Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5(iii), 11 -- Run-away couple – Live-in relationship of boy 24 years/girl 16 years – Police protection to protect life and liberty – Right of -- Section 11 precludes a marriage solemnized in contravention of Sub Section (iii) of Section 5, from the purview of being regarded as void or invalid -- Fundamental Right under Article 21 of Constitution of India stands on a much higher pedestal -- Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional Scheme it must be protected, regardless of the solemnization of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties -- Without commenting on the legitimacy of the relationship between the petitioners, direction given to Superintendent of Police to verify the contents of the petition, particularly the threat perception of the petitioners and complaints/representation and if deemed fit, to take appropriate steps to provide necessary protection qua their life and liberty in accordance with law.

(Para 8-13)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Writ jurisdiction --  One Time Settlement is not cloaked with such rigorous principles which may not permit extension of period to pay the remaining/balance settlement amount -- Extensions can be considered to be granted to deserving cases -- Held, Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would have the jurisdiction to extend the period of settlement as originally provided for, in the OTS letter.

(Para 22-24)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Illustrative guidelines framed to be considered cumulatively or individually, on case to cases basis, some of them would be :-

i. The Original Time provided in the Settlement – the first and foremost aspect to be noticed would be the time period originally granted by the bank to pay off the settlement amount. If the time period originally stipulated in the settlement letter to pay off the settlement amount is short or is not excessive, the case for extension then could be considered. It is to be noticed that the borrower is to arrange funds to complete the OTS. If reasonable time period is not given, the very purpose of settlement would be defeated. In that eventuality application for extension can be considered so that the borrower gets a reasonable time to clear off the settlement amount and the ultimate purpose of settlement is achieved.

ii. Extent of payments already deposited under the settlement or before filing of the petition – While considering an application for extension of time under OTS, the prime objective to be noticed is the intention of the borrower to culminate the settlement. If the borrower has already paid substantial amounts, to the creditor under the OTS, and for some remaining amounts, is seeking a reasonable extension, such requests can be considered favourably. This shows, that the applicant had an intention to clear the settlement and the deposit of substantial amounts, is an indication in this regard.

iii. Reasons which led to delay in payment – It is important to notice, the reasons, which led to the delay on the part of the borrower. If the borrower was prevented by certain reasons or circumstances beyond his control it could be a reason to consider an application for extension favourably. It would be imperative for the borrower to show, that he made his best efforts to ensure that the requisite amounts, are arranged within the specified time, but inspite of all his best efforts, he could not arrange for the same.

iv. Payments having been accepted by the Bank / Financial Institution , after the stipulated date – If the bank or the Financial Institution has been accepting the payments from the borrower towards the settlement even after the stipulated period of time, it shows that the time was not the essence of contract. It would be apparent from such conduct of the parties, that certain amount of relaxation or flexibility in making the payment of OTS amount is reserved between the parties.

v. Bona fide Intent of the borrower to pay the remaining amounts under the settlement – In order to test the bonafide intention of such an applicant, it could be reasonably be tested while asking such an applicant to deposit some further amount, towards the balance amount before calling upon the bank to consider the issue of extension. If such amounts are deposited under the orders of Court and the bonafides are established, such an applicant would be entitled for a favourable consideration of an application for extension.

Caveat added, that if for any reason, the effort does not lead to extension of time, as prayed for by the petitioner, then the amounts deposited by the borrower/depositors under the interim orders of the Court, would have to be returned back by the creditor to the petitioner.

vi. Time period being demanded by the applicant to clear the remaining / balance settlement amount. – An applicant whose intention would be to clear the balance settlement amounts, would not claim for an unreasonable period of an extension, as otherwise, the intention would be to gain more time, without any actual intent to clear the settlement. In the facts and circumstances of each case, the Courts would therefore determine a reasonable period, to enable the borrower to clear the remaining settlement amount, subject ofcourse, to payment of reasonable interest for the delayed period, to balance the equities.

vii. Attending factors and circumstances– Attending factors and circumstances involved, while making an application for extension play an important role to identify eligible and deserving cases as also to determine the extent of extension to be granted. For example, the current situation where the entire country has been adversely effected on account of COVID-19 pandemic, the difficulties in arranging the amounts could be taken note of while determining the period of extension to be granted to an applicant. Further, accounts which have suffered losses and became NPA on account of having suffered natural calamities, unfortunate accidents, fire incidents, thefts, damage by floods , storms etc. and have come forward for an eventual settlement, can also be considered for extension of time.

viii. Irreparable loss and injury to the applicant – While examining an application for extension of settlement, it could also be seen to be noticed, the extent of an injury to be suffered by an applicant.

Guidelines/factors are not exhaustive but only illustrative for guidance of the parties and the courts while considering the prayer for extension of the time under by OTS by the borrower on case to case basis -- Courts would be free to consider the credentials of the borrower as well, being an equitable and discretionary relief.

(Para 25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Petitioner paid substantial portion of the same and is willing to pay the remaining with interest -- Current attending circumstances, of widespread of COVID-19 pandemic – Petitioners held entitled to extension of time for 6 months to repay the remaining settlement amount – Petitioners shall also pay interest @ 9% p.a. simple on the delayed payments on reducing balance payable w.e.f. 01.06.2019 i.e. the closing date of the settlement/OTS.

(Para 26-30)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 14(1)(a) -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Provider and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019, Rule 5 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Maintainability of writ petition – Whether the present petition is maintainable in view of the proceedings pending before National Company Law Tribunal – Intent to restrict initiation or continuation of proceedings against a Corporate Debtor is to preserve its assets so that during Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the Corporate Debtor is subjected to remedial acts to improve its financial condition – Answered in AFFIRMATIVE and held that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present petition, the petition would be maintainable.

(Paras 13, 33-37)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Writ petition for a mandamus to transfer the investigation to CBI --  Denovo Investigaiton -- Death of the deceased was initially sought to be passed off as accidental by collision with a train or suicidal -- F.I.R. u/s 302, IPC was registered very much belatedly, albeit reluctantly, only at the persistence of the petitioner and her husband after they repeatedly approached the higher authorities -- Entire investigation and the closure report lack bonafide -- Closure report set aside and direction given for a de novo investigation by a fresh team of investigators to be headed by a senior police officer of the State consisting of efficient personnel well conversant with use of modern investigation technology also -- No officer who was part of the investigating team leading to the closure report shall be part of the team conducting de novo investigation -- Fresh investigation must be concluded within a maximum period of two months and the police report be filed before the court concerned whereafter the matter shall proceed in accordance with law -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Departmental enquiry – Judicial review – Nature of – Power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority – Judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself – Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion – It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome.

(Para 25)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Disciplinary proceedings -- Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority – Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice -- Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.

(Para 28)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Objection on role of Enquiry officer – It must be recognized that, under Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts -- While strict rules of evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the truth -- Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in certain circumstances -- No specific malice or bias has been alleged against the enquiry officer, and even during the enquiry no request had been made to seek a replacement; thus, evidencing how these objections are nothing but an afterthought.

(Para 31)

D. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Departmental enquiry – Allegation of corruption – Non-action in criminal case -- Dismissal from service -- After investigation, the CBI though did not find adequate material to launch criminal prosecution but recommended major disciplinary action – In a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say, statements made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances -- Appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated in the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet was filed by the CBI after enquiry, is liable to be discarded – Employer always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding.

(Para 33-35)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Allegation of corruption -- Departmental enquiry – Dismissal from service – Interference in -- Unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked -- Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the society -- Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly – Dismissal order, upheld.

(Para 1, 36)

Constitution of India, Article 16 -- Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the Public Services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 (62 of 2018) – 16% reservations to Marathas to be a “Socially and Educationally Backward Class” – Validity of – Matter referred to Larger Bench : 

-- As per Indra Sawhney’s case 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217, Article 16 (4) should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 16 (1), which is a guarantee held out to every citizen, reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50 per cent -- Relaxation of the strict rule of 50 per cent can be made in certain extraordinary situations -- People living in far flung and remote areas not being in the mainstream of national life should be treated in a different way -- Extreme caution has to be exercised and a special case made out for relaxation of the rule of 50 per cent.

-- Court prima facie opined that the State of Maharashtra has not shown any extraordinary situation for providing reservations to Marathas in excess of 50 per cent. Maratha community which comprises of 30 per cent of the population in the State of Maharashtra cannot be compared to marginalized sections of the society living in far flung and remote areas. The State has failed to make out a special case for providing reservation in excess of 50 per cent. Neither has any caution been exercised by the State in doing so.

-- The social, educational and economic backwardness of a community, existence of quantifiable data relating to inadequacy of representation of the community in public services and deprivation of the benefits flowing from reservations to the community are not exceptional circumstances for providing reservations in excess of 50 per cent.

Court referred the matter to Larger Bench by passing following orders: -

(A) As the interpretation of the provisions inserted by the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, these Appeals are referred to a larger Bench. These matters shall be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India for suitable orders.

(B) Admissions to educational institutions for the academic year 2020-21 shall be made without reference to the reservations provided in the Act. We make it clear that the Admissions made to Post-Graduate Medical Courses shall not be altered.

(C) Appointments to public services and posts under the Government shall be made without implementing the reservation as provided in the Act. Liberty to mention for early hearing.

(Para 1, 15-17)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Seeking declaration that order passed by Ld. Single Judge of High Court is void/ disabled/ recalled – Held, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution not maintainable – Rights and remedies are available to the petitioner, including by way of SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 1, 9, 12)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter – Fair Investigaiton -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- Observations of Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts -- It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.

(Para 12(I))

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor -- Question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case -- Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.

(Para 12(II))

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed Person – Released on bail – Impounding of passport – Legality of – Petitioner appeared before the Judicial Magistrate, she was granted bail and, thus, the proclamation order ceased to be operative -- Said fact was well within the knowledge of respondent-Regional Passport Office -- Moreover, in a bailable offence, no condition can be imposed by the Court regarding surrender of the passport -- Fundamental Rights of the petitioner breached -- Hence, the impugned action is highly deprecated -- Petition allowed with a costs of Rs.1.00 lakh to be paid by respondent-RPO to the petitioner -- Respondent-RPO directed to release the passport of the petitioner within 15 days.

(Para 19-25)

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10(3)(b) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 323, 406, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- FIR registered u/s 498-A, 323, 406, 506 IPC – Proclaimed offender – Seizure of passport – Fundamental right to travel abroad -- Petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender, when the petitioner was in New Zealand on a valid visa – Thereafter, High Court stayed his arrest for a period of 08 weeks -- On arrival from New Zealand, the passport of the petitioner was seized and later, he had appeared before the trial Court and was granted bail – Impounding of the passport is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- Petition allowed, seizure memo set aside.

(Para 8-15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer power u/s 406 Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Section 406 Cr.P.C. empowers the Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals – Held, only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 174 -- Scope of section 174 Cr.P.C. proceeding – Nature of -- Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. is limited to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out the apparent cause of unnatural death -- These are not in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing of FIR u/s 154 CrPC --  Held, inquiry conducted u/s 174 CrPC is limited for a definite purpose but is not an investigation of a crime u/s 157 of the CrPC.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4) -- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Jurisdiction of Patna Police to register complaint – Consent for CBI Investigation by Bihar police -- Legality of -- At the stage of investigation, it cannot be said that the concerned police station does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the case -- Allegation relating to criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of money which were to be eventually accounted for in Patna (where the Complainant resides), could prima facie indicate the lawful jurisdiction of the Patna police -- Exercise of jurisdiction by the Bihar Police appears to be in order -- At the stage of investigation not required to transfer the FIR to Mumbai police -- Bihar government was competent to give consent for entrustment of investigation to the CBI and as such the ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful.

(Para 22-30)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4), 406 – Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. at Mumbai -- Patna Police registered FIR, subsequently transferred it to the CBI – In future, if commission of cognizable offence u/s 175(2) CrPC is determined, the possibility of parallel investigation by the Mumbai Police cannot be ruled out – Both states are making acrimonious allegations of political interference against each other, the legitimacy of the investigation has come under a cloud -- To ensure public confidence in the investigation and to do complete justice in the matter, Court exercised powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, while according approval for the ongoing CBI investigation, holding that if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well.

(Para 35-41)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Contractual Extension Lecturer -- Minimum requirement of NET qualification – Whether the Appellants can be replaced by those possessing the NET qualification without being granted an opportunity to acquire such qualification? -- Held, there is no policy to grant time to serving contractual Extension Lecturers, not possessing NET time to possess such qualification while continuing in service, it is not possible for the Court to dictate to the Respondents to provide such a facility to the Appellants -- Writ prayer replacing the Appellants should not be themselves engaged on a contractual basis – Held, since the Appellants do not possess the mandatory NET qualification and, as such, cannot continue, there is no requirement to consider the submission as to how they are likely to be replaced.

(Para 2, 6-7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A, 24(2), 25(3) -- Return of plaint – Transfer of petition – De novo trial or not – Power of -- In cases dealing with transfer of proceedings from a Court having jurisdiction to another Court, the discretion vested in the Court by Sections 24(2) and 25(3) either to retry the proceedings or proceed from the point at which such proceeding was transferred or withdrawn, is in marked contrast to the scheme under Order VII Rule 10 read with Rule 10-A where no such discretion is given and the proceeding has to commence de novo.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A – Constitution of India, Article 136, 142 -- Return of plaint -- De novo trial or not – Power of -- High Court by the impugned order held that the suit at Delhi shall proceed from the stage at which it was pending at Gurgaon before return of the plaint and not de novo – Held, presentation of the plaint at Gurgaon was certainly not before a court having jurisdiction in the matter -- Suit has to proceed afresh before the proper court – Because the appellant did not raise the objection under clause 16B of the agreement at the very first opportunity -- Pleadings of the parties have been completed, evidence led, and that the matter was fixed for final argument – In exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and in order to do complete and substantial justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution Court decline to set aside the order of the High Court.

(Para 3, 27)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c) – Recovery of cannabis -- Prima facie case should be beyond reasonable doubt – Burden of proof on accused shift thereafter -- Stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such as Section 37, the minimum sentence of 10 years, absence of any provision for remission do not dispense with the requirements of prosecution to establish a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only where after which the burden of proof shall shift to the accused -- Gravity of the sentence and the stringency of the provisions will therefore call for a heightened scrutiny of the evidence for establishment of foundational facts by the prosecution.

(Para 2, 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c), 37 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Recovery of cannabis from house -- Conscious possession of contraband – Proof of -- Fair trial – Right of -- Appellant produced the sale agreement of house in question, Exhibit P.28 with promptness the very next day -- It was never investigated for its genuineness by the police and neither were the panchayat records verified -- Voters list entry of 2008 being prior to the sale is of no consequence -- Conscious possession not established so as to attribute the presumption under the NDPS Act against him with regard to recovery of the contraband -- Conviction could not be based on a foundation of conjectures and surmises to conclude on a preponderance of probabilities, the guilt of the appellant without establishing the same beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellant has been denied the right to a fair investigation, which is but a facet of a fair trial guaranteed to every accused under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Conviction of the appellant held to be unsustainable and is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted.

(Para 2, 12-17)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ through SPA -- Property purchased after SPA – SPA would only cover the properties owned by as on the date of their execution and they would not cover or extend to properties purchased on a later date – These were not General Powers of Attorney executed in relation to the properties owned and that may be owned in future, but restricted Special Powers of Attorney in relation to properties already owned by him in a particular Tehsil – Writ petition, instituted through the SPA is therefore defective in its very inception.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(iv), 41 -- Writ of habeas corpus – Foster care order by Child Welfare Committee with incomplete coram on gazetted holiday – Colourable exercise of powers –Order passed by the Child Welfare Committee is totally silent about the factum of petitioner and his family being unfit or incapacitated for taking care and for protection and well-being of the child -- Counselling report would show that the Counsellor interacted with the minor and found that the minor was living happily with her father and also wanted to reside with him – Since the order passed by the Child Welfare Committee is found to be the result of colourable exercise of powers, therefore, Court deemed it appropriate to restore the custody of the minor in favour of the petitioner -- In the event of filing any petition under the relevant statute for custody of minor in regular proceedings, the same shall be decided in accordance with law -- Custody of the child ordered to be handed over to the petitioner.

(Para 19-23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail – Delay in furnishing bail bonds – Effect of -- Petitioner did “avail of” his right u/s 167(2) of the Code and furnished personal bail bond with surety, which was accepted and attested by the Court, he would be deemed to have been released from custody -- Petitioner was not released because two other cases were pending against him – Surety withdrew the surety furnished by him -- Court permitted the petitioner to furnish fresh bail bond with surety -- Since he was in custody in other cases, therefore, he did not furnish the fresh bail bond with surety – After granted bail in other cases, petitioner requested the Court to accept the personal bail bond with surety as directed vide earlier order, which was declined – Held, mere delay in furnishing personal bail bonds/surety cannot visit the petitioner with adverse consequences and the order granting bail u/s 167(2) of the Code does not cease to exist or comes to an end or stand eclipsed -- Petitioner is directed to furnish personal bail bonds with surety and thereafter ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 141 – Judgment passed by Supreme Court of India -- Courts below ignoring the judgment by saying not applicable, without discussion – Permissibility of -- Ld. Court below, in the order has taken notice of the judgment, but refuses to follow the same by observing that “these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case” – Held, a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India -- No doubt, the ratio decidendi laid down in a judgment is binding and not obiter dicta -- However, before distinguishing judgment, the Court is required to analyse that what is the ratio laid down in the judgment and thereafter, proceed to explain the same -- Manner in which the ld. Court below has ignored the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not appreciable.

(Para 11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 139A – Withdrawal/Transfer of case from High Court – Pre-requisite -- Provision of Article 139A of the Constitution relating to withdrawal of a case from a High Court to this Court on the ground of pendency before this Court of a case involving same or similar questions of law contemplates fulfilment of two conditions.

-- First, in the case pending before Supreme Court, the questions of law involved ought to be the same or substantially the same as those involved in the case in the High Court, the withdrawal of which can be asked for.

-- Secondly, while exercising the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 139A of the Constitution must be satisfied that such questions are substantial questions of general importance.

Such satisfaction can be on Supreme Court’s own motion, on an application made by the Attorney General or on the basis of an application made by a party to any such case.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 139A – Transfer of High Court petition to Supreme Court -- 10% reservation for economic backward class – Challenge to -- Writ petition in High court – Civil Appeal pending in Supreme Court on same issue – Points involved in the Civil Appeal and the Writ Petition pending in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana require adjudication of substantially the same questions of law -- Writ petition withdrawn from High Court to Supreme Court for disposal of the said Writ Petition – Transfer petition allowed.

(Para 1, 9,10)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Live in relation with same sex as a couple – Life and liberty -- Police protection – Right of -- Petitioners are entitled to protection of their lives and liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, regardless of the nature of relationship between them -- Legitimacy of their relationship with each other is of no consequence viz-a-viz their right to life and liberty – Direction given to SSP to verify the contents of representation seeking protection of life and liberty, if necessary, requisite steps be taken, in accordance with law for granting protection of life and liberty to the petitioners.

(Para 7-9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, Rule 20, 32 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 Explanation IV, 141, Order 2 Rule 2 -- Two writ petition for same cause of action – Maintainability of -- Writ petitioner failed to explain why the prayer made in the second writ petition could not be incorporated or added in the previous petition and also failed to disclose what is the difference in the cause of action of both the writ petitions -- Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC, is applicable particularly when in the 1976 Rules, there is no provision inconsistent with the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC -- Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC, also provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit or petition under Article 226, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly or substantially in issue in such suit or proceedings -- Second writ petition not entertained and disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file application for amendment of the pleadings in the previously instituted writ petition.

(Para 14-18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, Rule 20, 32 – Writ petition – Such or similar writ petition – Pendency of – Procedure of -- Petitioner is required to make a disclosure in the Index and the relevant para, if such or similar petition is pending or decided -- Also required to disclose the difference in the cause of action, if any, in both the writ petitions, if any -- Writ petitioner shall disclose the reasons why the relief claimed in the subsequent petition could not be claimed or included in the previously instituted petition -- Filing of the multiple petitions is neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of Judicial Institution -- Institution has been setup to make a sincere endeavour to give justice to all the litigants -- For achieving that goal, it is necessary that unnecessary filing of any kind of petitions should be discouraged – Second writ petition is disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file application for amendment of the pleadings in the previously instituted writ petition.

(Para 17,18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 45, 52 – Denial for registration of car -- Writ of mandamus – Maintainability of -- Once the authorities abdicate from doing their duty, a writ of mandamus would be maintainable.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 45, 52 – Registration of car -- Art work on car – Objection of -- Base colour of the car which remains white, no doubt the art work done upon it is colourful, but has it changed the basic structure of the car or has the vehicle been altered in any manner which is not permitted by virtue of Section 52 of the Act? -- The answer is in the negative -- Respondents are issued a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing them to register the said vehicle within a period of two weeks.

(Para 16-19)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Absence of marriage -- Invalid/Void marriage – Run-away couple – Minor or Major -- Police protection – Right of -- Right to human life is to be treated on much higher pedestal, regardless of a citizen being minor or a major -- Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional Scheme it must be protected, regardless of the solemnization of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties -- Mere fact that petitioners are not of marriageable age would not deprive them of their fundamental right -- SSP is directed to provide necessary protection qua their life and liberty, if deemed fit.

(Para 15-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of habeas corpus for custody of minor – Maintainability of -- It is well settled that writ of habeas corpus can be issued for restoration of custody of a minor to the guardian wrongfully deprived of it -- However, exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus in such cases is not solely dependent on and does not necessarily follow merely determination of illegality of detention and is based on the paramount consideration of welfare of the minor child irrespective of legal rights of the parents.

(Para 18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 – Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Writ of Habeas Corpus by mother (resident of Australia) for custody of minor son -- Child born as well as resident of Australia – Now residing with grandmother and studying in School in India -- Contention that the Family Court/Guardian Court in India has no jurisdiction is not legally sustainable -- Facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus by handing over its custody to the petitioner -- It is in the welfare of the minor child that respondent no.3 / grand-mother be allowed to continue to have its custody subject to order of the Family Court/Guardian Court at Ambala, where the minor child is now ordinarily residing and that the petitioner be accordingly directed to approch the Family Court/Guardian Court at Ambala for adjudication of the question of entrustment of custody of the child to the petitioner for its repatriation to Australia.

(Para 6, 43-46)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased aged 35 years – Five dependent -- A photocopy of the original ITR for the year 2006-07, bearing the rubber stamp of the Income Tax Department shows that the date of filing the ITR was prior to the death of the deceased -- Hence, the High Court was not justified in disregarding the ITR for the year 2006-07 while assessing the income of the deceased -- ITRs for the assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 reflects the income of approximately Rs. 1,00,000 p.a. made basis for computing the compensation – Future prospects 40% and deduction towards his personal expenses made by 1/4th -- Multiplier adopted at 16 is appropriate -- Under the conventional heads Rs. 70,000/- (Loss of estate Rs. 15,000/- + Funeral expenses Rs. 15,000/- + Loss of consortium Rs.40,000/-) awarded – Total compensation comes to Rs.17,50,000/- -- Though the claimant did not file appeal before the High Court, Supreme Court by exercising powers under Article 142 enhanced the same to do complete justice between the parties – Interest @ 7.5% p.a. awarded from date of filing the claim petition.

(Para 1, 7,8)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Run-away marriage -- Police protection – Requirement of -- Deserves immediate attention of the Police Department to ensure that the couple is not unduly harassed by anyone including their respective parents -- Direction must go to the Commissioner of Police, to take steps which are consistent with their safety -- Couple is at liberty to present a representation to the police describing their apprehension from those who oppose the union so that effective steps are taken -- With these directions, the instant petition disposed of without expressing any opinion on the validity of marriage.

(Para 1-4)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Run-away couple -- Police protection petition – Photographs of couple – Requirement of -- Photographs are not proof of marriage -- Neither is a court concerned with the marriage in this jurisdiction -- Court is only concerned about the identity of the petitioners in these cases which can be traced back -- For these there are Aadhar cards and other official photo identification and passport size photographs of both etc. would be sufficient compliance which are to be placed on record duly authenticated by the petitioners -- Registry is directed that photographs would not be attached with protection petitions by runaway couples unless there is an affidavit of counsel that they are necessary for the understanding of the case, for which reasons must be assigned by way of an application.

(Para 1, 10)

Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 10(2)(l) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 19(1)(g) -- Lock down period during pandemic Covid-19 – Full wages to employees for 50 days – Notification/Order issued by Union of India – Power of – Challenged being violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) -- Both Industry and Labourers need each other -- No Industry or establishment can survive without employees/labourers and vice versa – Held, efforts should be made to sort out the differences and disputes between the workers and the employers regarding payment of wages of above 50 days and if any settlement or negotiation can be entered into between them without regard to the order dated 29.03.2020, the said steps may restore congenial work atmosphere – Directions issued for following interim measures which can be availed by all the private establishment, industries, factories and workers Trade Unions/ Employees Associations etc. which may be facilitated by the State Authorities: -

i) The private establishment, industries, employers who are willing to enter into negotiation and settlement with the workers/employees regarding payment of wages for 50 days or for any other period as applicable in any particular State during which their industrial establishment was closed down due to lockdown, may initiate a process of negotiation with their employees organization and enter into a settlement with them and if they are unable to settle by themselves submit a request to concerned labour authorities who are entrusted with the obligation under the different statute to conciliate the dispute between the parties who on receiving such request, may call the concerned Employees Trade Union/workers Association/ workers to appear on a date for negotiation, conciliation and settlement. In event a settlement is arrived at, that may be acted upon by the employers and workers irrespective of the order dated 29.03.2020 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.

ii) Those employers’ establishments, industries, factories which were working during the lockdown period although not to their capacity can also take steps as indicated in direction No.(i).

iii) The private establishments, industries, factories shall permit the workers/employees to work in their establishment who are willing to work which may be without prejudice to rights of the workers/employees regarding unpaid wages of above 50 days. The private establishments, factories who proceed to take steps as per directions (i) and (ii) shall publicise and communicate about their such steps to workers and employees for their response/participation. The settlement, if any, as indicated above shall be without prejudice to the rights of employers and employees which is pending adjudication in these writ petitions.

iv) The Central Government, all the States/UTs through their Ministry of Labour shall circulate and publicise this order for the benefit of all private establishment, employers, factories and workers/employees.

(Para 7, 36, 37)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Custody of 4 years old minor daughter with father – Writ of Habeas corpus by mother -- Maintainability of -- Merely because other remedies are available to the parties, would not render the present petition not maintainable.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 -- Custody of 4 year old minor daughter with father – Writ of Habeas corpus by mother – Temporary custody given to mother – Held,

-- Minor daughter is suffering from a congenital problem -- Father of the child has appended medical proof of her treatment along with the expenses being borne by him towards the said treatment -- Same would go on to show that the upbringing of the minor child has to be with extra care and attention in constant presence of other family members when the parents are away.

-- Paternal grandmother of the minor daughter is since deceased -- It is only the grandfather and the father of the minor daughter who live with her at the paternal house – Petitioner has taken a permission from her employer to work full time from home – Parents of petitioner are currently staying with her -- She along with them is in a better position to look after the daughter full time, while there is no female attendant at the house of father.

-- She is merely four years and ordinarily, per Section 6 of 1890 Act, custody of a minor who is less than five years has to be with her mother -- No doubt, the above provision postulates that the custody shall “ordinarily” be with the mother -- But the word “ordinarily” is to be construed to mean that unless, prima facie, it is shown otherwise by the father that child would be better taken care of by deprivation of motherhood -- Father must then give some cogent reasons, indicative of the welfare and interest of the child being jeopardized or the exclusive motherhood being imminently non-conducive to the upbringing of child -- Spirit of section 6 hypothesizes that, given the tender age of a minor, suitability of custody is not the predominant factor, what is more relevant or should weigh, is the requisite biological and natural environment, which gives rise to a general presumption that mother is first and best suitable for child care of a minor that age.

-- Minor daughter cannot be stated to be in illegal or unlawful custody, however, since the minor daughter is less than five years, the mother is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Section 6 -- Until the prayer of the parties qua custody of the minor child is decided by Guardian court, the welfare and interest of the minor child would be better in the hands of mother-petitioner.

-- Temporary custody of the minor given to the petitioner till any further appropriate orders are passed by the Guardian/ Civil Judge.

-- However, clarified that observations are mere obiter dictum in nature. Same would not effect the merits of the permanent custody petition which has been filed by father or interim custody application, if chosen to be filed by him, per liberty granted by this Court -- Guardian/ Civil Judge shall not get influenced with these tentative observations while deciding either of those on their own merits.

(Para 11-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32 – Fundamental Rights – Protection of -- Article 32 of the Constitution constitutes a recognition of the constitutional duty entrusted to Supreme Court to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.

(Para 32)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) – Right to speech and expression – Fundamental right of Journalist – Airing of views -- Exercise of journalistic freedom lies at the core of speech and expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) -- Exercise of that fundamental right is not absolute and is answerable to the legal regime enacted with reference to the provisions of Article 19(2) -- Right of a journalist under Article 19(1)(a) is no higher than the right of the citizen to speak and express.

(Para 32)

C. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- F.I.R. -- Allegation against police -- Transfer of Investigation to CBI -- Power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances” – An accused person does not have a choice in regard to the mode or manner in which the investigation should be carried out or in regard to the investigating agency – Court do not find that levelling such allegations would by and itself constitute a sufficient ground for the transfer of the investigation.

(Para 35-44)

D. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 – Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR -- Petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available under the CrPC -- Petitioner has an equally efficacious remedy available before the High Court – Held, a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable.

(Para 49)

E. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- One cause of action – FIR against -- Multiple FIRs and complaints – Quashing of -- Multiple FIRs and complaints in several states and in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir – Fairness in the administration of criminal justice would warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 to quash all other FIRs -- Filing of multiple FIRs arising out of the same telecast of the show hosted by the petitioner is an abuse of the process and impermissible -- Quashing of those FIRs would not amount to the expression of any opinion on the merits of the FIR which is being investigated.

(Para 2, 51)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5, 11, 12 -- Police protection to run-away couple – Minor girl -- FIR registered -- It is not for High Court in a protection petition to engage itself in social mores, norms and human behaviour or introduce personal ideas on morality – Even in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 marriage of a minor girl is not void -- SSP is directed to personally look into the matter and offer help, which is consistent with their safety.

(Para 6,7)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 43 – Interpretation of NDPS Act – Literal interpretation -- Provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the object and purpose of NDPS Act; impact on the society as a whole and the Act is required to be interpreted literally and not liberally which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and preamble of the Act.

(Para 8)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21 -- Small or Commercial quantity -- Mixture of narcotic or psychotropic substance with neutral substance –  Decision in the case of E. Micheal Raj (2008) 5 SCC 161, taking the view that in the mixture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of the neutral substance(s) is  not to be taken into consideration while determining the small quantity or commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and only the actual content by weight of the offending narcotic drug which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether it would constitute small quantity or commercial quantity, is not a good law.

(Para 10(i))

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia) – Small or Commercial quantity – Mixture of narcotic or psychotropic substance with neutral substance – Held, in case of seizure of mixture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the “small or commercial quantity” of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances.

(Para 10 (ii))

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001 – Challenge to -- Section 21 of the NDPS Act is not stand-alone provision and must be construed along with other provisions in the statute including provisions in the NDPS Act including Notification No.S.O.2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 and Notification S.O 1055(E) dated 19.10.2001 -- Challenge to Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001, fails and it is observed and held that the same is not ultra vires to the Scheme and the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act.

(Para 10 (iii) &(iv))

Constitution of India, Article 254, 346, Schedule VII, List III Entries 33 and 34 -- U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (24 of 1953), Section 16 -- Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, Clause 3 -- Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 3(2)(c) – Minimum price of sugar cane – Advise price of sugarcane – Power of – Held, view taken by the Constitution Bench in the subsequent decision in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, (2004) 5 SCC 430 is the correct law. There is no conflict between the two decisions in the case of Tika Ramji, AIR 1956 SC 676 and in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, (2004) 5 SCC 430 and therefore, there is no necessity to refer the matter to the larger Bench consisting of seven Judges. Held,

a.      By virtue of Entries 33 and 34 List III of seventh Schedule, both the Central Government as well as the State Government have the power to fix the price of sugarcane. The Central Government having exercised the power and fixed the “minimum price”, the State Government cannot fix the “minimum price” of sugarcane. However, at the same time, it is always open for the State Government to fix the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price”, in view of the relevant provisions of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, which has been issued in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953;

b.      The Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 which has been issued under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 confers power upon the State Government to fix the remunerative/advised price at which sugarcane can be bought or sold which shall always be higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government;

c.      Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 is not repugnant to Section 3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 as, as observed hereinabove, the price which is fixed by the Central Government is the “minimum price” and the price which is fixed by the State Government is the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government and therefore, there is no conflict.

It is only in a case where the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is lower than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the provisions of the Central enactments will prevail and the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government would prevail. So long as the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the same cannot be said to be void under Article 254 of the Constitution of India.

d.      The view taken by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. Co-operative Cane Unions Federations vs. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others is the correct law.

Reference answered.

(Para 23,24)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Removal of probationer on assessment of performance – Enquiry -- Opportunity of hearing -- Requirement of -- Probationer not strictly covered within the umbrella of Article 311 -- Merely because ACRs were consistently marked ‘Good’, it cannot be a ground to bestow him with a right to continue in service – Neither any specific misconduct has been attributed nor any allegation made – Order is based upon overall assessment of the performance during the period of probation, which was not found satisfactory – Such an inference which can be a valid foundation to dispense with services of a probationer does not warrant holding of an enquiry in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution -- In cases of ‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable opportunity of hearing is sine-qua-non.

(Para 14-20)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Probation period – Nature of -- Entire objective of probation is to provide the employer an opportunity to evaluate the probationer’s performance and test his suitability for a particular post -- Such an exercise is a necessary part of the process of recruitment, and must not be treated lightly -- Written tests and interviews are only attempts to predict a candidate’s possibility of success at a particular job -- True test of suitability is actual performance of duties which can only be applied after the candidate joins and starts working.

(Para 16)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Removal of probationer – Judicial review of -- If the Court finds that the real motive behind the order was to ‘punish’ the official, it may always strike down the same for want of reasonable opportunity of being heard -- Onus would lie on the probationer to prove that the action taken against him was of punitive characteristics.

(Para 21, 24)

D. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Appointment of Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate – Exercise of power not vested – Removal during probation -- Judicial officer is expected to be in know of Section 36(3) of the NDPS Act, 1985 which expressly ousts competence of a judicial officer below the rank of Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge in NDPS matters -- High Court on administrative side, therefore, justifiably inferred he was prone to act negligently or had the tendency to usurp power which the law does not vest in him -- This was a relevant factor to determine suitability of a probationer judicial officer – Order of discharge whereby services were dispensed with during probation approved.

(Para 23)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Challenge to appointment of Chowkidar -- Writ jurisdiction – Disputed question of facts – Scope of -- Disputed questions of fact can also be decided in a writ petition, if the pleadings on affidavit give adequate information to the Court -- Adequate material is available on record to decide whether the entry of munadi is collusive or not --  Circumstances suggest collusion -- Writ petition allowed -- Appointment of respondent No.5 as Chowkidar set aside – Direction given to authorities to initiate the process of appointment of a new Chowkidar after conducting fresh munadi in accordance with law.

(Para 1, 7-9)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 17(3) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Arms license cancelled on account of registration of criminal cases – Challenge to -- Acquitted in one case and in two cases, F.I.R's against him were cancelled – It is not the case of the respondents that he has ever misused the arms license issued to him – Held, respondents could not by invoking Section 17(3)(b) cancel the arms license of the petitioner – Writ petition allowed, cancellation orders quashed.

(Para 1-4, 16,17)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13 -- Acquittal in F.I.R. – Departmental proceedings on allegations, which were subject matter of FIR – Enquiry officer fallen in error and actually shows the intention of the authorities not to initiate the departmental enquiry against the petitioner for any other allegation except the allegations which were subject matter of FIR -- After the evidence has been examined by the trial court and it has recorded its findings acquitting the petitioner, the observations in the enquiry report clearly amounts to re-appreciation of evidence.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 13 -- Acquittal in F.I.R. -- Suspension period of an employee – Submission that during the pendency of the criminal case, where employee is acquitted, should be deemed to be on duty for all intents and purposes – Punishment orders quashed, respondents are directed to consequently, re-fix the pay of the petitioner with all consequential benefits.

(Para 14)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Orders of High Court in similar matter – Non-following by High Court in another matter – Non-aware of notification by State Authorities – Acceptability of -- Held, it is unfortunate that the High Court failed to follow its own orders in a similar matter -- High Court further gravely erred in holding that the authorities of the State were also unaware of the clarificatory notification and neither did the appellant bring it on record -- It is absolutely no defence of the State authorities to contend that they were not aware of their own notification -- Onus heavily rests on them and a casual statement generating litigation by State apathy cannot be approved -- Impugned orders are therefore held to be unsustainable and are set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 9-11)

Constitution of India, Article 14,15,16,21 – Scheme for compassionate appointment – Dependency is criteria -- Married daughter – Right of -- Equality cannot be achieved unless there are equal opportunities for all – Non-inclusion of a “married daughter” in the definition of 'dependent family member', would be violative of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Constitution – Daughter is held, eligible, ordered to give appointment on consideration of her claim.

(Para 11-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Constitution of India, Article 20(2) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 300 -- Second Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Double jeopardy -- Trial court convicted the accused – Appellate Court acquitted the accused solely based upon Yogendra Pratap Singh’s case, 2015 (1) RCR (Civil) 550 -- Hon’ble Apex Court held in that case, where the complaint was filed before the expiry of the period 15 days stipulated in the notice, the Court cannot take the cognizance thereof, however, the second complaint on the same cause of action has been held to be maintainable and the delay in filing such complaint shall be deemed to have been condoned -- Held, it cannot be said that the filing of the second complaint and passing of the summoning order therein, amounts to double jeopardy to the petitioner.

(Para 6-10)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Writ jurisdiction – Alternative efficacious remedy -- Principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law -- Writ courts normally refrain from exercising their extraordinary power if the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy -- Existence of such remedy however does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted -- At the same time, it is a well settled principle that such jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available -- Rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not a rule of jurisdiction.

(Para 14)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Armed Force Tribunal – Writ jurisdiction -- High Court would be justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction because of some glaring illegality committed by the AFT -- Alternative remedy must be efficacious and in case of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), or a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO); to expect such a person to approach the Supreme Court in every case may not be justified -- It is extremely difficult and beyond the monetary reach of an ordinary litigant to approach the Supreme Court -- Therefore, it will be for the High Court to decide in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case whether it should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction or not -- There cannot be a blanket ban on the exercise of such jurisdiction.

(Para 14)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Armed Force Tribunal – Writ jurisdiction -- Proceedings on the original side even in exercise of writ jurisdiction are to be transferred to the tribunal for decision -- This however, does not mean that the AFT can exercise all the powers of the High Court.

(Para 15)

D. Constitution of India, Article 214,215,226,227 -- Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (55 of 2007), Section 14,15,34 -- Armed Force Tribunal – Writ jurisdiction – LPA/Intra Court appeal – Transfer of -- High Court is a Constitutional Court constituted under Article 214 of the Constitution and are courts of record within the meaning of Article 215 -- It is obvious that the order of the High Court cannot be challenged before any other forum except the Supreme Court -- Contention that an intra court appeal from the judgment of a single judge of the High Court to a Division Bench pending in the High Court is required to be transferred under Section 34 of the Act is rejected.

(Para 17)

West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 (25 of 2008), Section 8,10,11,12 – Constitution of India, Article 30 – Minority Institution – Appointment of teachers in an Aided Madrasah -- Selection of teacher and their nomination by Commission -- Constitutional Validity of – Held, Concerned provisions cannot, be said to be transgressing the rights of the minority institutions:

--     The selection of the teachers and their nomination by the Commission constituted under the provisions of the Commission Act would satisfy the national interest as well as the interest of the minority educational institutions and said provisions are not violative of the rights of the minority educational institutions.

--     the additional feature in the present matter shows that the composition of the Commission with special emphasis on persons having profound knowledge in Islamic Culture and Theology, would ensure that the special needs and requirements of minority educational institutions will always be taken care of and thus the present case stands on a different footing.

--     in going by the test culled out in the TMA Pai Foundation [(2002) 8 SCC 481, it is held that the provisions of the Commission Act are not violative of the rights of the minority educational institutions on any count.

--     Held, Sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the Commission Act to be valid and constitutional.

(Para 55-57)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Service Matter – Junior getting higher salary -- Senior’s right to step-up -- Once, an employee who though is senior but getting lesser pay than his junior, his pay is to be stepped up equivalent to his junior and the stepped up pay of such senior employee cannot depend upon the pay of the junior thereafter especially when the junior has been imposed punishment -- Stepping up of the pay of the petitioner once granted, cannot be brought down upon the punishment imposed upon a junior employee -- Petitioner will also be entitled for the refixation of his salary and consequent retiral benefits.

(Para 19, 20)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Employee about to retire -- Salary reduced on pay re-fixation – Right to recover -- Pay was re-fixed two months prior to his retirement and the recovery was done from the last two salaries for which the petitioner got while in service – Recovery could not have been ordered from the petitioner as he was about to retire within a period of two months. Rafiq Masih’s case, (2014) 8 SCC 883, relied.

(Para 23)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), Section 87 – Constitution of India, Article 246(4), Seventh Schedule -- NRI landlord Amendment -- Extension to Chandigarh by Notification – Challenge to – Whether Notification dated 09.10.2009 issued under Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act extending Section 13-B of the Rent Act to Chandigarh by executive action is invalid? – Challenge predicated on the doctrine of excessive delegation, separation of powers, doctrine of the law of agency, fails and must be rejected -- Such challenge must also be rejected in view of the large number of eviction suits filed by Non-Resident Indian landlords on the strength of Notification dated 09.10.2009 who would be left remediless if contentions to the contrary are accepted.

(16-19)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), Section 87 – Constitution of India, Article 246(4), Seventh Schedule -- NRI Landlord Amendment -- Whether amendments made vide the Amendment Act with regard to the rights of Non-Resident Indians by the State Legislature of Punjab were beyond its competence? – Held, State legislature was well within its competence -- In the context of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and as the subject matter falls within the Concurrent List, it will be immaterial to decide on the competence of the legislating body -- Power to make laws in respect of a Union Territory vests with the Parliament under Article 246(4) -- In terms of Section 87 of the Reorganisation Act, the power to extend laws to the Union Territory of Chandigarh vests with the Central Government, that is the Parliament or the Central Executive, as the case may be, and is permissible.

(Para 20-28)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- NRI Landlord Amendment -- Whether Section 13-B of the Rent Act is arbitrary and unreasonable inasmuch as it does not afford any legal remedy to the tenants? – Held, by providing for a simplified procedure of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-B does not dilute the rights of tenants -- It gives a chance to the tenants on merits to establish their case and when justified and necessary to take the matter to trial -- By no means, therefore, Section 13-B can be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

(Para 29-36)

D. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Constitution of India, Article 14 -- NRI Landlord Amendment -- Whether classifying Non-Resident Indian landlords as a separate category renders Section 13-B invalid and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution? – Held, Section 13-B of the Rent Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional because it grants a right to claim eviction for bona fide need by summary procedure to a certain group of landlords, that is, Non-Resident Indians subject to and on the satisfaction of statutory conditions which incorporate a check on frivolous evictions – Section 13-B cannot, therefore, be treated as an arbitrary classification that infringes and violates Article 14 of the Constitution -- Challenge predicated on the basis of unconstitutionality of the classification is rejected.

(Para 38-45)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Bank default case -- Sale notice by bank – Co-sharer of property not a mortgagor or guarantor – Demarcation of -- Right of -- Until and unless the mortgaged property is demarcated and the possession is taken thereof, it cannot be put to sale as the petitioner is stated to be a co-sharer in the property who is neither a borrower nor a guarantor – Writ petition withdrawn to file a detailed reply to the notice – Bank directed to consider the said reply/objection positively and decide the same before proceeding further in respect of the sale of the mortgaged property.

(Para 2-6)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Divorce without consent of the second party – Power of Supreme Court -- Only in a case where one of the parties do not agree and give consent, only then the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India are required to be invoked to do the substantial Justice between the parties, however, at the same time, the interest of the wife is also required to be protected financially.

 (Para 6)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Divorce – Power of Supreme Court -- Appellant-husband and the respondent-wife have been living separately for more than 22 years and it will not be possible for the parties to live together – Divorce granted, husband shall pay to the wife a lump sum permanent alimony, quantified at Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs).

(Para 7,8)

A. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 – Vested right of employment -- Right of rehabilitation -- Number of abkari workers lost their livelihood due to ban on arrack in State -- Assurance was given to abraki workers for consideration for employment in 25% of vacancies in Corporation -- Government provided employment to dependents of deceased against 25% daily wage vacancies in Corporation -- Decision not unreasonable or arbitrary in light of overriding public interest.

(Para 12)

B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 – Legitimate expectation -- Assurance given to the respondents that they would be considered for appointment in the future vacancies of daily wage workers – Change in policy due to the difficulty in implementation – Held, overriding public interest which was the reason for change in policy has to be given due weight while considering the claim of the respondents regarding legitimate expectation.

(Para 19)

C. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 – Procedural legitimate expectation -- If an announcement is made by the Government of a policy conferring benefit on a large number of people, but subsequently, due to overriding public interest, the benefits that were announced earlier are withdrawn, it is not expedient to provide individual opportunities to such innominate number of persons – Court will not interfere on grounds of procedural fairness and natural justice, if the deciding authority has been allotted a full range of choice and the decision is taken fairly and objectively.

(Para 23)

Constitution of India, Article 311 – Departmental proceedings – Punishment/ Penalty imposed – Prospective effect -- Judgment in Major Singh Gill, 1992(1) SCT 436 holding that the punishment imposed in departmental proceedings “would relate back to the period when the alleged offence/misconduct was committed or in any case when the same was detected” does not lay down the correct law – Held, the punishment/ penalty takes effect prospectively from the date of its imposition.

(Page 48)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Writ petition – Dismissal by unreasoned order -- High Court neither discussed the issues arising the case, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as to why it has dismissed the writ petition – Matter remanded back.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Writ petition – Dismissal by unreasoned order -- Every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/Authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion -- Parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary Court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order – High Court while passing the impugned order simply dismissed the writ petition without any discussion, finding and the reason -- Such order is not legally sustainable and hence deserves to be set aside.

(Para 9-11)

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986), Section 15 -- Repudiation of claim -- Non-disclosure of previous claims – Burden of proof -- Mere disclosure of a previous insurance policy did not discharge the obligation which was cast on the Insured, as the proposer, to make a full, true and complete disclosure of the claims which were lodged under the previous policy in the preceding three years – This material fact was suppressed from the proposal form -- Burden cannot be cast upon the insurer to follow up on an inadequate disclosure by conducting a line of enquiry with the previous insurer in regard to the nature of the claims, if any, that were made under the earlier insurance policy -- Fact that such a claim was lodged and had been settled at Rs 36.66 lakhs was suppressed -- Suppression goes to the very root of the contract of insurance which would validate the grounds on which the claim was repudiated by the insurer.

(Para 12-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Acquittal from -- Back wages – Right of -- If an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Suspension of employees -- Dropping of proceedings – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant suspended on 23.10.1979 -- Disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983 --  Suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987 and re-instated -- By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry -- Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial -- Held, Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

(Para 7)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Conviction in Criminal case – Dismissal of employee – Acquittal by Appellate court – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 – Constitution of India, Article 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Stare Decisis -- Accused’s evidence by way of affidavit – Permissibility of – Accused, while appearing as his own witness in defence does not have any right to lead the evidence by way of affidavit – Held, even if the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Indian Bank Association 2014 (2) RCR (Criminal) 598 is taken to be suggesting contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Mandvi Co-op Bank Ltd., 2010(1) JT 259, then also, it is the Judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Mandvi Co-op Bank Ltd., which shall hold the field, being earlier in point of time and having been delivered by a Bench of equal strength.

(Para 10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26, Rule 9, Section 115 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner – Refusal to appoint – Revisional Jurisdiction -- Orders are not revisable orders -- Such type of orders do not decide substantive right of the parties -- Petitioner would be well within his right to lead substantive evidence during trial.

(Para 7-8)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26, Rule 9, Section 115 -- Appointment of Local Commissioner – Demarcation of land -- Discretion of the Court cannot be utilized to collect evidence for the petitioner.

(Para 9)