Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 52 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47, Order 21 Rule 58, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104 -- Doctrine of lis pendens – Separate suit – Maintainability of – Third party rights – Adjudication of doctrine of lis pendens along with Rules 58, 89 to 92, 99 to 104 of Order XXI CPC respectively and Section 47 CPC is as follows:

(i) Section 52 of the 1882 Act embodying the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to suits where any right to the property in question is directly and specifically in issue. Whether any right in the property was directly and specifically in question in the suit would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The doctrine cannot blindly be made inapplicable to suits in which the plaint contains a specific averment that the mortgaged property be attached and sold in lieu of the decree or a charge be created on the property. If interpreted so, any judgment-debtor can render the decree incapable of execution by transferring his interest in the property during the pendency of such a suit.

(ii) Rule 89 of Order XXI CPC provides an opportunity to any person claiming an interest in the property sold or a person acting for or on behalf of the persons having such interest, another opportunity to save the property from the clutches of the sale. A sine qua non for setting aside the sale under this rule would be the payment of the deposit as prescribed therein within a period of sixty days from the date of the sale. For the purposes of this rule, a pendente lite transferee of the judgment-debtor would also fall under the ambit of the phrase “person claiming an interest in the property sold”.

(iii) Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC provides that the sale shall be set-aside if there exists any material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. Furthermore, such material irregularity or fraud must cause a substantial injury to the applicant under Rule 90. In other words, there must be a direct nexus between the material irregularity or fraud and the substantial injury caused to the applicant.

(iv) The words “material irregularity in publishing or conducting it” in Rule 90 would include any material irregularity or fraud occurring at a stage prior to the proclamation of sale as well, provided that the applicant did not have an opportunity to raise or could not have raised such a grievance at the appropriate time. Furthermore, the mere absence of or any defect in the attachment, by itself, cannot be a ground for setting aside the sale under Rule 90, unless substantial injury is proved. The applicant must make specific averments as regards the alleged irregularities or fraud, and convince the executing court that a substantial injury has been caused to him as a consequence.

(v) The absence of a saleable interest on the part of the judgment-debtor to the suit property cannot be brought in as a ground under Rule 90 of Order XXI CPC. Such a ground would squarely fall within the ambit of Rule 58 of Order XXI CPC, if the sale is yet to be confirmed.

(vi) Rule 92(3) of Order XXI CPC states that no person against whom an order under Rule 92 is made (either confirming the sale under Rule 92(1) or setting it aside under Rule 92(2) can institute a separate suit in that regard. However, there is a very narrow scope for a person to file a separate suit despite the bar under Rule 92(3). The reason for such a separate suit must be that the execution proceedings and the sale was without jurisdiction and therefore, a nullity and not binding on the plaintiff who has instituted a separate suit.

(vii) Having said so, before holding such a separate suit instituted by a plaintiff alleging that the entire execution proceedings was without jurisdiction and therefore, the sale was a nullity, maintainable, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the plaintiff was not a party to the original decree or a representative of a party to the original decree, as stated in Section 47 CPC. If so, instead of filing a separate suit, such persons must prefer an application under Section 47 CPC. Upon any failure to do so, their separate suit would be hit by the bar contained in Section 47 CPC which specifically uses the words “and not by a separate suit”.

(viii) The term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would mean a party other than the judgment-debtor, decree-holder or the auction-purchaser and would refer to a party who has not had his right, title or interest vis-à-vis the property in question adjudicated under Rule 58, Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC respectively. To put it very simply, the term “third party” under Rule 92(4) would refer to a party who is extraneous to the original suit proceedings and the proceedings under Order XXI CPC, and who either has not had his right, title or interest adjudicated or having the opportunity to have his right, title or interest adjudicated, has not availed such a remedy within the required time. Such a “third party” would also be someone who falls outside the scope of Section 47 CPC.

(ix) Rule 92(4) is not a provision which confers any right to the third party to institute a suit for challenging the title of the judgment-debtor to the property which is subject to the execution proceedings. It is merely a procedural provision which states that such a suit must be instituted against the auction-purchaser, where the decree-holder and judgment-debtor would be necessary parties.

(x) When a party other than the judgment-debtor, including a third party, is dispossessed during the course of execution of a decree, the only remedy for such a dispossessed party would lie in filing an application under Rule 99 complaining of its dispossession. In such an application, all questions including that of the right, title and interest of the parties in the proceeding, to the property, would be examined by the executing court.

(xi) The words “may” used in Rule 99 along with the words “and not by a separate suit” used in Rule 101, must not be read to mean that a party who has been dispossessed has two options i.e., to either prefer an application under Rule 99 or to file a separate suit, the moment they are dispossessed.  This would defeat the underlying object of the amendment made to the scheme of Rules 99 to 104 respectively wherein the executing court has been specifically empowered to look into the questions relating to the right, title and interest of the parties, quite akin to that which would have been done by way of a separate suit. Once the period of limitation for preferring an application under Rule 99 lapses, the person who has been dispossessed in the course of the execution of the decree, including a third party, cannot file a separate suit to circumvent or by-pass the said prescribed period of limitation.

(xii) Rule 102 prevents the executing court from passing any order under Rule 100 if it is found that the applicant under Rule 99 is a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor. This again, cannot be construed as giving leeway to such a person to institute a separate suit. Court say so for the simple reason that, even in the separate suit, the law would not look favorably upon a pendente lite transferee, and no relief of declaration of title and/or possession would be granted to him. His fate would be the same as under an application under Rule 99.

(xiii) Therefore, - First, the separate suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively would be non-maintainable because they are representatives of the judgment-debtor and the bar envisaged under Section 47 CPC would squarely apply to their case. Secondly, having not availed the remedy under Rule 99 of Order XXI CPC within time, the separate suit instituted for the same relief(s) would be barred. Thirdly, even if the aforesaid two reasons assigned could be said to not affect the suit instituted by the respondent nos. 1 and 2 respectively, they would still not be entitled to the reliefs claimed owing to them being pendente lite transferees of the judgment-debtor whose transaction would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

(Para 256)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 – Execution of decree -- Objections -- An objection petition under Section 47 should not invariably be treated as a commencement of a new trial -- Jurisdiction lies in a narrow compass -- Object of Section 47 is to prevent unwarranted litigation and dispose of all objections as expeditiously as possible -- There is a steady rise of proceedings akin to a retrial which causes failure of realization of the fruits of a decree, unless prima facie grounds are made out entertaining objections under Section 47 would be an abuse of process.

(Para 97, 98)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – Res-judicata -- Suit being barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC or by res judicata, the trial Court rightly held that the same was a matter of evidence and the plaint could not have been rejected on the said ground.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7 -- Rejection of plaint – Ad-valorem court fee -- Petitioner was not an executant of the sale deed -- Once the plaintiff was not an executant of the sale deed and further the relief of possession had not been sought, there was no question of ordering the petitioner-plaintiff to affix the ad valorem court fee.

(Para 10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party -- For impleading a person as a party, two conditions must be satisfied: firstly, that there must be a right to some relief against such person in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; and secondly, that no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such person -- Power under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is discretionary and should be exercised sparingly but to advance the cause of complete justice and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Applicant placed on record Mutations and Jamabandi for the year 1996-97 showing transfer of the suit land from the State Government to ‘J’ and thereafter to himself -- Several rounds of litigation, including writ petitions before the High Court, in which his alleged rights over the same land have been contested -- These materials were sufficient to give the trial court a prima facie basis to conclude that the applicant has at least an arguable interest in the subject matter of the suit and that his presence would facilitate complete adjudication of the dispute.

(Para 2, 16)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction -- Objection as to claim based upon fraudulent documents – It is a matter of evidence which cannot be conclusively determined at the stage of impleadment -- Impleadment order does not confer any legitimacy upon applicant’s title; it merely allows him to be heard so that the court's final decree, if passed, may bind all persons claiming interest in the property and avoid future litigation -- Apprehension that the impleadment will prejudice the plaintiff/ petitioner's rights is thus unfounded.

(Para 2, 17)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 1 Rule 10 – Impleadment as party – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction --Dominus litis – Argument as to Plaintiff/ Petitioner, being dominus litis, is free to choose his defendants, cannot prevail when the relief claimed directly affects third-party rights reflected in the public records -- Petitioner's suit seeks declaration of nullity of a rapat entry and correction of revenue records may have an impact upon any person claiming interest through existing entries or documents.

(Para 2, 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 25 -- Transfer of suit -- Suit for groundless threat of infringement instituted by the petitioner before the Bombay High Court on 01.07.2025 is prior in time to the institution of the suit for infringement by the respondent no.1 on 07.07.2025 at Delhi High Court -- Jurisdiction at Delhi was invoked by the respondent no.1 by purchasing the product from an online portal and getting it delivered in Delhi -- Question of fact, law, and the issues to be determined in the suit for groundless threat of infringement instituted by the petitioner and the suit for infringement instituted by the respondent no. 1 are substantially overlapping -- In the interest of saving precious judicial time and to avoid duplication and multiplicity of proceedings, it would be expedient to transfer the suit for infringement instituted by the respondent no.1 pending before the Delhi High Court to the Bombay High Court where the suit instituted by the petitioner for Groundless Threat of Infringement is pending – Transfer petition allowed.

(Para 10-12)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8, Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 -- Second Proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order V CPC as amended by the Special Amendment under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 -- Non-filing of written statement – Cross-examination by defendant – Right of -- After the examination-in-chief of PW1 was closed, the cross-examination of Defendant no. 1 was taken as “Nil” on the ground that defendant had failed to file their written statement within stipulated time – Held, said reason is absolutely perverse and is contrary to the right of defence available to the defendant -- The purpose of cross-examination is to elicit the truth from the witness and impeach its credibility.

(Para 31)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 8, Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 -- Non-filing of written statement – Cross-examination by defendant – Right of -- When the WS was not allowed to be taken on record, the denial of the right to cross-examine cannot be taken away by leaving the defendant in lurch and this has acted as final nail in the coffin to defendant’s right of defence – Written Statement allowed to be field subject to payment of cost to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- and appellant/ defendant allowed to exercise his right of cross-examination of plaintiff’s witnesses.

(Para 31, 32)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 17 Rule 3 -- Closing of evidence -- Dismissal of application to lead and conclude evidence – Challenge to -- No cogent reason given by the petitioner to explain as to why in a period of 3½ years, petitioner has been unable to conclude his evidence – Very valuable public time of the Court has been expended in affording 26-27 opportunities to the petitioner -- However, the same cannot be misused to endlessly drag the matter to the unfair advantage or disadvantage of either party -- No ground to interfere in the impugned order – Revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 5, 12-16)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Amendment in prayer of suit – Petitioner/ Plaintiff dispossessed during the pendency of suit -- Petitioner earlier sought relief of injunction, but now, by way of the proposed amendment, he is seeking restoration of possession in his favour, on the basis of tenancy -- Such a relief sought by the petitioner would require detailed pleadings and independent evidence – Held, proposed amendment would fundamentally change the character and nature of the case -- Civil Judge has rightly declined the application for amendment of the civil suit.

(Para 10)

A. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation -- Already sold property – Appropriate remedy -- Revenue authorities refused to record name of the appellants after noticing the fact that the original person, through whom appellants-vendor claim right, had already sold his share and was not left with any land which could be transferred – Issues sought to be raised by the appellants cannot be examined in summary proceedings of mutation -- Remedy of the appellants would be to seek appropriate declaration from the competent Civil Court.

(Para 2-4)

B. Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVII of 1887), Section 34 – Mutation Proceeding – Nature of -- Any order passed in summary proceedings of mutation remain subservient to a declaration granted by the competent Civil Court.

(Para 4)

A. Karewa marriage – Void marriage -- At the time of alleged Karewa Mariage between S and SR, wife of SR namely L was still alive -- It is settled law that second marriage, during subsistence of first marriage, is null and void.

(Para 16)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence -- Application for additional evidence by way of DNA test to establish paternity of the defendants No.3 to 6 -- Plaintiff had moved the said application three-and-a-half years after initiation of appeal -- Plaintiff had failed to explain as to why the said application for producing evidence in question was not moved during trial; and why the said evidence was not produced before the learned trial Court -- Needless to say, the said facts were in the knowledge of the plaintiff during trial -- However, he failed to exercise due diligence -- No error in the dismissal of the said application of the plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the learned Lower Appellate Court.

(Para 17)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 10, 11 – Return of plaint – Rejection of plaint -- If the Civil Court is of the view that the dispute being commercial in nature has to go before the Commercial Court then the plaint has to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC -- Entire plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 7)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 38 -- Permanent injunction – Trespasser’ right – Claim as lessee -- For leasing out a Government land, the officials are required to adhere to the relevant statutory provisions -- Appellant failed to plead and prove as to when the lease was created in his favour and what were the terms -- It is not appropriate for the courts to protect possession of the trespassers while granting injunction against a true owner -- Property belongs to the Government -- Mere production of certain receipts evidencing the payment of certain amount without referring to the particular land would not come to the rescue of the appellant – Permanent  injunction declined by Ld. Appellate Court, upheld.

(Para 1, 5, 6)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 11, 96, 100 – Res-judicata – Two suits – Comon judgment -- One appeal – Effect of -- Trial Court dismissed Civil Suit No. 44 of 2004 and decreed Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006 based on common evidence lead by parties after clubbing of the suits -- There is not even a whisper about findings rendered by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006 in the grounds of First Appeal preferred against Civil Suit No. 44 of 2004 – Held, Ld. Additional District Judge was justified in dismissing the appeal preferred only against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No. 44 of 2004 without assailing the same in Civil Suit No. 95 of 2006 -- Appeal preferred before District Judge as well as present appeal is barred by principle of resjudicata.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 2(d) – Consideration -- Past consideration is as good as present consideration --  Word ‘consideration’ has been defined in Section 2 (d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which has a wider connotation and includes within its sweep not only the monetary consideration but even promises including promise to render future personal service.

(Para 13)

B. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), Section 54 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 201, 202 – Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 3, 4 -- Sale by Will/ Agreement to Sell/ General Power of attorney/ Affidavit -- PW-1/ S K deposed that her brother/ A.K. was only a Class IV employee and on her request and on her behalf he applied for the house in his name -- A.K/ Brother executed an agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, registered Will and an affidavit – Hence, Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 could not be invoked -- After the death of A.K. on 14.08.1984, his widow and children never made any attempt to pay the instalments -- All instalments were paid by S.K. and her daughter -- All the documents of the property have been produced by the plaintiff -- Hence, it is proved that there was sale of the house in favour of Ms. S.K. by A.K -- Likewise, the General Power of Attorney will not cease to have effect because Ms.SK has interest in the property in view of agreement and Will -- Case falls under Section 202 and not 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

(Para 13, 18)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 13 -- Agreement to sell of imperfect title – Effect of -- Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 enables the purchaser to claim specific performance against person with no title or imperfect title -- Clause (a) of Section 13 (1) provides that if the vendor has subsequent to any contract acquired any interest in the property, the purchaser may compel him to make good the contract out of such interest -- If there was any defect in his ownership, the same stood rectified on payment of instalment.

(Para 14)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 68 -- Will – Proof of -- Suspicious circumstances -- Execution of the Will proved by examining both the attesting witnesses – Despite lengthy cross examination, the defendants failed to impeach their credibility – Will is not surrounded by suspicious circumstances because of various documents executed by A.K. including agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, affidavit, apart from the Will.

(Para 15, 16)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11, Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, Section 96  -- Rejection of plaint – Appeal against – Temporary injunction – Legality of -- Where an appeal is filed by being aggrieved by the rejection of a plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the High Court ought not to have granted an order of temporary injunction -- When the plaint itself has been rejected, it cannot be said that the appeal filed against such an order is a continuation of a suit -- Until it is revived / restored, an order of temporary injunction cannot operate against the defendant in the suit.

(Para 5)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (45 of 1988), Section 2(8)(9), 4 – Rejection of plaint -- Benami properties -- Whether a property is a benami, has to be considered not in the light of Section 4 of the Benami Act alone but also in connection with Sections 2 (8) and 2 (9) of the said Act i.e. whether the property if benami falls in the exception -- It is only where the property is benami and does not fall within the exception contained in Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 that a suit may be said to be barred -- However, the issue whether the property is benami and is not covered by the exception, is an issue to be decided on the basis of evidence and not simply on mere averments contained in the plaint -- Defendants have to adduce evidence to prove the property to be benami -- Plaint cannot be rejected at the stage of consideration of application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

(Para 27-29)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Absolute property of hindu female -- Plea that plaint is hit by Section 14 of the Act -- No such specific plea was taken by the defendants in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC -- Such a plea was never raised and argued before either of the courts below -- There is no finding by any court on the above aspect -- Defendants cannot be permitted to raise such a plea for the first time in the Special Leave Petition without there being any foundation to that effect.

(Para 30)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 -- Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 14 – Absolute property of hindu female -- Section 14 of the Act simply provides that the property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner -- It does not bar or prohibit a suit in respect of such a property -- Therefore, in the absence of any bar contained in the above provision, the suit plaint is not liable to be rejected as barred by law.

(Para 31)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Transfer of Divorce petition – Pathankot to Gurdaspur – Generally, the Courts lean towards the convenience of wife, in case of transfer applications, however, it is not a thumb rule -- Various other circumstances coming forth, also ought to be taken into consideration -- Two sons are studying in B.Sc. (Agricultural) at Hoshiarpur, as well as in 10th class are in the custody of the applicant/ wife -- Applicant herself is working as a teacher -- Interim maintenance has been fixed to facilitate the applicant to bear the expenditure of studies of both the children -- Other weighing factor is distance between the two places, which is less than 40 kilometres and there are well connected means of transport on the said route – Transfer application dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, Section 47 -- Decree for possession with respect to a specific shop identified by the properties located in all the four directions -- Objector purchased the suit property, ten years after the decree was passed -- All the objection petitions are not required to be decided after framing the issues -- Prima facie, merit of the objection petition is to be examined by the Executing Court – Executing Court gave direction for registration of FIR against the judgment debtors and the objector -- FIR already registered by the decree holder will continue and shall remain unaffected – Objection petition dismissed, orders upheld.

(Para 2, 8-12)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 24 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13 – Transfer of divorce petition – Rohtak to Jind -- Generally, the Courts give preference to the convenience of wife in the transfer applications relating to the matrimonial disputes -- Applicant is not having any source of earning and she is taking care of the minor daughter -- Besides the same, three cases arising from this matrimonial dispute, are already pending in the Courts at Jind and the respondent is making appearance -- Transfer application allowed.

(Para 6-7)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 A – Additional evidence in suit -- Order 18 Rule 17 A of the CPC which provided for production of additional evidence not previously known or which could not be produced despite due diligence has already been deleted from the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 -- Thus, there is no right to lead additional evidence.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17A -- Application for comparison through handwriting expert -- Suit for declaration and for possession in 2011 -- Reliance in the suit upon compromise dated 25.10.2010 -- In the written statement it was plea that the compromise dated 25.10.2010 was a result of fabrication -- Once the petitioner has taken the said plea in his written statement, then it was open to him to have led all evidence in support of the said plea till the time his evidence was closed – On 08.08.2023 i.e., after more than 12 years of institution of the suit, an application seeking permission for comparison through handwriting expert filed – After evidence had been closed, application cannot be allowed.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135-140, 145, 150, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Electricity actionable matters -- Jurisdiction of Civil Court -- Purposive interpretation -- All the actionable matters become amenable for exercising of jurisdiction thereover by the statutorily created special authorities/ special bodies -- There is complete ouster of adjudicatory jurisdiction by the Civil Courts.

(Para 30-32, 34)

B. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 126, 127, 135, 145, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Jurisdiction of Civil court -- Not only in respect of Section 126 and Section 127 of the Act of 2003 but also in respect of the matters falling within the ambit of Section 135 of the Act of 2003, there is complete ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.

(Para 33)

C. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 151A, 153, 154 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173 – Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Investigation by police – Offences tried by the Special Courts – Summary trial – Cross-examination of witnesses – Permissibility of -- Powers of investigations conferred upon the investigating officers serving in the police stations stems from the mandate enclosed in Section 151-A -- Reports prepared u/s 173 Cr.P.C., are to be filed before the Special Courts – Even a summary trial, does require the assigning of an opportunity to the accused to make effective cross-examination(s) upon the prosecution witnesses, as right to fair trial becomes envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 39-41)

D. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Civil liability – Jurisdiction of Civil Court – Only pursuant to a binding and conclusive verdict of conviction becoming made by the Special Court, vis-a-vis the errant consumer, the Special Court in terms of sub-Section (5) of Section 154 of the Act of 2003, shall proceed to determine the compensation amount to be paid by the consumer concerned, to the supplier.

(Para 44)

E. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 152, 154(5), 155 – Composition of offence – Civil liability -- Makings of composition(s) of an offence in terms of Section 152 of the Act of 2003, would tantamount to acceptance of the guilt by the errant consumer -- Post the making of an order of composition, if the compounding fee, does not also cover the civil liability, the Court concerned may proceed to determine the civil liability against the errant consumer.

(Para 48)

F. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135, 154 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Theft of electricity – Prosecution in Special court – Acquittal – Compensation for malicious prosecution – Jurisdiction of civil court -- There is no remedy to the accused, to post the making of a binding and clinching verdict of acquittal by the Special Court -- As such, in respect of the claim of malicious prosecution, a suit in the said regard can be laid before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

(Para 53)

G. Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 145 -- Constitution of India, Article 226, 227 -- Jurisdiction of High Court – Judicial review -- Jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writs of various genres, is a constitutionally invested power, and, the said power is an in-segregable component of judicial review of administrative actions, or of the quasi-judicial actions, besides is the basic structure of the constitution -- As such, the power of judicial review of High Courts cannot be snatched even through the occurrence of Section 145 in the Act of 2003.

(Para 54)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 1 – Withdrawal of suit for declaration -- Abandonment of claim – Plaintiff seeking same relief without seeking permission to file fresh one at the time of withdrawal earlier not maintainable – Having abandoned the main claim, plaintiff cannot maintain suit for consequential relief of possession – Plaintiff rightly non-suited by invoking Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC.

(Para 12-14)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- It may be true that Order 7 Rule 11 even though authorizes the Court to reject a plaint on failure on the part of the plaintiff to disclose a cause of action but the same would not mean that the averments made therein or a document upon which reliance has been placed although discloses a cause of action, the plaint would still be rejected on the ground that such averments are not sufficient to prove the facts stated therein for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the suit.

(Para 17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint -- Plaint is not to be looked in isolation distinct from the documents relied upon with the plaint.

(Para 17)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Rejection of plaint – “does not disclose the cause of action” -- The phrase “does not disclose the cause of action” has to be very narrowly construed -- Rejection of plaint at the threshold entails very serious consequences -- This power therefore has to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and ought to be used only when the Court is absolutely sure that plaintiff does not have any arguable case at all.

(Para 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 6 Rule 17 -- Eviction petition under rent law -- Amendment of reply – Due diligence – Trial is at fag end -- Case was fixed for arguments, but the arguments were not addressed, even after availing almost 10 opportunities and only thereafter,  the application was filed -- Respondent not able to show that in spite of due diligence, the respondent could not raise the pleas before the commencement of the trial – Proposed amendment application is not bonafide and is only a malicious attempt on the part of the respondent-tenant to prolong the lis – Application for amendment of reply dismissed.

(Para 13-18)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17 – Recall/ further examination of witness – Stage of – Scope of -- If it appears to a court trying the suit at any stage of the proceedings that it is necessary to recall and further examine a witness it can always do so -- This power can be exercised even at the stage of writing a judgment by the court -- Power is to be used for removing ambiguities, for clarifying the statement and not for the purposes of filling up the lacuna in a party's case -- Power can be exercised by the Court at its own initiative and may even be so done at the instance of a party.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 18 Rule 17, Section 151 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Recall/ further examination of witness – Cross-examination – Permissibility of -- Section 165 of the Evidence Act provides that a Judge may in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness about any fact relevant -- If the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 are read along with the provisions of Section 165 of the Evidence Act it is clear that the power to recall and re-examine a witness is exclusively that of the court trying the suit -- The parties to the suit cannot take any objection to the question asked nor can they be permitted to cross-examine any witness without the leave of the court -- If circumstances warrant, an opportunity to a party to re-call a witness for examining, cross-examining or re-examining can be granted by a Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C.

(Para 7, 10)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Observation therein – Effect of -- It is settled law that the observations made in the order while rejecting the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC or the appeal therefrom are only for the purpose of deciding the said application -- Suit is to be decided by the trial Court independent of the said observations in accordance with the evidence on record.

(Para 3)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 151 -- Additional evidence – Rebuttal evidence -- Plaintiff-petitioner is setting up entirely a new case by way of leading additional evidence qua which there are no pleadings -- Jamabandi, which is now sought to be produced to show the possession of the plaintiff-petitioner, was to be produced in the affirmative as the onus was upon plaintiff -- Having not led the evidence in the affirmative, the plaintiff-petitioner cannot now be permitted to fill in the lacuna in the case by leading the said evidence as additional evidence --  Question of permitting the judgment to be produced as additional evidence qua which there are no pleadings would not arise.

-- Application itself is totally bereft as to why the said evidence was not led earlier.

-- There is not even a whisper that the plaintiff-petitioner was not aware of this evidence at the time of leading his evidence in the affirmative.

Application for additional evidence dismissed by Trial court – No fault, revision dismissed.

(Para 1, 4, 7-9)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Bar to appeal -- Proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 is not optional; it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record who denies the compromise -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create a new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already before the Appellate Court, to attack the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded -- When the fact of compromise is not disputed, the bar in Section 96(3) is absolute.

(Para 11)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43 Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Bar to appeal -- Compromise terms signed by Counsels -- Challenge to -- Both decrees rest on written compromise terms signed by counsel who held unquestioned vakalatnamas -- Signature of duly authorised counsel is the signature of the party -- Decrees are therefore consent decrees within the meaning of Section 96(3) -- Appellant never invoked the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3; instead, she lodged Appeals from Orders on the footing of the deleted Order XLIII Rule 1(m) -- Appellant’s submission that allegations of fraud transform a consent decree into an ordinary decree cannot be accepted -- Fraud, want of authority or other vitiating elements are precisely the matters that the proviso directs the Trial Court to examine -- Unless and until that route is pursued, the statutory bar in Section 96(3) of the CPC remains operative.

(Para 12, 13)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 23 Rule 3, Order 43, Rule 1A, Section 96(3) – Compromise decree – Challenge to – Maintainability of Appeal – The CPC, after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways -- If a person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful compromise ever took place, the CPC requires that person to go back to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and ask that Court to decide whether the compromise is valid -- On the other hand, someone who was not a party to the suit, but whose rights are hurt by a consent decree, may approach the Appellate Court in a First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, but only after obtaining leave -- Order XLIII Rule 1-A does not create an independent appeal at all.

(Para 15)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 41 Rule 23A, 25, 27 – Additional evidence – Additional Issue – Remitting back of appeal – Permissibility of -- First Appellate Court is a Court of fact and law both and the application for additional evidence can be allowed -- First Appellate Court erred in remitting the matter back to the trial Court after framing additional issue and permitting the plaintiff to lead additional evidence -- First Appellate Court has neither set aside the judgment of the trial Court on merits nor it has formed an opinion that re-trial of the case is necessary -- Hence, the impugned order passed by the First Appellate Court to the limited extent of remitting the matter back to the lower Court set aside and the first appeal is restored to its original number -- Court will proceed in accordance with Order 41 Rule 25 of the CPC.

(Para 7-10)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- When the First Appellate Court in exercise of its jurisdiction has considered the entire evidence and rendered a finding, the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence just because another view is possible, when the view taken by the First Appellate Court is plausible and does not suffer from vice in law -- When the determination of the High Court is only by way of re-appreciation of the existing evidence, without there being any legal question to be answered, it would be axiomatic that not even a question of law is involved, much less a substantial one.

(Para 12.1)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, 103 – First Appeal -- Regular Second Appeal – Scope of interference -- First Appellate Court analyzed the entire oral evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the documentary evidence relied upon by either side, and dismissed the suit -- Authority to re-consider the evidence is available only to the First Appellate Court under Section 96 and not to the High Court in exercise of its authority under Section 100, unless the case falls under the exceptional circumstances provided under Section 103.

(Para 12.2)

C. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Family property – Burdon of proof -- It is a settled principle of law that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family -- The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property -- If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, then there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available -- That apart, while considering the term ‘nucleus’ it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities.

(Para 13)

D. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 – Ancestral property -- For a property to be considered as an ancestral property, it has to be inherited from any of the paternal ancestors up to three generations.

(Para 14)

E. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Partiton of ancestral property – Self-acquired property -- As per Hindu law, after partition, each party gets a separate and distinct share and this share becomes their self-acquired property and they have absolute rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or bequeath it as they wish -- After the death of the father, the joint family became unmanageable due to difference of opinion among the members and therefore, they decided that it was not good to stay together and partitioned the lands allotted to them -- Thus, the intention of the parties and the recitals in the partition deed establish that the parties wanted to go their separate ways and did not want the property to remain as joint family property -- Properties bequeathed through partition, become the self-acquired properties of the respective sharers -- The mere existence of sons and daughters in a joint Hindu family does not make the father's separate or self-acquired property as joint family property.

(Para 17-19)

F. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Joint Hindu Family property – Income and Sale consideration -- Expenses incurred for maintenance, marriage and education of children -- When the income derived from the joint family property or when a joint family property is sold and the sale consideration is utilised for maintenance and education within the joint family, the same are to be treated as out of necessity as it is the duty of every Kartha to do so -- Hence, it is sufficient to satisfy the legal necessity if the Kartha had sold the property and used the funds for upbringing the children -- That apart, under the customary practices and tradition, it is the father who performs the marriage of his children and therefore, the expenses incurred for that purposes are also to be treated as expenses out of necessity.

(Para 19.1)

G. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (30 of 1956), Section 6 -- Separate/ self-acquired of a member of joint Hindu family – Abandonment of status – From the mere fact that other members of the family were allowed to use the property jointly with himself, or that the income of the separate property was utilized out of generosity to support persons whom the holder was either bound or not bound to support, or from the failure to maintain separate accounts, abandonment cannot be inferred, for an act of generosity or kindness, will not ordinarily be regarded as an admission of a legal obligation.

(Para 20)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Mandatory or discretionary -- Provisions of Rule 6 are enabling, discretionary and permissive -- They are not mandatory, obligatory or peremptory -- If the court is of the opinion that it is not safe to pass a judgment on admissions, or that a case involves questions which cannot be appropriately dealt with and decided on the basis of admission, it may, in exercise of its discretion, refuse to pass a judgment and may insist upon clear proof of even admitted facts.

(Para 28-30)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 -- Judgment on admissions – Stage of – Right of -- Rule authorizes the court to enter a judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a decree on such admitted claim -- This can be done at any stage -- Plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by the defendant in his written statement at any stage of the suit although he has joined issue on the defence -- Defendant may apply for dismissal of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff in rejoinder.

(Para 39)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6, Order 8 Rule 5 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 58 – Partial judgment/ decree on admissions – Since the object of sub-rule (1) is to enable the plaintiff to get judgment on admission of the defendant to the extent of such admission, he must get the benefit thereof immediately without waiting for the determination of “non-admitted claim” -- Sub-rule (2) makes it imperative for the court to draw up a decree in terms of judgment on admission which can be executed by the plaintiff -- In such cases, there may be two decrees; (i) in respect of admitted claim; and (ii) in respect of “non-admitted” or contested claim.

(Para 42)

D. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 12 Rule 6 – Judgment on admissions – A decree under Rule 6 may be either preliminary or final.

(Para 43)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2, Order 23 Rule 1(3)(b) – Withdrawal of suit with liberty to file fresh -- Petitioner raised her grievance against execution of the gift deed  and consequent attestation of mutation, but no specific relief has been prayed to declare the gift deed illegal, null or void and not binding on the rights of petitioner -- Such omission entails consequences under order 2 rule 2 of the Code -- Petitioner cannot sue again in respect of the omitted portion of the claim -- Since, the plea which had been left from incorporation, could not be said to be alien to the subject matter or cause of action of the suit, even the requirements of order 23 rule 1(3) (b) were satisfied -- Suit is at very initial stage, issues have not been framed; therefore, no prejudice likely to be caused to the respondents --  Petitioner permitted to withdraw the suit with permission to file afresh on the same cause of action.

(Para 11-19)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 – Regular Second Appeal – Condonation of delay -- State cannot be given any undue indulgence as compared to an ordinary litigant, especially in matters of limitation -- All parties, whether or not State under Article 12 of the Constitution, are required to act with due diligence and promptitude.

(Para 13)

A. CCS Pension Rules, 1972, Rule 56 – Regularization of daily wage employee – Pensionary  benefits -- Petitioner was engaged on daily wage basis prior to 10.05.2001 and his services were regularized thereafter -- Petitioner shall be deemed to have retired on attaining the age of 60 years i.e. w.e.f. 12.07.2012 – A period of two years is to be added towards the qualifying service of petitioner to the period of 7 years 6 months and 12 days -- Petitioner rendered total eligible regular service of 9 years, 6 months and 12 days -- Petitioner has rendered more than 8 years of service though less than 10 years of service and for such reason his service is to be reckoned as 10 years, which makes him qualified for pensionary benefits.

(Para 11-17)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 2 Rule 2—Constructive res-judicata -- Petitioner approached the Court in the year 2014 for grant of benefit of work charge/regularization -- His petition was not decided on merits and directions were issued to the competent authority to consider the case of the petitioner -- It was on such consideration that the benefit of work charge and regularization was granted to the petitioner -- Once the petitioner got such benefit, he immediately made a claim for pensionary benefits in the year 2015 which was finally rejected by the respondents in the year 2019 -- Petition cannot be said to suffer from principle of constructive res judicata or Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as the petitioner had sought the relief of pensionary benefits at the first available opportunity.

(Para 18)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908), Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction -- Co-owner -- Electricity in name of defendant – Right of irrigation -- One of the cosharers of the tubewell cannot deprive the right of irrigation to the other co-sharer by unauthorisedly removing the common facility for irrigating the fields.

(Para 4)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 13 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 26 Rule 9 – Eviction petition -- Appointment of Local Commissioner -- No right vested in favour of a party to get the said commission issued and rather the same is an enabling provision that enables the Court to appoint a Commissioner if it is of the opinion that the same is required in a case.

(Para 5)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 37, 38, 39, Order 21 -- Execution of decree – Time limit of 6 months -- All the High Courts directed to call for the necessary information from their respective district judiciary as regards pendency of the execution petitions -- High Courts shall thereafter proceed to issue an administrative order or circular, directing their respective district judiciary to ensure that the execution petitions pending in various courts shall be decided and disposed of within a period of six months without fail otherwise the concerned presiding officer would be answerable to the High Court on its administrative side.

(Para 75)

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (III of 1949), Section 2(c), 13 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 -- Eviction of tenant – Execution of order/ decree -- ‘Landlord’ has been defined as a person, who is entitled to receive the rent -- It is not synonymous with the word ‘Owner’ -- If the tenants/ appellants have any dispute with landlord, then they have to establish their rights in the separate suit -- At this stage, only the Executing Court is required to deliver possession in favour of the decree holder.

(Para 3)

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 2(b), 12 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 39 Rule 2(a) -- Contempt of Court -- Agreement to sell after Status quo order – Agreement to sell and acceptance of sale consideration despite the interim orders, held to be contempt of Court -- Respondent no. 1 to 4 held guilty of civil contempt, as defined under section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Rule-2(a) of the Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -- Unconditional apology tendered at the fag end of the proceedings, rejected – Fine of Rs.2,000/- on respondent no. 1 to 4 / Senior citizens each and costs of Rs.1,00,000/- as per Rule 21 of Contempt of Court (Gujarat High Court) Rules, 1984 imposed -- Agreement to sell held to be nonest and void ab initio, the same quashed and set aside.

(Para 17, 18, 28, 33, 34)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 96, 151, Order 41 Rule 27 – Additional evidence in appeal -- Application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC dismissed whereas the first appeal is pending -- Impugned order set aside and the First Appellate Court directed to consider the application for additional evidence afresh along with main appeal and at the time of deciding of the main appeal.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 11 Rule 14 – Production of documents – Discretion of court -- Provision does not give an absolute right to a party to seek production of documents at any stage of the proceedings and the same is an enabling power with the Court.

(Para 4)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 7 Rule 11 – Powers of Attorney Act, 1882 (7 of 1882), Section 2 -- Rejection of plaint -- Power of attorney – Conveyance already made -- Cancellation of attorney after 11 years -- Cause of action -- Power holder having exercised the authority conferred; to convey the properties in the name of the purchasers, the cancellation of the power of attorney will have no effect on the conveyances carried out under the valid power conferred -- Nor would it confer the person who executed the power of attorney any cause of action, by virtue of a cancellation of the power conferred by a subsequent document, to challenge the valid exercise of the power when it existed – Order of rejection of plaint passed by trial court affirmed.

(Para 8, 9)

Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), Section 22C, 22E – Public Utility Services – Permanent Lok Adalat – Territorial Jurisdiction – Insurance policy was issued from Chandigarh Branch, whereas, the place of occurrence/ accident is in district Auraiya (Uttar Pradesh) – Application preferred by the petitioner before the PLA at Gurugram is a misconceived motion, on account of territorial jurisdiction – Liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the competent authority/Court of territorial jurisdiction in accordance with law.

(Para 3, 4)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 34 – Cancellation of allotment -- Forfeiture of amount – Suit for declaration that cancellation was null and void -- HUDCO was in breach of several obligations as contemplated in the Allotment Letter, viz. failure to execute documents for securing approval under the ULCR Act and the IT Act; failure to execute the sub lease agreement in favour of the Appellant and; failure to secure the approval of the revised layout plan for the construction of the hotel -- It is a settled position of law that a commercial document ought not to be interpreted in a manner that arrives at a complete variance with what may originally have been the intention of the parties -- Respondent No. 1/HUDCO, was in breach of its reciprocal contractual obligations, thereby disentitling them from forfeiting the monies already paid by the Appellant towards the first instalment as enshrined in Clause 5 (iii) of the Allotment Letter – Appellant has blatantly engaged in forum shopping, and considering that their overall conduct does not in any manner reflect an approach aligning with the clean hands doctrine, they are not entitled to grant of any discretionary relief of interest in their favour -- Appellant held entitled to a refund of the principal amount, without any interest.

(Para 42-47, 60)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 34 – Interest -- It is trite law that u/s 34 of the CPC, the award of interest is a discretionary exercise steeped in equitable considerations.

(Para 49)

A. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Show cause notice – Challenge to -- Writ jurisdiction -- Writ Court should not entertain any petition, seeking to challenge a show cause notice unless the Court is convinced that the same has been issued by an authority having no jurisdiction, or the same is tainted with mala fides.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 74 -- Breach of contractual obligations -- Punitive measures – Blacklisting of contractor -- A mere allegation of breach of contractual obligations without anything more, per se, does not invite any such punitive action.

(Para 34)

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Regular Second Appeal – Substantial question of law – Interim order – Power of -- Second appeal will be maintainable before the High Court, if the case involves a substantial question of law -- High Court, without formulating substantial questions of law, granted the interim relief by directing the parties to maintain status quo, till the next date of hearing – Held, High Court could not have passed the interim order without satisfying itself of the existence of a substantial question of law, as mandated u/s 100 CPC – Interim order passed by High Court set aside.

(Para 10.4, 11, 13)

A. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28 – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Annulment of decree – Power of -- A suit for specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the control over the decree even after the decree has been passed -- Decree for specific performance has been described as a preliminary decree -- Power u/s 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it -- Court does not cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100 – Decree of appellate Court – Execution of -- Once the High Court as an appellate court in second appeal renders its judgment it is a decree of the second appellate court which becomes executable.

(Para 34)

C. Specific Relief Act, 1963 (47 of 1963), Section 28  – Decree of Specific performance – Extension of time – Modification of decree -- When time for payment of money is extended, it does not mean a modification of the decree -- Trial court has power to extend the time, and the expression “such further period as the court may allow” would mean the court which had passed the decree, or, where the application u/s 28 of the Act of 1963, is filed.

(Para 44, 45)

A. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Breach of injunction -- Imprisonment of a judgment-debtor – Attachment of property -- Once it is proved that J.D. had wilfully and with impunity disobeyed an order of injunction, the court owes it to itself to make the judgment-debtor realise that it does not pay to defy a decree of a court -- Court’s power under Order 21, Rule 32 is no more than a procedural aid to the harried decree-holder -- But the court has to record a finding that the judgment-debtor wilfully disobeyed or failed to comply with the decree in spite of opportunity afforded to him -- Absence of such finding is a serious infirmity vitiating the order.

(Para 44, 45)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Continuous breach of injunction – Res-judicata --  Each breach of injunction is independent and actionable in law making the judgment-debtor answerable -- Where there are successive breaches of decree, the judgment-debtor can be dealt with on every such breach and the doctrine of res judicata has no application.

(Para 46)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Detention of Judgment debtor – Onus to prove of  willful disobedience -- Onus of placing materials before the executing Court for enabling it to record a finding that the person against whom the order of detention is sought, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree for injunction, but has wilfully disobeyed it, lies on the person seeking such order of detention, lest the person seeking deprivation of the liberty of another cannot do so without fully satisfying the Court about its need.

(Para 50)

D. Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Detention of Judgment debtor – Revisional jurisdiction -- High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution must ascertain before interfering with any order passed by a subordinate court or tribunal whether the same suffers from any jurisdictional error -- Court should be guided by its conscience, more particularly keeping in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and not strictly go by the term “jurisdictional error” -- It is very easy for the High Court to say that there is no jurisdictional error and, therefore, no interference is warranted but before saying so, the High Court should be mindful of the consequences that would follow like arrest, detention in civil prison and attachment of property.

(Para 53)

E. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 21 Rule 32 – Execution of decree – Detention of Judgment debtor – Attachment of property -- Opportunity of hearing -- Executing court should have been a little more considerate while declining even to take the objections on record and give one opportunity of hearing to the appellants before passing the order of arrest, detention in a civil prison and attachment of the property -- This aspect overlooked even by the High Court while affirming the order passed by the executing court -- Supervisory jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is meant to take care of such situations -- Impugned orders set aside.

(Para 59, 60)

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 7, 11 – Appointment of Arbitrator – Arbitration agreement -- An arbitration agreement is sine qua non for arbitration proceedings.

(Para 20)

B. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996), Section 7, 11, 34 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 47 -- Ex-parte arbitration award – Setting aside of -- Objections filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the A&C Act were dismissed by the trial court on the ground that they were barred by limitation and had been filed beyond the condonable period -- Authenticity of the agreement cannot be established as it is not available on the record of the Municipal Board -- State Government has denied the existence of any such agreement – No evidence to show the existence of the arbitration agreement, except a piece of paper, which is not even a certified copy or an authenticated copy of the official records -- Arbitration, which is quasi-judicial, requires a standard of behaviour of arbitrators, which is impartial and independent, no less stringent than that demanded of judges – Both the Awards shall be treated as null and void and non-enforceable in law – Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, permits a party at the stage of execution to object to the decree, both on the grounds of fraud, as well as lack of subject matter jurisdiction – Appeals allowed, ex-parte awards set aside.

(Para 20-25)

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (31 of 2016), Section 7 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 21 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Objection to jurisdiction -- Objections regarding the place of suing shall not be allowed unless such objection is taken in the Court/ tribunal of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity – High Court, while exercising its discretion, overlooked the provisions of Section 21 of CPC -- Order passed by High Court set aside -- Proceedings under the IBC will continue in accordance with the law.

(Para 4, 7, 8)