A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of habeas corpus – Run-away marriage – During the pendency of the writ petition, detenue became major -- Detenue being major is entitled to make her choice and to live wherever she wants and the Court cannot assume the role of super guardian and impose any restriction -- Detenue was ordered to be released from Aashiana and at liberty to go with the petitioner.

(Para 8-15)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 -- MGNREGA scheme – Petitioner was not given work under MGNREGA scheme -- Grievance that Sarpanch is giving the benefit of MGNREGA scheme to a retired Master – Writ petition disposed of by giving direction to the Deputy Commissioner to examine the case of petitioner in the correct perspective being jobless person in the present scenario keeping in view the judgment passed in Charanjit Singh's case CRM-M-41977-2015, decided on 08.11.2016 in accordance with law, within a period of four weeks -- Compliance report thereof also sought by Court.

(Para 2-6)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Run-away marriage – Writ of habeas corpus -- On Court’s interaction, detenues reiterated that both of them are more than 18 years of age and are major and that they were not abducted by anyone and they left their home on their own and they want to live separately at Mohali and sustain themselves by carrying out the tailoring work – Relying upon report of ld. ACJM and stand of the detenues before High Court and non-production of any cogent and reliable documentary evidence by the petitioner, anyone of the detenues cannot be said to be minor -- Detenues being major are entitled to make their choice and to live wherever they want and the Court cannot assume the role of super guardian and impose any restriction -- Detenues ordered to be released from Nari Niketan and shall be at liberty to go to any place whatsoever as desired by them.

(Para 11-14)

Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (13 of 2012), Section 20 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Tenant company under liquidation proceedings – Eviction of – Remedy of -- Writ petitioner is calling upon High court to decree a suit for possession of tenanted premises in occupation of a company which is stated to be under liquidation -- Company was admittedly inducted as a tenant in the premises in dispute -- Company still exists and has not been dissolved – Held, urban tenancy in the State of Punjab, is governed and regulated by the provisions of the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 -- Thus, the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy of filing a petition under the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 – If petitioner’s argument to the effect that the tenancy has come to an end, is accepted still the petitioner has a remedy of filing a civil suit seeking relief of possession – Writ petition disposed of by relegating the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy.

(Para 4-7)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Right to go abroad – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted -- Rights of an accused does not automatically get suspended merely because he is being prosecuted in a criminal case -- One of the facet of right to liberty is to travel abroad – Held, while deciding such applications, the Courts must have regard to the nature of allegations, the conduct of the accused and above all, the need to ensure that the accused does not pose the risk of evading the prosecution – Concern of the Court ought to be only to ensure speedy trial of the criminal case and avoid the possibility of accused fleeing the reach of law -- Liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot be unreasonably curtailed except in the circumstances as discussed above.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Right to go abroad – Renewal of Passport -- Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Petitioner is struck in the country because he is an accused in a minor offence and conclusion of the trial of the case is taking a lot of time – It has been more than three years since the FIR was registered -- Petitioner has already, with the prior permission of the Court, visited the USA twice during the pendency of the case and did came back -- No doubt, the petitioner overstayed for a few days in the year 2019, however, he did return before the date fixed in the case -- Still further, the petitioner has only applied for renewal/re-issue of the passport – Direction issued to the passport authorities to immediately renew/re-issue the passport of the petitioner, on completion of all the formalities -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 11-13)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (9 of 1994) -- Non-using of Gram Panchayat funds – Legal notice to Panchayat department -- Writ of mandamus seeking direction to the authorities of the Panchayat Department to consider and decide legal notice – Held, Gram Panchayat, as a body, has to utilize the grants released for development works, when it is not in a position to do so, be it for whatever reason, the petitioner cannot get issued legal notices to the authorities asking them to take necessary action, without following the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1994 – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 1,4,5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 3, 4, Order 7 Rule 10, 11, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 24 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Dismiss in default – Restoration of -- Maintainability of suit – Continuation of stay -- Non-application of judicial mind – Explanation called form District Judge – Detailed reasons:

-- Application for withdrawal of the Civil suit allowed by the trial Court on 30.09.2019 as well as before the Appellate Court, which was allowed on 07.12.2019, therefore, on face of record, no cause of action survives in favour of plaintiff No.1 in the suit – By showing total non-application of judicial mind, the Appellate Court is continuing with the appeal as well as the interim injunction.

-- A perusal of the first order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the District Judge also reflect non-application of judicial mind as the operation of the order dated 06.08.2019 dismissing an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the plaintiffs, was stayed and simultaneously, further injunction was granted against the Bank from proceeding against the plaintiffs, in accordance with law -- It is well settled principle of law that if an injunction application filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed by the Civil Court, the Appellate Court unless by recording detailed reason of urgency may grant interim injunction for a short period or in ordinary course, after giving a short notice to the contesting defendants may pass an interim order. Both these principles of law have been ignored by the District Judge.

-- The Civil Court has passed the order dated 06.08.2019 in the presence of the contesting party i.e. the plaintiff No.1, defendant No.1 – Bank and the counsel representing interim resolution professional of plaintiff No.2, therefore, the Appellate Court who is adjourning the appeal to serve the remaining unserved defendants, who are not contesting before the Civil Court is nothing but a futile exercise, just to extend the stay in favour of the plaintiffs whereas the service of the remaining defendants could be dispensed with in terms of provisions of Order 41 Rule 3 Proviso added by amendment as applicable to Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh.

-- The another reason which show the slackness and disrespect on the part of the Appellate Court is that defendant No.1 – Bank has brought all the previous orders passed by the Writ Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the NCLT and the NCALT and on 07.12.2019, it was also brought to the notice of the Appellate Court that the Civil Court stands dismissed for non-prosecution, however, still the interim stay was extended and no effort was made to dispose of the main appeal.

-- Even surprisingly, despite the instructions passed by the High Court that the photocopy of the Lower Appellate Court should be summoned so that the proceedings before the Lower Court is not automatically stayed, the Appellate Court summoned the record of the trial Court vide order dated 07.12.2019 and despite the fact that the seat of the District Judge and of the trial Court is at the same place, till 01.02.2020, the record was not received and in the intervening period, the interim order was ordered to be extended by the Appellate Court.

-- Even further on 29.02.2020, after noticing that the suit is dismissed for non-prosecution and the petitioner – Bank is stressing that the appeal is not maintainable, the Appellate Court, while returning the record of the trial Court, directed that the application for restoration be decided in a time bound manner i.e. 1½ months, therefore, the intention of the plaintiffs is apparent on record to delay the proceedings either before the District Judge or before the trial Court by not arguing the application for restoration of civil suit.

-- Thus the District Judge has failed to perform even the administrative duty by not keeping a check on trial Court which has not decided the application for restoration of suit till date i.e. even after lapse of 08 months, in violation of his own order dated 29.02.2020.

-- The District Judge being the administrative head of the District, is required to keep a check on the subordinate judiciary and the manner in which the order in the civil suit are passed, show that an effort is made to delay the proceedings to enable the plaintiffs to gain time.

-- Even the trial Court is adjourning the case for effecting the service on non-contesting respondents and is not deciding the application for restoration of civil suit despite the fact that when suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, the presence of the counsel for defendants was marked and service on defendants can be effected through counsel, to avoid the delay.

-- The basic principles of law as set down in various judgments to decide the application for restoration of a suit/appeal or likewise setting-aside ex parte order are that if the application is filed within a reasonable time as in the instant case, it was filed within a period of 06 days; a bona fide ground is given, as in this case, the counsel representing the plaintiffs has filed his own affidavit; the general principle that no one should be condemn unheard is not violated and if required, the other party can be compensated by way of costs, thus, majority of such applications are allowed, however, this is not followed by the trial Court.

-- Based upon such principle, the trial Court could have decided the application immediately without wasting the time to serve the non-contesting respondents. Needless to say that 03 months time was taken by the Appellate Court, in summoning the record of the trial Court, which further delayed the disposal of the application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC.

-- It is not understandable as to why the District Judge/Appellate Court is adjourning the appeal despite the fact that the suit stands dismissed for non-prosecution on 29.11.2019 and the plaintiffs on both counts are seeking adjournments and both the Courts, on face of record are showing undue favour to the plaintiffs.

-- Once the petitioner – Bank on 07.12.2019 has brought to the notice of the Appellate Court, about all the orders passed by High Court & the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the dismissal of the suit in default, there was no justification for the Appellate Court to continue with the stay order, which was obtained by concealing the aforesaid litigation and orders and therefore, continuing with the stay order by ignoring the orders of the High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter se parties, the District Judge has shown disrespect to orders and, on face of record has shown favour to the plaintiffs to delay the proceedings.

-- Even otherwise, the grant of ex parte stay and thereafter, continuation of the interim stay for a period of 01 year despite all odds is in violation of the well settled principle of law held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that injunctions against financial institutions should not be granted casually. The default in payment of public money involved in the case is more than 1100 crores of rupees and therefore, the continuation of the interim order by the Appellate Court is not at all in public interest.

30 days’ time given to District Judge to submit explanation -- Civil Appeal ordered to be transferred from the Court of District Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge -- Transferee Court will decide the appeal within a period of 03 weeks, from the date of receipt of the case file -- Application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC be decided within a period of 03 weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order – In case, the suit is restored, the trial Court will further pass an order within a period of 03 weeks thereafter, regarding maintainability of suit by assessing the averments “only in the plaint” (in terms of Order 7 Rules 10 and 11 CPC), if any cause of action survive in favour of plaintiff No.1, after the suit stands dismissed as withdrawn qua plaintiff No.2 -- In view of the settled principle of law, the trial Court will only look into the contents of the plaint and no other documents will be considered for the same.

(Para 31-39)

Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) -- Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (47 of 2019) – Protest against CAA -- Shaheen Bagh protest – Blocking of roads – Legality of – Manner in which Administration should act is their responsibility and they should not hide behind the court orders or seek support therefrom for carrying out their administrative functions -- Courts adjudicate the legality of the actions and are not meant to give shoulder to the administration to fire their guns from -- Unfortunately, despite a lapse of a considerable period of time, there was neither any negotiations nor any action by the administration, thus warranting Court intervention -- Occupation of public ways, whether at the site in question or anywhere else for protests is not acceptable and the administration ought to take action to keep the areas clear of encroachments or obstructions -- Protests are subject to the legal position as enunciated above, with some sympathy and dialogue, but are not permitted to get out of hand.

(Para 18-21)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Contractual dues – Non-payment by department – Directions issued -- Petitioner concern executed the work but the final payment of Rs.30,41,631/-, including Rs.7,15,549/- as security deposit on completion of work, has not been made to the petitioner till date – Respondent-Executive Engineer, Panchayati Raj Public Works Division directed to consider and take appropriate action upon the letter sent by the petitioner not later than six weeks – If the dues as claimed by the petitioner concern are lawful, the payment shall be made within six weeks thereafter -- Any belated payment beyond the stipulated period shall carry interest @ 6.5 % per annum from the date of completion of the work till payment – If not entitled to the dues, a speaking order shall be passed and communicated to the petitioner concern.

(Para 8-11)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Run-away couple – Live-in relationship – Police Protection – Right of -- Boy is not of marriageable age -- Petitioners fear for their life and liberty and despite representation no protection has been granted to them – Petitioners are major and have freedom to live in accordance with their desire -- Petition disposed of with a directions to consider the representation in accordance with law and to provide protection to the petitioners in case the situation so demands.

(Para 1-6)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 300-A -- Petitioner worked from 17.07.1984 to 31.12.2012 which is about 28 years – Petitioner regularised on 31.12.2012 whereas juniors regularised w.e.f. 8.11.2012 -- Petitioner had fulfilled all the requirements as per the policy instructions dated 04.03.1999 except that she was not appointed through employment exchange -- Similarly situated persons have been already regularized on 08.11.2012 – Petition allowed -- Direction given that:

(i)      date of regularization of the petitioner shall be 08.11.2012 i.e. when the other similarly situated persons including some of the juniors of the petitioner were regularized.

(ii)     Respondent State shall fix full pension of the petitioner and re-calculate the pension of the petitioner and pay the arrears of all the admissible benefits to the petitioner arising out of regularization of service of the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today alongwith interest @6% per annum from the date when the benefit became due.

(iii)    petitioner shall also be entitled for costs of Rs.25,000/- which shall be paid by the respondent department to the petitioner by way of demand draft.

(Para 14-21)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 41(j) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 8, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 151 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Suit for mandatory injunction – Temporary injunction – Maintainability of -- Construction of Community Hall on the instructions of State Government, which has accorded permission on the basis of resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat and the amount is being spent by the State Government – Challenge to stay declined by Courts below – Held,

-- It is well settled principle of law that in a suit for mandatory injunction, no relief of temporary injunction can be granted, which will amount to passing a decree of mandatory injunction itself.

-- A careful perusal of the plaint would show that nothing is stated that any personal right of any of the petitioners is infringed, therefore, in view of Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, the suit is not maintainable.

-- The suit has not been filed in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and no application has been moved seeking permission from the Court that the suit is being filed on behalf of the entire village community, therefore, it is a suit which has been filed only by nine inhabitants of the village, whereas the Community Hall is being constructed for the entire village.

-- Both the Courts below have discussed the judgments of this Court, wherein it is held that the Gram Panchayat is competent to change the user of the land in a manner it likes as well as when sufficient area of Shamlat land is available, it can be used for any other development work and injunction cannot be granted regarding change of nature of land.

-- Even a perusal of the plaint further shows that it is nowhere mentioned that the passage of the temple will be blocked, rather it is a case of Gram Panchayat that there is difference of about 400 ft. between the temple and the Community Hall.

Court found no ground to interfere with the well-reasoned orders passed by the Courts below dismissing the application for stay -- Finding no merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Constitution of India, Article 136 – SLP against main judgment dismissed – SLP against review order -- Maintainability of -- When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted in the SLP filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court – Supreme Court does not entertain a SLP in which no relief can be granted – Held, principle of not entertaining SLP against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle – SLP dismissed.

(Para 15,16)

Constitution of India, Article 12, 39, 42, 226 -- Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (53 of  1961) -- Non-providing of maternity benefits -- Termination of employee – Maintainability of writ against private Company – Private entity is not a ‘State’ nor an 'instrumentality' or an 'agency' of the Government within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and thus, would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction – High court could have issued notice in case the petitioner was able to establish that the respondent/ software development company was performing a public duty, which is not the case – Writ petition dismissed being not maintainable, giving liberty to the petitioner to avail of her proper remedy in accordance with law.

(Para 1-5)

Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), Section 5, 59 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Public emergency – Covid-19 situation /lockdown – Notifications to exempt factories from observing some of the obligations towards employers – Over-time to employees – Respondent-State aimed to ameliorate the financial exigencies that were caused due to the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown – Held, financial losses cannot be offset on the weary shoulders of the laboring worker, who provides the backbone of the economy -- Section 5 of the Factories Act could not have been invoked to issue a blanket notification that exempted all factories from complying with humane working conditions and adequate compensation for overtime, as a response to a pandemic that did not result in an ‘internal disturbance’ of a nature that posed a ‘grave emergency’ whereby the security of India is threatened -- In any event, no factory/ classes of factories could have been exempted from compliance with provisions of the Factories Act, unless an ‘internal disturbance’ causes a grave emergency that threatens the security of the state, so as to constitute a ‘public emergency’ within the meaning of Section 5 of the Factories Act -- Writ petition allowed and Notification No. GHR/ 2020/56/FAC/142020/346/M3 dated 17 April 2020 and Notification No. GHR/2020/92/FAC/142020/346/M3 dated 20 July 2020 issued by the Labour and Employment Department of the Respondent State, quashed – Invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, Court directed that overtime wages shall be paid, in accordance with the provisions of Section 59 of the Factories Act to all eligible workers who have been working since the issuance of the notifications.

(Para 45, 46)

Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934), Section 5-A, 6 -- Aircraft Rules, 1937, 133-A – Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Covid-19 pandemic situation -- Refund of Air Fare – Batch of cases disposed of with the following directions:

1. If a passenger has booked a ticket during the lockdown period (from 25th March, 2020 to 24th May, 2020) for travel during lockdown period and the airline has received payment for booking of air ticket for travel during the same period, for both domestic and international air travel and the refund is sought by the passenger against that booking being cancelled, the airline shall refund the full amount collected without any cancellation charges. The refund shall be made within a period of three weeks from the date of cancellation.

2. If the tickets have been booked during the lockdown period through a travel agent for a travel within the lockdown period, in all such cases full refund shall be given by the airlines immediately. On such refund, the amount shall be passed on immediately by the agent to the passengers.

3. Passengers who booked tickets at any period of time but for travel after 24th May, 2020 – refund of fares to the passengers covered under this category shall be governed by the provisions of Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR).

4. Even for international travel, when the tickets have been booked on an Indian carrier and the booking is ex-India, if the tickets have been booked during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period, immediate refund shall be made.

5. If the tickets are booked for international travel on a foreign carrier and the booking is ex-India during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period, full refund shall be given by the airlines and said amount shall be passed on immediately by the agent to the passengers, wherever such tickets are booked through agents. In all other cases airline shall refund the collected amount to the passenger within a period of three weeks.

6. In all other cases, the airlines shall make all endeavours to refund the collected amount to the passenger within 15 days from today. If on account of financial distress, any airline / airlines are not able to do so, they shall provide credit shell, equal to the amount of fare collected, in the name of passenger when the booking is done either directly by the passenger or through travel agent so as to consume the same on or before 31st March, 2021. It is open to the passenger either to utilize such credit shell upto 31st March, 2021 on any route of his choice or the passenger can transfer the credit shell to any person including the travel agent through whom he / she has booked the ticket and the airlines shall honour such a transfer.

6.1. The credit shell issued in the name of the passenger shall be transferable which can be utilized upto 31st March, 2021 and the concerned airline shall honour such a transfer by devising a mechanism to facilitate such a transfer. It is also made clear that such credit shell can be utilized by the concerned agent through whom the ticket is booked, for third party use. It is also made clear that even in cases where credit shell is transferred to third party, same is to be utilized only through the agent who has booked the ticket at the first instance.

7. In cases where passengers have purchased the ticket through an agent, and credit shell is issued in the name of passenger, such credit shell is to be utilized only through the agent who has booked the ticket. In cases where tickets are booked through agent, credit shell as issued in the name of the passenger which is not utilized by 31st March, 2021, refund of the fare collected shall be made to the same account from which account amount was received by the airline.

8. In all cases where credit shell is issued there shall be an incentive to compensate the passenger from the date of cancellation upto 30th June, 2020 in which event the credit shell shall be enhanced by 0.5% of the face value (the amount of fare collected) for every month or part thereof between the date of cancellation and 30th June, 2020. Thereafter the value of the credit shell shall be enhanced by 0.75% of the face value per month upto 31st March, 2021.

Further, the Directorate, shall ensure strict compliance of the directions referred above, by issuing necessary instructions to the all concerned.

(Para 19)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Protection for life and liberty – Prayer for not to take coercive step on complaint of daughter-in-law -- Police officials had barged into house of petitioners on the complaint of respondent No.5 (daughter-in-law) in order to save her from the illegal confinement of the petitioners and her husband – Yet in order to save her matrimonial life, she did not submit any complaint to the police -- As no FIR was registered against the petitioners on request of  daughter-in-law, no direction can be issued to conduct preliminary inquiry regarding the said incident. Case is not covered by judgment in 'Lalita Kumari's case, 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 – Petition dismissed.

(Para 11-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 474, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- FIR against accused – Permission to go abroad – Right of – While evaluating the issue, Court must have regard to nature of the allegations, the conduct of the appellant and above all, the need to ensure that he does not pose a risk of evading the prosecution – Appellant regularly travelled between the US and India on as many as sixteen occasions between 2015 and 2020 -- Lodging of an FIR should not in the facts of the case be a bar on the travel of the appellant to the US for eight weeks to attend to the business of revalidating his Green Card -- Human right to dignity and the protection of constitutional safeguards should not become illusory by the imposition of conditions which are disproportionate to the need to secure the presence of the accused, the proper course of investigation and eventually to ensure a fair trial -- There is no reason or justification to deny him the permission which has been sought to travel to the US for eight weeks – Appellant granted permission subject to certain conditions.

(Para 21-24)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13, 14 – Application u/s 14 of the Act by PNB for physical possession of mortgage property -- P&S Bank wrongly took physical possession of property -- Patwari clarified description of property -- Writ petition disposed of with a direction to Deputy Commissioner to take action in accordance with law by passing an appropriate order by considering the report of the patwari concerned within a period of two weeks – P&S Bank also directed to hand over the physical possession of the mortgaged property to the Authorized Officer of PNB.

(Para 4-6)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5(iii), 11 -- Run-away couple – Live-in relationship of boy 24 years/girl 16 years – Police protection to protect life and liberty – Right of -- Section 11 precludes a marriage solemnized in contravention of Sub Section (iii) of Section 5, from the purview of being regarded as void or invalid -- Fundamental Right under Article 21 of Constitution of India stands on a much higher pedestal -- Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional Scheme it must be protected, regardless of the solemnization of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties -- Without commenting on the legitimacy of the relationship between the petitioners, direction given to Superintendent of Police to verify the contents of the petition, particularly the threat perception of the petitioners and complaints/representation and if deemed fit, to take appropriate steps to provide necessary protection qua their life and liberty in accordance with law.

(Para 8-13)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Writ jurisdiction --  One Time Settlement is not cloaked with such rigorous principles which may not permit extension of period to pay the remaining/balance settlement amount -- Extensions can be considered to be granted to deserving cases -- Held, Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would have the jurisdiction to extend the period of settlement as originally provided for, in the OTS letter.

(Para 22-24)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Illustrative guidelines framed to be considered cumulatively or individually, on case to cases basis, some of them would be :-

i. The Original Time provided in the Settlement – the first and foremost aspect to be noticed would be the time period originally granted by the bank to pay off the settlement amount. If the time period originally stipulated in the settlement letter to pay off the settlement amount is short or is not excessive, the case for extension then could be considered. It is to be noticed that the borrower is to arrange funds to complete the OTS. If reasonable time period is not given, the very purpose of settlement would be defeated. In that eventuality application for extension can be considered so that the borrower gets a reasonable time to clear off the settlement amount and the ultimate purpose of settlement is achieved.

ii. Extent of payments already deposited under the settlement or before filing of the petition – While considering an application for extension of time under OTS, the prime objective to be noticed is the intention of the borrower to culminate the settlement. If the borrower has already paid substantial amounts, to the creditor under the OTS, and for some remaining amounts, is seeking a reasonable extension, such requests can be considered favourably. This shows, that the applicant had an intention to clear the settlement and the deposit of substantial amounts, is an indication in this regard.

iii. Reasons which led to delay in payment – It is important to notice, the reasons, which led to the delay on the part of the borrower. If the borrower was prevented by certain reasons or circumstances beyond his control it could be a reason to consider an application for extension favourably. It would be imperative for the borrower to show, that he made his best efforts to ensure that the requisite amounts, are arranged within the specified time, but inspite of all his best efforts, he could not arrange for the same.

iv. Payments having been accepted by the Bank / Financial Institution , after the stipulated date – If the bank or the Financial Institution has been accepting the payments from the borrower towards the settlement even after the stipulated period of time, it shows that the time was not the essence of contract. It would be apparent from such conduct of the parties, that certain amount of relaxation or flexibility in making the payment of OTS amount is reserved between the parties.

v. Bona fide Intent of the borrower to pay the remaining amounts under the settlement – In order to test the bonafide intention of such an applicant, it could be reasonably be tested while asking such an applicant to deposit some further amount, towards the balance amount before calling upon the bank to consider the issue of extension. If such amounts are deposited under the orders of Court and the bonafides are established, such an applicant would be entitled for a favourable consideration of an application for extension.

Caveat added, that if for any reason, the effort does not lead to extension of time, as prayed for by the petitioner, then the amounts deposited by the borrower/depositors under the interim orders of the Court, would have to be returned back by the creditor to the petitioner.

vi. Time period being demanded by the applicant to clear the remaining / balance settlement amount. – An applicant whose intention would be to clear the balance settlement amounts, would not claim for an unreasonable period of an extension, as otherwise, the intention would be to gain more time, without any actual intent to clear the settlement. In the facts and circumstances of each case, the Courts would therefore determine a reasonable period, to enable the borrower to clear the remaining settlement amount, subject ofcourse, to payment of reasonable interest for the delayed period, to balance the equities.

vii. Attending factors and circumstances– Attending factors and circumstances involved, while making an application for extension play an important role to identify eligible and deserving cases as also to determine the extent of extension to be granted. For example, the current situation where the entire country has been adversely effected on account of COVID-19 pandemic, the difficulties in arranging the amounts could be taken note of while determining the period of extension to be granted to an applicant. Further, accounts which have suffered losses and became NPA on account of having suffered natural calamities, unfortunate accidents, fire incidents, thefts, damage by floods , storms etc. and have come forward for an eventual settlement, can also be considered for extension of time.

viii. Irreparable loss and injury to the applicant – While examining an application for extension of settlement, it could also be seen to be noticed, the extent of an injury to be suffered by an applicant.

Guidelines/factors are not exhaustive but only illustrative for guidance of the parties and the courts while considering the prayer for extension of the time under by OTS by the borrower on case to case basis -- Courts would be free to consider the credentials of the borrower as well, being an equitable and discretionary relief.

(Para 25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Petitioner paid substantial portion of the same and is willing to pay the remaining with interest -- Current attending circumstances, of widespread of COVID-19 pandemic – Petitioners held entitled to extension of time for 6 months to repay the remaining settlement amount – Petitioners shall also pay interest @ 9% p.a. simple on the delayed payments on reducing balance payable w.e.f. 01.06.2019 i.e. the closing date of the settlement/OTS.

(Para 26-30)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 14(1)(a) -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Provider and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019, Rule 5 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Maintainability of writ petition – Whether the present petition is maintainable in view of the proceedings pending before National Company Law Tribunal – Intent to restrict initiation or continuation of proceedings against a Corporate Debtor is to preserve its assets so that during Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the Corporate Debtor is subjected to remedial acts to improve its financial condition – Answered in AFFIRMATIVE and held that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present petition, the petition would be maintainable.

(Paras 13, 33-37)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Writ petition for a mandamus to transfer the investigation to CBI --  Denovo Investigaiton -- Death of the deceased was initially sought to be passed off as accidental by collision with a train or suicidal -- F.I.R. u/s 302, IPC was registered very much belatedly, albeit reluctantly, only at the persistence of the petitioner and her husband after they repeatedly approached the higher authorities -- Entire investigation and the closure report lack bonafide -- Closure report set aside and direction given for a de novo investigation by a fresh team of investigators to be headed by a senior police officer of the State consisting of efficient personnel well conversant with use of modern investigation technology also -- No officer who was part of the investigating team leading to the closure report shall be part of the team conducting de novo investigation -- Fresh investigation must be concluded within a maximum period of two months and the police report be filed before the court concerned whereafter the matter shall proceed in accordance with law -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Departmental enquiry – Judicial review – Nature of – Power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority – Judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself – Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion – It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome.

(Para 25)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Disciplinary proceedings -- Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority – Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice -- Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.

(Para 28)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Objection on role of Enquiry officer – It must be recognized that, under Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts -- While strict rules of evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the truth -- Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in certain circumstances -- No specific malice or bias has been alleged against the enquiry officer, and even during the enquiry no request had been made to seek a replacement; thus, evidencing how these objections are nothing but an afterthought.

(Para 31)

D. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Departmental enquiry – Allegation of corruption – Non-action in criminal case -- Dismissal from service -- After investigation, the CBI though did not find adequate material to launch criminal prosecution but recommended major disciplinary action – In a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say, statements made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances -- Appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated in the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet was filed by the CBI after enquiry, is liable to be discarded – Employer always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding.

(Para 33-35)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Allegation of corruption -- Departmental enquiry – Dismissal from service – Interference in -- Unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked -- Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the society -- Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly – Dismissal order, upheld.

(Para 1, 36)

Constitution of India, Article 16 -- Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the Public Services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 (62 of 2018) – 16% reservations to Marathas to be a “Socially and Educationally Backward Class” – Validity of – Matter referred to Larger Bench : 

-- As per Indra Sawhney’s case 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217, Article 16 (4) should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 16 (1), which is a guarantee held out to every citizen, reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50 per cent -- Relaxation of the strict rule of 50 per cent can be made in certain extraordinary situations -- People living in far flung and remote areas not being in the mainstream of national life should be treated in a different way -- Extreme caution has to be exercised and a special case made out for relaxation of the rule of 50 per cent.

-- Court prima facie opined that the State of Maharashtra has not shown any extraordinary situation for providing reservations to Marathas in excess of 50 per cent. Maratha community which comprises of 30 per cent of the population in the State of Maharashtra cannot be compared to marginalized sections of the society living in far flung and remote areas. The State has failed to make out a special case for providing reservation in excess of 50 per cent. Neither has any caution been exercised by the State in doing so.

-- The social, educational and economic backwardness of a community, existence of quantifiable data relating to inadequacy of representation of the community in public services and deprivation of the benefits flowing from reservations to the community are not exceptional circumstances for providing reservations in excess of 50 per cent.

Court referred the matter to Larger Bench by passing following orders: -

(A) As the interpretation of the provisions inserted by the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, these Appeals are referred to a larger Bench. These matters shall be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India for suitable orders.

(B) Admissions to educational institutions for the academic year 2020-21 shall be made without reference to the reservations provided in the Act. We make it clear that the Admissions made to Post-Graduate Medical Courses shall not be altered.

(C) Appointments to public services and posts under the Government shall be made without implementing the reservation as provided in the Act. Liberty to mention for early hearing.

(Para 1, 15-17)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Seeking declaration that order passed by Ld. Single Judge of High Court is void/ disabled/ recalled – Held, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution not maintainable – Rights and remedies are available to the petitioner, including by way of SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 1, 9, 12)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter – Fair Investigaiton -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- Observations of Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts -- It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.

(Para 12(I))

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor -- Question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case -- Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.

(Para 12(II))

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed Person – Released on bail – Impounding of passport – Legality of – Petitioner appeared before the Judicial Magistrate, she was granted bail and, thus, the proclamation order ceased to be operative -- Said fact was well within the knowledge of respondent-Regional Passport Office -- Moreover, in a bailable offence, no condition can be imposed by the Court regarding surrender of the passport -- Fundamental Rights of the petitioner breached -- Hence, the impugned action is highly deprecated -- Petition allowed with a costs of Rs.1.00 lakh to be paid by respondent-RPO to the petitioner -- Respondent-RPO directed to release the passport of the petitioner within 15 days.

(Para 19-25)

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10(3)(b) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 323, 406, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- FIR registered u/s 498-A, 323, 406, 506 IPC – Proclaimed offender – Seizure of passport – Fundamental right to travel abroad -- Petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender, when the petitioner was in New Zealand on a valid visa – Thereafter, High Court stayed his arrest for a period of 08 weeks -- On arrival from New Zealand, the passport of the petitioner was seized and later, he had appeared before the trial Court and was granted bail – Impounding of the passport is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- Petition allowed, seizure memo set aside.

(Para 8-15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer power u/s 406 Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Section 406 Cr.P.C. empowers the Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals – Held, only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 174 -- Scope of section 174 Cr.P.C. proceeding – Nature of -- Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. is limited to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out the apparent cause of unnatural death -- These are not in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing of FIR u/s 154 CrPC --  Held, inquiry conducted u/s 174 CrPC is limited for a definite purpose but is not an investigation of a crime u/s 157 of the CrPC.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4) -- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Jurisdiction of Patna Police to register complaint – Consent for CBI Investigation by Bihar police -- Legality of -- At the stage of investigation, it cannot be said that the concerned police station does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the case -- Allegation relating to criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of money which were to be eventually accounted for in Patna (where the Complainant resides), could prima facie indicate the lawful jurisdiction of the Patna police -- Exercise of jurisdiction by the Bihar Police appears to be in order -- At the stage of investigation not required to transfer the FIR to Mumbai police -- Bihar government was competent to give consent for entrustment of investigation to the CBI and as such the ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful.

(Para 22-30)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4), 406 – Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. at Mumbai -- Patna Police registered FIR, subsequently transferred it to the CBI – In future, if commission of cognizable offence u/s 175(2) CrPC is determined, the possibility of parallel investigation by the Mumbai Police cannot be ruled out – Both states are making acrimonious allegations of political interference against each other, the legitimacy of the investigation has come under a cloud -- To ensure public confidence in the investigation and to do complete justice in the matter, Court exercised powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, while according approval for the ongoing CBI investigation, holding that if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well.

(Para 35-41)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Contractual Extension Lecturer -- Minimum requirement of NET qualification – Whether the Appellants can be replaced by those possessing the NET qualification without being granted an opportunity to acquire such qualification? -- Held, there is no policy to grant time to serving contractual Extension Lecturers, not possessing NET time to possess such qualification while continuing in service, it is not possible for the Court to dictate to the Respondents to provide such a facility to the Appellants -- Writ prayer replacing the Appellants should not be themselves engaged on a contractual basis – Held, since the Appellants do not possess the mandatory NET qualification and, as such, cannot continue, there is no requirement to consider the submission as to how they are likely to be replaced.

(Para 2, 6-7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A, 24(2), 25(3) -- Return of plaint – Transfer of petition – De novo trial or not – Power of -- In cases dealing with transfer of proceedings from a Court having jurisdiction to another Court, the discretion vested in the Court by Sections 24(2) and 25(3) either to retry the proceedings or proceed from the point at which such proceeding was transferred or withdrawn, is in marked contrast to the scheme under Order VII Rule 10 read with Rule 10-A where no such discretion is given and the proceeding has to commence de novo.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A – Constitution of India, Article 136, 142 -- Return of plaint -- De novo trial or not – Power of -- High Court by the impugned order held that the suit at Delhi shall proceed from the stage at which it was pending at Gurgaon before return of the plaint and not de novo – Held, presentation of the plaint at Gurgaon was certainly not before a court having jurisdiction in the matter -- Suit has to proceed afresh before the proper court – Because the appellant did not raise the objection under clause 16B of the agreement at the very first opportunity -- Pleadings of the parties have been completed, evidence led, and that the matter was fixed for final argument – In exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and in order to do complete and substantial justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution Court decline to set aside the order of the High Court.

(Para 3, 27)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c) – Recovery of cannabis -- Prima facie case should be beyond reasonable doubt – Burden of proof on accused shift thereafter -- Stringent provisions of the NDPS Act, such as Section 37, the minimum sentence of 10 years, absence of any provision for remission do not dispense with the requirements of prosecution to establish a prima facie case beyond reasonable doubt after investigation, only where after which the burden of proof shall shift to the accused -- Gravity of the sentence and the stringency of the provisions will therefore call for a heightened scrutiny of the evidence for establishment of foundational facts by the prosecution.

(Para 2, 10)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8C, 20(b)(ii)(c), 37 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Recovery of cannabis from house -- Conscious possession of contraband – Proof of -- Fair trial – Right of -- Appellant produced the sale agreement of house in question, Exhibit P.28 with promptness the very next day -- It was never investigated for its genuineness by the police and neither were the panchayat records verified -- Voters list entry of 2008 being prior to the sale is of no consequence -- Conscious possession not established so as to attribute the presumption under the NDPS Act against him with regard to recovery of the contraband -- Conviction could not be based on a foundation of conjectures and surmises to conclude on a preponderance of probabilities, the guilt of the appellant without establishing the same beyond reasonable doubt -- Appellant has been denied the right to a fair investigation, which is but a facet of a fair trial guaranteed to every accused under Article 21 of the Constitution -- Conviction of the appellant held to be unsustainable and is set aside -- Appellant is acquitted.

(Para 2, 12-17)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ through SPA -- Property purchased after SPA – SPA would only cover the properties owned by as on the date of their execution and they would not cover or extend to properties purchased on a later date – These were not General Powers of Attorney executed in relation to the properties owned and that may be owned in future, but restricted Special Powers of Attorney in relation to properties already owned by him in a particular Tehsil – Writ petition, instituted through the SPA is therefore defective in its very inception.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 2(iv), 41 -- Writ of habeas corpus – Foster care order by Child Welfare Committee with incomplete coram on gazetted holiday – Colourable exercise of powers –Order passed by the Child Welfare Committee is totally silent about the factum of petitioner and his family being unfit or incapacitated for taking care and for protection and well-being of the child -- Counselling report would show that the Counsellor interacted with the minor and found that the minor was living happily with her father and also wanted to reside with him – Since the order passed by the Child Welfare Committee is found to be the result of colourable exercise of powers, therefore, Court deemed it appropriate to restore the custody of the minor in favour of the petitioner -- In the event of filing any petition under the relevant statute for custody of minor in regular proceedings, the same shall be decided in accordance with law -- Custody of the child ordered to be handed over to the petitioner.

(Para 19-23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail – Delay in furnishing bail bonds – Effect of -- Petitioner did “avail of” his right u/s 167(2) of the Code and furnished personal bail bond with surety, which was accepted and attested by the Court, he would be deemed to have been released from custody -- Petitioner was not released because two other cases were pending against him – Surety withdrew the surety furnished by him -- Court permitted the petitioner to furnish fresh bail bond with surety -- Since he was in custody in other cases, therefore, he did not furnish the fresh bail bond with surety – After granted bail in other cases, petitioner requested the Court to accept the personal bail bond with surety as directed vide earlier order, which was declined – Held, mere delay in furnishing personal bail bonds/surety cannot visit the petitioner with adverse consequences and the order granting bail u/s 167(2) of the Code does not cease to exist or comes to an end or stand eclipsed -- Petitioner is directed to furnish personal bail bonds with surety and thereafter ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 141 – Judgment passed by Supreme Court of India -- Courts below ignoring the judgment by saying not applicable, without discussion – Permissibility of -- Ld. Court below, in the order has taken notice of the judgment, but refuses to follow the same by observing that “these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case” – Held, a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India -- No doubt, the ratio decidendi laid down in a judgment is binding and not obiter dicta -- However, before distinguishing judgment, the Court is required to analyse that what is the ratio laid down in the judgment and thereafter, proceed to explain the same -- Manner in which the ld. Court below has ignored the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not appreciable.

(Para 11)

A. Constitution of India, Article 139A – Withdrawal/Transfer of case from High Court – Pre-requisite -- Provision of Article 139A of the Constitution relating to withdrawal of a case from a High Court to this Court on the ground of pendency before this Court of a case involving same or similar questions of law contemplates fulfilment of two conditions.

-- First, in the case pending before Supreme Court, the questions of law involved ought to be the same or substantially the same as those involved in the case in the High Court, the withdrawal of which can be asked for.

-- Secondly, while exercising the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 139A of the Constitution must be satisfied that such questions are substantial questions of general importance.

Such satisfaction can be on Supreme Court’s own motion, on an application made by the Attorney General or on the basis of an application made by a party to any such case.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 139A – Transfer of High Court petition to Supreme Court -- 10% reservation for economic backward class – Challenge to -- Writ petition in High court – Civil Appeal pending in Supreme Court on same issue – Points involved in the Civil Appeal and the Writ Petition pending in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana require adjudication of substantially the same questions of law -- Writ petition withdrawn from High Court to Supreme Court for disposal of the said Writ Petition – Transfer petition allowed.

(Para 1, 9,10)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Live in relation with same sex as a couple – Life and liberty -- Police protection – Right of -- Petitioners are entitled to protection of their lives and liberty as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, regardless of the nature of relationship between them -- Legitimacy of their relationship with each other is of no consequence viz-a-viz their right to life and liberty – Direction given to SSP to verify the contents of representation seeking protection of life and liberty, if necessary, requisite steps be taken, in accordance with law for granting protection of life and liberty to the petitioners.

(Para 7-9)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, Rule 20, 32 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11 Explanation IV, 141, Order 2 Rule 2 -- Two writ petition for same cause of action – Maintainability of -- Writ petitioner failed to explain why the prayer made in the second writ petition could not be incorporated or added in the previous petition and also failed to disclose what is the difference in the cause of action of both the writ petitions -- Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC, is applicable particularly when in the 1976 Rules, there is no provision inconsistent with the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC -- Explanation IV of Section 11 of the CPC, also provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit or petition under Article 226, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly or substantially in issue in such suit or proceedings -- Second writ petition not entertained and disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file application for amendment of the pleadings in the previously instituted writ petition.

(Para 14-18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ jurisdiction (Punjab and Haryana) Rules 1976, Rule 20, 32 – Writ petition – Such or similar writ petition – Pendency of – Procedure of -- Petitioner is required to make a disclosure in the Index and the relevant para, if such or similar petition is pending or decided -- Also required to disclose the difference in the cause of action, if any, in both the writ petitions, if any -- Writ petitioner shall disclose the reasons why the relief claimed in the subsequent petition could not be claimed or included in the previously instituted petition -- Filing of the multiple petitions is neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of Judicial Institution -- Institution has been setup to make a sincere endeavour to give justice to all the litigants -- For achieving that goal, it is necessary that unnecessary filing of any kind of petitions should be discouraged – Second writ petition is disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner to file application for amendment of the pleadings in the previously instituted writ petition.

(Para 17,18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 45, 52 – Denial for registration of car -- Writ of mandamus – Maintainability of -- Once the authorities abdicate from doing their duty, a writ of mandamus would be maintainable.

(Para 8)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 45, 52 – Registration of car -- Art work on car – Objection of -- Base colour of the car which remains white, no doubt the art work done upon it is colourful, but has it changed the basic structure of the car or has the vehicle been altered in any manner which is not permitted by virtue of Section 52 of the Act? -- The answer is in the negative -- Respondents are issued a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing them to register the said vehicle within a period of two weeks.

(Para 16-19)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Absence of marriage -- Invalid/Void marriage – Run-away couple – Minor or Major -- Police protection – Right of -- Right to human life is to be treated on much higher pedestal, regardless of a citizen being minor or a major -- Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional Scheme it must be protected, regardless of the solemnization of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties -- Mere fact that petitioners are not of marriageable age would not deprive them of their fundamental right -- SSP is directed to provide necessary protection qua their life and liberty, if deemed fit.

(Para 15-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of habeas corpus for custody of minor – Maintainability of -- It is well settled that writ of habeas corpus can be issued for restoration of custody of a minor to the guardian wrongfully deprived of it -- However, exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus in such cases is not solely dependent on and does not necessarily follow merely determination of illegality of detention and is based on the paramount consideration of welfare of the minor child irrespective of legal rights of the parents.

(Para 18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 – Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 25 -- Writ of Habeas Corpus by mother (resident of Australia) for custody of minor son -- Child born as well as resident of Australia – Now residing with grandmother and studying in School in India -- Contention that the Family Court/Guardian Court in India has no jurisdiction is not legally sustainable -- Facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus by handing over its custody to the petitioner -- It is in the welfare of the minor child that respondent no.3 / grand-mother be allowed to continue to have its custody subject to order of the Family Court/Guardian Court at Ambala, where the minor child is now ordinarily residing and that the petitioner be accordingly directed to approch the Family Court/Guardian Court at Ambala for adjudication of the question of entrustment of custody of the child to the petitioner for its repatriation to Australia.

(Para 6, 43-46)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 166 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Deceased aged 35 years – Five dependent -- A photocopy of the original ITR for the year 2006-07, bearing the rubber stamp of the Income Tax Department shows that the date of filing the ITR was prior to the death of the deceased -- Hence, the High Court was not justified in disregarding the ITR for the year 2006-07 while assessing the income of the deceased -- ITRs for the assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 reflects the income of approximately Rs. 1,00,000 p.a. made basis for computing the compensation – Future prospects 40% and deduction towards his personal expenses made by 1/4th -- Multiplier adopted at 16 is appropriate -- Under the conventional heads Rs. 70,000/- (Loss of estate Rs. 15,000/- + Funeral expenses Rs. 15,000/- + Loss of consortium Rs.40,000/-) awarded – Total compensation comes to Rs.17,50,000/- -- Though the claimant did not file appeal before the High Court, Supreme Court by exercising powers under Article 142 enhanced the same to do complete justice between the parties – Interest @ 7.5% p.a. awarded from date of filing the claim petition.

(Para 1, 7,8)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Run-away marriage -- Police protection – Requirement of -- Deserves immediate attention of the Police Department to ensure that the couple is not unduly harassed by anyone including their respective parents -- Direction must go to the Commissioner of Police, to take steps which are consistent with their safety -- Couple is at liberty to present a representation to the police describing their apprehension from those who oppose the union so that effective steps are taken -- With these directions, the instant petition disposed of without expressing any opinion on the validity of marriage.

(Para 1-4)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Run-away couple -- Police protection petition – Photographs of couple – Requirement of -- Photographs are not proof of marriage -- Neither is a court concerned with the marriage in this jurisdiction -- Court is only concerned about the identity of the petitioners in these cases which can be traced back -- For these there are Aadhar cards and other official photo identification and passport size photographs of both etc. would be sufficient compliance which are to be placed on record duly authenticated by the petitioners -- Registry is directed that photographs would not be attached with protection petitions by runaway couples unless there is an affidavit of counsel that they are necessary for the understanding of the case, for which reasons must be assigned by way of an application.

(Para 1, 10)

Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 10(2)(l) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 19(1)(g) -- Lock down period during pandemic Covid-19 – Full wages to employees for 50 days – Notification/Order issued by Union of India – Power of – Challenged being violative of Article 14, 19(1)(g) -- Both Industry and Labourers need each other -- No Industry or establishment can survive without employees/labourers and vice versa – Held, efforts should be made to sort out the differences and disputes between the workers and the employers regarding payment of wages of above 50 days and if any settlement or negotiation can be entered into between them without regard to the order dated 29.03.2020, the said steps may restore congenial work atmosphere – Directions issued for following interim measures which can be availed by all the private establishment, industries, factories and workers Trade Unions/ Employees Associations etc. which may be facilitated by the State Authorities: -

i) The private establishment, industries, employers who are willing to enter into negotiation and settlement with the workers/employees regarding payment of wages for 50 days or for any other period as applicable in any particular State during which their industrial establishment was closed down due to lockdown, may initiate a process of negotiation with their employees organization and enter into a settlement with them and if they are unable to settle by themselves submit a request to concerned labour authorities who are entrusted with the obligation under the different statute to conciliate the dispute between the parties who on receiving such request, may call the concerned Employees Trade Union/workers Association/ workers to appear on a date for negotiation, conciliation and settlement. In event a settlement is arrived at, that may be acted upon by the employers and workers irrespective of the order dated 29.03.2020 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.

ii) Those employers’ establishments, industries, factories which were working during the lockdown period although not to their capacity can also take steps as indicated in direction No.(i).

iii) The private establishments, industries, factories shall permit the workers/employees to work in their establishment who are willing to work which may be without prejudice to rights of the workers/employees regarding unpaid wages of above 50 days. The private establishments, factories who proceed to take steps as per directions (i) and (ii) shall publicise and communicate about their such steps to workers and employees for their response/participation. The settlement, if any, as indicated above shall be without prejudice to the rights of employers and employees which is pending adjudication in these writ petitions.

iv) The Central Government, all the States/UTs through their Ministry of Labour shall circulate and publicise this order for the benefit of all private establishment, employers, factories and workers/employees.

(Para 7, 36, 37)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Custody of 4 years old minor daughter with father – Writ of Habeas corpus by mother -- Maintainability of -- Merely because other remedies are available to the parties, would not render the present petition not maintainable.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 -- Custody of 4 year old minor daughter with father – Writ of Habeas corpus by mother – Temporary custody given to mother – Held,

-- Minor daughter is suffering from a congenital problem -- Father of the child has appended medical proof of her treatment along with the expenses being borne by him towards the said treatment -- Same would go on to show that the upbringing of the minor child has to be with extra care and attention in constant presence of other family members when the parents are away.

-- Paternal grandmother of the minor daughter is since deceased -- It is only the grandfather and the father of the minor daughter who live with her at the paternal house – Petitioner has taken a permission from her employer to work full time from home – Parents of petitioner are currently staying with her -- She along with them is in a better position to look after the daughter full time, while there is no female attendant at the house of father.

-- She is merely four years and ordinarily, per Section 6 of 1890 Act, custody of a minor who is less than five years has to be with her mother -- No doubt, the above provision postulates that the custody shall “ordinarily” be with the mother -- But the word “ordinarily” is to be construed to mean that unless, prima facie, it is shown otherwise by the father that child would be better taken care of by deprivation of motherhood -- Father must then give some cogent reasons, indicative of the welfare and interest of the child being jeopardized or the exclusive motherhood being imminently non-conducive to the upbringing of child -- Spirit of section 6 hypothesizes that, given the tender age of a minor, suitability of custody is not the predominant factor, what is more relevant or should weigh, is the requisite biological and natural environment, which gives rise to a general presumption that mother is first and best suitable for child care of a minor that age.

-- Minor daughter cannot be stated to be in illegal or unlawful custody, however, since the minor daughter is less than five years, the mother is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of Section 6 -- Until the prayer of the parties qua custody of the minor child is decided by Guardian court, the welfare and interest of the minor child would be better in the hands of mother-petitioner.

-- Temporary custody of the minor given to the petitioner till any further appropriate orders are passed by the Guardian/ Civil Judge.

-- However, clarified that observations are mere obiter dictum in nature. Same would not effect the merits of the permanent custody petition which has been filed by father or interim custody application, if chosen to be filed by him, per liberty granted by this Court -- Guardian/ Civil Judge shall not get influenced with these tentative observations while deciding either of those on their own merits.

(Para 11-18)

A. Constitution of India, Article 32 – Fundamental Rights – Protection of -- Article 32 of the Constitution constitutes a recognition of the constitutional duty entrusted to Supreme Court to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.

(Para 32)

B. Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) – Right to speech and expression – Fundamental right of Journalist – Airing of views -- Exercise of journalistic freedom lies at the core of speech and expression protected by Article 19(1)(a) -- Exercise of that fundamental right is not absolute and is answerable to the legal regime enacted with reference to the provisions of Article 19(2) -- Right of a journalist under Article 19(1)(a) is no higher than the right of the citizen to speak and express.

(Para 32)

C. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- F.I.R. -- Allegation against police -- Transfer of Investigation to CBI -- Power to transfer an investigation must be used “sparingly” and only “in exceptional circumstances” – An accused person does not have a choice in regard to the mode or manner in which the investigation should be carried out or in regard to the investigating agency – Court do not find that levelling such allegations would by and itself constitute a sufficient ground for the transfer of the investigation.

(Para 35-44)

D. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32 – Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR -- Petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available under the CrPC -- Petitioner has an equally efficacious remedy available before the High Court – Held, a petition under Article 32 is not maintainable.

(Para 49)

E. Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- One cause of action – FIR against -- Multiple FIRs and complaints – Quashing of -- Multiple FIRs and complaints in several states and in the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir – Fairness in the administration of criminal justice would warrant the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 to quash all other FIRs -- Filing of multiple FIRs arising out of the same telecast of the show hosted by the petitioner is an abuse of the process and impermissible -- Quashing of those FIRs would not amount to the expression of any opinion on the merits of the FIR which is being investigated.

(Para 2, 51)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5, 11, 12 -- Police protection to run-away couple – Minor girl -- FIR registered -- It is not for High Court in a protection petition to engage itself in social mores, norms and human behaviour or introduce personal ideas on morality – Even in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 marriage of a minor girl is not void -- SSP is directed to personally look into the matter and offer help, which is consistent with their safety.

(Para 6,7)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 43 – Interpretation of NDPS Act – Literal interpretation -- Provisions of NDPS Act are required to be interpreted keeping in mind the object and purpose of NDPS Act; impact on the society as a whole and the Act is required to be interpreted literally and not liberally which may ultimately frustrate the object, purpose and preamble of the Act.

(Para 8)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21 -- Small or Commercial quantity -- Mixture of narcotic or psychotropic substance with neutral substance –  Decision in the case of E. Micheal Raj (2008) 5 SCC 161, taking the view that in the mixture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of the neutral substance(s) is  not to be taken into consideration while determining the small quantity or commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and only the actual content by weight of the offending narcotic drug which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether it would constitute small quantity or commercial quantity, is not a good law.

(Para 10(i))

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia) – Small or Commercial quantity – Mixture of narcotic or psychotropic substance with neutral substance – Held, in case of seizure of mixture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the “small or commercial quantity” of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances.

(Para 10 (ii))

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 2(viia), (xxiiia), 21 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001 – Challenge to -- Section 21 of the NDPS Act is not stand-alone provision and must be construed along with other provisions in the statute including provisions in the NDPS Act including Notification No.S.O.2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 and Notification S.O 1055(E) dated 19.10.2001 -- Challenge to Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001, fails and it is observed and held that the same is not ultra vires to the Scheme and the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act.

(Para 10 (iii) &(iv))

Constitution of India, Article 254, 346, Schedule VII, List III Entries 33 and 34 -- U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (24 of 1953), Section 16 -- Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, Clause 3 -- Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 3(2)(c) – Minimum price of sugar cane – Advise price of sugarcane – Power of – Held, view taken by the Constitution Bench in the subsequent decision in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, (2004) 5 SCC 430 is the correct law. There is no conflict between the two decisions in the case of Tika Ramji, AIR 1956 SC 676 and in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, (2004) 5 SCC 430 and therefore, there is no necessity to refer the matter to the larger Bench consisting of seven Judges. Held,

a.      By virtue of Entries 33 and 34 List III of seventh Schedule, both the Central Government as well as the State Government have the power to fix the price of sugarcane. The Central Government having exercised the power and fixed the “minimum price”, the State Government cannot fix the “minimum price” of sugarcane. However, at the same time, it is always open for the State Government to fix the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price”, in view of the relevant provisions of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966, which has been issued in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953;

b.      The Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 which has been issued under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 confers power upon the State Government to fix the remunerative/advised price at which sugarcane can be bought or sold which shall always be higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government;

c.      Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 is not repugnant to Section 3(2)(c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 as, as observed hereinabove, the price which is fixed by the Central Government is the “minimum price” and the price which is fixed by the State Government is the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government and therefore, there is no conflict.

It is only in a case where the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is lower than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the provisions of the Central enactments will prevail and the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government would prevail. So long as the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the same cannot be said to be void under Article 254 of the Constitution of India.

d.      The view taken by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of U.P. Co-operative Cane Unions Federations vs. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others is the correct law.

Reference answered.

(Para 23,24)