Search By Topic: Bail Matters

910. (SC) 29-01-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437, 438 -- Anticipatory bail – Life of – Conditions to be imposed -- Protection granted to a person under Section 438 Cr. PC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it should inure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time -- Normal conditions under Section 437 (3) read with Section 438 (2) should be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event) etc.

(Para 91)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437, 438 -- Anticipatory bail – Life of – Life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the trial -- Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.

(Para 91)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437, 438 -- Anticipatory bail – Registration of F.I.R. – Requirement of – It is not essential that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.

(Para 92-1)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 437, 438 -- Anticipatory bail – Nature of – Power of -- Following need to be kept in mind by courts, dealing with applications under Section 438, Cr. PC:

(1)   Consistent with the judgment in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others v. State of Punjab [1980 (2) SCC 565], when a person complains of apprehension of arrest and approaches for order, the application should be based on concrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to one or other specific offence. The application seeking anticipatory bail should contain bare essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends arrest, as well as his side of the story. These are essential for the court which should consider his application, to evaluate the threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not essential that an application should be moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.

(2)   It may be advisable for the court, which is approached with an application under Section 438, depending on the seriousness of the threat (of arrest) to issue notice to the public prosecutor and obtain facts, even while granting limited interim anticipatory bail.

(3)   Nothing in Section 438 Cr. PC, compels or obliges courts to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc. While considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. The courts would be justified – and ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437 (3), Cr. PC [by virtue of Section 438 (2)]. The need to impose other restrictive conditions, would have to be judged on a case by case basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the state or the investigating agency. Such special or other restrictive conditions may be imposed if the case or cases warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine manner, in all cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of anticipatory bail may be granted, if they are required in the facts of any case or cases; however, such limiting conditions may not be invariably imposed.

(4)   Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the court.

(5)   Anticipatory bail granted can, depending on the conduct and behavior of the accused, continue after filing of the charge sheet till end of trial.

(6)   An order of anticipatory bail should not be “blanket” in the sense that it should not enable the accused to commit further offences and claim relief of indefinite protection from arrest. It should be confined to the offence or incident, for which apprehension of arrest is sought, in relation to a specific incident. It cannot operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission of an offence.

(7)   An order of anticipatory bail does not in any manner limit or restrict the rights or duties of the police or investigating agency, to investigate into the charges against the person who seeks and is granted pre-arrest bail.

(8)   The observations in Sibbia regarding “limited custody” or “deemed custody” to facilitate the requirements of the investigative authority, would be sufficient for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of Section 27, in the event of recovery of an article, or discovery of a fact, which is relatable to a statement made during such event (i.e deemed custody). In such event, there is no question (or necessity) of asking the accused to separately surrender and seek regular bail. Sibbia (supra) had observed that “if and when the occasion arises, it may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts made in pursuance of information supplied by a person released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court in State of U.P. v Deoman Upadhyaya.”

(9)   It is open to the police or the investigating agency to move the court concerned, which grants anticipatory bail, for a direction under Section 439 (2) to arrest the accused, in the event of violation of any term, such as absconding, non-cooperating during investigation, evasion, intimidation or inducement to witnesses with a view to influence outcome of the investigation or trial, etc.

(10)  The court referred to in para (9) above is the court which grants anticipatory bail, in the first instance, according to prevailing authorities.

(11)  The correctness of an order granting bail, can be considered by the appellate or superior court at the behest of the state or investigating agency, and set aside on the ground that the court granting it did not consider material facts or crucial circumstances. (See Prakash Kadam & Etc. Etc vs Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr [(2011) 6 SCC 189]; Jai Prakash Singh (supra) State through C.B.I. vs. Amarmani Tripathi [(2005) 8 SCC 21]). This does not amount to “cancellation” in terms of Section 439 (2), Cr. PC.

(12)  The observations in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra & Ors [2011 (1) SCC 694] (and other similar judgments) that no restrictive conditions at all can be imposed, while granting anticipatory bail are hereby overruled. Likewise, the decision in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [(1996 (1) SCC 667)] and subsequent decisions (including K.L. Verma v. State & Anr [1998 (9) SCC 348]; Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar & Anr [2005 (1) SCC 608]; Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal [2005 (4) SCC 303]; Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. & Anr [2004 (7) SCC 558]; HDFC Bank Limited v. J.J. Mannan [2010 (1) SCC 679]; Satpal Singh v. the State of Punjab [2018 SCC Online (SC 415] and Naresh Kumar Yadav v Ravindra Kumar [2008 (1) SCC 632]) which lay down such restrictive conditions, or terms limiting the grant of anticipatory bail, to a period of time are hereby overruled.

(Para 92)

925. (SC) 02-07-2014

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41 – Arrest of accused – Procedure of -- All cases where the arrest of a person is not required u/s 41(1), the police officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time -- Law obliges such an accused to appear before the police officer and it further mandates that if such an accused complies with the terms of notice he shall not be arrested, unless for reasons to be recorded, the police office is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary -- At this stage also, the condition precedent for arrest as envisaged u/s 41 Cr.PC has to be complied and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate.

(Para 10)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A etc. -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 12 – Dowry case – Offence punishable upto seven years -- Arrest of accused – Procedure of -- Practice of mechanically reproducing in the case diary all or most of the reasons contained in Section 41 Cr.PC for effecting arrest be discouraged and discontinued -- Police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically – Following direction given:

-- (1) All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;

-- (2) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

-- (3) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

-- (4) The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;

-- (5) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- (6) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr.PC be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

-- (7) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

-- (8) Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

Directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, but also such cases where offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without fine.

(Para 11-13)