Search By Topic: Civil Procedural Law

601. (SC) 03-11-2020

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 114, 151, Order 47 Rule 1 – Review – Scope of -- An order can be reviewed by a Court only on the prescribed grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC – An application for review is more restricted than that of an appeal and the Court of review has limited jurisdiction as to the definite limit mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC itself -- Powers of review cannot be exercised as an inherent power nor can an appellate power can be exercised in the guise of power of review.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 114, 151, Order 47 Rule 1 – Review – Scope of -- Observations in para 20 of judgment with respect to possession of the plaintiffs on appreciation of evidence on record -- It cannot be said that there was an error apparent on the face of proceedings which were required to be reviewed in exercise of powers under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC -- High Court has clearly erred in deleting para 20 in exercise of powers under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC -- At the most, observations made in para 20 can be said to be erroneous decision cannot be a ground to exercise of powers under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC -- Impugned order is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

(Para 10, 11, 15)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 114, 151, Order 47 Rule 1 – Review – Scope of -- Non-framing of the issue with respect to possession – There were necessary pleadings with respect to possession in the plaint as well as in the written statement -- Even the parties also led the evidence on the possession -- Original plaintiff/appellant led the evidence with supporting documents to show his possession and to that, there was no cross-examination by the defendants/respondents – Defendants/respondents did not lead any evidence to show their possession -- If the parties are aware of the rival cases, the failure to formally formulate the issue fades into insignificance when an extensive evidence has been recorded without any demur – High Court deleted the observations made in para 20 with respect to possession in review -- impugned order is unsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside.

(Para 11.1-15)

603. (P&H HC) 21-10-2020

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with possession -- Specific recital with regard to delivery of possession in the agreement to sell signed by the parties proved -- Mere failure of plaintiff to depose about the delivery of possession in the examination-in-chief would not be sufficient for the Court to record a finding that the stand of the plaintiffs with respect to delivery of actual possession is erroneous.

(Para 9)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Agreement to sell with actual physical possession of specific portion out of joint land – Permissibility of -- A co-sharer in actual physical possession of a specific portion out of the big parcel of joint land is entitled to deliver possession thereof to anyone -- No doubt, sale of a specific portion or parcel of land out of joint property by a co-sharer shall be deemed to be sale of undivided share out of joint land -- However, there is no bar either in the delivery of possession of specific portion or sale thereof out of the joint land -- First Appellate Court committed material irregularity while observing that a co-sharer cannot deliver the possession of the specific portion in its possession to someone out of joint property.

(Para 10)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Delay and laches – Appellate Court finds that suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from laches -- Defendant while filing the written statement did not allege that the suit suffered from laches -- Consequently no issue on this aspect was framed -- In the evidence no stand that the suit filed by the plaintiffs suffers from unexplained laches -- Thus, the observations made by the learned first Appellate Court are not only beyond pleadings but also beyond evidence.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Suit for specific performance – Limitation -- Delay and laches -- Period of limitation in a suit for specific performance do not begin to run from the date on which agreement to sell has been executed – Period of limitation would either begin to run from the date fixed for its performance or if no date or period is stipulated, then from the date the plaintiff has notice that the performance has been refused by the opposite side.

(Para 11, 13, 21)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96 -- First Appeal – Setting aside of trial court judgment -- It is not appropriate for the learned first Appellate Court to set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court without recording definite finding or the reasons for reversing thereof after critical analysis of the reasons with reference to error in the application of law or misreading or non-reading or misconstruction of the evidence available on record.

(Para 21)

F. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 12 -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 54 -- Agreement to sell – Entire sale consideration paid – Delay and laches – Ground of -- It is not appropriate for the Court to decline the relief of specific performance on the ground of laches particularly when the entire sale consideration has been paid and the suit was filed within limitation.

(Para 21)

611. (P&H HC) 09-10-2020

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 3, 4, Order 7 Rule 10, 11, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 24 – Constitution of India, Article 227 – Dismiss in default – Restoration of -- Maintainability of suit – Continuation of stay -- Non-application of judicial mind – Explanation called form District Judge – Detailed reasons:

-- Application for withdrawal of the Civil suit allowed by the trial Court on 30.09.2019 as well as before the Appellate Court, which was allowed on 07.12.2019, therefore, on face of record, no cause of action survives in favour of plaintiff No.1 in the suit – By showing total non-application of judicial mind, the Appellate Court is continuing with the appeal as well as the interim injunction.

-- A perusal of the first order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the District Judge also reflect non-application of judicial mind as the operation of the order dated 06.08.2019 dismissing an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the plaintiffs, was stayed and simultaneously, further injunction was granted against the Bank from proceeding against the plaintiffs, in accordance with law -- It is well settled principle of law that if an injunction application filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed by the Civil Court, the Appellate Court unless by recording detailed reason of urgency may grant interim injunction for a short period or in ordinary course, after giving a short notice to the contesting defendants may pass an interim order. Both these principles of law have been ignored by the District Judge.

-- The Civil Court has passed the order dated 06.08.2019 in the presence of the contesting party i.e. the plaintiff No.1, defendant No.1 – Bank and the counsel representing interim resolution professional of plaintiff No.2, therefore, the Appellate Court who is adjourning the appeal to serve the remaining unserved defendants, who are not contesting before the Civil Court is nothing but a futile exercise, just to extend the stay in favour of the plaintiffs whereas the service of the remaining defendants could be dispensed with in terms of provisions of Order 41 Rule 3 Proviso added by amendment as applicable to Punjab, Haryana and Chandigarh.

-- The another reason which show the slackness and disrespect on the part of the Appellate Court is that defendant No.1 – Bank has brought all the previous orders passed by the Writ Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the NCLT and the NCALT and on 07.12.2019, it was also brought to the notice of the Appellate Court that the Civil Court stands dismissed for non-prosecution, however, still the interim stay was extended and no effort was made to dispose of the main appeal.

-- Even surprisingly, despite the instructions passed by the High Court that the photocopy of the Lower Appellate Court should be summoned so that the proceedings before the Lower Court is not automatically stayed, the Appellate Court summoned the record of the trial Court vide order dated 07.12.2019 and despite the fact that the seat of the District Judge and of the trial Court is at the same place, till 01.02.2020, the record was not received and in the intervening period, the interim order was ordered to be extended by the Appellate Court.

-- Even further on 29.02.2020, after noticing that the suit is dismissed for non-prosecution and the petitioner – Bank is stressing that the appeal is not maintainable, the Appellate Court, while returning the record of the trial Court, directed that the application for restoration be decided in a time bound manner i.e. 1½ months, therefore, the intention of the plaintiffs is apparent on record to delay the proceedings either before the District Judge or before the trial Court by not arguing the application for restoration of civil suit.

-- Thus the District Judge has failed to perform even the administrative duty by not keeping a check on trial Court which has not decided the application for restoration of suit till date i.e. even after lapse of 08 months, in violation of his own order dated 29.02.2020.

-- The District Judge being the administrative head of the District, is required to keep a check on the subordinate judiciary and the manner in which the order in the civil suit are passed, show that an effort is made to delay the proceedings to enable the plaintiffs to gain time.

-- Even the trial Court is adjourning the case for effecting the service on non-contesting respondents and is not deciding the application for restoration of civil suit despite the fact that when suit was dismissed for non-prosecution, the presence of the counsel for defendants was marked and service on defendants can be effected through counsel, to avoid the delay.

-- The basic principles of law as set down in various judgments to decide the application for restoration of a suit/appeal or likewise setting-aside ex parte order are that if the application is filed within a reasonable time as in the instant case, it was filed within a period of 06 days; a bona fide ground is given, as in this case, the counsel representing the plaintiffs has filed his own affidavit; the general principle that no one should be condemn unheard is not violated and if required, the other party can be compensated by way of costs, thus, majority of such applications are allowed, however, this is not followed by the trial Court.

-- Based upon such principle, the trial Court could have decided the application immediately without wasting the time to serve the non-contesting respondents. Needless to say that 03 months time was taken by the Appellate Court, in summoning the record of the trial Court, which further delayed the disposal of the application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC.

-- It is not understandable as to why the District Judge/Appellate Court is adjourning the appeal despite the fact that the suit stands dismissed for non-prosecution on 29.11.2019 and the plaintiffs on both counts are seeking adjournments and both the Courts, on face of record are showing undue favour to the plaintiffs.

-- Once the petitioner – Bank on 07.12.2019 has brought to the notice of the Appellate Court, about all the orders passed by High Court & the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the dismissal of the suit in default, there was no justification for the Appellate Court to continue with the stay order, which was obtained by concealing the aforesaid litigation and orders and therefore, continuing with the stay order by ignoring the orders of the High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter se parties, the District Judge has shown disrespect to orders and, on face of record has shown favour to the plaintiffs to delay the proceedings.

-- Even otherwise, the grant of ex parte stay and thereafter, continuation of the interim stay for a period of 01 year despite all odds is in violation of the well settled principle of law held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that injunctions against financial institutions should not be granted casually. The default in payment of public money involved in the case is more than 1100 crores of rupees and therefore, the continuation of the interim order by the Appellate Court is not at all in public interest.

30 days’ time given to District Judge to submit explanation -- Civil Appeal ordered to be transferred from the Court of District Judge to the Court of Additional District Judge -- Transferee Court will decide the appeal within a period of 03 weeks, from the date of receipt of the case file -- Application under Order 9 Rule 4 CPC be decided within a period of 03 weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order – In case, the suit is restored, the trial Court will further pass an order within a period of 03 weeks thereafter, regarding maintainability of suit by assessing the averments “only in the plaint” (in terms of Order 7 Rules 10 and 11 CPC), if any cause of action survive in favour of plaintiff No.1, after the suit stands dismissed as withdrawn qua plaintiff No.2 -- In view of the settled principle of law, the trial Court will only look into the contents of the plaint and no other documents will be considered for the same.

(Para 31-39)

613. (P&H HC) 06-10-2020

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 41(j) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 8, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 151 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Suit for mandatory injunction – Temporary injunction – Maintainability of -- Construction of Community Hall on the instructions of State Government, which has accorded permission on the basis of resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat and the amount is being spent by the State Government – Challenge to stay declined by Courts below – Held,

-- It is well settled principle of law that in a suit for mandatory injunction, no relief of temporary injunction can be granted, which will amount to passing a decree of mandatory injunction itself.

-- A careful perusal of the plaint would show that nothing is stated that any personal right of any of the petitioners is infringed, therefore, in view of Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, the suit is not maintainable.

-- The suit has not been filed in representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and no application has been moved seeking permission from the Court that the suit is being filed on behalf of the entire village community, therefore, it is a suit which has been filed only by nine inhabitants of the village, whereas the Community Hall is being constructed for the entire village.

-- Both the Courts below have discussed the judgments of this Court, wherein it is held that the Gram Panchayat is competent to change the user of the land in a manner it likes as well as when sufficient area of Shamlat land is available, it can be used for any other development work and injunction cannot be granted regarding change of nature of land.

-- Even a perusal of the plaint further shows that it is nowhere mentioned that the passage of the temple will be blocked, rather it is a case of Gram Panchayat that there is difference of about 400 ft. between the temple and the Community Hall.

Court found no ground to interfere with the well-reasoned orders passed by the Courts below dismissing the application for stay -- Finding no merit in the revision petition, the same is dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

618. (SC) 28-08-2020

A. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 –Limitation – Onus of -- It was for the applicant invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, to prima facie show the existence in his favour, of a legally recoverable debt -- In other words, had to show that the debt is not barred by limitation.

(Para 36)

B. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Schedule, Part II, clauses (19) to (21) -- Limitation – Period of limitation for initiation of a suit for recovery of money lent, is three years from the date on which the loan is paid -- Last loan amount is said to have been advanced in 2004-2005 -- In the winding up petition, there is not a whisper of any agreed date by which the alleged loan was to be repaid -- Debt was barred by limitation even in the year 2012, when winding up proceedings were initiated in the Madras High Court – Held, NCLT rightly refused to admit the application under Section 7 of the IBC, holding the same to be barred by limitation.

(Para 37, 38)

C. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Personal loan -- A personal Loan to a Promoter or a Director of a company cannot trigger the Corporate Resolution Process under the IBC.

(Para 40)

D. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Forgery in signatures -- Fabrication of records – Proof of – Jurisdiction of -- Disputes as to whether the signatures are forged or whether records have been fabricated can be adjudicated upon evidence including forensic evidence in a regular suit and not in proceedings u/s 7 of the IBC.

(Para 40)

E. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – No financial debt in existence -- Application u/s 7 of the IBC was not maintainable -- Payment received for shares, duly issued to a third party at the request of the payee as evident from official records, cannot be a debt, not to speak of financial debt.

(Para 42,43)

619. (SC) 27-08-2020

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law -- If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal -- It was not open to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal -- Existence of a “substantial question of law” is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way -- To be a question of law “involved in the case”, there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.

(Para 32, 33)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Principles summarised:

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

(iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.

(Para 37)

D. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 27 -- Adverse possession -- A decree of possession does not automatically follow a decree of declaration of title and ownership over property -- It is well settled that, where a Plaintiff wants to establish that the Defendant’s original possession was permissive, it is for the Plaintiff to prove this allegation and if he fails to do so, it may be presumed that possession was adverse, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

(Para 46)

E. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 5 -- Suit for possession – A person claiming a decree of possession has to establish his entitlement to get such possession and also establish that his claim is not barred by the laws of limitation -- He must show that he had possession before the alleged trespasser got possession.

(Para 51)

F. Possession Follows Title -- Maxim “possession follows title” is limited in its application to property, which having regard to its nature, does not admit to actual and exclusive occupation, as in the case of open spaces accessible to all -- The presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.

(Para 52)

G. Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 3 -- Suit for possession – Limitation – Ground of -- A suit for recovery of possession of immovable property is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the institution of any suit after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed in the said Act -- Court is obliged to dismiss a suit filed after expiry of the period of limitation, even though the plea of limitation may not have been taken in defence.

(Para 53)

H. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Suit for possession -- Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- In the absence of any whisper in the plaint as to the date on which the Defendant and/or his Predecessor-in-interest took possession of the suit property and in the absence of any whisper to show that the relief of decree for possession was within limitation, the High Court could not have reversed the finding of the First Appellate Court, and allowed the Plaintiff the relief of recovery of possession, more so when the Defendant had pleaded that he had been in complete possession of the suit premises, as owner, with absolute rights, ever since 1966, when his father had executed a Deed of Release in his favour and/or in other words for over 28 years as on the date of institution of the suit.

(Para 55)

I. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law -- Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal cannot satisfy the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC.

(Para 59)

621. (SC) 05-08-2020

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A, 24(2), 25(3) -- Return of plaint – Transfer of petition – De novo trial or not – Power of -- In cases dealing with transfer of proceedings from a Court having jurisdiction to another Court, the discretion vested in the Court by Sections 24(2) and 25(3) either to retry the proceedings or proceed from the point at which such proceeding was transferred or withdrawn, is in marked contrast to the scheme under Order VII Rule 10 read with Rule 10-A where no such discretion is given and the proceeding has to commence de novo.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 10A – Constitution of India, Article 136, 142 -- Return of plaint -- De novo trial or not – Power of -- High Court by the impugned order held that the suit at Delhi shall proceed from the stage at which it was pending at Gurgaon before return of the plaint and not de novo – Held, presentation of the plaint at Gurgaon was certainly not before a court having jurisdiction in the matter -- Suit has to proceed afresh before the proper court – Because the appellant did not raise the objection under clause 16B of the agreement at the very first opportunity -- Pleadings of the parties have been completed, evidence led, and that the matter was fixed for final argument – In exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and in order to do complete and substantial justice between the parties under Article 142 of the Constitution Court decline to set aside the order of the High Court.

(Para 3, 27)

626. (SC) 09-07-2020

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Order 7 Rule 14 -- Rejection of plaint – Remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. Law summarised:

--       Underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

--       Power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.

--       Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.

--       Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.

--       In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

--       At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.

--       Test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed.

--       Plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.

--       If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

--       Power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial.

--       Provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.

(Para 12-12.10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Rejection of plaint – Cause of action -- “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment -- It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit -- Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.

(Para 13)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 58, 59 -- Rejection of plaint – Limitation – Cause of action -- If there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued.

(Para 14)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 58, 59 – Rejection of plaint -- Limitation -- Cause of action – Right to sue -- Words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings -- Right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises -- Suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted -- Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.

(Para 14)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(a) -- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Sale – Suit for cancellation of sale deed -- Non-payment of sale consideration – Right to sue -- Rejection of plaint -- Actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed is not a sine qua non for completion of the sale -- Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction -- Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground -- Plaintiffs may have other remedies in law for recovery of the balance consideration, but could not be granted the relief of cancellation of the registered Sale Deed -- Suit filed by the Plaintiffs is vexatious, meritless, and does not disclose a right to sue -- Plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (a).

(Para 15.3)

F. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11(d) -- Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Article 59 -- Non-payment of sale consideration -- Delay of over 5 and ½ years after the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, shows that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 -- Suit was instituted on 15.12.2014, even though the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was delivered to the Plaintiffs -- Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation -- Plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.

(Para 15.8)

627. (P&H HC) 02-07-2020

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 36, 41(h) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 -- Temporary injunction – Bar upon -- Section 41(h) of the Act bars the grant of injunction in case any other equally efficacious remedy is available in law -- Section 41(h) of the Act cannot come into play at the time of grant of temporary injunction.

(Para 8)

B. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 36, 39 – Mandatory injunction – Permanent injunction – Both prayers simultaneously – Maintainability of -- Objection regarding prayer of mandatory injunction and permanent injunction being unavailable in the same suit is being considered only to be rejected -- If a defendant has illegally occupied the property of a plaintiff and is raising construction thereupon mandatory injunction can definitely be sought to direct him to remove the construction already raised and permanent injunction can be sought to restrain him from raising construction.

(Para 9)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 36, 41(h) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Co-sharer -- Temporary injunction -- Prima facie it appears that the order of partition and Rapat regarding possession have been obtained fraudulently -- Appeal is pending against ex parte order of partition – A co-sharer in exclusive possession cannot be dispossessed except by way of legal and valid partition -- Plaintiff can certainly protect infringement of his legal rights through an order of temporary injunction.

(Para 10)

631. (SC) 06-05-2020

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 3-A, Order 43 Rule 1A(2), 96 -- Compromise decree – Appeal – Challenge in Civil suit -- Right of :

--       Neither any appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC.

--       A right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who denies the compromise and invites order of the Court in that regard in terms of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC while preferring an appeal against the decree -- Section 96(3) CPC shall not be a bar to such an appeal, because it is applicable where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute.

(Para 19)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 3-A -- Compromise decree – Non-party to suit -- Challenge by -- Appellant was not a party to the stated compromise decree, claiming right, title and interest over the land in the stated sale deed, which was purchased by him from judgment debtor and party to the suit – In the suit at the best, he could seek relief against Judgment debtor, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the partition suit.

(Para 21)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3 -- Compromise decree – Validity from -- It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties thereto.

(Para 21)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, 3-A -- Compromise decree – Challenge to – Civil suit – Maintainability of -- It is only the High Court, who had accepted the compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC -- Suit instituted before the civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment.

(Para 22)

635. (P&H HC) 06-03-2020

A. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 7, 11 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (v of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Section 11, Explanation IV of Section 11 – Eviction proceedings – Title suit thereafter – Maintainability of -- Once, the application filed u/s 7 of the Act is decided in which question of title, though available, is not raised, it puts an end to the controversy regarding the question of title which cannot be raised thereafter by filing a suit u/s 11 of the Act -- Subsequently a suit filed u/s 11 of the Act to establish the question of title shall not be maintainable.

(Para 8, 18-20)

B. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Title suit – In case, if the title of a person is threatened by the Gram Panchayat or anybody else, he can always file a suit u/s 11 of the Act for seeking declaration for having acquired the right, title or interest in the property in question.

(Para 19)

C. Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (18 of 1961), Section 11 – Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, 1964, Rule 21-A -- Title suit – Limitation -- Whether the suit filed u/s 11 of the Act is time barred in view of Rule 21-A of the Rules if it is not filed within 30 days from the date of accrual of cause of action? – Held, cases in which application u/s 7 of the Act is not filed but a person or a Panchayat seeks a declaration of their right, title or interest in the land vested or deemed to have been vested in the Panchayat then the suit has to be filed within the period of 30 days from the date of accrual of the cause of action as provided in Rule 21-A of the Rules which means that the suit has to be filed when the right, title or interest is threatened and not at any time otherwise Rule 21-A(1) of the Rules provided in the Rules will become redundant.

(Para 21)

646. (SC) 10-02-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Civil suit – Handwriting expert report – F.I.R. w.r.t. forged receipts – Sustainability of -- Quashing of FIR -- Handwriting expert in civil suit has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of respondent No.2 -- It was only thereafter, FIR was registered -- In the Summary Suit, issue No.5 has been framed by the Court “whether the defendant proved that the plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts” – Held, when the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit -- Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered -- Continuation of FIR would amount to abuse of the process of Court – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR allowed.

(Para 18, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 45, 72, 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint -- Presumption of legal enforceability debt – Rebuttal of -- ‘Y’ admitted the issuance of cheques -- Once the issuance of cheque is admitted/established, the presumption would arise u/s 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of cheque that is the complainant-appellant No.3 -- Burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence -- High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden, the presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act will continue to remain -- When disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 20)

648. (P&H HC) 31-01-2020

A. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B -- NRI Landlord – Eviction petition through power of attorney – Maintainability of – Held, it would not be appropriate to hold that petition u/s 13-B of the 1949 Act cannot be filed through power of attorney.

(Para 9)

B. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 2(a), 13-B – NRI Landlord -- Various petition – Maintainability of -- Definition of “building” includes the entire building as also a part of a building -- All the premises in possession of the various tenants are part of the same building and, therefore, covered by the definition of a building -- Hence, the landowner is entitled to maintain the various petitions filed against various tenants of the same building.

(Para 10)

C. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13-B – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 9 Rule 8 -- NRI-Landlord – First petition dismissed for non-prosecution -- Second petition – Maintainability of -- Previous petition filed u/s 13-B by the landlord was dismissed for non-prosecution under Order 9 Rule 8 CPC -- Strictly the provisions of the CPC are not applicable, however, the broader principles of the CPC would be applicable -- As per the CPC, second petition/suit on the same cause of action is maintainable if the previous suit or petition was dismissed in default in the absence of both the parties – Held, second petition would not be barred.

(Para 11-13)