Search By Topic: Cheque bounce cases

6. (SC) 24-07-2024

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 7, 138, 141, 143A -- Drawer – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act -- Liability of Directors of Company -- Interpretation of -- High Court's interpretation accurately identified the "drawer" as the individual who issues the cheque -- Drawer u/s 143A refers specifically to the issuer of the cheque, not the authorized signatories -- Primary liability rests on the drawer, emphasizing the drawer's responsibility for maintaining sufficient funds -- Section 141 of the NI Act extending liability to the company's officers for the dishonour of a cheque -- Appellants' attempt to extend this principle to Section 143A, to hold directors or other individuals personally liable for interim compensation, is unfounded -- Authorized signatories act on behalf of the company but do not assume the company's legal identity.

(Para 28-30)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 7, 138, 143A -- Drawer – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation u/s 143A of NI Act -- Liability of Directors of Company – Interpretation of -- When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its natural and ordinary meaning -- Legislative intent, as discerned from the plain language of the statute, aims to hold the drawer accountable -- Appellants' argument for a broader interpretation to include authorized signatories u/s 143A contradicts this principle and would lead to an unjust extension of liability not supported by the statutory text.

(Para 31)

23. (P&H HC) 03-04-2024

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Cheque bounce complaint – Presumption as to liability – Rebuttal – Standard of proof -- Once execution of the cheque is proved/ admitted, the presumptions u/s 118(a) and 139 of the said Act would arise that it is supported by a consideration -- Such presumptions are rebuttable in nature and the accused can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence, and if the accused is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the complainant who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would dis-entitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument -- Standard of proof so as to prove defence on the part of an accused is 'preponderance of probabilities' and inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on records by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Void cheque – Alteration in cheque -- Amount written in cheque corrected in figures or in number without the knowledge and consent of maker of the cheque amounts to material alteration and also amounts cancellation -- The figure “2" was specifically inserted in cheque specifically without the knowledge of the drawer is a material alteration which makes the documents void -- Accused is not liable for any type of legal recoverable debt -- Nothing is on file to prove any type of transaction or debt to held the accused liable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 8-10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Receipt issued on the letter pad of the shop of accused is also not proved the liability of the accused in any manner as no witness regarding the receipt is on the letter pad and without any witness the document did not prove any type of liability towards the accused.

(Para 9)

25. (SC) 15-03-2024

A. “May” – “Shall” – Interpretation -- Word “may” ordinarily does not mean “must” -- Ordinarily, “may” will not be construed as “shall” -- But this is not an inflexible rule -- The use of the word “may” in certain legislations can be construed as “shall”, and the word “shall” can be construed as “may” -- It all depends on the nature of the power conferred by the relevant provision of the statute and the effect of the exercise of the power -- The legislative intent also plays a role in the interpretation of such provisions. Even the context in which the word “may” has been used is also relevant.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 143A will apply only when the case is being tried as a warrant case -- In the case of a summary or summons trial, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A can be exercised after the plea of the accused is recorded.

(Para 10)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 421 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Recovery of -- By a legal fiction, the interim compensation is treated as a fine for the purposes of its recovery -- Section 421 of the Cr.PC deals with the recovery of the fine imposed by a criminal court while passing the sentence -- Thus, recourse can be taken to Section 421 of the Cr.PC. for recovery of interim compensation -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered treating it as fine -- Interim compensation amount can be recovered by the Trial Court by issuing a warrant for attachment and sale of the movable property of the accused -- If acquitted, he may get back the money along with the interest as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 143A from the complainant.

(Para 11, 12)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A(5) – Cheque bounce complaint – Non-payment of interim compensation – Right to defend -- Non-payment of interim compensation by the accused does not take away his right to defend the prosecution.

(Para 12)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Power of Trial Court – It can be exercised even before the accused is held guilty -- Sub-section (1) of Section 143A provides for passing a drastic order for payment of interim compensation against the accused in a complaint u/s 138, even before any adjudication is made on the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Word “may” used in Section 143A, cannot be construed or interpreted as “shall”. Therefore, the power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary.

(Para 14)

G. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation -- Tests applicable for the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 148 can never apply to the exercise of jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 143A of the N.I. Act.

(Para 15)

H. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Financial distress -- Factors to be considered while exercising discretion -- When the court deals with an application u/s 143A of the N.I. Act, the Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application under sub-section (1) of Section 143A -- Presumption u/s 139 of the N.I. Act, by itself, is no ground to direct the payment of interim compensation -- At this stage, the fact that the accused is in financial distress can also be a consideration –  Court will have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted – Court will have to consider various factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant and the paying capacity of the accused -- If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie a plausible defence, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation -- Factors set out are not exhaustive -- There could be several other factors, such as, the pendency of a civil suit, etc. -- While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all the relevant factors.

(Para 16)

I. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 143A, 148 – Cheque bounce complaint – Interim compensation – Law summarised:

a. The exercise of power under sub-section (1) of Section 143A is discretionary. The provision is directory and not mandatory. The word “may” used in the provision cannot be construed as “shall.”

b. While deciding the prayer made under Section 143A, the Court must record brief reasons indicating consideration of all relevant factors.

c. The broad parameters for exercising the discretion under Section 143A are as follows:

i. The Court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration.

ii. A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case.

iii. If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the Court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation.

iv. If the Court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. While doing so, the Court will have to consider several factors such as the nature of the transaction, the relationship, if any, between the accused and the complainant, etc.

v. There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive.

(Para 19)