Search By Topic: Bail Matters

851. (SC) 14-08-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1), 389(3) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal – In view of mandate of Section 389(3) of the CrPC, the principles are different in the case of sentence not exceeding three years and/or in the case of bailable offences -- Discretion u/s 389(1) is to be exercised judicially, the Appellate Court is obliged to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed, giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of the conviction and whether there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of the appeal.

(Para 26, 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Dowry death -- Object was to curb dowry death -- Section 304B does not categorize death, it covers every kind of death that occurs otherwise than in normal circumstances -- Where the other ingredients of Section 304B of the Code are satisfied, the deeming fiction of Section 304B would be attracted and the husband or the relatives shall be deemed to have caused the death of the bride -- In dealing with cases under Section 304B, this legislative intent has to be kept in mind -- Once there is material to show that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment before death, there is a presumption of dowry death and the onus is on the accused in-laws to show otherwise.

(Para 28-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389, 439 –Bail being the rule and jail an exception  -- Regular bail – Suspension of sentence – Difference between -- There is a difference between grant of bail u/s 439 of the CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence u/s 389 of the CrPC and grant of bail, post-conviction.

-- In the earlier case there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception.

-- In case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial.

(Para 36)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors -- There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 36)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 389(1) -- Suspension of sentence during pendency of appeal -- Death took place within 7 or 8 months and there is oral evidence of the parents of cruelty and torture immediately preceding the death -- Also evidence of payment of Rs.2,50,000/- to the Respondent-Accused by the victim’s brother -- Respondent No.2-accused has not been able to demonstrate any apparent and/or obvious illegality or error in the judgment of the Sessions Court, to call for suspension of execution of the sentence. Held,

-- In considering an application for suspension of sentence, the Appellate Court is only to examine if there is such patent infirmity in the order of conviction that renders the order of conviction prima facie erroneous.

-- Where there is evidence that has been considered by the Trial Court, it is not open to a Court considering application under Section 389 to re-assess and/or re-analyze the same evidence and take a different view, to suspend the execution of the sentence and release the convict on bail.

Appellant spent money beyond his financial capacity, at the wedding of the victim and had even gifted an I-10 car -- Failure to lodge an FIR complaining of dowry and harassment before the death of the victim is inconsequential -- Parents and other family members of the victim obviously would not want to precipitate a complete breakdown of the marriage by lodging an FIR against the Respondent No.2 and his parents, while the victim was alive. Impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the Respondent No.2 is directed to surrender for being taken into custody -- The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

(Para 38-42)

871. (P&H HC) 24-07-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 167(2) -- Default bail – Delay in furnishing bail bonds – Effect of -- Petitioner did “avail of” his right u/s 167(2) of the Code and furnished personal bail bond with surety, which was accepted and attested by the Court, he would be deemed to have been released from custody -- Petitioner was not released because two other cases were pending against him – Surety withdrew the surety furnished by him -- Court permitted the petitioner to furnish fresh bail bond with surety -- Since he was in custody in other cases, therefore, he did not furnish the fresh bail bond with surety – After granted bail in other cases, petitioner requested the Court to accept the personal bail bond with surety as directed vide earlier order, which was declined – Held, mere delay in furnishing personal bail bonds/surety cannot visit the petitioner with adverse consequences and the order granting bail u/s 167(2) of the Code does not cease to exist or comes to an end or stand eclipsed -- Petitioner is directed to furnish personal bail bonds with surety and thereafter ordered to be released on bail.

(Para 11)

B. Constitution of India, Article 141 – Judgment passed by Supreme Court of India -- Courts below ignoring the judgment by saying not applicable, without discussion – Permissibility of -- Ld. Court below, in the order has taken notice of the judgment, but refuses to follow the same by observing that “these judgments are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case” – Held, a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India -- No doubt, the ratio decidendi laid down in a judgment is binding and not obiter dicta -- However, before distinguishing judgment, the Court is required to analyse that what is the ratio laid down in the judgment and thereafter, proceed to explain the same -- Manner in which the ld. Court below has ignored the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not appreciable.

(Para 11)

889. (P&H HC) 13-07-2020

A. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8, 12 -- Juvenile/ Child in conflict with law – Right of Bail –Duty of Juvenile Justice Board:--

-- Very constitution of a Juvenile Justice Board, headed by a Metropolitan Magistrate with at least three years’ experience, is with the intention that such an experienced judicial officer, assisted by two social workers, would be conscious of their pious duty to ensure protection of the rights of juveniles.

-- Manifest in no uncertain terms the duty cast upon the Juvenile Justice Board to implement the letter of the law in true spirit, keeping in mind the ultimate interests of the child.

Section 12 of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that grant of bail to the child in conflict with the law should be the norm and the proviso thereto requires denial of such bail only if release of the child is likely to bring him or her into association with known criminals or expose him/her to moral, physical or psychological danger or defeat the ends of justice.

(Para 5)

B. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 8, 12 -- Juvenile/ Child in conflict with law – Right of Bail –Duty of Juvenile Justice Board – Juvenile Justice Board declined the bail lackadaisically recorded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that if the petitioner was released on bail, it was likely to bring him into association with a known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger – Ld. Principal Magistrate further recorded that his release would defeat the ends of justice -- This mechanical reproduction of the legal provision was mere lip service by the learned Principal Magistrate to the legal requirement but is of no avail -- This is not the level of care or the approach expected of a Magistrate heading a Juvenile Justice Board -- Very purpose of constituting such Boards would be defeated by such uncaring and inept discharge of functions by judicial officers entrusted with the duty of giving effect to this welfare legislation -- Revision allowed, petitioner ordered to be released on bail forthwith without sureties.

(Para 6-8)