Search By Topic: Cheque bounce cases

351. (P&H HC) 26-07-2017

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 -- Cheque bounce case -- Acquittal in criminal case – Civil liability to pay -- Claim of the plaintiff was not based on dishonour of the cheques -- It was based on the basis of transaction of supply of poultry feed to the company and the bills raised therefore -- Merely, because defendant has been acquitted in criminal proceeding that does not mean that the claim of the plaintiff in civil proceedings ipso facto stand disproved.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 34 – Books of accounts -- Bills and entries of accounts maintained in ordinary course of business can be proved by deposition on oath of the plaintiff -- Sales man and the other witnesses have also been produced to support the transaction and to prove the bills and accounts entries -- Company has been making payment from time to time and have never denied the supply of the material or the existence of the bills -- This tantamounts to acknowledgment.

(Para 7)

C. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 100, Order 41 –Liability of Company -- Appeal – Right of -- Company or the Managing Director of the company has never come forward to dispute their liability or to dispute the transactions of supply of the material by the plaintiff to the company -- They have not even challenged the liability fastened upon them by the trial court – Appellant, who do not even claim to be authorised representative of the company cannot question the liability against the company by filing the present appeal -- She can at the best question her liability in her personal capacity -- Appellant was a Director of the company and also a share holder, therefore, whatever liability the company law imposes upon her she cannot escape that by filing a appeal even her personal capacity -- She would always remain liable qua the liability of the company but subject to the extent of her liability according to the prevalent company law.

 (Para 8)

367. (P&H HC) 01-03-2017

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal – Appellant secured loan amount of Rs.2,00,000/- from one person and handed over to the accused -- However, there is no evidence that said person had the capacity to advance Rs.2,00,000/- or that amount allegedly given on loan to the appellant is shown in the Income Tax Return or in any other record maintained by said person -- Appellant has not even examined that person -- In his cross-examination, the appellant had stated that he had given the loan amount to the respondent on interest -- However, the appellant does not hold any licence for money lending -- No document was accepted by the appellant regarding advancing of loan or that respondent has furnished any security for repayment of amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- appears to be highly improbable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 5-7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Except self serving statement of the appellant there is no material evidence on record to prove the factum of legally enforceable debt of the respondent towards appellant – No oral or documentary evidence to prove the advancement of loan – In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in accused’s favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible – Keeping in view the above, the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.

(Para 7)

368. (SC) 19-09-2016

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Post dated security cheque – Dishonour of – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act -- Whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction -- If on the date of the cheque liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Post dated security cheque – Dishonour of – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act -- Though the word “security” is used in the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of installments -- Repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the installment falls due -- Disbursement of loan was prior to the date of the cheques -- Once the loan was disbursed and installments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act.

(Para 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Post dated security cheque – Dishonour of – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act -- Cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability -- Dishonour of cheque issued for discharge of later liability is clearly covered by the statute in question.

(Para 11-12)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Post dated Security cheque – Dishonour of – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act -- Crucial question to determine applicability of Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability or whether it represents advance payment without there being subsisting debt or liability.

(Para 13)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Post dated security cheque – Dishonour of – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act – Quashing of Complaint -- Reference to the complaint shows that as per the case of the complainant, the cheques which were subject matter of the said complaint were towards the partial repayment of the dues under the loan agreement – While dealing with a quashing petition, the Court has ordinarily to proceed on the basis of averments in the complaint -- Defence of the accused cannot be considered at this stage -- Court considering the prayer for quashing does not adjudicate upon a disputed question of fact.

(Para 17)

372. (P&H HC) 30-03-2016

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20, 118 -- Security cheque – Filling of cheque by drawee – Validity of -- Negotiable Instruments Act raises a presumption u/s 118 that a negotiable instrument is presumed to be fully supported by consideration -- If a cheque is issued as security or with an authority given to the drawee that it could be filled up or used for certain claims which are later ascertained, it is still a valid instrument as per Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which states that document which is inchoate with authority granted to the drawee to fill up the recitals, the document would become the full-fledged enforceable negotiable instrument, the moment the recitals were filled up by the drawee of the negotiable instrument.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Order 37 – Summary suit by public limited company – Leave to defend – Condition for deposit of security, while granting leave to defend – Validity of --  Held, suits filed by a Company through a power of attorney could hardly be a matter of serious defence -- Plea that the cheques are issued as security is not really a stout plea that admits of any serious consideration; at least prima facie so -- As regards the contention that there is no privity of contract with the plaintiff or some of the defendants and that the liability to Punjab Tractors cannot be enforced through the plaintiff, it is not a defence worthy of substance if the High Court has passed an order of amalgamation empowering the transferee Company to claim all rights of transferor Company -- Non-production of the original cheques also would not assume significance in these cases, for, it has been explained that the dishonour of cheques resulted in actions for offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before court of competent jurisdiction and that therefore certified copies of cheques have been filed along with the plaints – Held, none of the defenses in any of the cases of the defendants has any prima facie merit and if the defendants are given an opportunity to defend, it is by way of mercy and, therefore, the condition imposed was tenable – Defendants are directed to deposit security of 50% of the suit amount.

(Para 9-12)

384. (SC) 16-09-2015

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Liability to pay amount – Drawer of cheque -- Appellant-complainant supplied goods to M/s. Shah Agencies – Accused carried their business in the names of M/s. Shah Enterprises and M/s. Shah Agencies -- In part discharge of the liability of M/s. Shah Agencies, two cheques for Rs. 5 lakhs each were issued by the accused on an account maintained by M/s. Shah Enterprises – Cheques were dishonoured due to insufficient fund -- Case made out in the complaint was that the goods were sold and supplied to M/s. Shah Enterprises and the liability was of M/s. Shah Enterprises -- While in the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, the Complainant came out with a case that the liability was that of M/s. Shah Agencies as goods were sold and supplied to M/s. Shah Agencies and it was not the case of the appellant that the accused had agreed to take over and discharge the liabilities of M/s. Shah Agencies – Acquittal of accused upheld.

(Para 1, 4, 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Liability to pay amount – Drawer of cheque -- First and foremost essential ingredient for attracting a liability under this Section is that the person who is to be made liable should be the drawer of the cheque and should have drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for discharge, in whole or part, of any debt or other liability.

(Para 9)

388. (P&H HC) 01-04-2015

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Offence by Company – Vicarious liability of Director – Quashing of complaint:

(i)    In order to make the company liable u/s 138 of the Act vicariously, the Director can be prosecuted if there is specific recital that the Directors thereof were at the time when offence the offence committed, were responsible for the conduct and day to day business of the complaint -- Director, who had resigned long back before the cheque was presented cannot be prosecuted --  One of the Director in the array of accused was never Director of the company since its incorporation and still he has been arrayed as accused in the capacity of Director -- The certification to this effect is computerized information, which is perse admissible under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, rather this document has not been denied with reference to any evidence to the contrary.

(ii)   Averments even if made in the complaint that the Director was in-charge, the same can be negated if the High Court comes across some unimpeachable/acceptable circumstance, which may lead to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the relevant time and therefore, making such Director as an accused to stand trial would be an abuse of process of law.

(iii)  It is mandatory in terms of Section 138 and 141 of the Act to specifically aver in the complaint that Director was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, when the offence was committed and he was responsible for day to day functioning of the company -- Role of the Director in a company is a question of fact depending upon the nomenclature of the company and other circumstances prevailing therein -- There cannot be any universal application of the rule that a Director of company is in-charge of its day to day affairs.

(iv)   Section 141 of the Act is a penal provision creating criminal liability -- As per nature of the offence it has to be strictly construed -- It is not sufficient to make bald cursory statement in a complaint that Director/Directors is/are in-charge of and are responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without specifying anything more as to the role of the Director/Directors -- It is requirement of law that the complainant must spell out as to how and in what manner the accused are in-charge of the affairs of the company in the conduct of its business and thus responsible for the same.

(v)    Some times a Director is not the active Director and he may be non executive Director, who was no doubt a custodian of governance of the company, but at the same time was not involved in day to day affairs running of its business -- For making such a Director liable there must have been specific averment in the complaint as to how and in what manner such a Director was responsible for conduct of business of the company -- In the absence of such plea the Court can definitely come to rescue of such Director against whom the proceedings are nothing but a pure abuse of process of law.

(vi)   “no criminal proceedings shall be initiated against the Director/accused unless specific allegations should comeforth in complaint, earmarking unambiguous role in the context of charge and responsibility in discharge of day to functioning of the company so as to prevent embarking on a fishing expedition to try and unearth material against the Director.

Complaint is liable to quashed being abuse of process of law and is deficient in formulising vicarious liability of the petitioners in terms of Section 141 of the Act.

(Para 9-19)

389. (SC) 28-01-2015

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Power of attorney – Cognizance by Magistrate – Power of -- Magistrate had taken cognizance of the complaint without prima facie establishing the fact as to whether the Power of Attorney existed in first place and whether it was in order – Complaint against the appellant was not preferred by the payee or the holder in due course and the statement on oath of the person who filed the complaint has also not stated that he filed the complaint having been instructed by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque – Held, it was not open to the Magistrate to take cognizance -- Proceedings in question against the appellant are quashed.

(Para 16, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Section 138 – Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Power of attorney – Cognizance by Magistrate – Power of -- Except mentioning in the cause title there is no mention of, or a reference to the Power of Attorney in the body of the said complaint nor was it exhibited as part of the said complaint -- In the list of evidence there is just a mere mention of the words “Power of Attorney”, however there is no date or any other particulars of the Power of Attorney mentioned in the complaint -- Even in the verification statement, there is not even a whisper that she is filing the complaint as the Power of Attorney holder of the complainant -- Even the order of issue of process does not mention that the Magistrate had perused any Power of Attorney for issuing process – Magistrate wrongly took cognizance in the matter and the Court below erred in putting the onus on the appellant rather than the complainant -- Proceedings in question against the appellant are quashed.

(Para 17-19)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Power of attorney – Complaint was filed by one claiming to be General Power of Attorney of the complainant company – Complaint was not signed either by Managing Director or Director of the Company -- PW-1/R gave evidence on behalf of company who is only the employee of the Company -- As per Resolution of the Company i.e. Ex.P3 Managing Director and Director are authorized to file suits and criminal complaints against the debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution and they were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to appear on their behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc. -- But nothing on the record suggest that an employee is empowered to file the complaint on behalf of the Company -- Managing Director and Director are authorized persons of the Company to file the complaint by signing and by giving evidence -- At best the said persons can nominate any person to represent themselves or the Company before the Court –Employee of the Company signed the complaint and the Deputy General Manager of the Company/ PW-1 gave evidence as if he knows everything though he does not know anything -- Nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized by the Managing Director or any Director -- Magistrate rightly acquitted the appellant.

(Para 20)

394. (SC) 27-11-2012

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Account closed – Payment stopped – Referred to drawer -- Signature do not match – Image is not found -- Expression “amount of money …………. is insufficient” appearing in Section 138 of the Act is a genus and dishonour for reasons such “as account closed”, “payment stopped”, “referred to the drawer” are only species of that genus – Dishonour on the ground that the “signatures do not match” or that the “image is not found”, which too implies that the specimen signatures do not match the signatures on the cheque would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 of the Act.

-- Question whether or not there was a lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued would be a matter that the trial Court will examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it and keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration.

(Para 15)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Payment Stopped -- Dishonour on the ground that the payment has been stopped, regardless whether such stoppage is with or without notice to the drawer, and regardless whether the stoppage of payment is on the ground that the amount lying in the account was not sufficient to meet the requirement of the cheque, would attract the provisions of Section 138.

(Para 16)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Fraud – Allegations of fraud and the like are matters that cannot be investigated by a Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and shall have to be left to be determined at the trial after the evidence is adduced by the parties.

(Para 17)

396. (Bombay HC) 07-12-2010

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate – Evidence of complainant – Affidavit of complainant in evidence -- For the purpose of issuing process u/s 200 of the Cr. P.C., it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, 1881 and the Magistrate is not obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant or his witnesses upon oath for taking the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

-- It is only if and where the Magistrate, after considering the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the documents produced in support thereof and the verification in the form of affidavit of the complainant, is of the view that examination of the complainant or his witness is required, that the Magistrate may call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court and examine the complainant and/or his witness upon oath for taking decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

(Para 59)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 145 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Cognizance by Magistrate – Evidence of complainant -- Affidavit of complainant in evidence -- Nothing wrong with filing the affidavit in support of the complaint in a format indicating all the essential facts satisfying the ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act, 1881 for the purpose of enabling the Magistrate to decide whether or not to issue process on the complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act, 1881.

(Para 59)

397. (SC) 03-05-2010

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374(3), 378(4), 397, 401 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Cheque bounce case – Remedies available -- Offence u/s 138 triable by a Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) -- After trial, the progression of further legal proceedings would depend on whether there has been a conviction or an acquittal.

-- In the case of conviction, an appeal would lie to the Court of Sessions under Section 374(3)(a) of the CrPC; thereafter a Revision to the High Court under Section 397/401 of the CrPC and finally a petition before the Supreme Court, seeking special leave to appeal under 136 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in case of conviction there will be four levels of litigation.

-- In the case of acquittal by the JMFC, the complainant could appeal to the High Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC, and thereafter for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136. In such an instance, therefore, there will be three levels of proceedings.

(Para 14)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143, 147 -- Cheque bounce case – Framing of Guidelines for compounding of offence :

THE GUIDELINES

(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount.

Competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance.

(Para 15, 17)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Multiple complaints – Controlling of -- It should be mandatory for the complainant to disclose that no other complaint has been filed in any other court in respect of the same transaction -- Such a disclosure should be made on a sworn affidavit which should accompany the complaint filed u/s 200 of the CrPC -- If it is found that such multiple complaints have been filed, orders for transfer of the complaint to the first court should be given, generally speaking, by the High Court after imposing heavy costs on the complainant for resorting to such a practice. These directions should be given effect prospectively.

(Para 16)

D. Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320 -- Guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law-making and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain – It must be kept in mind that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance on how to proceed with the compounding of offences under the Act -- Scheme contemplated u/s 320 of the CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense -- In view of the legislative vacuum, no hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions which have been designed to discourage litigants from unduly delaying the composition of the offence in cases involving Section 138 of the Act -- Competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance.

(Para 17)

398. (SC) 11-01-2010

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143, 145 -- Affidavit of complainant in evidence – Absence of accused -- Section 145 allows for the evidence of the complainant to be given on affidavit, that is, in the absence of the accused -- Accused, however, is fully protected, as under sub-section (2) of section 145 he has the absolute and unqualified right to have the complainant and any or all of his witnesses summoned for cross-examination.

(Para 16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143, 144, 145, 146, 147 – Object of Amendment Act, 2002 -- Sections 143 to 147 were inserted in the Act by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 to do away with all the stages and processes in a regular criminal trial that normally cause inordinate delay in its conclusion and to make the trial procedure as expeditious as possible without in any way compromising on the right of the accused for a fair trial.

(Para 17)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143, 145, 147 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137 – Affidavit of complainant in evidence – Examination-in-chief – Requirement of -- Whether it is also open to the accused to insist that before cross-examining him as to the facts stated in the affidavit he must first depose in examination-in-chief and be required to verbally state what is already said in the affidavit ? – Nothing in section 145(2) to suggest that -- Deponent of the affidavit (the complainant or any of his witnesses) can only be subjected to cross-examination as to the facts stated in the affidavit -- Prosecution may also have to summon a witness whose evidence is given on affidavit in case objection is raised by the defence regarding the validity and/or sufficiency of proof of some document(s) submitted along with the affidavit.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881). Section 143, 145(1) -- Affidavit of accused in evidence – Permissibility of -- High Court held that subject to the provisions of sections 315 and 316 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the accused can also give his evidence on affidavit – Held, High Court overreached itself and took a course that amounts to taking over the legislative functions.

-- On a bare reading of section 143 it is clear that the legislature provided for the complainant to give his evidence on affidavit and did not provide for the accused to similarly do so. But the High Court thought that not mentioning the accused along with the complainant in sub-section (1) of section 145 was merely an omission by the legislature that it could fill up without difficulty. Even though the legislature in their wisdom did not deem it proper to incorporate the word ‘accused’ with the word ‘complainant’ in section 145(1), it did not mean that the Magistrate could not allow the accused to give his evidence on affidavit by applying the same analogy unless there was a just and reasonable ground to refuse such permission.

High Court was in error in taking the view, that on a request made by the accused the magistrate may allow him to tender his evidence on affidavit.

(Para 30-32)

400. (SC) 06-07-2009

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce case -- Offence by Company – Vicarious liability of Managing Director/ Joint Managing Director -- If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company -- It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time.

(Para 20 (i))

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case -- Offence by Company – Signature on cheque by Director/ Officer of Company – In the case of a director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on behalf of the company, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any specific allegation about consent, connivance or negligence -- The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility under sub-section (2) of Section 141.

(Para 20 (ii))

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 5(a)(b)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g) -- Cheque bounce case -- Offence by Company – Vicarious liability of Deputy General Manager -- A Deputy General Manger is not a person who is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company -- He does not fall under any of the categories (a) to (g) listed in section 5 of the Companies Act -- Therefore the question whether he was in charge of the business of the company or not, is irrelevant -- He cannot be made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act -- If he has to be made liable u/s 141(2), the necessary averments relating to consent/connivance/negligence should have been made -- No such averment made -- Hence Deputy General Manger could not be prosecuted either u/s (1) or u/s (2) of Section 141 of the Act.

(Para 22)