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252. (SC) 10-02-2023

Constitution of India, Articles 21, 25, 26 – Ex-communication of a member of Dawoodi Bohra community – Civil rights – Constitutional morality

-- A person who is ex-communicated by the community, will not be entitled to use the common property of the community and the burial/cremation grounds of the community -- In a sense, such a person will virtually become untouchable (being banished or ostracized) within the community -- In a given case, it will result in his civil death -- It can be argued that the concept of Constitutional morality which overrides the freedom conferred by clause (b) of Article 26, will not permit the civil rights of ex-communicated persons which originate from the dignity and liberty of human beings to be taken away -- The concepts of equality, liberty and fraternity are certainly part of our Constitutional morality -- Basic ideas enshrined in our Constitution are part of Constitutional morality -- The conscience of our Constitution is Constitutional morality -- Therefore, the Constitutional Court ought not to tolerate anything which takes away the right and privilege of any person to live with dignity as the concept of Constitutional morality does not permit the Court to do so -- Therefore, the protection under Article 26(b) granted by the decision in the case of Sardar Syedna, (1962) Suppl. (2) SCR 496 : AIR 1962 SC 853 to the power to ex-communicate a member of the Dawoodi Bohra community, needs reconsideration as the said right is subject to morality which is understood as Constitutional morality.

-- The ex-communication will have many civic consequences which will, prima facie, affect his fundamental right to live with dignity and the right to lead a meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21 -- Therefore, the question is whether the said right of the community to ex-communicate its members can be balanced with the other fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution and in particular, Article 21.

Issues require examination by a larger Bench.

(Para 28-35)

265. (P&H HC) 31-01-2023

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 146, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Rioting – Details in FIR – Requirement of -- Quashing of FIR -- In order to attract the provision of Section 146 or 147, basic ingredients of these offences which are force/ violence/ Criminal force/ resistance have to be explicit from the description of events in the FIR, so as to prima facie constitute the offence -- Neither, violence or any kind of use of force/ resistance, on part of the protesting persons, has been alleged even in FIR, nor has it been shown that in what manner any force/ Criminal force/ resistance was used by the accused persons -- FIR quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Rioting – Unlawful assembly -- Details in FIR – Requirement of -- Quashing of FIR -- Mere averment to the effect that accused blocked the road will not suffice to construe the use of force or violence as the same is required to be portrayed from the description of events in FIR itself – No offence u/s 147 and 149 of the IPC is made out there being no allegation of rioting or creating an unlawful assembly -- FIR quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Details of offence in FIR – Requirement of -- FIR cannot be the encyclopedia of all the events of the case, but at the same time, there must be description of basic actions of accused persons from which it can be prime facie construed that alleged offences were committed by accused person.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 195, 482 -- Disobedience to order promogulated by public servant – Quashing of FIR -- In order to constitute this offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites the Court to take cognizance of this offence only on a complaint filed by the concerned public servant – Neither there was any mention of promulgated order issued by any public servant nor any such complaint was filed at its instance, thus, applicability of Section 188 itself erroneous -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10, 18)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 283 --  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Blockage of road – Quashing of FIR -- No videography or photographs of alleged blockage -- Vague allegations regarding blocking of road, in the absence of any basic minimum details, does not lead to prima facie satisfaction for constituting offence u/s 283 of IPC -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10, 12, 18)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 19 -- Fundamental right to protest -- Quashing of FIR u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Alternative remedy – Just because the petitioner and other accused persons could avail their remedy before the Trial Court u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C., they could not be left in lurch to face the agony of criminal trial while exercising their fundamental right to protest.

(Para 15)

277. (SC) 05-01-2023

A. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13(2)(4), 17, 18 -- SARFAESI proceedings – Challenge to order of DRT – Alternative remedy of appeal -- Writ jurisdiction -- By entertaining the writ petition straightway under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the DRT-I, the High Court has allowed / permitted the borrower to circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act – In view of alternative statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rule 8(1)(2) – Possession of secured assets -- Possession Notices were published in two leading newspapers having sufficient circulation in the locality -- Even the Possession Notices were served upon the borrowers also -- Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in holding that there was a breach of Rules 8(1) & (2) of the Rules, 2002 -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside.

(Para 6.2, 8)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, Rule 9(3)(4) -- Auction of secured assets -- Deposit of 25 % of auction price on next day – Deposit of 75% amount on 15th day from communication by Bank – Permissibility of – High Court observed and held that there was non-compliance of the Rule 9(3) inter alia on the ground that 25% of the amount of sale price and thereafter 75% of the balance sale price was not deposited within the time stipulated under Rule 9 – Held, findings are just contrary to Rules 9(3) and (4) of the Rules, 2002.

-- Purchaser was required to deposit 25% of the amount of the sale price on the same day of sale or not later than the next working day -- Auction was held on 17.02.2017 -- Entire 25% of the sale price came to be deposited by 18.02.2017.

-- By communication / letter dated 08.03.2017, the secured creditor/ Bank directed the auction purchaser to deposit the balance 75% of the bid amount within 15 days and the auction purchaser deposited the balance 75% of the sale price on 23.03.2017, i.e., on the 15th day from the date of communication by the secured creditor/ Bank -- As per Rule 9(4) of the Rules, 2002, the balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the Authorized Officer on or before 15th day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period, in any case not exceeding three months -- Therefore, the communication dated 08.03.2017 can be said to be the extended period by the secured creditor/ Bank.

Held, it can be said that the entire sale price was deposited within the time prescribed under Rules 9(3) and (4) of the Rules, 2002 -- Therefore, the High Court has committed an error in holding that there was a breach of Rules 9(3) & (4) of the Rules, 2002 -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside.

(Para 2.3, 6.3, 6.4, 8)

D. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13(2)(4), 31(i) -- Agricultural property – Exemption from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act -- Once the secured property is put as a security by way of mortgage etc. meaning thereby the same was not treated as agricultural land, such properties cannot be said to be exempted from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act under Section 31(i) -- No evidence was led at all on behalf of the borrowers that the secured properties in question were actually put to use as agricultural land and/or any agricultural activity was going on -- High Court has committed an error in applying Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act and quashing and setting aside the entire Possession Notice, Auction Notice as well as Sale etc. -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside.

(Para 7.2, 8)

E. Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (54 of 2002), Section 13(2)(4), 31(i) -- Agricultural property – Exemption from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act – Onus of proof -- When it was the case on behalf of the borrowers that in view of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act, the properties were agricultural lands, the same were being exempted from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the burden was upon the borrower to prove that the secured properties were agricultural lands and actually being used as agricultural lands and/or agricultural activities were going on.

(Para 7.3)

295. (P&H HC) 12-12-2022

Constitution of India, Article 21 – Bank loan Defaulter -- Right to travel abroad – Look Out Notice (LOC) – Fundamental right to travel abroad guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed by seeking issuance of an LOC – Since the right to travel abroad flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a very high threshold is mandated to deny such a right to an Indian citizen -- At the time the LOC was issued against the petitioner, he is not an accused of having committed a cognizable offence in India -- Originating agency can only request that they be informed about the arrival/departure of the subject in such cases -- Since in the instant case, petitioner is admittedly having ‘permanent residency certificate’ of USA and has business interests in the USA, the petitioner cannot be prevented from travelling abroad -- However in view of declaration of loan account as fraud and declaration of petitioner as a “willful defaulter” and filing of a police complaint, though after filing of the Writ Petition, subject to certain conditions, he can be permitted to travel abroad – Writ Petition allowed, subject to depositing an FDR/TDR for Rs. 10 lakhs with the Registrar General within 2 weeks, the LOC issued against the petitioner set aside -- In the event of petitioner returning to India and producing his passport before the Registrar (General) within the time of 2 months as aforesaid, the FDR/TDR deposited by him shall be returned otherwise it shall be forfeited.

(Para 34-51)

296. (SC) 09-12-2022

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 2(2), 7, 8 – Constitution of India, Article 14, 21 -- Scheduled Tribe daughter’s right of survivorship -- Whether the appellant/petitioner being the daughter is entitled to the share in the compensation with respect to the land acquired, on survivorship basis under the provisions of Hindu Succession Act? -- As per Section 2(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu Succession Act will not be applicable to the members of the Scheduled Tribe.

-- If the claim of the appellant on the basis of the survivorship under the Hindu Succession Act is accepted in that case it would tantamount to amend the law. It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court.

-- To deny the equal right to the daughter belonging to the tribal even after a period of 70 years of the Constitution of India under which right to equality is guaranteed, it is high time for the Central Government to look into the matter and if required, to amend the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act by which the Hindu Succession Act is not made applicable to the members of the Scheduled Tribe.

-- Direction given to Central Government to consider it just and necessary to withdraw the exemptions provided to the Scheduled Tribes and whether to bring a suitable amendment or not – Court shown hope and trust that the Central Government will look into the matter and take an appropriate decision taking into consideration the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 6-7.2)