Search By Topic: Constitution of India

3. (SC) 08-11-2024

Constitution of India, Article 30(1) – Minority educational Institution – Legislative/ Administrative Power to change -- Article 30(1) can be classified as both an anti-discrimination provision and a special rights provision -- A legislation or an executive action which discriminates against religious or linguistic minorities in establishing or administering educational institutions is ultra vires Article 30(1).

-- Religious or linguistic minorities must prove that they established  the educational institution for the community to be a minority educational institution for the purposes of Article 30(1);

-- The right guaranteed by Article 30(1) is applicable to universities established before the commencement of the Constitution;

-- The right under Article 30(1) is guaranteed to minorities as defined upon the commencement of the Constitution. A different right-bearing group cannot be identified for institutions established before the adoption of the Constitution;

-- The incorporation of the University would not ipso facto lead to surrendering of the minority character of the institution. The circumstances surrounding the conversion of a teaching college to a teaching university must be viewed to identify if the minority character of the institution was surrendered upon the conversion. The Court may on a holistic reading of the statutory provisions relating to the administrative set-up of the educational institution deduce if the minority character or the purpose of establishment was relinquished upon incorporation; and

The following are the factors which must be used to determine if a minority ‘established’ an educational institution:

i. The indicia of ideation, purpose and implementation must be satisfied. First, the idea for establishing an educational institution must have stemmed from a person or group belonging to the minority community; second, the educational institution must be established predominantly for the benefit of the minority community; and third, steps for the implementation of the idea must have been taken by the member(s) of the minority community; and

ii. The administrative-set up of the educational institution must elucidate and affirm (I) the minority character of the educational institution; and (II) that it was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority community.

The view taken in Azeez Basha’ case AIR 1968 SC 662 that an educational institution is not established by a minority if it derives its legal character through a statute, is overruled -- The question of whether AMU is a minority educational institution must be decided based on the principles laid down in the judgment.

(Para 160, 161)

Reference answered with majority opinion

6. (SC) 25-09-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

7. (SC) 24-09-2024

Constitution of India, Article 226 – Promotion during pendency of criminal case -- DPC – Charge-sheet thereafter – Putting the result in sealed cover – Legality of -- Disciplinary/ criminal proceedings can be said to be initiated against the employee only when a charge memo is issued to the employee in a disciplinary proceeding or a charge-sheet for a criminal prosecution is filed in the competent Court -- Sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after issuance of the charge-memo/ charge-sheet -- Pendency of investigation and grant of prosecution sanction will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure.

-- Charge sheet was filed by CBI, after completion of investigation on 25th October, 2008, whereas the DPC to consider the promotion of Additional Commissioners of Income Tax was convened on 22nd February, 2007, wherein the sealed cover procedure was adopted qua the respondent.

-- It is thus clear that the charge sheet against the respondent was filed well after the meeting of the DPC was convened.

Hence, it could not be said that the prosecution for a criminal charge was pending against the respondent when the DPC was convened -- Therefore, the move on the part of DPC to resort to the sealed cover procedure was unjustified and unsustainable on facts and in law -- The ‘Sealed Cover’ wherein the assessment of the respondent was considered by the DPC was opened in court -- Letter shows that the DPC assessed the respondent to be ‘FIT’ for promotion -- Consequential steps in light of the above recommendations shall follow.

(Para 24-29)

27. (SC) 22-08-2024

Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 -- RGPSM’s General Service Conditions, Clause 4 -- Appointment in Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan / SSA -- Termination of service/ contract – Non-renewal of contract -- Appellant topped the revised Merit List, leading to her appointment -- While serving complaint(s) against her : (i) not punctual in attending to her duties, and; (ii) not correctly reported with regard to the events in the hostel -- She, inter alia, frankly admits to being late on occasion, but to compensate for her late-coming, she used to sit till late evening in the office for completion of work.

-- Clause 4 makes it clear that ordinarily, for inefficiency, one month’s notice is sufficient -- The Clause also makes it clear that if someone is found to have indulged in “undesirable activities”, the Mission Director was competent to terminate such person’s services “with immediate effect”.

-- Ld. Single Judge of High Court quashed the order holding that the termination orders being stigmatic in nature, relating to alleged misconduct involving moral turpitude, the same could not have been passed without holding a regular enquiry.

Respondents have placed themselves in a Catch-22 situation – If it is a case of termination simpliciter and non-stigmatic, then one month’s notice was required to be issued to the appellant, which was not done – If impugned order to be seen as falling under the latter part of Clause 4, it would be stigmatic -- Impugned order does visit the appellant with evil consequences and would create hurdles for her re further employment – Order of Ld. Single Judge, upheld, appellant held entitled to all consequential benefits including notional continuation in service at par with other similarly-situated employees, but with the back wages restricted to 50% -- In view of the long passage of time, liberty denied to the respondents to proceed afresh against the appellant as was granted by the learned Single Judge.

(Para 12, 30-36)

29. (SC) 09-08-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 -- Bail – Principles – Court observed, over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have forgotten a very well-settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment -- On account of non-grant of bail even in straight forward open and shut cases, Supreme Court is flooded with huge number of bail petitions thereby adding to the huge pendency -- Trial courts and the High Courts attempt to play safe in matters of grant of bail -- Trial courts and the High Courts should recognize the principle that “bail is rule and jail is exception”.

(Para 53)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 45 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 7A, 8, 12 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 201, 120B -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 – Corruption case -- Regular bail – Bar contained in Section 45 of PMLA – Prolonged incarnation – Speedy trial – Right of -- Long incarceration running for around 17 months, trial even not having been commenced, the appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy trial – Right to speedy trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights – 493 witnesses have been named, the case involves thousands of pages of documents and over a lakh pages of digitized documents -- Not even the remotest possibility of the trial being concluded in the near future – Keeping the appellant behind the bars for an unlimited period of time would deprive his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – Bail allowed, stringent conditions imposed.

(Para 49-58)

37. (MP HC) 30-07-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 439 --  Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Automatic cancellation of bail -- Whether High Court can impose a condition of automatic cancellation of bail order -- Cancelling of bail order directly affects freedom of a person which affects his fundamental rights -- Reasonable opportunity of hearing is a fundamental right under the Constitution of India – Held, if there is an automatic cancellation of bail order, then valuable right of natural justice is denied to accused -- Such condition could not be made part of the bail order.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 362 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 403 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Automatic cancellation of bail -- Review of order -- Court is barred from reviewing or altering its own order under Section 362 of Cr.P.C./ 403 of B.N.S.S., 2023 -- Both sections are pari materia -- While recalling a judgment Court has to apply its mind and has to look into the facts of the case, therefore, bar u/s 362 of Cr.P.c. or new Section 403 of B.N.S.S., 2023 will be operative, but there are certain exceptions when Court can recall/relook into the judgment and violation of fundamental rights is one of the said exceptions -- If condition of automatic cancellation of bail order is hit by Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then order will be revived and Court can consider the application for modification also.

(Para 7)

45. (P&H HC) 11-07-2024

A. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 1(3), 4, 531 – Procedure in criminal cases after BNSS (w.e.f. 01.07.2024):

I. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stands repealed w.e.f. 01.07.2024. Ergo; no new/fresh appeal or application or revision or petition can be filed under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on or after 01.07.2024.

II. The provisions of Section 4 and Section 531 of BNSS, 2023 are mandatory in nature as a result whereof any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition/ trial/ inquiry or investigation pending before 01.07.2024 are required to be disposed of, continued, held or made (as the case may be) in accordance with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In other words; any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition filed on or after 01.07.2024, is required to be filed/ instituted under the provisions of BNSS, 2023.

III. Any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition filed on or after 01.07.2024 under the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 is non-maintainable & hence would deserve dismissal/ rejection on this score alone. However, any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition filed upto 30.06.2024 under the provisions of Cr.P.C., 1973 is maintainable in law. To clarify; in case any appeal/ application/ revision/ petition is filed upto 30.06.2024 but there is defect (Registry objections, as referred to in common parlance) and such defect is cured/ removed on or after 01.07.2024, such appeal/ application/ revision/ petition shall be deemed to have been validly filed/ instituted on or after 01.07.2024 and, therefore, would be non- maintainable.

IV. Section 531 of BNSS shall apply to "revision", "petition" as also "petition of complaint" (ordinarily referred to as complaint before Magistrate) with the same vigour as it is statutorily mandated to apply to "appeal/ application/ trial/ inquiry or investigation" in terms of Section 531 of BNSS.

(Para 9)

B. Constitution of India, Article 20 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 1(3), 4, 531 – Procedure in criminal trial – Retrospective or Prospective -- Prohibition under Article 20 pertains to only conviction/ sentence under a law, which has been enacted later on, but not trial thereof -- There is no gainsaying that BNSS is essentially a criminal procedural law whereas BNS provides for substantive criminal law – It is trite law that the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts, even where the alteration which the statute makes has been disadvantageous to one of the parties -- No person has a vested right in any course of procedure -- He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the Court in which he sues, and, if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode.

(Para 8.3, 8.4)

C. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528, 531 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498A – Quashing of FIR/ Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. -- Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C on 03.07.2024 – Maintainability of -- The Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 stands repealed w.e.f. 01.07.2024 -- Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is non-maintainable, dismissed -- Petitioner shall be at liberty to file an appropriate petition invoking the provisions of BNSS, as and if permissible in law.

(Para 10)

47. (SC) 09-07-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 12, 13, 226 -- Army Welfare Education Society / Private Educational  Institution – Service dispute – Maintainability of writ –

-- Whether the appellant Army Welfare Education Society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution of India so as to make a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution maintainable against it?

-- Whether a service dispute in the private realm involving a private educational  institution and its employees can be adjudicated upon in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Held, High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition holding that the appellant society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution -- School run by the Appellant Society imparts education -- Relationship is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract -- If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element -- The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents.

(Para 42, 46)

B. Doctrine of legitimate expectation -- Features :

-- First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;

-- Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings;

-- Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation;

-- Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters;

-- Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.

-- Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally.

The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in nature, are sufficient to help in deciding the applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case.

(Para 48, 49)

C. Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Arbitrariness in State action -- It is clear that legitimate expectation, jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a check on arbitrariness in State action -- It does not extend to and cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties, wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.

(Para 49)

D. Doctrine of legitimate expectation – Schol run by Society – Applicability upon -- Even if the function being performed by a private educational institution in imparting education may be considered as a public function, the relationship between the administration of such an institution and its employees remains a contractual one, falling within the ambit of private law -- No statutory obligation on the appellant society which requires that the salaries and allowances of the respondents are to be kept at par with what is payable to teachers of Government institutions -- Appellant society, for the purposes of its relationship with its employees, cannot be regarded as a public or Government authority -- Doctrine of legitimate expectation will have no applicability to the facts of the case.

(Para 50-52)