Search By Topic: Cheque bounce cases

301. (P&H HC) 04-04-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143-A, 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 5 -- All the provisions relating to punishment, execution thereof, fine and compensation and recovery thereof, as contained in the Cr.P.C, has to be read in conjunction and in harmony with Section 143-A and Section 148 of the Act.

(Para 27)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A – Complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act -- Provision for deposit of 20% in complaint -- Substantive obligation -- Prospective in nature -- Section 143-A of the Act cast a substantive obligation upon the accused and thereby effect the substantive right of the accused -- Since the Amendment Act has not made the provision applicable retrospectively, specifically, to pending cases, hence, it cannot be applied retrospectively, to pending cases; which arose from the default of the accused which has taken place before coming into force of this provision.

(Para 29)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143-A -- Provision for deposit of 20% in complaint  --  Nature of -- Standalone liability -- Closing of defence not permissible – This section does not authorize the Trial Court to pass any order, having consequences against the accused qua the steps of the trial; in case of non-payment of interim compensation -- This section does not authorize the Court to close the defense or to take any other step for speeding up the trial as such -- This provision is intended to create a 'stand alone liability' which has to be discharged independent of the trial and which shall have consequences outside the trial only.

(Para 30)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 148 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378, 421, 424 -- Appeal against conviction -- Provision for deposit of 20% in Appeal --  Nature of -- Procedural in nature – Applicability on pending appeals -- Provisions for recovery of fine or compensation from the appellant/convict already existed in the existing procedure relating to the recovery, therefore, the provision introduced vide Section 148 of the Act; which relates only to recovery of amount partly, as interim measure, has to be treated purely procedural only, which is otherwise also beneficial for the appellant as compared to the pre-existing provisions -- Hence it has to be held that provision of Section 148 of the Act shall govern all the appeals pending on date of enforcement of this provision or filed thereafter.

(Para 35)

302. (SC) 15-03-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Acquittal of accused in cheque bounce case – Setting aside of -- Jurisdiction of Appellate Court -- Ordinarily, the Appellate Court will not be upsetting the judgment of acquittal, if the view taken by Trial Court is one of the possible views of matter and unless the Appellate Court arrives at a clear finding that the judgment of the Trial Court is perverse, i.e., not supported by evidence on record or contrary to what is regarded as normal or reasonable; or is wholly unsustainable in law -- Such general restrictions are essentially to remind the Appellate Court that an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt and a judgment of acquittal further strengthens such presumption in favour of the accused -- Same rule with same rigour cannot be applied in a matter relating to the offence u/s 138 of the NI Act, particularly where a presumption is drawn that the holder has received the cheque for the discharge, wholly or in part, of any debt or liability -- Appellate Court is certainly entitled to examine the evidence on record in order to find if preponderance indeed leans in favour of the accused.

(Para 11.1)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Onus of proof -- Accused-appellant could not deny his signature on the cheques in question -- It is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e., the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt -- Onus, therefore, shifts on the accused-appellant to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption.

(Para 14)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Rebuttal of presumption – Probable defence -- On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist.

(Para 16)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Source of fund for loan – Requirement of law – After purportedly drawing the presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act, the Trial Court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused -- This approach of the Trial Court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law -- After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused-appellant.

(Para 17)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Creation of doubt is not sufficient -- Trial Court proceeded to pass the order of acquittal on the mere ground of 'creation of doubt' -- Trial Court appears to have proceeded on a misplaced assumption that by mere denial or mere creation of doubt, the appellant had successfully rebutted the presumption as envisaged by Section 139 of the NI Act -- In the scheme of the NI Act, mere creation of doubt is not sufficient.

(Para 20)

305. (SC) 06-02-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Object of Section 138 of NI Act -- Object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility to negotiable instruments including cheques and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments including cheques in financial transactions -- Penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque presented two times – Complaint after second default – Permissibility of -- Prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment of the cheque amount is not impermissible simply because no statutory notice had been issued after the first default and no proceeding for prosecution had been initiated.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Conviction of accused – Revisional Jurisdiction of High court -- It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings -- It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

(Para 19)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138, 139 -- Post-dated cheque – Rebuttal of presumption -- Onus to rebut the presumption u/s 139 that the cheque has been issued in discharge of a debt or liability is on the accused -- Fact that the cheque might be post-dated does not absolve the drawer of a cheque of the penal consequences of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

(Para 36)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 20,87,138,139 -- Cheque signed by drawer – Cheque filled by other – Effect of -- It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer -- If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.

(Para 37)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Blank signed cheque – Subsequent filing of cheque by other – Effect of --Rebuttal of presumption – Onus of proof -- Payee may fill up the amount and other particulars, this in itself would not invalidate the cheque -- Onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence -- Subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration.

(Para 38, 42)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Fiduciary relation -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of -- Existence of a fiduciary relationship between the payee of a cheque and its drawer, would not disentitle the payee to the benefit of the presumption u/s 139 of the Act, in the absence of evidence of exercise of undue influence or coercion.

(Para 39)

H. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Blank cheque leaf -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of -- Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption u/s 139 of the Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.

(Para 40)

I. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Friendly loan without receipt – Effect of -- Fact that the loan may not have been advanced by a cheque or demand draft or a receipt might not have been obtained would make no difference.

(Para 41)

319. (P&H HC) 30-10-2018

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141  -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of summoning order and complaint – Maintainability of petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Revisional Jurisdiction -- Alternative remedy available – Objection of -- Held, in exercise of revisional power, Court of Sessions or the High Court is not vested with the power of quashing a criminal complaint -- This power is available to the High Court alone under Section 482 Cr.P.C., whereunder the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, can pass orders to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- Thus, the prayer made in this petition could not have been granted by the revisional Court and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Court of Sessions in the first instance.

(Para 5)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Liability of Ex-officio Director -- Every person who was incharge of the business of the Company and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business is vicariously liable apart from the Company itself -- Such a person may be somebody other than a 'Director' so long as he is an officer of the Company -- However, an Ex-officio Director is not liable.

(Para 8)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Ex-officio-Director of the Company -- Petitioner-Director had resigned and cheque in dispute had been issued much later -- For imposing vicarious liability upon the petitioner, as a person responsible for the business of the company, it was necessary to make specific averments in the complaint regarding his role in the conduct of the business of the Company -- No such averment having been made, the Magistrate was not justified in summoning the petitioner.

(Para 21)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Summoning of accused -- At the stage of summoning of an accused person, the trial Court/Magistrate must be satisfied on the basis of material produced before it that prima facie the accused persons have committed an offence.

(Para 21)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482  -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company – Liability of Director of the Company – Quashing of Complaint and summoning order -- Averment made in the legal notice “You address No. 3 being Chairman/Director of addressee No. 1 are also being incharge and being responsible person of address No. 1 company for conduct to the business of the Company are also liable for the punishment prescribed under the Act ibid.” – Held, averments made in the legal notice u/s 138 of the Act cannot be construed to be averments made in the complaint -- Even the averments made in the legal notice, do not fulfill the requirement of law -- Summoning orders as well as Complaints alongwith consequential proceedings having arisen therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 25-27)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 204 – Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Summoning of Directors of the Company -- Held in order to reduce litigation it would be appropriate for the concerned Magistrates to seek copies of Form No. 32 and the latest Annual Return filed by the Company so that only those persons who are Directors on the date of commission of the offence are summoned – Directions given that in all cases where the accused is a 'Company', before issuing summons to the accused persons the trial Court/Magistrate shall direct the complainant to produce a copy of Form No. 32 and the annual Return filed by the Company in order to determine the persons, who were Directors on the date of commission of the offence -- In cases where the accused–Director is the Chairman or Managing Director or Joint Managing Director or authorized signatory of the cheque, they may be summoned without any averment regarding their role in the conduct of the affairs of the Company -- For summoning of any other Director or officer of the Company the necessary averment regarding their role in the conduct of the business of the Company, must be insisted upon -- In respect of whole time Directors, mere reproduction of the words of Section 141 of the Act would be sufficient.

(Para 28, 29)

334. (SC) 05-12-2017

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Advocate Client relationship – Issuance of cheque by client – Dishonour of – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Mere issuance of cheque by the client may not debar him from contesting the liability -- If liability is disputed, the advocate has to independently prove the contract.

(Para 18)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 --Advocate Client relationship – Professional misconduct -- Issuance of cheque by client as percentage – Dishonour of – Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – Maintainability of -- Claim based on percentage of subject matter in litigation cannot be the basis of a complaint u/s 138 of the Act -- Claim of the respondent advocate being against public policy and being an act of professional misconduct, proceedings in the complaint filed by him have to be held to be abuse of the process of law and have to be quashed -- Issue of professional misconduct is left to be dealt with at the appropriate forum.

(Para 18-20)

C. Advocates Act, 1961 (25 of 1961), Section 35 – Constitution of India, Article 39A -- Advocate Client relationship – Professional misconduct -- Can justice be secured with the legal professionals failing to uphold the professional ethics? -- Commercialization to the extent of exploiting the litigant and misbehavior to the extent of browbeating the Court, breach of professional duties to the court and the litigant on the part of some members of the legal profession, affecting the right of the litigants to speedy and inexpensive justice, need to be checked – Court hoping that the concerned authorities in the Government will take cognizance of the issue of introducing requisite legislative changes for an effective regulatory mechanism to check violation of professional ethics and also to ensure access to legal services which is major component of access to justice mandated under Article 39A of the Constitution.

(Para 23-31)

338. (SC) 05-10-2017

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 258 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Discharge of accused – Compounding of offence -- Court can close the proceedings and discharge the accused on satisfaction that the cheque amount with assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect –Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the Court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused -- Court is entitled to close the proceedings in exercise of its powers u/s 143 of the Act read with Section 258 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11, 18 (i)-(iii), 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Online hearing of case – Online appearance of accused – Exemption of accused from personal appearance -- Service of summons can be by post/ e-mail/ courier -- Summons ought to indicate that the accused could make specified payment by deposit in a particular account before the specified date and inform the court and the complainant by e-mail -- If the accused complies with such summons and informs the Court and the complainant by e-mail, the Court can ascertain the objection, if any, of the complainant and close the proceedings unless it becomes necessary to proceed with the case -- Some cases of Section 138 cases can be decided online -- If complaint with affidavits and documents can be filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of the complainant or the accused -- Only if the accused contests, need for appearance of parties may arise which may be through counsel and wherever viable, video conferencing can be used -- Personal appearances can be dispensed with.

(Para 16, 17, 20)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 64 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Discretion of the Magistrate to hold that it was undesirable to try the case summarily as sentence of more than one year may have to be passed -- Court has jurisdiction u/s 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award suitable compensation with default sentence under Section 64 IPC and with further powers of recovery under Section 431 Cr.P.C -- With this approach, prison sentence of more than one year may not be required in all cases.

(Para 12, 18(iv))

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 264, 357(3) – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Procedure for summoning -- Evidence of the complaint can be given on affidavit -- Bank’s slip being prima facie evidence of the dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to record any further preliminary evidence -- Such affidavit evidence can be read as evidence at all stages of trial or other proceedings – Normal rule for trial of cases under Chapter XVII of the Act is to follow the summary procedure except where exercise of power under second proviso to Section 143 becomes necessary.

(Para 18(iv), (v), 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Chapter XXIA -- Cheque bounce complaint – Plea bargaining -- Speedy trial -- It will be open to the Court to consider the provisions of plea bargaining -- Trial can be on day to day basis and endeavour must be to conclude it within six months.

(Para 20)

343. (P&H HC) 20-09-2017

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138,139 -- Friendly loan of Rs. 20 lacs – Acquittal of accused --

--       Complainant has not mentioned in his complaint as to for what purpose, he had advanced such a substantial amount as loan to the accused.

--       While appearing in the witness box applicant has deposed that the loan was advanced to the respondent in the presence of her father-in-law but she has not examined this witness in support of her claim.

--       No other witness has been examined by her regarding the loan transaction. Applicant has also not produced on record any receipt or pronote for grant of loan to the accused. Therefore, the act and conduct of the applicant is highly improbable, as no sane person is expected to advance such a substantial amount as loan to any other person without any documentation or even receipt or acknowledgement.

--       Complainant has also failed to mention the date, month and year of advancement of loan or issuance of cheque in question by the accused in her favour either in her pleadings or in her evidence.

–       Complainant has also not produced any document which may show her income/expenditure/ account of business income or the income tax return, which may draw an inference that she is financially well placed.

--       She has not given any detail as to what business or profession she is carrying.

--       Only contention, which the complainant has raised is that she has advanced a loan of Rs.20 lakhs to the accused as she had sold an industrial shed at Panchkula, but neither such sale deed nor any other relevant document has been produced on record by the complainant, which can substantiate the plea that the amount of Rs.20 lakhs was collected by her after the sale of the said industrial unit situated in Panchkula.

When no evidence to connect the respondent-accused with the alleged offence is available on record, no case is made out for interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal.

(Para 10-12)

349. (P&H HC) 27-07-2017

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Cheque bounce case -- Additional evidence at appellate stage -- In application pleading that he was not well-conversant with the technicalities of law and even his earlier counsel also did not give him proper advice and as such due to the negligence of his previous counsel, he could not produce the certified copies of the complaints as well as copy of the FIR – Held, respondent cannot be permitted to take the said pleas.

(Para 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 -- Cheque bounce case --Additional evidence at appellate stage -- Evidence sought to be produced by way of additional evidence regarding filing of similar complaints under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by the complainant against some other persons was well within the knowledge of the respondent, but he did not make any effort to lead any evidence to that effect before the trial Court itself at the time of his defence evidence – Application should not have been allowed by the Ld. Appellate court.

(Para 13, 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 391 – Cheque bounce case -- Additional evidence -- Bearing on the case -- Production of copies of complaints, judgments and the FIR so to be lodged by the respondent by way of additional evidence has no material bearing on the facts of the case inasmuch as each case has to be decided on its own merits -- Judgments of other cases may not influence while deciding a particular case and cannot be a guiding factor as each case has its own peculiar facts.

(Para 17)