Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 16, 111 – Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Partition proceedings – Admission of ROR, declining of stay – Writ jurisdiction -- Petitioners refrains from challenging the order declining stay and sought direction to decide the pending ROR on date fixed and till then the AC 1^st Grade be restrained from passing any order – Held, prayer is reasonable, FCR directed to decide the ROR on the next date, till then, AC1st Grade restrained from passing any order in the pending partition proceedings.

(Para 1-5)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Banking default case -- One time settlement (OTS) – Delay in deposit – Extension of – Writ petition disposed of with permission to the petitioner to pay the balance amount with interest at the rate of 9%. Anu Bhalla’s case (P&H DB) (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15836 relied.

(Para 2, 3)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 16, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Writ jurisdiction -- Appointment of Sole Arbitrator – Jurisdiction of – challenge to -- Respondent No. 1 did not take legal recourse against the appointment of the sole arbitrator, and rather submitted themselves before the tribunal to adjudicate on the jurisdiction issue as well as on the merits -- In this situation, he has to endure the natural consequences of submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator, which can be challenged, through an application u/s 34 -- Award has already been passed during the pendency of this appeal, and the Respondent No. 1 challenge u/s 34 to the same -- Held, High Court erred in utilizing its discretionary power available under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution -- Order of the High Court set aside -- Respondent No. 1 is at liberty to raise any legally permissible objections regarding the jurisdictional question in the pending Section 34 proceedings.

(Para 22-26)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 16, 34 – Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 (4 of 1992),  Section 2(k) -- Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Writ jurisdiction -- Contract – Interpretation of -- Contract between the parties indicates that it was for both manufacturing as well as supply of bricks -- Pertinent question therefore is whether the present contract, which is composite in nature, falls within the ambit of a works contract under Section 2(k) of the Gujarat Act -- Question requires contractual interpretation, and is a matter of evidence, especially when both parties have taken contradictory stands regarding this issue -- It is a settled law that the interpretation of contracts in such cases shall generally not be done in the writ jurisdiction -- Mere fact that the Gujarat Act might apply may not be sufficient for the writ courts to entertain the plea to challenge the ruling of the arbitrator u/s 16 of the Arbitration Act.

(Para 24)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Sale notice by Bank – Challenged in writ petition -- One Time Settlement/ OTS offered – Petitioners are ready and willing to deposit the sum of Rs.2.50 crores within the stipulated period – Stated that sum of Rs.50 lakhs shall be deposited by 28.12.2020, before 11:00 A.M. and rest of the amount of Rs.2 crores by 31.03.2021 – Writ petition disposed of, in case amount of Rs.50 lakhs is deposited by the petitioners by 11:00 A.M. on 28.12.2020, auction of the property scheduled for 28.12.2020 be deferred -- Sale notice dated 27.11.2020 shall stand set aside -- On failure of the petitioners to deposit the said amount, respondent is at liberty to proceed with the auction.

(Para 4-6)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 – Live-in-relationship with major boy of not marriageable age – Life and liberty – Protection petition -- Petitioners cannot possibly be denied enforcement of their fundamental rights as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India -- Petitioners, both being major, have decided to live together in a live-in relationship and there possibly may not be any legally justifiable reason for the respondents to object to the same -- SSP directed to decide the representation and take necessary action as per law.

(Para 9, 10)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Auction purchaser – Non-deposit of money -- Forfeiture of earnest money –  Settlement of issue – Refund of GST on earnest money – Petitioner ready to deposit full amount with interest – Direction given that in case the petitioner deposit the entire amount along with applicable interest i.e. 9% and the GST (already deposited by the bank to the Government on or before 28.12.2020), the Bank will transfer the property in the name of the petitioner and shall issue sale certificate forthwith -- Bank is also directed to apply for refund of the GST from the Government which has been deposited by it and in case the same is refunded, transfer the same to the petitioner forthwith.

(Para 2, 5-7)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366-A -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 9 -- Run-away marriage – Boy aged 18 years and girl aged 16-1/2 are not competent to perform marriage -- FIR against Granthi of Gurudwara Sahib registered, where marriage solemnised – It will open for the I.O. to investigate the case registered u/s 363 and 366-A IPC in accordance with law -- Petition for protection of life and liberty dismissed – Custody of girl handed over to Gandhi Vanita Ashram, who will take care of the studies of girl and will also abide by the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, till she attains the age of majority.

(Para 9-12)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Contractual employee – Termination of -- It is the duty of Courts to ensure that employees are fairly treated -- A contractual employee cannot be replaced by another contractual employee as it would permit the employer to keep a sanctioned post vacant and make a person work on reduced remuneration against the said post.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Appointment through intermediary – Status of -- Termination of -- Right of -- Petitioner was not directly appointed by the Government -- Fact that respondent No.2/ Director General, Department of Horticulture, Haryana was issuing direct orders for allocating work to the petitioner does not in any way lead to the conclusion that he was directly appointed by the said respondent -- Overall control however, remains with respondent No.4/ Contractor who would be the employer of the petitioner -- If the manpower supplied is replaced by the contractor, he continues to be the employee of the contractor and can be deployed elsewhere -- He does not become jobless and in case wages are not being paid to him, he can invoke the jurisdiction of the Industrial Adjudicator -- Industrial Adjudicator can also pierce the veil and return a finding that the contract in the present case is a sham but to return such a finding evidence would need to be led – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

A. Constitution of India, Section 191, 193 – Vote for election of Rajya Sabha in forenoon – Conviction on same day afternoon – Effect of -- “Whether the vote cast by a Member of the Legislative Assembly in an election to the Rajya Sabha, in the forenoon on the date of election, would become invalid, consequent upon his disqualification, arising out of a conviction and sentence imposed by a Criminal Court, in the afternoon on the very same day?” -- It is not possible to hold that the vote casted at 9:15 a.m. should be treated as invalid on account of the conviction and sentence passed by the criminal Court at 2:30 p.m. on the same day – Held, vote cast at 9:15 a.m. was rightly treated as a valid vote.

(Para 1, 58-61)

B. Constitution of India, Article 191, 193 -- Conviction of M.L.A. by Court -- Disqualification to continue – Effect of -- A disqualification for which penalty is prescribed under Article 193, also invites civil consequences such as the denial of privileges that go with the membership, other than the penalty stipulated in Article 193 – Held, once a person is disqualified, he ceases to be a member and his right to vote also ceases alongwith his membership -- This is a natural consequence of a person ceasing to be a member and this consequence is automatic and not dependent upon Article 193 -- Therefore, Court cannot stretch Article 193 to such an extent that even the natural consequences of disqualification of a member will not get attracted because of the prescription of a penalty.

(Para 48)

A. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 – Custody of minor child – Natural guardian – Right of -- No doubt, u/s 6 the father is a natural guardian of a minor child has a preferential right to claim its custody but Section 6 cannot supersede the dominant consideration as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor child -- Whenever a question arises before a court pertaining to the custody of a minor child, the matter is to be decided not on considerations of the legal rights of parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interest and welfare of the minor.

(Para 12)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (32 of 1956), Section 6 -- Custody of minor child – Writ of habeas corpus – Maintainability of -- Writ of habeas corpus can be issued for restoration of custody of a minor to the guardian wrongfully deprived of it -- However, exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus in such cases is not solely dependent on and does not necessarily follow merely determination of illegality of detention and is based on the paramount consideration of welfare of the minor child irrespective of legal rights of the parents -- Welfare of the child is not to be measured by money only nor merely physical comfort -- The word 'welfare' must be taken in its widest sense -- Moral or religious welfare of the child must be considered as well as its physical wellbeing.

(Para 13-18)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Custody of minor child – Writ of habeas corpus by mother – Minor girl child removed from Canada and brought to India – Whether paramount consideration of the welfare and best interest of the minor girl child lies in return to Canada or continued stay in India -- Both the parents are permanent residents of Canada, are gainfully employed in Canada and have purchased house in Canada and father has not wound up and left employment in Canada and permanently settled in India -- Child has spent major part of more than five years of her life of six years in Canada resulting in her integration with the social, physical, psychological, cultural and academic environment of Canada – On the basis of the summary inquiry, for the welfare and in best of interest of the minor girl child direction given to father to return to Canada alongwith minor daughter on or before 01.01.2021; fails to comply with direction, father shall hand over custody of the minor girl child and her passport to the petitioner on 02.01.2021 or such other date as may be agreed to by the petitioner -- On such return of the minor girl child to Canada, either of the parties shall be at liberty to file appropriate application/petition for appointment of guardian, grant of custody of the minor girl child before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

(Para 29-32)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 -- Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Closure report – Fair Investigaiton -- Investigation and closure report do not contain any material with regard to the nature of investigation for insufficiency of evidence against them -- Closure report is based on the ipse dixit of the Investigating Officer -- Investigation appears to be a sham, designed to conceal more than to investigate -- Police has the primary duty to investigate on receiving report of the commission of a cognizable offence -- This is a statutory duty under the Cr.P.C. apart from being a constitutional obligation to ensure that peace is maintained in the society and the rule of law is upheld and applied -- To say that further investigation was not possible as the informant had not supplied adequate materials to investigate is a preposterous statement, coming from the police – Trial of other accused stayed, closure reports partly set aside insofar as the non-charged sheeted accused are concerned -- I.P.S. appointed to carry out further investigation through a team of competent officers.

(Para 6, 7, 11)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156, 173 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Investigaiton by police – Interference in – Power of -- Police has a statutory duty to investigate into any crime in accordance with law as provided in the Cr. P.C. -- Investigation is the exclusive privilege and prerogative of the police which cannot be interfered with -- But if the police does not perform its statutory duty in accordance with law or is remiss in the performance of its duty, the court cannot abdicate its duties on the precocious plea that investigation is the exclusive prerogative of the police -- Once the conscience of the court is satisfied, from the materials on record, that the police has not investigated properly or apparently is remiss in the investigation, the court has a bounden constitutional obligation to ensure that the investigation is conducted in accordance with law -- If the court gives any directions for that purpose within the contours of the law, it cannot amount to interference with investigation -- A fair investigation is, but a necessary concomitant of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and this Court has the bounden obligation to ensure adherence by the police.

(Para 8)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Live-in-relationship with  minor girl -- Protection of life and liberty – Boy aged 23 years and girl aged about 17 ½ years --  Live-in-relationship, more particularly, when the girl is a minor, is not only taken to be as immoral, against social norms, but is also not legally acceptable -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 4-6)

Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5 – Marriage prior to marriageable age -- Registration of marriage after attaining marriageable age -- At the time of marriage the bridegroom was 18 years and 23 days old whereas the bride was 22 years 3 months and 1 day old -- Subsequently, they were blessed with a daughter -- Registrar directed to register the marriage after being satisfied that the petitioners fulfill other conditions prescribed under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

(Para 1-5)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Termination of pregnancy -- Pregnancy for period of gestation is 25 weeks -- Fetus is having Arnold Chiari syndrome – Medical deformities of the fetus and in case the pregnancy is not terminated, the child if born, will be handicapped for entire life to come and will not be able to live a healthy life -- Risk involved has been explained to the petitioner but, once it is clear that the fetus is having Arnold Chiari syndrome, the pregnancy needs to be terminated even as per the advice of the Medical Board, the petitioner is agreeable for the termination of the pregnancy with the risk involved – Petitioner allowed to terminate her pregnancy.

(Para 2-6)

Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), Section 40(a)(1)(iib) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 226 -- Matter pending before Income Tax Authority – Cause of action to challenge vires of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act – Writ jurisdiction of High Court – High Court dismissed writ petition without deciding the vires of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act on merits – Held, High Court ought to have decided the issue with regard to vires of Section 40(a)(iib) on merits, irrespective of the fact whether the matter was sub judice before the Income Tax Authority -- Once the show cause notice was issued by the assessing officer calling upon the appellant-assessee to show cause why the VAT expenditure is not allowable as deduction in accordance with Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act, while computing the income of the appellant, it can be said that the cause of action has arisen for the appellant to challenge the vires of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act and the appellant may not have to wait till the assessment proceedings before the Income Tax Authority are finalised -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the writ petition on merits with respect to challenge to the vires of Section 40(a)(iib) of the Income Tax Act.

(Para 6, 7)

Constitution of India, Articles 14, 226 -- Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Sections 64, 65 -- Refund of contract consideration – Duty of Board -- Writ jurisdiction -- Similarly situated contractors refunded by Court order -- Respondent approached the civil court, later resort to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India -- When writ petition was considered, the suit was permitted to be withdrawn; the High Court directed the Board to deposit the entire principal amount, with interest @ 10% per annum -- By the final impugned judgment, that order was confirmed – Held, deliberate inaction to force a citizen or a commercial concern to approach the court, rather than take a decision, justified on the anvil of reason means that the Board acted in a discriminatory manner -- Conduct of the Board betrays a callous and indifferent attitude – Despite knowledge that at least three other identically placed entities had asked for return of money and, upon approaching the court, were refunded the amounts given by them promptly -- Nothing prevented the Board from deciding to refund the amount, without forcing appellant to approach the court – Order of High Court upheld with modification in interest part.

(Para 32, 37-40)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B – Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 – Divorce by mutual consent – Waiver of second motion period of six months – Right of – Application for waiver of the second motion filed jointly by the petitioners has been dismissed for the reasons if one of the parties is going abroad, he could come back or give special power of attorney to anyone in the family – Held, husband has to go abroad and in such circumstances, it would be important for him to snap the link as such with his wife for purposes of immigration and, thus, holding on to the first marriage as such might not prove fruitful for purposes of his immigration – Family Court has not applied its mind judicially to the controversy in question and the reasoning as such is not in consonance with the judgment of the Apex Court (Amardeep Singh’s case 2017 (4) RCR (Civil) 608) – Revision allowed, impugned order set aside – Family Court shall take a decision afresh keeping in view the observations made above on the application, within a period of 2 weeks.

(Para 1-7)

A. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Black listing of Contractor – Principle of natural justice – A prior show cause notice granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard is an essential element of all administrative decision-making and particularly so in decisions pertaining to blacklisting which entail grave consequences for the entity being blacklisted -- In these cases, furnishing of a valid show cause notice is critical and a failure to do so would be fatal to any order of blacklisting pursuant thereto -- Such notice must spell out clearly, or its contents be such that it can be clearly inferred therefrom, that there is intention on the part of the issuer of the notice to blacklist the noticee -- Such a clear notice is essential for ensuring that the person against whom the penalty of blacklisting is intended to be imposed, has an adequate, informed and meaningful opportunity to show cause against his possible blacklisting.

(Para 19-21)

B. Constitution of India, Article 14 -- Black listing of Contractor – Principle of natural justice

-- Action of blacklisting was neither expressly proposed nor could it have been inferred from the language employed by the Corporation in its show cause notice.

-- After listing 12 clauses of the “Instruction to Bidders”, which were part of the Corporation’s Bid Document, the notice merely contains a vague statement that in light of the alleged leakage of question papers by the appellant, an appropriate decision will be taken by the Corporation.

-- Clause 10 of the Instruction to Bidders section of the Bid Document, which the Corporation has argued to be the source of its power to blacklist the appellant, is not even mentioned in the show cause notice.

-- Mere existence of a clause in the Bid Document, which mentions blacklisting as a bar against eligibility, cannot satisfy the mandatory requirement of a clear mention of the proposed action in the show cause notice.

-- Corporation’s notice is completely silent about blacklisting and as such, it could not have led the appellant to infer that such an action could be taken by the Corporation in pursuance of this notice.

-- Had the Corporation expressed its mind in the show cause notice to black list, the appellant could have filed a suitable reply for the same.

Show cause notice does not fulfil the requirements of a valid show cause notice for blacklisting – Order of blacklisting the appellant clearly traversed beyond the bounds of the show cause notice which is impermissible in law – Order is contrary to the principles of natural justice, matter remitted back to the Corporation for fresh consideration.

(Para 24-27)

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 10, 36 – Novel coronavirus disease, 2019 / Covid-19 situation -- Use of disinfectant on human body – Public Interest Litigation/ PIL to ban usage – Held,

-- Provisions of the Act, 2005, confer certain more responsibilities and duties on the respondent No.1/ Union of India apart from issuance of guidelines and providing financial support -- The Act, 2005, is special legislation containing self-contained provisions to deal with a disaster. The Pandemic being a disaster within the meaning of Act, 2005, has to be dealt with sternly and effectively.

-- When public authorities/ organizations were using disinfectants both chemical/organic on the human body and there are various studies to the effect that it may be harmful to the health and the body. Some more actions were required to remove the cloud of uncertainty and to regulate the use even if it was to either prevent such use or regulate the use so that health of citizens is amply protected.

-- For spraying disinfectant on human body, fumigation or use of UV rays against the human body, there has to be regulatory regime when respondent No.1 itself is of the view that such use is not recommended. The respondent No.1 has wide powers and responsibilities under Act, 2005, which could have been utilized to remedy the situation. In event, use of disinfectant on human body is to cause adverse effect on the health of the people, there has to be immediate remedial action and respondent No.1 cannot stop only by saying that such use is not recommended.

Directions issued:

i) The respondent No.1/Union of India may consider and issue necessary directions in exercise of powers vested in it under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, regarding ban/Regulation on the usage of disinfection tunnels involving spraying or fumigation of chemical/organic disinfectants for the human beings.

Or

ii) There shall be similar consideration and directions by the respondents as indicated above with regard to exposure of human being to artificial ultraviolet rays.

iii) Looking to the health concern of the people in general, the aforesaid exercise be completed by respondent No.1/Union of India  within a period of one month.

(Para 1, 2, 34-42)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 53, 67 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section  161, 164, 173 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 20(3) and 21 – NDPS case -- Statement/ Confession made before officers under NDPS Act –

-- Whether the officer investigating the matter under the NDPS Act would qualify as police officer or not ?

-- Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer u/s 67 of the Act can be treated as confessional statement or not, even if the officer is not treated as police officer?

-- Whether such a statement is to be treated as statement u/s 161 of the Code or it partakes the character of statement u/s 164 of the Code? –

To arrive at the conclusion that a confessional statement made before an officer designated u/s 42 or section 53 can be the basis to convict a person under the NDPS Act, without any non obstante clause doing away with section 25 of the Evidence Act, and without any safeguards, would be a direct infringement of the constitutional guarantees contained in Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India – Judgment in Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) then goes on to follow Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409) do not state the law correctly, and are thus overruled -- Other judgments that expressly refer to and rely upon these judgments, or upon the principles laid down by these judgments, also stand overruled – Judgments of Noor Aga (2008 (16) SCC 417) and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan’s case (2011) 12 SCC 298 are correct in law. Held,

(i) That the officers who are invested with powers u/s 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.

(ii) That a statement recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.

(Para 2, 152-155)

(Majority judgment)

Reference answered.

Provisions of the Cr.P.C do not apply to an inquiry/investigation under the NDPS Act except to the limited extent provided in Section 50(5) and 51 -- Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has not been made applicable to the NDPS Act -- Judgment in Raj Kumar Karwal (1990 (2) SCC 409), which has reaffirmed the verdict of three Constitution Benches does not require reconsideration -- Nor does Kanhaiyalal (2008 (4) SCC 668) require reconsideration.

(Para 270-271)

(Minority judgment)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Writ of habeas corpus – Run-away marriage – During the pendency of the writ petition, detenue became major -- Detenue being major is entitled to make her choice and to live wherever she wants and the Court cannot assume the role of super guardian and impose any restriction -- Detenue was ordered to be released from Aashiana and at liberty to go with the petitioner.

(Para 8-15)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 -- MGNREGA scheme – Petitioner was not given work under MGNREGA scheme -- Grievance that Sarpanch is giving the benefit of MGNREGA scheme to a retired Master – Writ petition disposed of by giving direction to the Deputy Commissioner to examine the case of petitioner in the correct perspective being jobless person in the present scenario keeping in view the judgment passed in Charanjit Singh's case CRM-M-41977-2015, decided on 08.11.2016 in accordance with law, within a period of four weeks -- Compliance report thereof also sought by Court.

(Para 2-6)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Run-away marriage – Writ of habeas corpus -- On Court’s interaction, detenues reiterated that both of them are more than 18 years of age and are major and that they were not abducted by anyone and they left their home on their own and they want to live separately at Mohali and sustain themselves by carrying out the tailoring work – Relying upon report of ld. ACJM and stand of the detenues before High Court and non-production of any cogent and reliable documentary evidence by the petitioner, anyone of the detenues cannot be said to be minor -- Detenues being major are entitled to make their choice and to live wherever they want and the Court cannot assume the role of super guardian and impose any restriction -- Detenues ordered to be released from Nari Niketan and shall be at liberty to go to any place whatsoever as desired by them.

(Para 11-14)

Punjab Rent Act, 1995 (13 of 2012), Section 20 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Tenant company under liquidation proceedings – Eviction of – Remedy of -- Writ petitioner is calling upon High court to decree a suit for possession of tenanted premises in occupation of a company which is stated to be under liquidation -- Company was admittedly inducted as a tenant in the premises in dispute -- Company still exists and has not been dissolved – Held, urban tenancy in the State of Punjab, is governed and regulated by the provisions of the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 -- Thus, the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy of filing a petition under the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 – If petitioner’s argument to the effect that the tenancy has come to an end, is accepted still the petitioner has a remedy of filing a civil suit seeking relief of possession – Writ petition disposed of by relegating the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy.

(Para 4-7)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Right to go abroad – Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Accused is presumed to be innocent until convicted -- Rights of an accused does not automatically get suspended merely because he is being prosecuted in a criminal case -- One of the facet of right to liberty is to travel abroad – Held, while deciding such applications, the Courts must have regard to the nature of allegations, the conduct of the accused and above all, the need to ensure that the accused does not pose the risk of evading the prosecution – Concern of the Court ought to be only to ensure speedy trial of the criminal case and avoid the possibility of accused fleeing the reach of law -- Liberty of a citizen or a non-citizen cannot be unreasonably curtailed except in the circumstances as discussed above.

(Para 10,11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 21, 226, 227 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 452, 324, 323, 34 -- Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 9 -- Right to go abroad – Renewal of Passport -- Pendency of FIR – Effect of -- Petitioner is struck in the country because he is an accused in a minor offence and conclusion of the trial of the case is taking a lot of time – It has been more than three years since the FIR was registered -- Petitioner has already, with the prior permission of the Court, visited the USA twice during the pendency of the case and did came back -- No doubt, the petitioner overstayed for a few days in the year 2019, however, he did return before the date fixed in the case -- Still further, the petitioner has only applied for renewal/re-issue of the passport – Direction issued to the passport authorities to immediately renew/re-issue the passport of the petitioner, on completion of all the formalities -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 11-13)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (9 of 1994) -- Non-using of Gram Panchayat funds – Legal notice to Panchayat department -- Writ of mandamus seeking direction to the authorities of the Panchayat Department to consider and decide legal notice – Held, Gram Panchayat, as a body, has to utilize the grants released for development works, when it is not in a position to do so, be it for whatever reason, the petitioner cannot get issued legal notices to the authorities asking them to take necessary action, without following the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1994 – Writ petition dismissed.

(Para 1,4,5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 3, 4, Order 7 Rule 10, 11, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 24 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Dismiss in default – Restoration of -- Maintainability of suit – Continuation of stay -- Non-application of judicial mind – Explanation called form District Judge – Detailed reasons:

-- Application for withdrawal of the Civil suit allowed by the trial Court on 30.09.2019 as well as before the Appellate Court, which was allowed on 07.12.2019, therefore, on face of record, no cause of action survives in favour of plaintiff No.1 in the suit – By showing total non-application of judicial mind, the Appellate Court is continuing with the appeal as well as the interim injunction.

-- A perusal of the first order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the District Judge also reflect non-application of judicial mind as the operation of the order dated 06.08.2019 dismissing an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the plaintiffs, was stayed and simultaneously, further injunction was granted against the Bank from proceeding against the plaintiffs, in accordance with law -- It is well settled principle of law that if an injunction application filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed by the Civil Court, the Appellate Court unless by recording detailed reason of urgency may grant interim injunction for a short period or in ordinary course, after giving a short notice to the contesting defendants may pass an interim order. Both these principles of law have been ignored by the District Judge.

-- The Civil Court has passed the order dated 06.08.2019 in the presence of the contesting party i.e. the plaintiff No.1, defendant No.1 – Bank and the counsel representing interim resolution professional of plaintiff No.2, therefore, the Appellate Court who is adjourning the appeal to serve the remaining unserved defendants, who are not contesting before the Civil Court is nothing but a futile exercise, just to extend the stay in favour of the plaintiffs whereas the service of the remaining defendants could be dispensed with in terms of provisions of Order 41 Rule 3 Proviso added by amendment as applicable to Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh.

-- The another reason which show the slackness and disrespect on the part of the Appellate Court is that defendant No.1 – Bank has brought all the previous orders passed by the Writ Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the NCLT and the NCALT and on 07.12.2019, it was also brought to the notice of the Appellate Court that the Civil Court stands dismissed for non-prosecution, however, still the interim stay was extended and no effort was made to dispose of the main appeal.

-- Even surprisingly, despite the instructions passed by the High Court that the photocopy of the Lower Appellate Court should be summoned so that the proceedings before the Lower Court is not automatically stayed, the Appellate Court summoned the record of the trial Court vide order dated 07.12.2019 and despite the fact that the seat of the District Judge and of the trial Court is at the same place, till 01.02.2020, the record was not received and in the intervening period, the interim order was ordered to be extended by the Appellate Court.

-- Even further on 29.02.2020, after noticing that the suit is dismissed for non-prosecution and the petitioner – Bank is stressing that the appeal is not maintainable, the Appellate Court, while returning the record of the trial Court, directed that the application for restoration be decided in a time bound manner i.e. 1½ months, therefore, the intention of the plaintiffs is apparent on record to delay the proceedings either before the District Judge or before the trial Court by not arguing the application for restoration of civil suit.

-- Thus the District Judge has failed to perform even the administrative duty by not keeping a check on trial Court which has not decided the application for restoration of suit till date i.e. even after lapse of 08 months, in violation of his own order dated 29.02.2020.

-- The District Judge being the administrative head of the District, is required to keep a check on the subordinate judiciary and the manner in which the order in the civil suit are passed, show that an effort is made to delay the proceedings to enable the plaintiffs to gain time.

-- Even the trial Court is adjourning the case for effecting the service on non-contesting respondents and is not deciding the application for restoration of civil suit despite the fact that when suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, the presence of the counsel for defendants was marked and service on defendants can be effected through counsel, to avoid the delay.

-- The basic principles of law as set down in various judgments to decide the application for restoration of a suit/appeal or likewise setting-aside ex parte order are that if the application is filed within a reasonable time as in the instant case, it was filed within a period of 06 days; a bona fide ground is given, as in this case, the counsel representing the plaintiffs has filed his own affidavit; the general principle that no one should be condemn unheard is not violated and if required, the other party can be compensated by way of costs, thus, majority of such applications are allowed, however, this is not followed by the trial Court.

-- Based upon such principle, the trial Court could have decided the application immediately without wasting the time to serve the non-contesting respondents. Needless to say that 03 months time was taken by the Appellate Court, in summoning the record of the trial Court, which further delayed the disposal of the application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC.

-- It is not understandable as to why the District Judge/Appellate Court is adjourning the appeal despite the fact that the suit stands dismissed for non-prosecution on 29.11.2019 and the plaintiffs on both counts are seeking adjournments and both the Courts, on face of record are showing undue favour to the plaintiffs.

-- Once the petitioner – Bank on 07.12.2019 has brought to the notice of the Appellate Court, about all the orders passed by High Court & the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the dismissal of the suit in default, there was no justification for the Appellate Court to continue with the stay order, which was obtained by concealing the aforesaid litigation and orders and therefore, continuing with the stay order by ignoring the orders of the High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter se parties, the District Judge has shown disrespect to orders and, on face of record has shown favour to the plaintiffs to delay the proceedings.

-- Even otherwise, the grant of ex parte stay and thereafter, continuation of the interim stay for a period of 01 year despite all odds is in violation of the well settled principle of law held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that injunctions against financial institutions should not be granted casually. The default in payment of public money involved in the case is more than 1100 crores of rupees and therefore, the continuation of the interim order by the Appellate Court is not at all in public interest.

30 days’ time given to District Judge to submit explanation -- Civil Appeal ordered to be transferred from the Court of District Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge -- Transferee Court will decide the appeal within a period of 03 weeks, from the date of receipt of the case file -- Application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC be decided within a period of 03 weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order – In case, the suit is restored, the trial Court will further pass an order within a period of 03 weeks thereafter, regarding maintainability of suit by assessing the averments “only in the plaint” (in terms of Order 7 Rules 10 and 11 CPC), if any cause of action survive in favour of plaintiff No.1, after the suit stands dismissed as withdrawn qua plaintiff No.2 -- In view of the settled principle of law, the trial Court will only look into the contents of the plaint and no other documents will be considered for the same.

(Para 31-39)

Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) -- Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (47 of 2019) – Protest against CAA -- Shaheen Bagh protest – Blocking of roads – Legality of – Manner in which Administration should act is their responsibility and they should not hide behind the court orders or seek support therefrom for carrying out their administrative functions -- Courts adjudicate the legality of the actions and are not meant to give shoulder to the administration to fire their guns from -- Unfortunately, despite a lapse of a considerable period of time, there was neither any negotiations nor any action by the administration, thus warranting Court intervention -- Occupation of public ways, whether at the site in question or anywhere else for protests is not acceptable and the administration ought to take action to keep the areas clear of encroachments or obstructions -- Protests are subject to the legal position as enunciated above, with some sympathy and dialogue, but are not permitted to get out of hand.

(Para 18-21)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Contractual dues – Non-payment by department – Directions issued -- Petitioner concern executed the work but the final payment of Rs.30,41,631/-, including Rs.7,15,549/- as security deposit on completion of work, has not been made to the petitioner till date – Respondent-Executive Engineer, Panchayati Raj Public Works Division directed to consider and take appropriate action upon the letter sent by the petitioner not later than six weeks – If the dues as claimed by the petitioner concern are lawful, the payment shall be made within six weeks thereafter -- Any belated payment beyond the stipulated period shall carry interest @ 6.5 % per annum from the date of completion of the work till payment – If not entitled to the dues, a speaking order shall be passed and communicated to the petitioner concern.

(Para 8-11)

Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Run-away couple – Live-in relationship – Police Protection – Right of -- Boy is not of marriageable age -- Petitioners fear for their life and liberty and despite representation no protection has been granted to them – Petitioners are major and have freedom to live in accordance with their desire -- Petition disposed of with a directions to consider the representation in accordance with law and to provide protection to the petitioners in case the situation so demands.

(Para 1-6)

Constitution of India, Article 14, 21, 300-A -- Petitioner worked from 17.07.1984 to 31.12.2012 which is about 28 years – Petitioner regularised on 31.12.2012 whereas juniors regularised w.e.f. 8.11.2012 -- Petitioner had fulfilled all the requirements as per the policy instructions dated 04.03.1999 except that she was not appointed through employment exchange -- Similarly situated persons have been already regularized on 08.11.2012 – Petition allowed -- Direction given that:

(i)      date of regularization of the petitioner shall be 08.11.2012 i.e. when the other similarly situated persons including some of the juniors of the petitioner were regularized.

(ii)     Respondent State shall fix full pension of the petitioner and re-calculate the pension of the petitioner and pay the arrears of all the admissible benefits to the petitioner arising out of regularization of service of the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today alongwith interest @6% per annum from the date when the benefit became due.

(iii)    petitioner shall also be entitled for costs of Rs.25,000/- which shall be paid by the respondent department to the petitioner by way of demand draft.

(Para 14-21)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 41(j) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 8, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 151 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Suit for mandatory injunction – Temporary injunction – Maintainability of -- Construction of Community Hall on the instructions of State Government, which has accorded permission on the basis of resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat and the amount is being spent by the State Government – Challenge to stay declined by Courts below – Held,

-- It is well settled principle of law that in a suit for mandatory injunction, no relief of temporary injunction can be granted, which will amount to passing a decree of mandatory injunction itself.

-- A careful perusal of the plaint would show that nothing is stated that any personal right of any of the petitioners is infringed, therefore, in view of Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, the suit is not maintainable.

-- The suit has not been filed in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and no application has been moved seeking permission from the Court that the suit is being filed on behalf of the entire village community, therefore, it is a suit which has been filed only by nine inhabitants of the village, whereas the Community Hall is being constructed for the entire village.

-- Both the Courts below have discussed the judgments of this Court, wherein it is held that the Gram Panchayat is competent to change the user of the land in a manner it likes as well as when sufficient area of Shamlat land is available, it can be used for any other development work and injunction cannot be granted regarding change of nature of land.

-- Even a perusal of the plaint further shows that it is nowhere mentioned that the passage of the temple will be blocked, rather it is a case of Gram Panchayat that there is difference of about 400 ft. between the temple and the Community Hall.

Court found no ground to interfere with the well-reasoned orders passed by the Courts below dismissing the application for stay -- Finding no merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Constitution of India, Article 136 – SLP against main judgment dismissed – SLP against review order -- Maintainability of -- When the main judgment of the High Court cannot be effected in any manner, no relief can be granted in the SLP filed against order rejecting review application to review the main judgment of the High Court – Supreme Court does not entertain a SLP in which no relief can be granted – Held, principle of not entertaining SLP against an order rejecting the review petition when main judgment is not under challenge has become a precedential principle – SLP dismissed.

(Para 15,16)

Constitution of India, Article 12, 39, 42, 226 -- Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (53 of  1961) -- Non-providing of maternity benefits -- Termination of employee – Maintainability of writ against private Company – Private entity is not a ‘State’ nor an 'instrumentality' or an 'agency' of the Government within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and thus, would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction – High court could have issued notice in case the petitioner was able to establish that the respondent/ software development company was performing a public duty, which is not the case – Writ petition dismissed being not maintainable, giving liberty to the petitioner to avail of her proper remedy in accordance with law.

(Para 1-5)

Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), Section 5, 59 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Public emergency – Covid-19 situation /lockdown – Notifications to exempt factories from observing some of the obligations towards employers – Over-time to employees – Respondent-State aimed to ameliorate the financial exigencies that were caused due to the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown – Held, financial losses cannot be offset on the weary shoulders of the laboring worker, who provides the backbone of the economy -- Section 5 of the Factories Act could not have been invoked to issue a blanket notification that exempted all factories from complying with humane working conditions and adequate compensation for overtime, as a response to a pandemic that did not result in an ‘internal disturbance’ of a nature that posed a ‘grave emergency’ whereby the security of India is threatened -- In any event, no factory/ classes of factories could have been exempted from compliance with provisions of the Factories Act, unless an ‘internal disturbance’ causes a grave emergency that threatens the security of the state, so as to constitute a ‘public emergency’ within the meaning of Section 5 of the Factories Act -- Writ petition allowed and Notification No. GHR/ 2020/56/FAC/142020/346/M3 dated 17 April 2020 and Notification No. GHR/2020/92/FAC/142020/346/M3 dated 20 July 2020 issued by the Labour and Employment Department of the Respondent State, quashed – Invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, Court directed that overtime wages shall be paid, in accordance with the provisions of Section 59 of the Factories Act to all eligible workers who have been working since the issuance of the notifications.

(Para 45, 46)

Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934), Section 5-A, 6 -- Aircraft Rules, 1937, 133-A – Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Covid-19 pandemic situation -- Refund of Air Fare – Batch of cases disposed of with the following directions:

1. If a passenger has booked a ticket during the lockdown period (from 25th March, 2020 to 24th May, 2020) for travel during lockdown period and the airline has received payment for booking of air ticket for travel during the same period, for both domestic and international air travel and the refund is sought by the passenger against that booking being cancelled, the airline shall refund the full amount collected without any cancellation charges. The refund shall be made within a period of three weeks from the date of cancellation.

2. If the tickets have been booked during the lockdown period through a travel agent for a travel within the lockdown period, in all such cases full refund shall be given by the airlines immediately. On such refund, the amount shall be passed on immediately by the agent to the passengers.

3. Passengers who booked tickets at any period of time but for travel after 24th May, 2020 – refund of fares to the passengers covered under this category shall be governed by the provisions of Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR).

4. Even for international travel, when the tickets have been booked on an Indian carrier and the booking is ex-India, if the tickets have been booked during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period, immediate refund shall be made.

5. If the tickets are booked for international travel on a foreign carrier and the booking is ex-India during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period, full refund shall be given by the airlines and said amount shall be passed on immediately by the agent to the passengers, wherever such tickets are booked through agents. In all other cases airline shall refund the collected amount to the passenger within a period of three weeks.

6. In all other cases, the airlines shall make all endeavours to refund the collected amount to the passenger within 15 days from today. If on account of financial distress, any airline / airlines are not able to do so, they shall provide credit shell, equal to the amount of fare collected, in the name of passenger when the booking is done either directly by the passenger or through travel agent so as to consume the same on or before 31st March, 2021. It is open to the passenger either to utilize such credit shell upto 31st March, 2021 on any route of his choice or the passenger can transfer the credit shell to any person including the travel agent through whom he / she has booked the ticket and the airlines shall honour such a transfer.

6.1. The credit shell issued in the name of the passenger shall be transferable which can be utilized upto 31st March, 2021 and the concerned airline shall honour such a transfer by devising a mechanism to facilitate such a transfer. It is also made clear that such credit shell can be utilized by the concerned agent through whom the ticket is booked, for third party use. It is also made clear that even in cases where credit shell is transferred to third party, same is to be utilized only through the agent who has booked the ticket at the first instance.

7. In cases where passengers have purchased the ticket through an agent, and credit shell is issued in the name of passenger, such credit shell is to be utilized only through the agent who has booked the ticket. In cases where tickets are booked through agent, credit shell as issued in the name of the passenger which is not utilized by 31st March, 2021, refund of the fare collected shall be made to the same account from which account amount was received by the airline.

8. In all cases where credit shell is issued there shall be an incentive to compensate the passenger from the date of cancellation upto 30th June, 2020 in which event the credit shell shall be enhanced by 0.5% of the face value (the amount of fare collected) for every month or part thereof between the date of cancellation and 30th June, 2020. Thereafter the value of the credit shell shall be enhanced by 0.75% of the face value per month upto 31st March, 2021.

Further, the Directorate, shall ensure strict compliance of the directions referred above, by issuing necessary instructions to the all concerned.

(Para 19)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Protection for life and liberty – Prayer for not to take coercive step on complaint of daughter-in-law -- Police officials had barged into house of petitioners on the complaint of respondent No.5 (daughter-in-law) in order to save her from the illegal confinement of the petitioners and her husband – Yet in order to save her matrimonial life, she did not submit any complaint to the police -- As no FIR was registered against the petitioners on request of  daughter-in-law, no direction can be issued to conduct preliminary inquiry regarding the said incident. Case is not covered by judgment in 'Lalita Kumari's case, 2013(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 979 – Petition dismissed.

(Para 11-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 474, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- FIR against accused – Permission to go abroad – Right of – While evaluating the issue, Court must have regard to nature of the allegations, the conduct of the appellant and above all, the need to ensure that he does not pose a risk of evading the prosecution – Appellant regularly travelled between the US and India on as many as sixteen occasions between 2015 and 2020 -- Lodging of an FIR should not in the facts of the case be a bar on the travel of the appellant to the US for eight weeks to attend to the business of revalidating his Green Card -- Human right to dignity and the protection of constitutional safeguards should not become illusory by the imposition of conditions which are disproportionate to the need to secure the presence of the accused, the proper course of investigation and eventually to ensure a fair trial -- There is no reason or justification to deny him the permission which has been sought to travel to the US for eight weeks – Appellant granted permission subject to certain conditions.

(Para 21-24)

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13, 14 – Application u/s 14 of the Act by PNB for physical possession of mortgage property -- P&S Bank wrongly took physical possession of property -- Patwari clarified description of property -- Writ petition disposed of with a direction to Deputy Commissioner to take action in accordance with law by passing an appropriate order by considering the report of the patwari concerned within a period of two weeks – P&S Bank also directed to hand over the physical possession of the mortgaged property to the Authorized Officer of PNB.

(Para 4-6)

Constitution of India, Article 21, 226 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 5(iii), 11 -- Run-away couple – Live-in relationship of boy 24 years/girl 16 years – Police protection to protect life and liberty – Right of -- Section 11 precludes a marriage solemnized in contravention of Sub Section (iii) of Section 5, from the purview of being regarded as void or invalid -- Fundamental Right under Article 21 of Constitution of India stands on a much higher pedestal -- Being sacrosanct under the Constitutional Scheme it must be protected, regardless of the solemnization of an invalid or void marriage or even the absence of any marriage between the parties -- Without commenting on the legitimacy of the relationship between the petitioners, direction given to Superintendent of Police to verify the contents of the petition, particularly the threat perception of the petitioners and complaints/representation and if deemed fit, to take appropriate steps to provide necessary protection qua their life and liberty in accordance with law.

(Para 8-13)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Writ jurisdiction --  One Time Settlement is not cloaked with such rigorous principles which may not permit extension of period to pay the remaining/balance settlement amount -- Extensions can be considered to be granted to deserving cases -- Held, Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would have the jurisdiction to extend the period of settlement as originally provided for, in the OTS letter.

(Para 22-24)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Illustrative guidelines framed to be considered cumulatively or individually, on case to cases basis, some of them would be :-

i. The Original Time provided in the Settlement – the first and foremost aspect to be noticed would be the time period originally granted by the bank to pay off the settlement amount. If the time period originally stipulated in the settlement letter to pay off the settlement amount is short or is not excessive, the case for extension then could be considered. It is to be noticed that the borrower is to arrange funds to complete the OTS. If reasonable time period is not given, the very purpose of settlement would be defeated. In that eventuality application for extension can be considered so that the borrower gets a reasonable time to clear off the settlement amount and the ultimate purpose of settlement is achieved.

ii. Extent of payments already deposited under the settlement or before filing of the petition – While considering an application for extension of time under OTS, the prime objective to be noticed is the intention of the borrower to culminate the settlement. If the borrower has already paid substantial amounts, to the creditor under the OTS, and for some remaining amounts, is seeking a reasonable extension, such requests can be considered favourably. This shows, that the applicant had an intention to clear the settlement and the deposit of substantial amounts, is an indication in this regard.

iii. Reasons which led to delay in payment – It is important to notice, the reasons, which led to the delay on the part of the borrower. If the borrower was prevented by certain reasons or circumstances beyond his control it could be a reason to consider an application for extension favourably. It would be imperative for the borrower to show, that he made his best efforts to ensure that the requisite amounts, are arranged within the specified time, but inspite of all his best efforts, he could not arrange for the same.

iv. Payments having been accepted by the Bank / Financial Institution , after the stipulated date – If the bank or the Financial Institution has been accepting the payments from the borrower towards the settlement even after the stipulated period of time, it shows that the time was not the essence of contract. It would be apparent from such conduct of the parties, that certain amount of relaxation or flexibility in making the payment of OTS amount is reserved between the parties.

v. Bona fide Intent of the borrower to pay the remaining amounts under the settlement – In order to test the bonafide intention of such an applicant, it could be reasonably be tested while asking such an applicant to deposit some further amount, towards the balance amount before calling upon the bank to consider the issue of extension. If such amounts are deposited under the orders of Court and the bonafides are established, such an applicant would be entitled for a favourable consideration of an application for extension.

Caveat added, that if for any reason, the effort does not lead to extension of time, as prayed for by the petitioner, then the amounts deposited by the borrower/depositors under the interim orders of the Court, would have to be returned back by the creditor to the petitioner.

vi. Time period being demanded by the applicant to clear the remaining / balance settlement amount. – An applicant whose intention would be to clear the balance settlement amounts, would not claim for an unreasonable period of an extension, as otherwise, the intention would be to gain more time, without any actual intent to clear the settlement. In the facts and circumstances of each case, the Courts would therefore determine a reasonable period, to enable the borrower to clear the remaining settlement amount, subject ofcourse, to payment of reasonable interest for the delayed period, to balance the equities.

vii. Attending factors and circumstances– Attending factors and circumstances involved, while making an application for extension play an important role to identify eligible and deserving cases as also to determine the extent of extension to be granted. For example, the current situation where the entire country has been adversely effected on account of COVID-19 pandemic, the difficulties in arranging the amounts could be taken note of while determining the period of extension to be granted to an applicant. Further, accounts which have suffered losses and became NPA on account of having suffered natural calamities, unfortunate accidents, fire incidents, thefts, damage by floods , storms etc. and have come forward for an eventual settlement, can also be considered for extension of time.

viii. Irreparable loss and injury to the applicant – While examining an application for extension of settlement, it could also be seen to be noticed, the extent of an injury to be suffered by an applicant.

Guidelines/factors are not exhaustive but only illustrative for guidance of the parties and the courts while considering the prayer for extension of the time under by OTS by the borrower on case to case basis -- Courts would be free to consider the credentials of the borrower as well, being an equitable and discretionary relief.

(Para 25)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Banking default case -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Petitioner paid substantial portion of the same and is willing to pay the remaining with interest -- Current attending circumstances, of widespread of COVID-19 pandemic – Petitioners held entitled to extension of time for 6 months to repay the remaining settlement amount – Petitioners shall also pay interest @ 9% p.a. simple on the delayed payments on reducing balance payable w.e.f. 01.06.2019 i.e. the closing date of the settlement/OTS.

(Para 26-30)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 14(1)(a) -- Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial Service Provider and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019, Rule 5 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- One Time Settlement/ OTS – Extension of time – Maintainability of writ petition – Whether the present petition is maintainable in view of the proceedings pending before National Company Law Tribunal – Intent to restrict initiation or continuation of proceedings against a Corporate Debtor is to preserve its assets so that during Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), the Corporate Debtor is subjected to remedial acts to improve its financial condition – Answered in AFFIRMATIVE and held that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present petition, the petition would be maintainable.

(Paras 13, 33-37)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Writ petition for a mandamus to transfer the investigation to CBI --  Denovo Investigaiton -- Death of the deceased was initially sought to be passed off as accidental by collision with a train or suicidal -- F.I.R. u/s 302, IPC was registered very much belatedly, albeit reluctantly, only at the persistence of the petitioner and her husband after they repeatedly approached the higher authorities -- Entire investigation and the closure report lack bonafide -- Closure report set aside and direction given for a de novo investigation by a fresh team of investigators to be headed by a senior police officer of the State consisting of efficient personnel well conversant with use of modern investigation technology also -- No officer who was part of the investigating team leading to the closure report shall be part of the team conducting de novo investigation -- Fresh investigation must be concluded within a maximum period of two months and the police report be filed before the court concerned whereafter the matter shall proceed in accordance with law -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 8-15)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Departmental enquiry – Judicial review – Nature of – Power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority – Judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself – Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion – It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome.

(Para 25)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Disciplinary proceedings -- Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not assume the role of an appellate authority – Their jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law, procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice -- Put differently, judicial review is not analogous to venturing into the merits of a case like an appellate authority.

(Para 28)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Disciplinary proceedings -- Objection on role of Enquiry officer – It must be recognized that, under Section 165, Evidence Act, judges have the power to ask any question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts -- While strict rules of evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the truth -- Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in certain circumstances -- No specific malice or bias has been alleged against the enquiry officer, and even during the enquiry no request had been made to seek a replacement; thus, evidencing how these objections are nothing but an afterthought.

(Para 31)

D. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Departmental enquiry – Allegation of corruption – Non-action in criminal case -- Dismissal from service -- After investigation, the CBI though did not find adequate material to launch criminal prosecution but recommended major disciplinary action – In a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say, statements made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances -- Appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated in the present proceedings as no criminal chargesheet was filed by the CBI after enquiry, is liable to be discarded – Employer always retains the right to conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective of the outcome of a criminal proceeding.

(Para 33-35)

E. Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 – Allegation of corruption -- Departmental enquiry – Dismissal from service – Interference in -- Unlike in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings Courts only interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the Court itself is shocked -- Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to send a clear message of deterrence to the society -- Charges such as corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly – Dismissal order, upheld.

(Para 1, 36)

Constitution of India, Article 16 -- Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the Public Services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 (62 of 2018) – 16% reservations to Marathas to be a “Socially and Educationally Backward Class” – Validity of – Matter referred to Larger Bench : 

-- As per Indra Sawhney’s case 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217, Article 16 (4) should be balanced against the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 16 (1), which is a guarantee held out to every citizen, reservations contemplated in Clause (4) of Article 16 should not exceed 50 per cent -- Relaxation of the strict rule of 50 per cent can be made in certain extraordinary situations -- People living in far flung and remote areas not being in the mainstream of national life should be treated in a different way -- Extreme caution has to be exercised and a special case made out for relaxation of the rule of 50 per cent.

-- Court prima facie opined that the State of Maharashtra has not shown any extraordinary situation for providing reservations to Marathas in excess of 50 per cent. Maratha community which comprises of 30 per cent of the population in the State of Maharashtra cannot be compared to marginalized sections of the society living in far flung and remote areas. The State has failed to make out a special case for providing reservation in excess of 50 per cent. Neither has any caution been exercised by the State in doing so.

-- The social, educational and economic backwardness of a community, existence of quantifiable data relating to inadequacy of representation of the community in public services and deprivation of the benefits flowing from reservations to the community are not exceptional circumstances for providing reservations in excess of 50 per cent.

Court referred the matter to Larger Bench by passing following orders: -

(A) As the interpretation of the provisions inserted by the Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 is a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India, these Appeals are referred to a larger Bench. These matters shall be placed before Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India for suitable orders.

(B) Admissions to educational institutions for the academic year 2020-21 shall be made without reference to the reservations provided in the Act. We make it clear that the Admissions made to Post-Graduate Medical Courses shall not be altered.

(C) Appointments to public services and posts under the Government shall be made without implementing the reservation as provided in the Act. Liberty to mention for early hearing.

(Para 1, 15-17)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Seeking declaration that order passed by Ld. Single Judge of High Court is void/ disabled/ recalled – Held, writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution not maintainable – Rights and remedies are available to the petitioner, including by way of SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution.

(Para 1, 9, 12)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter – Fair Investigaiton -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- Observations of Supreme Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1976) 1 SCC 15; Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 709; and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by Supreme Court on the ground that as the informant and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts -- It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions, Supreme Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved and the accused is entitled to acquittal.

(Para 12(I))

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 2(h)(o), 35, 41, 42, 43, 50, 44, 49, 51, 52(3), 53, 54, 55, 57, 57A, 58, 67, 68 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 100,154,156, 157, 173 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(e) – Constitution of India -- Article 21 – NDPS matter -- Informant and Investigator are same – Effect of -- In a case where the informant himself is the investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the like factor -- Question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case -- Therefore, merely because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they are specifically overruled.

(Para 12(II))

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed Person – Released on bail – Impounding of passport – Legality of – Petitioner appeared before the Judicial Magistrate, she was granted bail and, thus, the proclamation order ceased to be operative -- Said fact was well within the knowledge of respondent-Regional Passport Office -- Moreover, in a bailable offence, no condition can be imposed by the Court regarding surrender of the passport -- Fundamental Rights of the petitioner breached -- Hence, the impugned action is highly deprecated -- Petition allowed with a costs of Rs.1.00 lakh to be paid by respondent-RPO to the petitioner -- Respondent-RPO directed to release the passport of the petitioner within 15 days.

(Para 19-25)

Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 10(3)(b) – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498-A, 323, 406, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- FIR registered u/s 498-A, 323, 406, 506 IPC – Proclaimed offender – Seizure of passport – Fundamental right to travel abroad -- Petitioner was declared a proclaimed offender, when the petitioner was in New Zealand on a valid visa – Thereafter, High Court stayed his arrest for a period of 08 weeks -- On arrival from New Zealand, the passport of the petitioner was seized and later, he had appeared before the trial Court and was granted bail – Impounding of the passport is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India -- Petition allowed, seizure memo set aside.

(Para 8-15)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 -- Transfer power u/s 406 Cr.P.C. – Scope of -- Section 406 Cr.P.C. empowers the Supreme Court to transfer cases and appeals – Held, only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 174 -- Scope of section 174 Cr.P.C. proceeding – Nature of -- Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. is limited to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out the apparent cause of unnatural death -- These are not in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing of FIR u/s 154 CrPC --  Held, inquiry conducted u/s 174 CrPC is limited for a definite purpose but is not an investigation of a crime u/s 157 of the CrPC.

(Para 18-21)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4) -- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Jurisdiction of Patna Police to register complaint – Consent for CBI Investigation by Bihar police -- Legality of -- At the stage of investigation, it cannot be said that the concerned police station does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the case -- Allegation relating to criminal breach of trust and misappropriation of money which were to be eventually accounted for in Patna (where the Complainant resides), could prima facie indicate the lawful jurisdiction of the Patna police -- Exercise of jurisdiction by the Bihar Police appears to be in order -- At the stage of investigation not required to transfer the FIR to Mumbai police -- Bihar government was competent to give consent for entrustment of investigation to the CBI and as such the ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful.

(Para 22-30)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 157, 177, 178, 181(4), 406 – Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), Section 5, 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506, 120B – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Death at Mumbai – Proceedings u/s 174 Cr.P.C. at Mumbai -- Patna Police registered FIR, subsequently transferred it to the CBI – In future, if commission of cognizable offence u/s 175(2) CrPC is determined, the possibility of parallel investigation by the Mumbai Police cannot be ruled out – Both states are making acrimonious allegations of political interference against each other, the legitimacy of the investigation has come under a cloud -- To ensure public confidence in the investigation and to do complete justice in the matter, Court exercised powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, while according approval for the ongoing CBI investigation, holding that if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well.

(Para 35-41)

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Contractual Extension Lecturer -- Minimum requirement of NET qualification – Whether the Appellants can be replaced by those possessing the NET qualification without being granted an opportunity to acquire such qualification? -- Held, there is no policy to grant time to serving contractual Extension Lecturers, not possessing NET time to possess such qualification while continuing in service, it is not possible for the Court to dictate to the Respondents to provide such a facility to the Appellants -- Writ prayer replacing the Appellants should not be themselves engaged on a contractual basis – Held, since the Appellants do not possess the mandatory NET qualification and, as such, cannot continue, there is no requirement to consider the submission as to how they are likely to be replaced.

(Para 2, 6-7)