to Supreme Court -- 10% reservation for economic backward class – Challenge to -- Writ petition in High court – Civil Appeal pending in Supreme Court on same issue – Points involved in the Civil Appeal and the Writ Petition pending in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana require adjudication of substantially the same questions of law -- Writ petition withdrawn from High Court to Supreme Court for disposal of the said Writ Petition – Transfer petition allowed.

(Para 1, 9,10)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Live in relation with same sex as a couple – Life and liberty -- Police protection – Right of -- Petitioners are entitled to protection of their lives and liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, regardless of the nature of relationship between them -- Legitimacy of their relationship with each other is of no consequence viz-a-viz their right to life and liberty – Direction given to SSP to verify the contents of representation seeking protection of life and liberty, if necessary, requisite steps be taken, in accordance with law for granting protection of life and liberty to the petitioners.

(Para 7-9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, Rule 20, 32 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 Explanation IV, 141, Order 2 Rule 2 -- Two writ petition for same cause of action – Maintainability of -- Writ petitioner failed to explain why the prayer made in the second writ petition could not be incorporated or added in the previous petition and also failed to disclose what is the difference in the cause of action of both the writ petitions -- Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC, is applicable particularly when in the 1976 Rules, there is no provision inconsistent with the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC -- Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC, also provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit or petition under Article 226, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly or substantially in issue in such suit or proceedings -- Second writ petition not entertained and disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file application for amendment of the pleadings in the previously instituted writ petition.

(Para 14-18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, Rule 20, 32 – Writ petition – Such or similar writ petition – Pendency of – Procedure of -- Petitioner is required to make a disclosure in the Index and the relevant para, if such or similar petition is pending or decided -- Also required to disclose the difference in the cause of action, if any, in both the writ petitions, if any -- Writ petitioner shall disclose the reasons why the relief claimed in the subsequent petition could not be claimed or included in the previously instituted petition -- Filing of the multiple petitions is neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of Judicial Institution -- Institution has been setup to make a sincere endeavour to give justice to all the litigants -- For achieving that goal, it is necessary that unnecessary filing of any kind of petitions should be discouraged – Second writ petition is disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file application for amendment of the pleadings in the previously instituted writ petition.

(Para 17,18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 45, 52 – Denial for registration of car -- Writ of mandamus – Maintainability of -- Once the authorities abdicate from doing their duty, a writ of mandamus would be maintainable.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 45, 52 – Registration of car -- Art work on car – Objection of -- Base colour of the car which remains white, no doubt the art work done upon it is colourful, but has it changed the basic structure of the car or has the vehicle been altered in any manner which is not permitted by virtue of Section 52 of the Act? -- The answer is in the negative -- Respondents are issued a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing them to register the said vehicle within a period of two weeks.

(Para 16-19)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Absence of marriage -- Invalid/Void marriage – Run-away couple – Minor or Major -- Police protection – Right of -- Right to human life is to be treated on much higher pedestal, regardless of a citizen being minor or a major -- Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional Scheme it must be protected, regardless of the solemnization of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties -- Mere fact that petitioners are not of marriageable age would not deprive them of their fundamental right -- SSP is directed to provide necessary protection qua their life and liberty, if deemed fit.

(Para 15-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of habeas corpus for custody of minor – Maintainability of -- It is well settled that writ of habeas corpus can be issued for restoration of custody of a minor to the guardian wrongfully deprived of it -- However, exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus in such cases is not solely dependent on and does not necessarily follow merely determination of illegality of detention and is based on the paramount consideration of welfare of the minor child irrespective of legal rights of the parents.

(Para 18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 – Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Writ of Habeas Corpus by mother (resident of Australia) for custody of minor son -- Child born as well as resident of Australia – Now residing with grandmother and studying in School in India -- Contention that the Family Court/Guardian Court in India has no jurisdiction is not legally sustainable -- Facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus by handing over its custody to the petitioner -- It is in the welfare of the minor child that respondent no.3 / grand-mother be allowed to continue to have its custody subject to order of the Family Court/Guardian Court at Ambala, where the minor child is now ordinarily residing and that the petitioner be accordingly directed to approch the Family Court/Guardian Court at Ambala for adjudication of the question of entrustment of custody of the child to the petitioner for its repatriation to Australia.

(Para 6, 43-46)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased aged 35 years – Five dependent -- A photocopy of the original ITR for the year 2006-07, bearing the rubber stamp of the Income Tax Department shows that the date of filing the ITR was prior to the death of the deceased -- Hence, the High Court was not justified in disregarding the ITR for the year 2006-07 while assessing the income of the deceased -- ITRs for the assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 reflects the income of approximately Rs. 1,00,000 p.a. made basis for computing the compensation – Future prospects 40% and deduction towards his personal expenses made by 1/4th -- Multiplier adopted at 16 is appropriate -- Under the conventional heads Rs. 70,000/- (Loss of estate Rs. 15,000/- + Funeral expenses Rs. 15,000/- + Loss of consortium Rs.40,000/-) awarded – Total compensation comes to Rs.17,50,000/- -- Though the claimant did not file appeal before the High Court, Supreme Court by exercising powers under Article 142 enhanced the same to do complete justice between the parties – Interest @ 7.5% p.a. awarded from date of filing the claim petition.

(Para 1, 7,8)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Run-away marriage -- Police protection – Requirement of -- Deserves immediate attention of the Police Department to ensure that the couple is not unduly harassed by anyone including their respective parents -- Direction must go to the Commissioner of Police, to take steps which are consistent with their safety -- Couple is at liberty to present a representation to the police describing their apprehension from those who oppose the union so that effective steps are taken -- With these directions, the instant petition disposed of without expressing any opinion on the validity of marriage.

(Para 1-4)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Run-away couple -- Police protection petition – Photographs of couple – Requirement of -- Photographs are not proof of marriage -- Neither is a court concerned with the marriage in this jurisdiction -- Court is only concerned about the identity of the petitioners in these cases which can be traced back -- For these there are Aadhar cards and other official photo identification and passport size photographs of both etc. would be sufficient compliance which are to be placed on record duly authenticated by the petitioners -- Registry is directed that photographs would not be attached with protection petitions by runaway couples unless there is an affidavit of counsel that they are necessary for the understanding of the case, for which reasons must be assigned by way of an application.

(Para 1, 10)

Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 10(2)(l) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 19(1)(g) -- Lock down period during pandemic Covid-19 – Full wages to employees for 50 days – Notification/Order issued by Union of India – Power of – Challenged being violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) -- Both Industry and Labourers need each other -- No Industry or establishment can survive without employees/labourers and vice versa – Held, efforts should be made to sort out the differences and disputes between the workers and the employers regarding payment of wages of above 50 days and if any settlement or negotiation can be entered into between them without regard to the order dated 29.03.2020, the said steps may restore congenial work atmosphere – Directions issued for following interim measures which can be availed by all the private establishment, industries, factories and workers Trade Unions/ Employees Associations etc. which may be facilitated by the State Authorities: -

i) The private establishment, industries, employers who are willing to enter into negotiation and settlement with the workers/employees regarding payment of wages for 50 days or for any other period as applicable in any particular State during which their industrial establishment was closed down due to lockdown, may initiate a process of negotiation with their employees organization and enter into a settlement with them and if they are unable to settle by themselves submit a request to concerned labour authorities who are entrusted with the obligation under the different statute to conciliate the dispute between the parties who on receiving such request, may call the concerned Employees Trade Union/workers Association/ workers to appear on a date for negotiation, conciliation and settlement. In event a settlement is arrived at, that may be acted upon by the employers and workers irrespective of the order dated 29.03.2020 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.

ii) Those employers’ establishments, industries, factories which were working during the lockdown period although not to their capacity can also take steps as indicated in direction No.(i).

iii) The private establishments, industries, factories shall permit the workers/employees to work in their establishment who are willing to work which may be without prejudice to rights of the workers/employees regarding unpaid wages of above 50 days. The private establishments, factories who proceed to take steps as per directions (i) and (ii) shall publicise and communicate about their such steps to workers and employees for their response/participation. The settlement, if any, as indicated above shall be without prejudice to the rights of employers and employees which is pending adjudication in these writ petitions.

iv) The Central Government, all the States/UTs through their Ministry of Labour shall circulate and publicise this order for the benefit of all private establishment, employers, factories and workers/employees.

(Para 7, 36, 37)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Custody of 4 years old minor daughter with father – Writ of Habeas corpus by mother -- Maintainability of -- Merely because other remedies are available to the parties, would not render the present petition not maintainable.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 -- Custody of 4 year old minor daughter with father – Writ of Habeas corpus by mother – Temporary custody given to mother – Held,

-- Minor daughter is suffering from a congenital problem -- Father of the child has appended medical proof of her treatment along with the expenses being borne by him towards the said treatment -- Same would go on to show that the upbringing of the minor child has to be with extra care and attention in constant presence of other family members when the parents are away.

-- Paternal grandmother of the minor daughter is since deceased -- It is only the grandfather and the father of the minor daughter who live with her at the paternal house – Petitioner has taken a permission from her employer to work full time from home – Parents of petitioner are currently staying with her -- She along with them is in a better position to look after the daughter full time, while there is no female attendant at the house of father.

-- She is merely four years and ordinarily, per Section 6 of 1890 Act, custody of a minor who is less than five years has to be with her mother -- No doubt, the above provision postulates that the custody shall “ordinarily” be with the mother -- But the word “ordinarily” is to be construed to mean that unless, prima facie, it is shown otherwise by the father that child would be better taken care of by deprivation of motherhood -- Father must then give some cogent reasons, indicative of the welfare and interest of the child being jeopardized or the exclusive motherhood being imminently non-conducive to the upbringing of child -- Spirit of section 6 hypothesizes that, given the tender age of a minor, suitability of custody is not the predominant factor, what is more relevant or should weigh, is the requisite biological and natural environment, which gives rise to a general presumption that mother is first and best suitable for child care of a minor that age.

-- Minor daughter cannot be stated to be in illegal or unlawful custody, however, since the minor daughter is less than five years, the mother is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Section 6 -- Until the prayer of the parties qua custody of the minor child is decided by Guardian court, the welfare and interest of the minor child would be better in the hands of mother-petitioner.

-- Temporary custody of the minor given to the petitioner till any further appropriate orders are passed by the Guardian/ Civil Judge.

-- However, clarified that observations are mere obiter dictum in nature. Same would not effect the merits of the permanent custody petition which has been filed by father or interim custody application, if chosen to be filed by him, per liberty granted by this Court -- Guardian/ Civil Judge shall not get influenced with these tentative observations while deciding either of those on their own merits.

(Para 11-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32 – Fundamental Rights – Protection of -- Article 32 of the Constitution constitutes a recognition of the constitutional duty entrusted to Supreme Court to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.

(Para 32)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) – Right to speech and expression – Fundamental right of Journalist – Airing of views -- Exercise of journalistic freedom lies at the core of speech and expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) -- Exercise of that fundamental right is not absolute and is answerable to the legal regime enacted with reference to the provisions of Article 19(2) -- Right of a journalist under Article 19(1)(a) is no higher than the right of the citizen to speak and express.

(Para 32)

C. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- F.I.R. -- Allegation against police -- Transfer of Investigation to CBI -- Power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances” – An accused person does not have a choice in regard to the mode or manner in which the investigation should be carried out or in regard to the investigating agency – Court do not find that levelling such allegations would by and itself constitute a sufficient ground for the transfer of the investigation.

(Para 35-44)

D. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 – Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR -- Petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available under the CrPC -- Petitioner has an equally efficacious remedy available before the High Court – Held, a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable.

(Para 49)

E. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- One cause of action – FIR against -- Multiple FIRs and complaints – Quashing of -- Multiple FIRs and complaints in several states and in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir – Fairness in the administration of criminal justice would warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 to quash all other FIRs -- Filing of multiple FIRs arising out of the same telecast of the show hosted by the petitioner is an abuse of the process and impermissible -- Quashing of those FIRs would not amount to the expression of any opinion on the merits of the FIR which is being investigated.

(Para 2, 51)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5, 11, 12 -- Police protection to run-away couple – Minor girl -- FIR registered -- It is not for High Court in a protection petition to engage itself in social mores, norms and human behaviour or introduce personal ideas on morality – Even in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 marriage of a minor girl is not void -- SSP is directed to personally look into the matter and offer help, which is consistent with their safety.

(Para 6,7)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 43 – Interpretation of NDPS Act – Literal interpretation -- Provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the object and purpose of NDPS Act; impact on the society as a whole and the Act is required to be interpreted literally and not liberally which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and preamble of the Act.

(Para 8)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21 -- Small or Commercial quantity -- Mixture of narcotic or psychotropic substance with neutral substance –  Decision in the case of E. Micheal Raj (2008) 5 SCC 161, taking the view that in the mixture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of the neutral substance(s) is  not to be taken into consideration while determining the small quantity or commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and only the actual content by weight of the offending narcotic drug which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether it would constitute small quantity or commercial quantity, is not a good law.

(Para 10(i))

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia) – Small or Commercial quantity – Mixture of narcotic or psychotropic substance with neutral substance – Held, in case of seizure of mixture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the “small or commercial quantity” of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances.

(Para 10 (ii))

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001 – Challenge to -- Section 21 of the NDPS Act is not stand-alone provision and must be construed along with other provisions in the statute including provisions in the NDPS Act including Notification No.S.O.2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 and Notification S.O 1055(E) dated 19.10.2001 -- Challenge to Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001, fails and it is observed and held that the same is not ultra vires to the Scheme and the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act.

(Para 10 (iii) &(iv))

Constitution of India, Article 254, 346, Schedule VII, List III Entries 33 and 34 -- U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (24 of 1953), Section 16 -- Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, Clause 3 -- Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 3(2)(c) – Minimum price of sugar cane – Advise price of sugarcane – Power of – Held, view taken by the Constitution Bench in the subsequent decision in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, (2004) 5 SCC 430 is the correct law. There is no conflict between the two decisions in the case of Tika Ramji, AIR 1956 SC 676 and in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, (2004) 5 SCC 430 and therefore, there is no necessity to refer the matter to the larger Bench consisting of seven Judges. Held,

a.      By virtue of Entries 33 and 34 List III of seventh Schedule, both the Central Government as well as the State Government have the power to fix the price of sugarcane. The Central Government having exercised the power and fixed the “minimum price”, the State Government cannot fix the “minimum price” of sugarcane. However, at the same time, it is always open for the State Government to fix the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price”, in view of the relevant provisions of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, which has been issued in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953;

b.      The Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 which has been issued under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 confers power upon the State Government to fix the remunerative/advised price at which sugarcane can be bought or sold which shall always be higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government;

c.      Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 is not repugnant to Section 3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 as, as observed hereinabove, the price which is fixed by the Central Government is the “minimum price” and the price which is fixed by the State Government is the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government and therefore, there is no conflict.

It is only in a case where the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is lower than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the provisions of the Central enactments will prevail and the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government would prevail. So long as the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the same cannot be said to be void under Article 254 of the Constitution of India.

d.      The view taken by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. Co-operative Cane Unions Federations vs. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others is the correct law.

Reference answered.

(Para 23,24)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Removal of probationer on assessment of performance – Enquiry -- Opportunity of hearing -- Requirement of -- Probationer not strictly covered within the umbrella of Article 311 -- Merely because ACRs were consistently marked ‘Good’, it cannot be a ground to bestow him with a right to continue in service – Neither any specific misconduct has been attributed nor any allegation made – Order is based upon overall assessment of the performance during the period of probation, which was not found satisfactory – Such an inference which can be a valid foundation to dispense with services of a probationer does not warrant holding of an enquiry in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution -- In cases of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sine-qua-non.

(Para 14-20)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Probation period – Nature of -- Entire objective of probation is to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the probationer’s performance and test his suitability for a particular post -- Such an exercise is a necessary part of the process of recruitment, and must not be treated lightly -- Written tests and interviews are only attempts to predict a candidate’s possibility of success at a particular job -- True test of suitability is actual performance of duties which can only be applied after the candidate joins and starts working.

(Para 16)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Removal of probationer – Judicial review of -- If the Court finds that the real motive behind the order was to ‘punish’ the official, it may always strike down the same for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard -- Onus would lie on the probationer to prove that the action taken against him was of punitive characteristics.

(Para 21, 24)

D. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Appointment of Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate – Exercise of power not vested – Removal during probation -- Judicial officer is expected to be in know of Section 36(3) of the NDPS Act, 1985 which expressly ousts competence of a judicial officer below the rank of Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge in NDPS matters -- High Court on administrative side, therefore, justifiably inferred he was prone to act negligently or had the tendency to usurp power which the law does not vest in him -- This was a relevant factor to determine suitability of a probationer judicial officer – Order of discharge whereby services were dispensed with during probation approved.

(Para 23)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Challenge to appointment of Chowkidar -- Writ jurisdiction – Disputed question of facts – Scope of -- Disputed questions of fact can also be decided in a writ petition, if the pleadings on affidavit give adequate information to the Court -- Adequate material is available on record to decide whether the entry of munadi is collusive or not --  Circumstances suggest collusion -- Writ petition allowed -- Appointment of respondent No.5 as Chowkidar set aside – Direction given to authorities to initiate the process of appointment of a new Chowkidar after conducting fresh munadi in accordance with law.

(Para 1, 7-9)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 17(3) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Arms license cancelled on account of registration of criminal cases – Challenge to -- Acquitted in one case and in two cases, F.I.R's against him were cancelled – It is not the case of the respondents that he has ever misused the arms license issued to him – Held, respondents could not by invoking Section 17(3)(b) cancel the arms license of the petitioner – Writ petition allowed, cancellation orders quashed.

(Para 1-4, 16,17)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13 -- Acquittal in F.I.R. – Departmental proceedings on allegations, which were subject matter of FIR – Enquiry officer fallen in error and actually shows the intention of the authorities not to initiate the departmental enquiry against the petitioner for any other allegation except the allegations which were subject matter of FIR -- After the evidence has been examined by the trial court and it has recorded its findings acquitting the petitioner, the observations in the enquiry report clearly amounts to re-appreciation of evidence.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13 -- Acquittal in F.I.R. -- Suspension period of an employee – Submission that during the pendency of the criminal case, where employee is acquitted, should be deemed to be on duty for all intents and purposes – Punishment orders quashed, respondents are directed to consequently, re-fix the pay of the petitioner with all consequential benefits.

(Para 14)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Orders of High Court in similar matter – Non-following by High Court in another matter – Non-aware of notification by State Authorities – Acceptability of -- Held, it is unfortunate that the High Court failed to follow its own orders in a similar matter -- High Court further gravely erred in holding that the authorities of the State were also unaware of the clarificatory notification and neither did the appellant bring it on record -- It is absolutely no defence of the State authorities to contend that they were not aware of their own notification -- Onus heavily rests on them and a casual statement generating litigation by State apathy cannot be approved -- Impugned orders are therefore held to be unsustainable and are set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 9-11)

Constitution of India, Article 14,15,16,21 – Scheme for compassionate appointment – Dependency is criteria -- Married daughter – Right of -- Equality cannot be achieved unless there are equal opportunities for all – Non-inclusion of a “married daughter” in the definition of 'dependent family member', would be violative of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Constitution – Daughter is held, eligible, ordered to give appointment on consideration of her claim.

(Para 11-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 -- Second Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Double jeopardy -- Trial court convicted the accused – Appellate Court acquitted the accused solely based upon Yogendra Pratap Singh’s case, 2015 (1) RCR (Civil) 550 -- Hon’ble Apex Court held in that case, where the complaint was filed before the expiry of the period 15 days stipulated in the notice, the Court cannot take the cognizance thereof, however, the second complaint on the same cause of action has been held to be maintainable and the delay in filing such complaint shall be deemed to have been condoned -- Held, it cannot be said that the filing of the second complaint and passing of the summoning order therein, amounts to double jeopardy to the petitioner.

(Para 6-10)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Writ jurisdiction – Alternative efficacious remedy -- Principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law -- Writ courts normally refrain from exercising their extraordinary power if the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy -- Existence of such remedy however does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted -- At the same time, it is a well settled principle that such jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available -- Rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not a rule of jurisdiction.

(Para 14)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Armed Force Tribunal – Writ jurisdiction -- High Court would be justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction because of some glaring illegality committed by the AFT -- Alternative remedy must be efficacious and in case of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), or a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO); to expect such a person to approach the Supreme Court in every case may not be justified -- It is extremely difficult and beyond the monetary reach of an ordinary litigant to approach the Supreme Court -- Therefore, it will be for the High Court to decide in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case whether it should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction or not -- There cannot be a blanket ban on the exercise of such jurisdiction.

(Para 14)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Armed Force Tribunal – Writ jurisdiction -- Proceedings on the original side even in exercise of writ jurisdiction are to be transferred to the tribunal for decision -- This however, does not mean that the AFT can exercise all the powers of the High Court.

(Para 15)

D. Constitution of India, Article 214,215,226,227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Armed Force Tribunal – Writ jurisdiction – LPA/Intra Court appeal – Transfer of -- High Court is a Constitutional Court constituted under Article 214 of the Constitution and are courts of record within the meaning of Article 215 -- It is obvious that the order of the High Court cannot be challenged before any other forum except the Supreme Court -- Contention that an intra court appeal from the judgment of a single judge of the High Court to a Division Bench pending in the High Court is required to be transferred under Section 34 of the Act is rejected.

(Para 17)

West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 (25 of 2008), Section 8,10,11,12 – Constitution of India, Article 30 – Minority Institution – Appointment of teachers in an Aided Madrasah -- Selection of teacher and their nomination by Commission -- Constitutional Validity of – Held, Concerned provisions cannot, be said to be transgressing the rights of the minority institutions:

--     The selection of the teachers and their nomination by the Commission constituted under the provisions of the Commission Act would satisfy the national interest as well as the interest of the minority educational institutions and said provisions are not violative of the rights of the minority educational institutions.

--     the additional feature in the present matter shows that the composition of the Commission with special emphasis on persons having profound knowledge in Islamic Culture and Theology, would ensure that the special needs and requirements of minority educational institutions will always be taken care of and thus the present case stands on a different footing.

--     in going by the test culled out in the TMA Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481, it is held that the provisions of the Commission Act are not violative of the rights of the minority educational institutions on any count.

--     Held, Sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the Commission Act to be valid and constitutional.

(Para 55-57)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Service Matter – Junior getting higher salary -- Senior’s right to step-up -- Once, an employee who though is senior but getting lesser pay than his junior, his pay is to be stepped up equivalent to his junior and the stepped up pay of such senior employee cannot depend upon the pay of the junior thereafter especially when the junior has been imposed punishment -- Stepping up of the pay of the petitioner once granted, cannot be brought down upon the punishment imposed upon a junior employee -- Petitioner will also be entitled for the refixation of his salary and consequent retiral benefits.

(Para 19, 20)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Employee about to retire -- Salary reduced on pay re-fixation – Right to recover -- Pay was re-fixed two months prior to his retirement and the recovery was done from the last two salaries for which the petitioner got while in service – Recovery could not have been ordered from the petitioner as he was about to retire within a period of two months. Rafiq Masih’s case, (2014) 8 SCC 883, relied.

(Para 23)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), Section 87 – Constitution of India, Article 246(4), Seventh Schedule -- NRI landlord Amendment -- Extension to Chandigarh by Notification – Challenge to – Whether Notification dated 09.10.2009 issued under Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act extending Section 13-B of the Rent Act to Chandigarh by executive action is invalid? – Challenge predicated on the doctrine of excessive delegation, separation of powers, doctrine of the law of agency, fails and must be rejected -- Such challenge must also be rejected in view of the large number of eviction suits filed by Non-Resident Indian landlords on the strength of Notification dated 09.10.2009 who would be left remediless if contentions to the contrary are accepted.

(16-19)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), Section 87 – Constitution of India, Article 246(4), Seventh Schedule -- NRI Landlord Amendment -- Whether amendments made vide the Amendment Act with regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State Legislature of Punjab were beyond its competence? – Held, State legislature was well within its competence -- In the context of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject matter falls within the Concurrent List, it will be immaterial to decide on the competence of the legislating body -- Power to make laws in respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under Article 246(4) -- In terms of Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, the power to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh vests with the Central Government, that is the Parliament or the Central Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible.

(Para 20-28)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- NRI Landlord Amendment -- Whether Section 13-B of the Rent Act is arbitrary and unreasonable inasmuch as it does not afford any legal remedy to the tenants? – Held, by providing for a simplified procedure of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B does not dilute the rights of tenants -- It gives a chance to the tenants on merits to establish their case and when justified and necessary to take the matter to trial -- By no means, therefore, Section 13-B can be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

(Para 29-36)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- NRI Landlord Amendment -- Whether classifying Non-Resident Indian landlords as a separate category renders Section 13-B invalid and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution? – Held, Section 13-B of the Rent Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional because it grants a right to claim eviction for bona fide need by summary procedure to a certain group of landlords, that is, Non-Resident Indians subject to and on the satisfaction of statutory conditions which incorporate a check on frivolous evictions – Section 13-B cannot, therefore, be treated as an arbitrary classification that infringes and violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Challenge predicated on the basis of unconstitutionality of the classification is rejected.

(Para 38-45)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bank default case -- Sale notice by bank – Co-sharer of property not a mortgagor or guarantor – Demarcation of -- Right of -- Until and unless the mortgaged property is demarcated and the possession is taken thereof, it cannot be put to sale as the petitioner is stated to be a co-sharer in the property who is neither a borrower nor a guarantor – Writ petition withdrawn to file a detailed reply to the notice – Bank directed to consider the said reply/objection positively and decide the same before proceeding further in respect of the sale of the mortgaged property.

(Para 2-6)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Divorce without consent of the second party – Power of Supreme Court -- Only in a case where one of the parties do not agree and give consent, only then the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India are required to be invoked to do the substantial Justice between the parties, however, at the same time, the interest of the wife is also required to be protected financially.

 (Para 6)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Divorce – Power of Supreme Court -- Appellant-husband and the respondent-wife have been living separately for more than 22 years and it will not be possible for the parties to live together – Divorce granted, husband shall pay to the wife a lump sum permanent alimony, quantified at Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs).

(Para 7,8)

A. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 – Vested right of employment -- Right of rehabilitation -- Number of abkari workers lost their livelihood due to ban on arrack in State -- Assurance was given to abraki workers for consideration for employment in 25% of vacancies in Corporation -- Government provided employment to dependents of deceased against 25% daily wage vacancies in Corporation -- Decision not unreasonable or arbitrary in light of overriding public interest.

(Para 12)

B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 – Legitimate expectation -- Assurance given to the respondents that they would be considered for appointment in the future vacancies of daily wage workers – Change in policy due to the difficulty in implementation – Held, overriding public interest which was the reason for change in policy has to be given due weight while considering the claim of the respondents regarding legitimate expectation.

(Para 19)

C. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 – Procedural legitimate expectation -- If an announcement is made by the Government of a policy conferring benefit on a large number of people, but subsequently, due to overriding public interest, the benefits that were announced earlier are withdrawn, it is not expedient to provide individual opportunities to such innominate number of persons – Court will not interfere on grounds of procedural fairness and natural justice, if the deciding authority has been allotted a full range of choice and the decision is taken fairly and objectively.

(Para 23)

Constitution of India, Article 311 – Departmental proceedings – Punishment/ Penalty imposed – Prospective effect -- Judgment in Major Singh Gill, 1992(1) SCT 436 holding that the punishment imposed in departmental proceedings “would relate back to the period when the alleged offence/misconduct was committed or in any case when the same was detected” does not lay down the correct law – Held, the punishment/ penalty takes effect prospectively from the date of its imposition.

(Page 48)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Writ petition – Dismissal by unreasoned order -- High Court neither discussed the issues arising the case, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as to why it has dismissed the writ petition – Matter remanded back.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Writ petition – Dismissal by unreasoned order -- Every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/Authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion -- Parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary Court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order – High Court while passing the impugned order simply dismissed the writ petition without any discussion, finding and the reason -- Such order is not legally sustainable and hence deserves to be set aside.

(Para 9-11)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 15 -- Repudiation of claim -- Non-disclosure of previous claims – Burden of proof -- Mere disclosure of a previous insurance policy did not discharge the obligation which was cast on the Insured, as the proposer, to make a full, true and complete disclosure of the claims which were lodged under the previous policy in the preceding three years – This material fact was suppressed from the proposal form -- Burden cannot be cast upon the insurer to follow up on an inadequate disclosure by conducting a line of enquiry with the previous insurer in regard to the nature of the claims, if any, that were made under the earlier insurance policy -- Fact that such a claim was lodged and had been settled at Rs 36.66 lakhs was suppressed -- Suppression goes to the very root of the contract of insurance which would validate the grounds on which the claim was repudiated by the insurer.

(Para 12-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Acquittal from -- Back wages – Right of -- If an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Suspension of employees -- Dropping of proceedings – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant suspended on 23.10.1979 -- Disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983 --  Suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987 and re-instated -- By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry -- Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial -- Held, Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

(Para 7)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Conviction in Criminal case – Dismissal of employee – Acquittal by Appellate court – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 – Constitution of India, Article 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Stare Decisis -- Accused’s evidence by way of affidavit – Permissibility of – Accused, while appearing as his own witness in defence does not have any right to lead the evidence by way of affidavit – Held, even if the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Indian Bank Association 2014 (2) RCR (Criminal) 598 is taken to be suggesting contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Mandvi Co-op Bank Ltd., 2010(1) JT 259, then also, it is the Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Mandvi Co-op Bank Ltd., which shall hold the field, being earlier in point of time and having been delivered by a Bench of equal strength.

(Para 10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26, Rule 9, Section 115 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner – Refusal to appoint – Revisional Jurisdiction -- Orders are not revisable orders -- Such type of orders do not decide substantive right of the parties -- Petitioner would be well within his right to lead substantive evidence during trial.

(Para 7-8)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26, Rule 9, Section 115 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner – Demarcation of land -- Discretion of the Court cannot be utilized to collect evidence for the petitioner.

(Para 9)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Constitution of India, Article 141 -- Plaint to be barred by any law -- Rejection of plaint -- Expression “law” occurring in Order 7 Rule 11 (d) includes judicial decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court -- The authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court is the law of land -- The law declared by Hon’ble Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India is law of land -- Law includes not only legislative enactments but also judicial precedents.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (c) – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Article 17(iii), Section 7 (iv)(c) -- Non-executant of deed in possession – Challenge to Transfer deed – Ad-valorem court fee -- If a non-executant who is in possession of the property seeks to get the document annulled, then he is required to pay Court as per Article 17(iii) of the Second Schedule of the Act.

(Para 9)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (c) – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7 (iv)(c) -- Non-executant of deed not in possession – Challenge to Transfer deed – Ad-valorem court fee – If the non-executant who is not in possession of the property and he seeks not only the declaration of the instrument to be invalid, but also seeks possession thereof, then he is required to pay ad valorem Court fee as per market value under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Act.

(Para 9)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 (c) – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7 (iv)(c) -- Non-executant of deed in possession – Challenge to Transfer deed – Ad-valorem court fee -- Suit for declaration to the effect that he is owner in possession of the suit property -- Transfer deed was claimed to be sham transaction and was not binding upon the right and title of the plaintiff -- Permanent injunction was also sought, restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff – Transfer deed under challenge in the suit does not show any consideration -- Plaintiff is not required to pay ad valorem Court fee.

(Para 2, 10)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Rule of natural justice -- Basic fundamental principle of law that no order can be passed by any Court in any judicial proceedings against any party to such proceedings without hearing and giving such party an opportunity of hearing.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Rule of natural justice -- A person is made a party to the judicial proceedings in relation to a certain dispute has a legitimate right to raise an objection that before passing any order in such proceedings, he should be at least heard and his views/stand in relation to the subject matter of the proceedings be taken into consideration -- The Court is duty bound to hear all such person(s) by giving them an opportunity to place their stand.

(Para 10)

View of Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 32 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – Section 497 IPC effectively creating a dent in individual dignity of women -- Emphasis on element of connivance or consent of husband tantamounts to subordination of women which violates Article 21 of Constitution – If it is treated as a crime, there would be immense intrusion into the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere -- It is better to be left as a ground for divorce -- As a criminal offence it will offend the two facets of Article 21 of the Constitution, namely, dignity of husband and wife, as the case may be, and the privacy attached to a relationship between the two – Held, Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional -- When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path.

(Para 41-56)

View of R.F. Nariman, J.

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery – Aggrieved party – Procedure of -- Constitutional validity of – In treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this provision, such provision discriminates against women on grounds of sex only, and must be struck down -- Section 198, CrPC is also a blatantly discriminatory provision, in that it is the husband alone or somebody on his behalf who can file a complaint against another man for this offence -- Held, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, struck down as being invalid.

(Para 81-86)

View of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery -- Constitutional Validity – Criminal law must be in consonance with constitutional morality -- Being antithetical to the constitutional guarantees of liberty, dignity and equality, Section 497 does not pass constitutional muster – Held, Section 497 lacks an adequately determining principle to criminalize consensual sexual activity and is manifestly arbitrary -- Section 497 is a denial of substantive equality as it perpetuates the subordinate status ascribed to women in marriage and society -- Section 497 violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is based on gender stereotypes about the role of women and violates the non-discrimination principle embodied in Article 15 of the Constitution -- Section 497 is a denial of the constitutional guarantees of dignity, liberty, privacy and sexual autonomy which are intrinsic to Article 21 of the Constitution; and Section 497 is unconstitutional.

 (Para 153)

View of Indu Malhotra, J.

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 497 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 198 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 15, 21 – Adultery as offence -- Right to equality – Procedure to prosecute -- Constitutional validity – Section 497 is struck down as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution -- Section 198(2) of the Cr.P.C. which contains the procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of the I.P.C. shall be unconstitutional only to the extent that it is applicable to the offence of Adultery under Section 497.

(Para 165-171)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Civil and Criminal proceedings – Stay of – Automatic vacation of stay -- Proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied -- Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up -- At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay -- Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up -- In an attempt to remedy this, situation, Directions given that :

-- in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended.

-- In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order.

-- The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized.

-- The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced.

(Para 35)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Framing of charge – Challenge to – Power of -- Stay of proceedings -- Framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order -- Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution -- However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered -- Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter.

-- Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period.

-- Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally.

-- If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated.

-- In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters.

-- Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts.

-- Trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced -- High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage.

A copy of order sent to all the High Courts for necessary action.

(Para 37, 38)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Equal pay for equal work – Law summarised -- Full bench of the High Court in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CWP no. 14796 of 2003), dated 11.11.2011 and decision rendered by the division bench of the High Court in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (LPA no. 337 of 2003, decided on 7.1.2009) are set aside -- Decision rendered in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Rajinder Kumar (LPA no. 1024 of 2009, decided on 30.8.2010), with the modification, that the concerned employees would be entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale, of the category to which they belong, but would not be entitled to allowances attached to the posts held by them.

(Para 52)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14, 141 – Equal pay for equal work for work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual etc. – Law summarised -- Principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has also been extended to temporary employees (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like) -- An employee engaged for the same work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities -- Any act, of paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position -- In view of the law declared by Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee, whether engaged on regular or temporary basis -- Sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts.

(Para 54-57)

C. Constitution of India, Article 14, 141 – Equal pay for equal work – Temporary employees -- All the temporary employees were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre/establishment -- Concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees -- Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time – It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis -- Principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable and all the concerned temporary employees would be entitled to draw wages at the minimum of the pay-scale (at the lowest grade, in the regular pay-scale), extended to regular employees, holding the same post.

 (Para 57, 58)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Right to life -- Access to justice -- Access to justice is and has been recognised as a part and parcel of right to life in India and in all civilized societies around the globe -- The right is so basic and inalienable that no system of governance can possibly ignore its significance, leave alone afford to deny the same to its citizens -- Supreme Court has by a long line of decisions given an expansive meaning and interpretation to the word ‘life’ appearing in Article 21 of the Constitution.

(i)    In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, Court declared that the right to life does not mean mere animal existence alone but includes every aspect that makes life meaningful and liveable.

(ii)   In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 the right against solitary confinement and prison torture and custodial death was declared to be a part of right to life.

(iii)  In Charles Sobhraj v. Suptd. Central Jail (1978) 4 SCC 104 the right against bar fetters was declared to be a right protected under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(iv)   In Khatri II v. State of Bihar (1981) 1 SCC 627, the right to free legal aid was held to be a right covered under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(v)    In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 526 the right against handcuffing was declared to be a right under Article 21.

(vi)   So also in Rudal Shah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 the right to compensation for illegal and unlawful detention was considered to be a right to life under Article 21 and also under Article 14.

(vii)  In Sheela Barse v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 226, Court declared speedy trial to be an essential right under Article 21.

(viii) In Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 248, right to emergency, medical aid was declared to be protected under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(ix)   In Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 and Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame (1990) 1 SCC 520, right to shelter, clothing, decent environment and a decent accommodation was also held to be a part of life.

(x)    In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 388, right to clean environment was held to be a right to life under Article 21.

(xi)   In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 475, right to marriage was held to be a part of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.

(xii)  In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1, right to make reproductive choices was declared as right to life.

(xiii) While in Sukhwant Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 7 SCC 559 right to reputation was declared to be a facet of right to life guaranteed under Article 21.

(xiv) In the recent Constitution Bench Judgment decision of this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India [W.P (Crl.) No.184 of 2014], Court held reputation to be an inherent and inseparable component of Article 21.

Held, access to justice is indeed a facet of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Article 21 of the Constitution apart, access to justice can be said to be part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 as well.

(Para 27,28)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 – Access to justice -- Four main facets that constitute the essence of access to justice are:

i)     The State must provide an effective adjudicatory mechanism;

ii)    The mechanism so provided must be reasonably accessible in terms of distance;

iii)   The process of adjudication must be speedy; and

iv)   The litigant’s access to the adjudicatory process must be affordable.

(Para 29, 30)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21, 32, 136, 142 -- Access to justice – Right to life – Transfer of case from Jammu and Kashmir to other State -- Access to justice is a facet of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, a violation actual or threatened of that right would justify the invocation of this Court’s powers under Article 32 of the Constitution – There is no prohibition against use of power under Article 142 to direct transfer of cases from a Court in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to a Court outside the State or vice versa -- There is no enabling provision, the absence of an enabling provision, however, cannot be construed as a prohibition against transfer of cases to or from the State of Jammu and Kashmir – Extraordinary power available to this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can, therefore, be usefully invoked in a situation where the Court is satisfied that denial of an order of transfer from or to the Court in the State of Jammu and Kashmir will deny the citizen his/her right of access to justice.

 (Para 36)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 41-A – Arrest of Advocate/ Doctor – Procedure of law violated – Life and liberty of accused -- Compensation to accused arrested -- Arrest of the petitioners was not made by following the procedure of arrest -- Dignity of the petitioners, a doctor and a practicing Advocate has been seriously jeopardized -- It is an assault on his/her identity – Said identity is sacrosanct under the Constitution – Article 21 has been violated and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation – Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (1997) 1 SCC 416, there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of Cr.PC -- A sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation is awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence -- It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.

(Para 22-27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheating – Civil Dispute -- On a perusal of the FIR, it is clear to us that the dispute is purely of a civil nature, but a maladroit effort has been made to give it a criminal colour – No ingredient of Section 420 IPC is remotely attracted -- Even if it is a wrong, the complainant has to take recourse to civil action – Not the case where cognizance of the offence can be taken by the court and the accused can be asked to face trial -- Entire case projects a civil dispute and nothing else – Prosecution initiated against the petitioners stands quashed.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Convict – Under-trial prisoner -- There is a difference between a ‘convict' and 'under-trial prisoner' -- A convict suffers his sentence after conviction when his guilt is proved, whereas an under-trial prisoner remains in jail and is presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the Court.

(Para 24)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Undertrial-prisoner’s right to marry – Right to marry is a necessary concomitant of right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and if not a fundamental right, it is akin to it and so on and so forth -- An undertrial prisoner, being presumed to be innocent, has a right to marry with someone who is not an under-trial like him/her and/or a person can marry an under-trial prisoner, if he/she desires.

(Para 26-28)

C. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Undertrial-prisoner’s right to marry – Venue of marriage -- Whether the petitioner can be allowed to marry under-trial in jail premises? – Held, the marriage can only be performed outside the jail as the jails cannot be converted into marriage palaces.

(Para 29, 30)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Challenge to writ order by way of writ petition – Maintainability of -- A judgment passed in one writ petition cannot be challenged by filing another writ petition under Article 226 -- Under Article 226, High Court cannot issue a writ of certiorari to set aside the order/judgment passed by another writ Court, either in Single, or Division Bench, which had passed such judgment, in exercise of similar jurisdiction under Article 226.

(Para 23-28)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ order – Allegation of fraud played upon court – Challenge to writ order by way of writ petition, subsequently by way of LPA -- Pleadings were all before the learned Single Judge who decided earlier writ, including the amended written statement filed by the Chandigarh Housing Board and the same were also duly referred to by the learned Single Judge in his judgment -- Board had resisted private respondent’s claim for allotment on all the grounds now being given by the appellant – Appellant had, during pendency of that petition, made an application for impleadment therein which was dismissed and the order became final – Whether or not the judgment itself, after having considered all the points raised, is correct or otherwise, would have been a matter to have been decided in appeal -- If the petitioner himself was also aggrieved, he could also very well have availed of his remedies against the dismissal of his application for impleadment, as also the judgment itself -- Neither the Housing Board, nor the appellant availed of that remedy – No interference required in that judgment, when it has not been appealed against.

(Para 38-43)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Concealment of facts -- Notice of motion was got issued on concealment of facts -- Petitioner has no right to be heard. Prestige Lights Ltd.’s case (2007) 8 SCC 449 relied.

(Para 9)

B. East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (50 of 1948), Section 42 – Review – Power of Director, Consolidation -- Director, Consolidation of Holdings has no power to review his previous orders.

(Para 10,11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Constitution of India, Article 20(1) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300(1) -- Double jeopardy – Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Trial and punishment under Section 420 IPC – Permissibility of – Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. is wider than Article 20(2) of the Constitution -- While, Article 20(2) of the Constitution only states that 'no one can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once' -- Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. states that no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence but on the same facts – Held in the case although the offences are different but the facts are the same -- Hence, Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. applies -- Consequently, the prosecution u/s 420, IPC was barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 7, 8)