Search By Topic: Civil Procedural Law

53. (P&H HC) 21-04-2026

Second Appeal -- Scope of interference -- Concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, based on misreading of evidence or suffering from patent illegality -- Interference confined only to substantial questions of law.

Unregistered Will – Suspicious circumstances -- Will proved by attesting witness, scribe and unrebutted expert evidence regarding thumb impressions of testator -- Mere exclusion of natural heirs, unequal distribution of property or non-registration of Will not suspicious circumstances.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Regular Second Appeal -- Scope of interference in a Regular Second Appeal is confined to substantial questions of law -- Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below cannot be interfered with unless it is shown that such findings are perverse, based on misreading of evidence or suffer from patent illegality.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Section 63 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 68 – Unregistered Will -- Will duly proved through attesting witness, scribe and unrebutted expert evidence regarding thumb impressions of testator -- Mere exclusion of natural heirs, unequal distribution of property or non-registration of Will not suspicious circumstances -- Non-registration of a Will is not a circumstance to doubt its validity --  No cogent evidence to show that the testator was not in a sound disposing state of mind at the time of execution of the Will -- Defendant did not examine any expert in rebuttal to disprove the thumb impressions on the Will -- Such omission assumes importance and lends further credence to the case set up by the plaintiff – Will, upheld.

(Para 8-13)

55. (P&H HC) 17-04-2026

***

Additional evidence (SPA) at appellate stage cannot be permitted in absence of due diligence and explanation for non-production at trial, as it would amount to filling lacunae – Application dismissed.

Registered Sale Deed carries presumption of validity – Allegation of fraud not proved as plaintiff failed to depose – SPA holder cannot depose on behalf of principal on personal facts – Adverse inference drawn – Appeal dismissed.

***

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27(1), (1)(aa) – SPA in additional evidence at appellate stage – Permissible only on proof of due diligence and inability to produce evidence at trial despite best efforts –Applicant has not exercised due diligence and cannot be permitted at this stage to improve his case or fill up lacunae in his case by leading additional evidence -- Application dismissed.

(Para 1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 3 Rules 1 and 2, Section 100 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 -- Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17, 60(2) -- Registered Sale Deed – Presumption of validity – Allegation of fraud – Burden of proof – Power of Attorney (SPA) – Scope of deposition – Second Appeal – Registered Sale Deed bearing thumb impression and photograph carries presumption of truth and validity – Allegation of fraud not proved as plaintiff failed to step into witness box and led no evidence – SPA holder cannot depose on behalf of plaintiff regarding facts within personal knowledge of principal – Non-examination of plaintiff warrants adverse inference – Contradictory pleas regarding sale consideration – NOC supports case of defendants – High Court in second appeal has limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the Courts below – Appeal dismissed.

(Paras 15 to 32)

56. (P&H HC) 17-04-2026

Regular Second Appeal -- In Punjab & Haryana, second appeals lie under S.41 of 1918 Act and not S.100 CPC, hence no substantial question of law required.

Family settlement -- Spes successionis -- Settlement not confined to persons having existing title -- Can validly include persons with semblance of claim, expectancy or chance of succession -- Even contingent/ prospective right sufficient juridical basis -- Children/grandchild having expectancy in intestate succession held competent parties -- Family settlement upheld on such foundation.

Compromise decree/Family settlement -- Where decree merely recognizes and formalizes pre-existing rights arising from prior family settlement, does not require compulsory registration.

Fraud/misrepresentation — Allegations must be pleaded with specific and detailed particulars as to manner and circumstances and proved by cogent evidence; bald and omnibus assertions are insufficient in law.

Family settlement/ transfer -- Minor as beneficiary -- Family settlement conferring share on a minor not void merely due to minority, being distinct from a contract and aimed at preserving family harmony and equitable distribution.

Mutation -- Any error in the mutation entries does not, ipso facto, divest the appellants-plaintiffs of their rightful share in the property.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 -- Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (6 of 1918), Section 41 – Regular Second Appeal -- Scope -- Applicability of Punjab Courts Act, 1918 vis-à-vis Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -- In States of Punjab & Haryana, second appeals governed by Section 41 of 1918 Act and not by Section 100 CPC -- No requirement to frame substantial question of law. Position settled by Pankajakshi’s, (2016) 6 SCC 157, Kirodi’s  (2019) 11 SCC 317 = (2019) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14222 and Satender’s case, 2022 (12) Scale 92.

(Para 6)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 6 -- Family settlement – Spes Successionis -- Nature of property/ right to be included – Family settlement is not circumscribed to parties possessing an existing legal title in the property – Law recognizes that such a settlement may validly be arrived at even amongst persons having a semblance of a claim, a possible expectancy, or a mere chance of succession – It has been unequivocally held that even a prospective or contingent right to succeed to property constitutes a sufficient juridical basis for entering into a family arrangement -- Children and grandchild of the appellants-plaintiffs, possessed a legitimate expectation or chance of succession in the event of intestate devolution -- Consequently, the existence of such a potential claim furnishes an adequate legal foundation for the family settlement.

(Para 12, 12.1)

C. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17 – Compromise decree/ Family settlement – Requirement of Registration -- Decree merely formalized and recognized the pre-existing rights which had already accrued to the respondents-defendants pursuant to the family settlement effected in the year 1989 -- In such circumstances, the decree falls within the category of declaratory recognition of antecedent rights and, therefore, does not attract the requirement of compulsory registration.

(Para 12.4)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 4 -- Fraud / misrepresentation -- Pleading and proof – Allegations must be pleaded with specificity and particularity -- Full particulars of fraud, undue influence, and misrepresentation has to be clearly set out in the pleadings -- Allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence must be pleaded with precision and specificity, detailing the manner, circumstances, and particulars thereof -- A bald and omnibus assertion, devoid of material particulars, does not satisfy the statutory requirement -- Moreover, such allegations are required to be substantiated by cogent, convincing, and reliable evidence.

(Para 12.6, 16, 16.1)

E. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 11 -- Transfer / Family Settlement – Minor is beneficiary -- Validity -- Family settlement, wherein a minor member of the family is conferred a share in immovable property, cannot be rendered null and void merely on account of the minority of such beneficiary -- Jurisprudential foundation of a family settlement is fundamentally distinct from that of a contractual arrangement inter se parties -- A family settlement, being an arrangement intended to preserve harmony, avoid disputes, and secure equitable distribution of property within the family, cannot be invalidated solely on the ground that one or more beneficiaries had not attained the age of majority at the relevant time.

(Para 18)

F. Mutation -- Nature and effect -- Mutation entries, being fiscal in nature, neither confer nor extinguish title -- Respondents-defendants derive their title not from the mutation, but from the judgment and decree -- Consequently, any error in the mutation entries does not, ipso facto, divest the appellants-plaintiffs of their rightful share in the property.

(Para 18.5)

G. Limitation -- Suit for possession based upon title – There is no limitation for seeking possession on the basis of title.

(Para 18.6)

57. (SC) 09-04-2026

Execution of decree -- Jurisdiction of Executing Court is limited to give effect to the decree as passed and not to assume the role of a trial court so as to substitute its own view in place of that expressed under the decree.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Power of Executing Court -- Executing Court is empowered to decide questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed -- It has to execute the decree as it is without changing the same -- Jurisdiction of Executing Court is limited to give effect to the decree as passed and not to assume the role of a trial court so as to substitute its own view in place of that expressed under the decree.

(Para 24)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Power of Executing Court -- Executing Court has to strictly conform to the decree under execution and if the decree provides for reciprocal obligations, it must ensure compliance of those conditions by both the parties in pith and substance, unless the decree is a nullity.

(Para 27)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Power of Executing Court -- Compromise decree describes the portions of land falling into the shares of the parties -- Executing Court has to ensure that both the parties fulfil their obligations and exchange the land as per the decree and to see that the sale deed is executed as directed -- Merely for the reasons that exchange of some portions of the land may not be practicable for the reason that constructions on it are not as per the sanctioned map or that part of it has been sold off, are all immaterial.

(Para 30)

58. (SC) 08-04-2026

Impleadment as party in writ proceedings -- A person directly affected by an interim order in writ proceedings impleaded as a proper party cannot be denied impleadment merely because he was not an original party.

In writ proceedings, the principles of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC guide impleadment.

Necessary and proper party – A necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be passed and a proper party is one whose presence enables complete and effective adjudication.

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Impleadment in writ proceedings -- Necessary and proper party – High Court declined prayer of appellant to be impleaded in pending writ petition and also refused clarification/modification of interim order – Record showed that interim order passed in writ petition was relied upon by municipal authorities while dealing with appellant’s case and revised building plans were rejected on footing that operation of the 2025 Rules had been kept in abeyance – Held, where a person is directly and demonstrably affected by an interim order passed in writ proceedings, such person cannot be shut out merely because he was not an original party – At the least he is a proper party whose presence enables Court to effectively adjudicate consequences of its own order – High Court erred in holding that appellant had no lis – Order refusing impleadment set aside – Appellant directed to be impleaded in writ petition.

(Paras 7-18)

B. Constitution of India, Article 226 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 -- Writ – Impleadment of Necessary/ Proper party -- Though proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are not to be controlled by the technicalities of pleadings as in an ordinary civil suit, the principles underlying Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC continue to furnish sound guidance -- A necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be passed -- A proper party is one whose presence enables the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon the questions involved.

(Para 7)

63. (P&H HC) 18-03-2026

Compromise decree – Compulsory Registration -- Family settlement arrived at even between persons standing in remote familial relationships having even a semblance of claim in the property, when acknowledged through a compromise decree, does not require compulsory registration under the Registration Act

A. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17(1)(2) – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 6 -- Family settlement – Spes successionis -- Compromise decree -- Compulsory registration – Requirements of -- A family settlement may be arrived at even between persons standing in remote familial relationships -- A family arrangement entered into between parties having even a possible or semblance of claim in the property, when acknowledged and recognized in a decree subsequently passed by a Court, does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and, therefore, does not require compulsory registration.

(Para 13-15)

B. Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 17(1)(2) – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 6 -- Family settlement – Compromise decree -- Compulsory registration – Requirements of -- Judgment and decree merely recognized a pre-existing right arising out of a family settlement between defendant Nos.1 and 2 -- Decree, therefore, did not itself create any new right, title or interest in the immovable property but merely acknowledged and affirmed an already existing arrangement between the parties -- Consequently, such a decree does not attract the requirement of compulsory registration.

(Para 17)

66. (P&H HC) 24-02-2026

Specific performance decree – Court must specify time for deposit of balance sale consideration; where no time is fixed, decree holder must deposit the amount within a reasonable period.

Specific performance decree – Time limit for deposit – Where trial court decree fixing time is challenged in appeal and appeal is dismissed, doctrine of merger applies and the appellate decree prevails.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 12A -- Decree for specific performance – Deposit of balance sale consideration – Time limit -- It obligatory for the Court to specify, the date by which, the purchase money or other sum should be paid by the vendee or lessee -- If the Court had failed to stipulate any particular time period, then it is expected of the decree holder to deposit the same, within a reasonable period of time.

(Para 19, 25)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 20 Rule 12A -- Decree for specific performance – Deposit of balance sale consideration – Time limit -- Delay in deposit of balance sale consideration – Deposit was to be made within a period of two months, from the date of decree -- Trial Court decree challenged in appeal – Stay application was also filed therein, which was not decided -- Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed – An application for seeking deposit of the balance sale consideration file after the decision of the appeal, soon thereafter and by application of doctrine of merger, the appellate decree is to be given effect to, as the time limit is no longer an essence, for the execution of the decree, as such, earlier passed by the trial Court.

(Para 4, 26-29)

67. (P&H HC) 13-01-2026

Injunction against co-owner -- A co-owner who has himself raised construction on a portion of joint land cannot restrain other co-owners from doing the same.

Admission in earlier suit -- That the suit land already stood partitioned and the parties were in exclusive possession of their respective portions disentitles the petitioner from claiming injunction over the joint property.

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary Injunction – Co-sharers – Construction on joint property – Equity – A co-owner who has himself raised construction on a portion of the joint land cannot seek injunction to restrain other co-owners from exercising similar rights over the joint property – Principle that one who seeks equity must act equitably applies.

(Para 6.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8 Rule 5 -- Admission in earlier suit – Effect – Admission that suit land already stood partitioned and parties were in exclusive possession of their respective portions disentitles the petitioner from claiming injunction over the joint property.

(Para 6.1)

C. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Revision – Interference with appellate order – Additional District Judge has interfered with the trial court’s order on sound reasoning, no illegality, arbitrariness or jurisdictional error -- Consequently, no interference is warranted in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The instant revision petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

(Para 6.2)

69. (SC) 15-12-2025

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47, Order 21 Rule 58, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 -- Doctrine of lis pendens – Separate suit – Maintainability of – Third party rights – Adjudication of doctrine of lis pendens along with Rules 58, 89 to 92, 99 to 104 of Order XXI CPC respectively and Section 47 CPC is as follows:

(i) Section 52 of the 1882 Act embodying the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to suits where any right to the property in question is directly and specifically in issue. Whether any right in the property was directly and specifically in question in the suit would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The doctrine cannot blindly be made inapplicable to suits in which the plaint contains a specific averment that the mortgaged property be attached and sold in lieu of the decree or a charge be created on the property. If interpreted so, any judgment-debtor can render the decree incapable of execution by transferring his interest in the property during the pendency of such a suit.

(ii) Rule 89 of Order XXI CPC provides an opportunity to any person claiming an interest in the property sold or a person acting for or on behalf of the persons having such interest, another opportunity to save the property from the clutches of the sale. A sine qua non for setting aside the sale under this rule would be the payment of the deposit as prescribed therein within a period of sixty days from the date of the sale. For the purposes of this rule, a pendente lite transferee of the judgment-debtor would also fall under the ambit of the phrase “person claiming an interest in the property sold”.

(iii) Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC provides that the sale shall be set-aside if there exists any material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. Furthermore, such material irregularity or fraud must cause a substantial injury to the applicant under Rule 90. In other words, there must be a direct nexus between the material irregularity or fraud and the substantial injury caused to the applicant.

(iv) The words “material irregularity in publishing or conducting it” in Rule 90 would include any material irregularity or fraud occurring at a stage prior to the proclamation of sale as well, provided that the applicant did not have an opportunity to raise or could not have raised such a grievance at the appropriate time. Furthermore, the mere absence of or any defect in the attachment, by itself, cannot be a ground for setting aside the sale under Rule 90, unless substantial injury is proved. The applicant must make specific averments as regards the alleged irregularities or fraud, and convince the executing court that a substantial injury has been caused to him as a consequence.

(v) The absence of a saleable interest on the part of the judgment-debtor to the suit property cannot be brought in as a ground under Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC. Such a ground would squarely fall within the ambit of Rule 58 of Order XXI CPC, if the sale is yet to be confirmed.

(vi) Rule 92(3) of Order XXI CPC states that no person against whom an order under Rule 92 is made (either confirming the sale under Rule 92(1) or setting it aside under Rule 92(2) can institute a separate suit in that regard. However, there is a very narrow scope for a person to file a separate suit despite the bar under Rule 92(3). The reason for such a separate suit must be that the execution proceedings and the sale was without jurisdiction and therefore, a nullity and not binding on the plaintiff who has instituted a separate suit.

(vii) Having said so, before holding such a separate suit instituted by a plaintiff alleging that the entire execution proceedings was without jurisdiction and therefore, the sale was a nullity, maintainable, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the plaintiff was not a party to the original decree or a representative of a party to the original decree, as stated in Section 47 CPC. If so, instead of filing a separate suit, such persons must prefer an application under Section 47 CPC. Upon any failure to do so, their separate suit would be hit by the bar contained in Section 47 CPC which specifically uses the words “and not by a separate suit”.

(viii) The term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would mean a party other than the judgment-debtor, decree-holder or the auction-purchaser and would refer to a party who has not had his right, title or interest vis-à-vis the property in question adjudicated under Rule 58, Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC respectively. To put it very simply, the term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would refer to a party who is extraneous to the original suit proceedings and the proceedings under Order XXI CPC, and who either has not had his right, title or interest adjudicated or having the opportunity to have his right, title or interest adjudicated, has not availed such a remedy within the required time. Such a “third party” would also be someone who falls outside the scope of Section 47 CPC.

(ix) Rule 92(4) is not a provision which confers any right to the third party to institute a suit for challenging the title of the judgment-debtor to the property which is subject to the execution proceedings. It is merely a procedural provision which states that such a suit must be instituted against the auction-purchaser, where the decree-holder and judgment-debtor would be necessary parties.

(x) When a party other than the judgment-debtor, including a third party, is dispossessed during the course of execution of a decree, the only remedy for such a dispossessed party would lie in filing an application under Rule 99 complaining of its dispossession. In such an application, all questions including that of the right, title and interest of the parties in the proceeding, to the property, would be examined by the executing court.

(xi) The words “may” used in Rule 99 along with the words “and not by a separate suit” used in Rule 101, must not be read to mean that a party who has been dispossessed has two options i.e., to either prefer an application under Rule 99 or to file a separate suit, the moment they are dispossessed.  This would defeat the underlying object of the amendment made to the scheme of Rules 99 to 104 respectively wherein the executing court has been specifically empowered to look into the questions relating to the right, title and interest of the parties, quite akin to that which would have been done by way of a separate suit. Once the period of limitation for preferring an application under Rule 99 lapses, the person who has been dispossessed in the course of the execution of the decree, including a third party, cannot file a separate suit to circumvent or by-pass the said prescribed period of limitation.

(xii) Rule 102 prevents the executing court from passing any order under Rule 100 if it is found that the applicant under Rule 99 is a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor. This again, cannot be construed as giving leeway to such a person to institute a separate suit. Court say so for the simple reason that, even in the separate suit, the law would not look favorably upon a pendente lite transferee, and no relief of declaration of title and/or possession would be granted to him. His fate would be the same as under an application under Rule 99.

(xiii) Therefore, - First, the separate suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively would be non-maintainable because they are representatives of the judgment-debtor and the bar envisaged under Section 47 CPC would squarely apply to their case. Secondly, having not availed the remedy under Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC within time, the separate suit instituted for the same relief(s) would be barred. Thirdly, even if the aforesaid two reasons assigned could be said to not affect the suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, they would still not be entitled to the reliefs claimed owing to them being pendente lite transferees of the judgment-debtor whose transaction would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

(Para 256)

71. (SC) 18-11-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 5, Section 96, 100 -- Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 10 -- Interim protection in Appeal – Permissibility of -- Just because the original suit came to be dismissed, that does not mean that in the pending appeal, the appellate court cannot grant appropriate relief -- Application seeking to maintain the status quo filed before the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the suit for specific performance stood dismissed -- Reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI Rule 5, while declining to grant status quo, is grossly misplaced.

-- appeal is considered a continuation of the original suit, and the appellate court has co-extensive power to grant appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the status quo pending the final disposal of the appeal.

-- interim relief is designed to aid the main relief and ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous. It aims to prevent irreparable harm that might be caused while the case is pending final determination.

-- grant of appropriate relief is a discretionary power of the appellate court, and the same must be exercised judicially based on the well-settled principles of a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience.

(Para 14-20)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 5, Section 96 -- First Appeal – Interim protection -- First appellate court can re-examine both questions of fact and law and may re-appreciate the evidence on record -- Its powers are as extensive as the original court’s, meaning it can reconsider the need for interim protection.

(Para 18)

72. (SC) 18-11-2025

A. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Challenge – Maintainability of writ petition -- Every award of a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court -- It shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute, and that no appeal shall lie against it – Award cannot be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding -- Writ petition challenging the award was maintainable.

(Para 8-10)

B. Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 21, 22E – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9, 47, Order 21 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Permanent Lok Adalat – Award/ Deemed decree – Objection in Execution – Writ -- Maintainability -- Treating the filing of objections in such execution as an “efficacious alternative remedy” for challenging the award is inconsistent with the statutory scheme -- Decree in such a case owes its force not merely to the CPC but to the special statute which deems the award to be a decree only for the limited purpose of execution -- Statutory structure is the same whether the aggrieved person is a party to the award or is a third party who claims to be affected by it -- In either case, if the validity of the award is to be examined at all, it is to be tested in writ proceedings before the High Court and not by expanding the scope of execution or by encouraging independent civil suits.

(Para 11-13)

77. (P&H HC) 27-10-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party -- For impleading a person as a party, two conditions must be satisfied: firstly, that there must be a right to some relief against such person in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; and secondly, that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such person -- Power under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is discretionary and should be exercised sparingly but to advance the cause of complete justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Applicant placed on record Mutations and Jamabandi for the year 1996-97 showing transfer of the suit land from the State Government to ‘J’ and thereafter to himself -- Several rounds of litigation, including writ petitions before the High Court, in which his alleged rights over the same land have been contested -- These materials were sufficient to give the trial court a prima facie basis to conclude that the applicant has at least an arguable interest in the subject matter of the suit and that his presence would facilitate complete adjudication of the dispute.

(Para 2, 16)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Objection as to claim based upon fraudulent documents – It is a matter of evidence which cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of impleadment -- Impleadment order does not confer any legitimacy upon applicant’s title; it merely allows him to be heard so that the court's final decree, if passed, may bind all persons claiming interest in the property and avoid future litigation -- Apprehension that the impleadment will prejudice the plaintiff/ petitioner's rights is thus unfounded.

(Para 2, 17)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction --Dominus litis – Argument as to Plaintiff/ Petitioner, being dominus litis, is free to choose his defendants, cannot prevail when the relief claimed directly affects third-party rights reflected in the public records -- Petitioner's suit seeks declaration of nullity of a rapat entry and correction of revenue records may have an impact upon any person claiming interest through existing entries or documents.

(Para 2, 18)

89. (P&H HC) 02-06-2025

A. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(d) – Consideration -- Past consideration is as good as present consideration --  Word ‘consideration’ has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which has a wider connotation and includes within its sweep not only the monetary consideration but even promises including promise to render future personal service.

(Para 13)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 201, 202 – Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 3, 4 -- Sale by Will/ Agreement to Sell/ General Power of attorney/ Affidavit -- PW-1/ S K deposed that her brother/ A.K. was only a Class IV employee and on her request and on her behalf he applied for the house in his name -- A.K/ Brother executed an agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, registered Will and an affidavit – Hence, Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 could not be invoked -- After the death of A.K. on 14.08.1984, his widow and children never made any attempt to pay the instalments -- All instalments were paid by S.K. and her daughter -- All the documents of the property have been produced by the plaintiff -- Hence, it is proved that there was sale of the house in favour of Ms. S.K. by A.K -- Likewise, the General Power of Attorney will not cease to have effect because Ms.SK has interest in the property in view of agreement and Will -- Case falls under Section 202 and not 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

(Para 13, 18)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 13 -- Agreement to sell of imperfect title – Effect of -- Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables the purchaser to claim specific performance against person with no title or imperfect title -- Clause (a) of Section 13 (1) provides that if the vendor has subsequent to any contract acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest -- If there was any defect in his ownership, the same stood rectified on payment of instalment.

(Para 14)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will – Proof of -- Suspicious circumstances -- Execution of the Will proved by examining both the attesting witnesses – Despite lengthy cross examination, the defendants failed to impeach their credibility – Will is not surrounded by suspicious circumstances because of various documents executed by A.K. including agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, affidavit, apart from the Will.

(Para 15, 16)

91. (SC) 20-05-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 2(8)(9), 4 – Rejection of plaint -- Benami properties -- Whether a property is a benami, has to be considered not in the light of Section 4 of the Benami Act alone but also in connection with Sections 2 (8) and 2 (9) of the said Act i.e. whether the property if benami falls in the exception -- It is only where the property is benami and does not fall within the exception contained in Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 that a suit may be said to be barred -- However, the issue whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence and not simply on mere averments contained in the plaint -- Defendants have to adduce evidence to prove the property to be benami -- Plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 27-29)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Absolute property of hindu female -- Plea that plaint is hit by Section 14 of the Act -- No such specific plea was taken by the defendants in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- Such a plea was never raised and argued before either of the courts below -- There is no finding by any court on the above aspect -- Defendants cannot be permitted to raise such a plea for the first time in the Special Leave Petition without there being any foundation to that effect.

(Para 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Absolute property of hindu female -- Section 14 of the Act simply provides that the property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner -- It does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such a property -- Therefore, in the absence of any bar contained in the above provision, the suit plaint is not liable to be rejected as barred by law.

(Para 31)

96. (P&H HC) 14-05-2025

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135-140, 145, 150, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Electricity actionable matters -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Purposive interpretation -- All the actionable matters become amenable for exercising of jurisdiction thereover by the statutorily created special authorities/ special bodies -- There is complete ouster of adjudicatory jurisdiction by the Civil Courts.

(Para 30-32, 34)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135, 145, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Jurisdiction of Civil court -- Not only in respect of Section 126 and Section 127 of the Act of 2003 but also in respect of the matters falling within the ambit of Section 135 of the Act of 2003, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

(Para 33)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 151A, 153, 154 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Investigation by police – Offences tried by the Special Courts – Summary trial – Cross-examination of witnesses – Permissibility of -- Powers of investigations conferred upon the investigating officers serving in the police stations stems from the mandate enclosed in Section 151-A -- Reports prepared u/s 173 Cr.P.C., are to be filed before the Special Courts – Even a summary trial, does require the assigning of an opportunity to the accused to make effective cross-examination(s) upon the prosecution witnesses, as right to fair trial becomes envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 39-41)

D. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Civil liability – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – Only pursuant to a binding and conclusive verdict of conviction becoming made by the Special Court, vis-a-vis the errant consumer, the Special Court in terms of sub-Section (5) of Section 154 of the Act of 2003, shall proceed to determine the compensation amount to be paid by the consumer concerned, to the supplier.

(Para 44)

E. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 152, 154(5), 155 – Composition of offence – Civil liability -- Makings of composition(s) of an offence in terms of Section 152 of the Act of 2003, would tantamount to acceptance of the guilt by the errant consumer -- Post the making of an order of composition, if the compounding fee, does not also cover the civil liability, the Court concerned may proceed to determine the civil liability against the errant consumer.

(Para 48)

F. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Prosecution in Special court – Acquittal – Compensation for malicious prosecution – Jurisdiction of civil court -- There is no remedy to the accused, to post the making of a binding and clinching verdict of acquittal by the Special Court -- As such, in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, a suit in the said regard can be laid before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

(Para 53)

G. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 145 -- Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Jurisdiction of High Court – Judicial review -- Jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs of various genres, is a constitutionally invested power, and, the said power is an in-segregable component of judicial review of administrative actions, or of the quasi-judicial actions, besides is the basic structure of the constitution -- As such, the power of judicial review of High Courts cannot be snatched even through the occurrence of Section 145 in the Act of 2003.

(Para 54)

100. (SC) 05-05-2025

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Recall/ further examination of witness – Stage of – Scope of -- If it appears to a court trying the suit at any stage of the proceedings that it is necessary to recall and further examine a witness it can always do so -- This power can be exercised even at the stage of writing a judgment by the court -- Power is to be used for removing ambiguities, for clarifying the statement and not for the purposes of filling up the lacuna in a party's case -- Power can be exercised by the Court at its own initiative and may even be so done at the instance of a party.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17, Section 151 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Recall/ further examination of witness – Cross-examination – Permissibility of -- Section 165 of the Evidence Act provides that a Judge may in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness about any fact relevant -- If the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 are read along with the provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act it is clear that the power to recall and re-examine a witness is exclusively that of the court trying the suit -- The parties to the suit cannot take any objection to the question asked nor can they be permitted to cross-examine any witness without the leave of the court -- If circumstances warrant, an opportunity to a party to re-call a witness for examining, cross-examining or re-examining can be granted by a Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C.

(Para 7, 10)