Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41, Rule 27 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 65 -- Additional evidence -- Agreement dated 14.6.2010 came into existence after filing of written statement on 28.4.2010 -- Meaning thereby, this plea could not be taken in the pleading by way of written statement -- It is also settled law that parties can be allowed to lead evidence in support of their pleadings -- As there was no pleading qua agreement dated 14.6.2010, there was no question of allowing of application for leading secondary evidence -- In fact it was required to move an application for amendment of written statement on the basis of subsequent agreement and thereafter, such an application for leading secondary evidence should have been filed, that has not been done -- Statement of witness beyond pleading is not admissible and cannot be considered by the Court below.

(Para 4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 63, 66 -- Subsequent document – Secondary evidence – Permissibility of -- Amendment in written statement -- Agreement dated 14.6.2010 came into existence after filing of written statement on 28.4.2010 -- Meaning thereby, this plea could not be taken in the pleading by way of written statement -- It is also settled law that parties can be allowed to lead evidence in support of their pleadings -- As there was no pleading qua agreement dated 14.6.2010, there was no question of allowing of application for leading secondary evidence -- In fact he was required to move an application for amendment of written statement on the basis of subsequent agreement dated 14.6.2010 and thereafter, such an application for leading secondary evidence should have been filed.

(Para 4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 6A – Framing of issue – Counter claim – Permissibility of -- Counter claim after almost two and a half years after the framing of the issues -- Even though evidence on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff has commenced, it has not yet concluded -- The evidence on behalf of the defendants is yet to commence -- It has also not been shown that any prejudice would be caused to the respondent-plaintiff before the trial court, if the counter-claim was to be adjudicated upon, along with the main suit – Held, no serious injustice or irreparable loss would be suffered by the respondent-plaintiff – Application for counter-claim allowed.

(Para 2, 8-14)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Re-calling of witness – Power of Court -- Basic purpose of Rule 17 is to enable the court to clarify any position or doubt, and the court may, either suo motu or on the request of any party, recall any witness at any stage in that regard -- This power can be exercised at any stage of the suit -- No doubt, once the court recalls the witness for the purpose of any such clarification, the court may permit the parties to assist the court by examining the witness for the purpose of clarification required or permitted by the court -- The power under Rule 17 cannot be stretched any further -- The said power cannot be invoked to fill up omission in the evidence already led by a witness -- It cannot also be used for the purpose of filling up a lacuna in the evidence -- ‘No prejudice is caused to either party’ is also not a permissible ground to invoke Rule 17 -- No doubt, it is a discretionary power of the court but to be used only sparingly, and in case, the court decides to invoke the provision, it should also see that the trial is not unnecessarily protracted on that ground.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Re-calling of witness – Inherent powers of Court -- Rigour under Rule 17 does not affect the inherent powers of the court to pass the required orders for ends of justice to reopen the evidence for the purpose of further examination or cross-examination or even for production of fresh evidence -- This power can also be exercised at any stage of the suit, even after closure of evidence.

(Para 14)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), Section 140, 166, 173 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 4(2), Order 41, Rule 31, Section 96 – Compensation in motor vehicle accident case -- Award of Tribunal – First Appeal – Duty of First Appellate Court/ High Court  – An appeal u/s 173 of the M.V. Act is essentially in the nature of first appeal alike Section 96 of the Code and, therefore, the High Court is equally under legal obligation to decide all issues arising in the case both on facts and law after appreciating the entire evidence -- High Court neither set out the facts of the case of the parties, nor dealt with any of the submissions urged, nor took note of the grounds raised by the appellant and nor made any attempt to appreciate the evidence in the light of the settled legal principles applicable to the issues arising in the case to find out as to whether the award of the Tribunal is legally sustainable or not and if so, how, and if not, why? -- As a first appellate Court, it was the duty of the High Court to have decided the appeal keeping in view the powers conferred on it by the statute -- Impugned judgment also does not, satisfy the requirements of Order XX Rule 4 (2) read with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code which requires that judgment shall contain a concise statement of the case, points for determination, decisions thereon and the reasons -- Impugned judgment of the High Court is not sustainable – Matter remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits.

 (Para 24-29)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16, 20 -- Agreement to sell immovable property -- Suit for specific performance by buyer – Vendor’s contention that the plaintiffs/respondents were not ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement loses its relevance for the reason that the suit property stands alienated in favour of another person by the Vendor vide registered sale deed. M.M.S. Investments’, Madurai’s case 2007(2) RCR(Civil) 816 relied.

 (Para 2, 12)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 -- Agreement to sell immovable property – Allegation of forgery -- Criminal Court judgment is not binding upon civil litigation -- Mere fact that the FIR was got registered by the appellant or challan has been presented in the Court is not at all sufficient to hold in favour of the appellant that the agreement is the result of fraud or forgery – Held, even judgment passed by a criminal court accepting plea of the appellants would not be binding upon the civil court as the civil court has to record its independent finding on the plea of fraud or forgery in the light of materials on record.

(Para 13)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16, 20 -- Readiness and willingness to perform -- Ordinarily, in contract for sale of immovable property, time is not essence of the contract – Contention of the appellant/Vendor that filing of suit after two years of the agreement negatives claim of the respondents/plaintiff with regard to readiness and willingness is devoid of merit and is accordingly rejected -- Suit for specific performance decreed.

(Para 6, 15)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 41 -- Agreement to sell – Execution of sale deed in favour of other --  Bonafide purchaser – Plea of – Non-appearance as witness – Adverse inference of – Vendee did not adduce any evidence to discharge the onus to prove the plea of bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice -- An adverse inference is to be drawn against them for their failure to appear in the witness box and provide an opportunity to the contesting respondents to challenge correctness of their plea of bona fide purchasers, for value, without notice.

(Para 16)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7(iv) -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 CPC -- Ad valorem court fee – Rejection of plaint -- Suit for declaration for declaring sale deed null and void on account of non passing of consideration, the possession of the land remained with them and cheques for consideration were not honoured – Held, at this stage of litigation, only averments in the plaint are to be seen -- Trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit without insisting upon payment of ad valorem court fee.

(Para 4-7)

A. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 4 -- Sale-deed  -- Challenge to -- Allegation of fraud – Pleadings -- To prove averments of fraud and misrepresentation there has to be specific pleadings.

(Para 6)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Sale-deed – Execution of – Non-encashment of cheques by Vendor – Whether sale complete -- Out of sale consideration of Rs.7,21,000/-, the appellant stated to have made payment of Rs.5,21,000/- in cash and Rs.2 lacs by banker's Cheque -- It is prerogative of the vendor to present and encash the cheque but the fact remains that the sale, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was complete – Sale is held to be with consideration.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 3 – Exhibition of documents -- Proved -- Mere exhibition of the documents would not dispense with its proof.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 14 Rule 1, 2 -- Issue of fact – Non-framing of issue -- Since there was no issue of adoption, there was no need for the plaintiff to prove the adoption.

(Para 6)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Cross-examination -- Only one line of the cross-examination has not to be read in isolation, but the cross-examination in whole has to be read.

(Para 6)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 47 – Expert evidence -- Trial Court could not have stepped into the shoes of the Handwriting Expert, who compared the signatures as the Handwriting Expert.

(Para 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 20 -- Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7(iv)(a) -- Suit for specific performance – Rejection of plaint -- Subsequent vendee filed counter claim for possession – Advalorem court fee – Requirement of – Suit for possession of land where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Collector's register as separately assessed permanently to such revenue, then the amount of court fee shall be computed on 10 times of the revenue so payable -- Accordingly for the relief of possession the claimant was required to pay advalorem court fee on 10 times of the land revenue of the suit land -- Term “land” is not defined anywhere in the Court Fees Act -- It should, therefore, be incorporated in the ordinary sense and cover all kinds of land regardless of the use to which it is put or may be likely to be put – Application for rejection of plaint rightly dismissed.

(Para 11-13)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 16(c) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 148 -- Agreement to sell of immovable property – Readiness and willingness -- Compromise decree passed by Lok Adalat – Non-compliance of -- Extension of time for compliance -- Requirement of readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract ought to exist on three occasions: (i) At the time of time stipulated in the agreement; (ii) During the pendency of the suit when the plaintiff's action is tested about on his pleadings of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) and (iii) till the decree is satisfied when it is put to execution and when the defendant has not acted as per the terms of the agreement -- If the readiness and willingness are lacking in any one of the three situations, relief cannot obtain in favour of the agreement holder -- In this case, the plaintiff was surely not ready and willing even after decree within the time stipulated under the compromise decree and in spite of an extension of time by one month, as granted by the Lok Adalat -- Order passed by the Lok Adalat declining to extend the time further was perfectly justified.

(Para 1,2,9,10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 10 – Subsequent suit – Stay of suit -- In any suit for partition or for declaration on the basis that the properties are joint family properties, every person that asserts the character of properties as belonging to the family stands in the position of plaintiff -- If in the 1st suit instituted by one of the brothers he has not included all the items and when one of the defendants had remained ex-parte, and did not press for an adjudication independently for himself, there can be no bar for such a defendant who is the member of the joint family to file his own suit and seek for a similar relief -- The 2nd suit here becomes relevant for it includes the suit items and sets out also several other items in the subsequent suit.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 10 – Subsequent suit – Stay of suit – Discretion of Court -- Whether it shall always be taken as mandatory that the Court shall stay its own proceedings if an earlier suit is substantially and materially on an issue that was relevant in the earlier instituted suit – Held, the expression used in Section 10 sounds like a mandatory character, however it still give the discretion to the Court to consider whether the stay could shall be granted or not.

(Para 5-7)

Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), 7, Article 17(iii) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Challenge to sale deed – Ad valorem court fees – Rejection of plaint -- Plaintiff is a member of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) and a co-sharer in the suit property filed the suit for separate possession of his share on the basis of partition by metes and bounds -- Thereafter, when his share was also sold by the Karta of the family without legal necessity to defendant no.5, the suit for declaration was filed to challenge the sale deeds being null and void with a consequential relief that neither the possession be taken from him without partition nor any portion of the suit property be demolished and re-constructed at the instance of defendant no.5 – Held, Plaintiff was not required to ask for possession in the later suit filed for declaration to challenge the sale deeds in which he was not associated – Trial Court dismissed the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of plaint on the ground of non-affixation of ad valorem court fees – No error in the order.

 (Para 1, 10-12)

A. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 13-A (Haryana) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 144 – Ejectment – Pendency of title suit – Restitution of possession -- Proceedings u/s 7 of the Act have been decided without deciding title suit u/s 13-A of the Act -- Possession has already been taken by the Gram Panchayat during the proceedings for want of stay – Held, if the suit of title is decided and decreed in favour of petitioners, then u/s 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioners will also be entitled to restitution of possession.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 144 – Execution of decree -- Pendency of appeal – Restitution of possession -- Appeal by judgment debtor is not rendered infructuous, even if decree is executed -- On reversal of judgment and decree of trial Court in appeal, the consequences ensue and accordingly judgment debtor becomes entitled to restitution.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Easement Act, 1882 (V of 1882), Section 52 – License – Licensee – Defendants are occupying the disputed premises on the basis of permission granted by its owners, who are the real brothers or their legal representatives, without any condition to pay any rent – Since there is no lease nor any rent deed, it is nothing more than a license, which means to give a license or permit a person to occupy when the land owner allows to do work or perform an act on the land owner’s property – Visitor has a license to enter into the property – This kind of license need not be written, signed and registered – It may be oral or it may be implied by the relationship or actions of the parties.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2 – Ex-parte Decree – Compromise Decree – Decree after contest – Binding effect -- A decree of a Court of law either passed after contest or passed without contest or passed ex-parte or passed on the basis of compromise or any other form is a decree, which is, by all means, binding on all the Courts.

(Para 10)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 2 – Compromise decree – Change of Presiding officer – Effect of -- Trial Court declared the said decree as void and non-est and is not binding upon the court -- This is obviously perverse, as the decree has been passed by the same Court -- Though, the Presiding Officer might have been changed, yet 'Court' means 'Court' and not the Presiding Officer -- In either case, the said decree was passed by a co-ordinate Bench, which has not been challenged anywhere, nor even in present suit, thus, it has attained finality.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Easement Act, 1882 (V of 1882), Section 52 – Licensee – Compromise decree – Non-registration of – Objection to -- A licensee has no right to claim that any memorandum of understanding of family settlement among the owners was not registered, and the suit filed on the basis of it earlier, was not maintainable, in which the defendants were not parties nor their right or title has been affected by that decree.

(Para 12)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(i) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 9 Rule 6, 13 – Arrears of Rent – Ex-parte ejectment order -- Non-supply of ejectment petition alongwith summons is merely an irregularity cannot be ground for setting aside ex-parte ejectment order.

For the sake of argument, even if it is  presumed that no copy of the ejectment petition was received by the tenant-petitioner, it would at best be a mere irregularity within the meaning of proviso to Rule 8 of Order IX of the Code because on 8.8.1997 the tenant-petitioner was apprised that the date of appearance before the Court is 23.8.1997, as has been held by this Court in Dev Karan's case (supra).  Therefore, no ground is provided to set aside the impugned order.

 (Para 8)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(i) – Arrears of Rent – Deposit of – Question of grant of opportunity to the tenant would not arise who has refused to appear before the court after summons have been duly served upon him alongwith ejectment petition – Benefit of Rakesh Wadhawan’s case, 2002(1) RCR 514 is not available.

The argument of learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner based on the judgment in the case of Rakesh Wadhawan's case (supra) would not be available because the question of grant of opportunity would not arise to a tenant who has refused to appear before the Court after summons have been duly served on him along with a copy of the ejectment petition.  It is evident that he was aware of the date of appearance before the Court which was fixed for 23.8.1997 and the summons were served on him on 8.8.1997.  There was ample opportunity given but the tenant-petitioner has failed to avail it.  In such an eventuality, the principles laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rakesh Wadhawan's case (supra) would not be attracted.  The argument is wild and is imaginative.

 (Para 9)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13, 15(5) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 1 Rule 10 – Necessary party – Ejectment petition against the tenant – Application by another person for impleading him as party, claiming possession as tenant under some one else – Not a necessary party to be impleaded as no relief has been clamed by the landlord against him – Landlord/Petitioner is dominus litus and cannot be compelled to fight litigation against him.

(Para 4)

Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 11 – Code of Civil Procedure, Section 11 – Resjudicata – In earlier petition the Assistant Collector held that the petitioners are not in illegal occupation and that the suit land does not fall within the definition of Shamlat Deh – Subsequent application by Gram Panchayat u/s 11 read with section 7 would not operate as resjudicata because Gram Panchayat was not the party in the earlier petition.

(Para 6)

A. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 15(6) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 9, Rule 6(1)(a), 7 – On the date fixed for service of summons the Court declared that service is complete – From the endorsement made on the summons, it is clear that the sub-tenant was not interested in contesting the case – There cannot be any other conclusion except that he was proceeded ex-parte – Merely, there is no specific order in this regard is no ground for setting aside ex-parte proceedings.

 (Para 7)

B. Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (11 of 1973), Section 15(6) – Code of Civil Procedure, Order 1 Rule 10, Order 6 Rule 17, Order 9, Rule 6(1)(a), 7 – Ex-parte proceedings -- Ex-parte proceedings initiated against the sub-tenant – During the pendency of the case, suit property was sold – Not necessary to issue fresh notice, on application moved by Vendee under Order 1 Rule 10 and Order 6 Rule 17.

(Para 7)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 15(6) -- Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 47, Order 21 Rule 97 -- Execution -- Objection -- Order of ejectment passed -- Execution proceedings initiated – Objections raised under Section 47 of the Code, rejected – Again objections under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code, raised, which were either subject matter of the judgement and decree or objection raised under 47 of the Code -- Objection cannot be allowed to be raised again and again -- Petition dismissed with cost Rs. 10,000/-.

The judgement debtor petitioner has sheerly mis-used the process of the Court as the ejectment order has already been passed on 16.12.1997 which has been upheld by this Court in C.R. No. 832 of 1998 decided on 2.11.1999. The rent receipts produced by him (Exs. R-1 to R-3) were found to be forged. Thereafter the judgement debtor petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition which was dismissed. The decree holder respondents filed the execution petition against the judgement debtor petitioner being execution No. 323 of 2000 instituted on 9.12.2000. The judgement debtor petitioner raised same objections under Section 47 of the Code which have again been raised under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code. Those objections were dismissed on 3.4.2001 and his revision petition being C.R. No.2411 of 2001 was dismissed by this Court on 20.2.2002. He filed and withdrew S.L.P. No. 12828 of 2002 on 26.7.2002. It has also been found by the executing Court that the objection sought to be raised before the executing Court under Order XX1 Rule 97 of the Code were the same which were either the subject matter of consideration in the judgement and decree dated 16.12.1997 or the objection petition filed under Section 47 of the Code which was dismissed on 3.4.2001 and upheld by this Court on 20.2.2002. It is well settled that similar objections either under one provision or the other cannot be permitted to be raised time and again. In this regard reliance may be placed on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Kaur vs. Ashok Kumar and another 2003 (8) S.C.C. 289. In that case also what was decided in the ejectment proceedings and later in the execution petition was sought to be raised again.

When the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur’ case (supra) are applied to the facts of the present case, the alleged compromise dated 31.5.2000 has already been adjudicated upon when the judgement debtor petitioner filed objections under Section 47 of the Code and those objections were dismissed on 3.4.2001. As already observed in the preceding paras his revision petition was dismissed by this Court on 20.2.2002. The other objection with regard to the receipt dated 30.10.1986 and 5.1.1987 or the municipal record have already been adjudicated upon by the Appellate Authority in its ejectment order dated 16.12.1997 as upheld by this Court in its order dated 2.11.1999 passed in C.R. No. 832 of 1998. Infact the judgement debtor petitioner has made all efforts to put off the execution of the judgement and decree dated 16.12.1997 on one pretext or the other. The observations of the Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur’s case (supra) shows that such a delaying tactics should not permitted to succeed as the same are wholly frivolous and vexatious. Therefore, this petition is nothing else but a frivolous piece of litigation with a malafide motive to delay the execution of the decree.

For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/-.  

 (Paras 9-10-11)

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 15 – Revisional jurisdiction -- In the revisional jurisdiction conferred by the Section 15 of the Act, the court can examine the legality as also proprietary of the order passed by the concerned authority.

(Para 8)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(v) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908), Order 26 Rules 9 and 10 -- Ceased to occupy – Ex-parte Local Commissioner’s Report -- Local Commissioner was appointed and he visited the demised shop without giving notice to the opposite party – Shop found locked – He was examined in the court and cross-examined as well – Report cannot be discarded on this ground alone that no notice was issued to the opposite party – Ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller restored.

There is no embargo in the rules aforesaid to appoint a Local Commissioner without first issuing notice to the other side. Ex-parte appointment of the Local Commissioner, who may even submit his report without issuing notice to other party, is permissible under the law. All that is required in such matters is that the report of Local Commissioner would not become admissible or relied upon unless the Local Commissioner is examined in Court giving adequate opportunity to the other party to cross-examine him. In the present case, it is conceded position that Local Commissioner was examined as AW4 and was cross-examined as well. If the report of the Local Commissioner, who may visit the spot without notice to the other party, is discarded on that ground alone, the same would defeat the very purpose of appointing a Local Commissioner in the cases, as the one in hand, inasmuch as the other party, after coming to know of the visit of Local Commissioner, would only open the lock of the shop, thus, defeating the cause of its adversary.

 (Para 9)  

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13(2)(iii) – Eviction -- Material alteration – Tenant  admitted opening of a door in the wall adjoining another shop – It is possible only by breaking a common wall, which would certainly impair value and utility of the building – The shop as such lose its identity being a single shop – Tenant liable to be evicted.

On the dint of the evidence led by the parties and, in particular, that once the respondent had admitted the opening of a door from the adjoining shop, in considered view of this Court, second ground seeking eviction was proved to the hilt. An opening of the door from the adjoining shop, as mentioned above, has since been admitted. That the said adjoining shop belongs to some body else, is also an admitted position. The opening of the door from an adjoining shop could only be by breaking the common wall and that would certainly result in diminishing the value of the shop beyond measures. The shop as such would lose its identity being a single shop. This kind of alteration would obviously materially impair the value and utility of the shop, thus, entailing an order of eviction on the second ground pleaded in the petition for eviction.

(Para 10)

A. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section, 2(g)(ii-a), 7 – Amended by Punjab Act No. 8 of 1995 – Scope thereof – The word “transfer” mentioned in clause (ii-a) would not mean leasing the land for a limited period -- The transfer has to be by a sale -- The words “by any other manner whatsoever” as mentioned in the clause would means analogous to a sale -- A perpetual lease or a lease for a period of 99 years, which virtually means sale, may come within the sweep of clause (ii-a), lease for a period of 10 years, would certainly not be covered by the said clause.

 (Para 7)  

B. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Section 11 – Res-Judicata – Dismissal of earlier two application for ejectment of the Panchayat -- Applications were not decided on merit – Principle of res-judicata, therefore not applicable.

(Para 10)

C. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 111(g) – Lessee – Title of the landlord -- Petitioner after expiry of the lease involved the Gram Panchayat in multifarious litigations, based upon contradictory stands  -- Being the Lessee, tenant cannot deny the title of their landlord – Eviction order upheld.

(Para 11)

Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938), Section 39 – Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959 (46 of 1959), Section 6, 7, 8(2) – Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 370 -- National Saving Certificates – Nominee -- Effect on succession -- Language of Section 39 of the Act is not capable of altering the course of succession under law – It is difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee -- Though language and phraseology of Section 6 of the Act is different than the one used in Section 39 of the Insurance Act, yet, the effect of both the provisions is the same -- Any amount paid to the nominee after valid deductions becomes the estate of the deceased -- Such an estate devolves upon all persons who are entitled to succession under law, custom or testament of the deceased holder -- Nominee becoming entitled to the payment of the amount on account of national savings certificates received by him u/s 6 read with Section 7 of the Act who in turn is liable to return the amount to those, in whose favour law creates beneficial interest, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, 1959. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 8, 15.

(Para 11, 13)