Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 354, 376 -- Rape – Quashing of FIR/Charge -- Complainant/ prosecutrix was married -- Allegation that consent was based on a false assurance of marriage -- Allegations made of by the complainant positively during the subsistence of her marriage -- Held, it is apparent that the complainant could not have been induced into a physical relationship, based on an assurance of marriage – Since the aspect of assurance stands falsified, the acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC -- Even in the charge sheet, the investigating officer has acknowledged, that he could not find any proof to substantiate the charges -- Charge-sheet had been filed only on the basis of the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C. -- FIR u/s 328, 354 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and the consequential chargesheet as also the framing of charges deserves to be quashed -- Same are accordingly quashed.

(Para 20-22)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power of High Court – Nature of – quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest -- Ex debito justitiae -- Power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party -- It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code -- In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process -- This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest -- Full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment -- Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists -- Power possessed by the High Court u/s 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

(Para 49-51)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compounding of offence -- Compromise quashing of FIR / Complaint – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code -- Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz;

(i)      to secure the ends of justice or

(ii)     to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

(Para 57)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) -- Corruption matters -- Compromise quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.

(Para 57)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376, 395, 406, 420, 498-A, 506 etc. -- Compromise quashing of FIR /Complaint – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed -- High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime

--      Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society.

--      Offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.

(Para 57)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 52A – NDPS case -- Delay in sending sample to FSL -- Alleged recovery was effected on 12.08.2007 -- Samples were sent on 27.08.2007 to the FSL -- No explanation as to why the samples were not sent within the stipulated period of 72 hours as prescribed in the standing instructions issued by the Narcotics Control Bureau -- Samples were directly sent to the FSL without obtaining orders from the Court as mandated by Section 52A of the Act -- Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution.

(Para 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- NDPS case – Non-Investigaiton of owner of vehicle – No independent witness – Material contradiction – Acquittal of accused -- Owner of the vehicle was neither involved at any stage of investigation, nor was summoned by the prosecution to verify as to how the vehicle in question came into the possession of the appellants -- Recovery was allegedly effected at canal bridge, which is admittedly a public place -- In spite of that, no independent witness was joined -- As per the FIR, the recovery was effected from the car being driven by appellant No.1, whereas appellant No.2 was sitting on the rear seat and one bag each was lying on the front as well as the rear seat – However, PW5, S.I. categorically stated before the Court that both the appellants were sitting on the front seats -- This is a material contradiction which goes to falsify the case of the prosecution -- Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside.

(Para14-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment to suicide – mens rea -- Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing -- Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained -- In order to convict a person u/s 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.

(Para 45, 46)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Abetment to suicide – What to talk of instances of instigation, there are even no allegations against the appellants -- No proximate link between the incident of 14.1.2005 when the deceased was denied permission to use the Qualis car with the factum of suicide which had taken place on 18.1.2005 – Deceased was hyper-sensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life – In a joint family, instances of this kind are not very uncommon -- Different people behave differently in the same situation -- High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition filed by the appellants u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the charges u/s 306 I.P.C. against them -- High Court ought to have quashed the proceedings so that the appellants who were not remotely connected with the offence u/s 306 I.P.C. should not have been compelled to face the rigmaroles of a criminal trial -- As a result, the charges u/s 306 I.P.C. against the appellants quashed.

(Para 47-72)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374(3), 378(4), 397, 401 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Cheque bounce case – Remedies available -- Offence u/s 138 triable by a Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) -- After trial, the progression of further legal proceedings would depend on whether there has been a conviction or an acquittal.

-- In the case of conviction, an appeal would lie to the Court of Sessions under Section 374(3)(a) of the CrPC; thereafter a Revision to the High Court under Section 397/401 of the CrPC and finally a petition before the Supreme Court, seeking special leave to appeal under 136 of the Constitution of India. Thus, in case of conviction there will be four levels of litigation.

-- In the case of acquittal by the JMFC, the complainant could appeal to the High Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC, and thereafter for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136. In such an instance, therefore, there will be three levels of proceedings.

(Para 14)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143, 147 -- Cheque bounce case – Framing of Guidelines for compounding of offence :

THE GUIDELINES

(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is made, compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount.

Competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance.

(Para 15, 17)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Multiple complaints – Controlling of -- It should be mandatory for the complainant to disclose that no other complaint has been filed in any other court in respect of the same transaction -- Such a disclosure should be made on a sworn affidavit which should accompany the complaint filed u/s 200 of the CrPC -- If it is found that such multiple complaints have been filed, orders for transfer of the complaint to the first court should be given, generally speaking, by the High Court after imposing heavy costs on the complainant for resorting to such a practice. These directions should be given effect prospectively.

(Para 16)

D. Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320 -- Guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law-making and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain – It must be kept in mind that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance on how to proceed with the compounding of offences under the Act -- Scheme contemplated u/s 320 of the CrPC cannot be followed in the strict sense -- In view of the legislative vacuum, no hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions which have been designed to discourage litigants from unduly delaying the composition of the offence in cases involving Section 138 of the Act -- Competent Court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Non-compoundable offence -- Compromise between parties – Inherent power of High Court -- There can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. -- Only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" or "to secure the ends of justice". Further held:

-- Power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system.

-- No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

-- Compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice".

-- Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases.

-- There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.

Only inevitable conclusion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court u/s 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 28-33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Section 482 – Ex-Debitia Justitia -- Non-compoundable offence -- Compromise between parties – Inherent power of High Court -- Power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised Ex-Debitia Justitia to prevent an abuse of process of Court:

-- There can neither be an exhaustive list nor the defined para-meters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

-- Power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. Exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint.

-- Court is a vital and an extra-ordinary effective instrument to maintain and control social order. Courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and ever-lasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a Court which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote savagery.

(Para 34)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Cheque bounce case – Acquittal in -- Appellate Court’s Power --  Magistrate came to the conclusion that the complainant/respondent has not established his case -- High Court on reappreciation of the evidence, has come to a different conclusion on entirely new grounds without considering the material considered by the trial court and convicted the appellant – Held, it was the duty of the High Court to have first come to the conclusion that the conclusions arrived at by the trial court for good reasons are either unreasonable or contrary to the material on record -- In the absence of any such finding, the High Court was in error in taking a contra view merely because another view was possible on the material on record -- Impugned judgment of the High Court, set aside.

(Para 5-9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque by Company -- Demand notice to Director of Company – Validity of – Demand notice to Director of Company, who signed the cheque -- High Court committed error in recording a finding that there was no notice to the drawer of the cheque, as required u/s 138 of the NI Act – Held, Impugned order of the High Court is liable to be quashed.

(Para 1, 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by Company -- Offence by Company – Deposit of money in court – Quashing of proceedings – Permissibly of -- Once the offence is committed, any payment made subsequent thereto will not absolve the accused of the liability of criminal offence, though in the matter of awarding of sentence, it may have some effect on the Courts trying the offence -- But by no stretch of imagination, a criminal proceeding could be quashed on account of deposit of money in the Court.

(Para 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (1 of 1986), Section 22 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Dishonour of Cheque -- Prosecution of the Company/ Directors – SICA proceedings -- Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- Section only creates an embargo against disposal of assets of the company for recovery of its debts -- Purpose of such an embargo is to preserve the assets of the company from being attached or sold for realisation of dues of the creditors -- Section does not bar payment of money by the company or its directors to other persons for satisfaction of their legally enforceable dues -- Section 22 SICA does not create any legal impediment for instituting and proceeding with a criminal case on the allegations of an offence u/s 138 of the NI Act against a company or its Directors.

(Para 18)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (1 of 1986), Section 22-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 227 -- Dishonour of Cheque -- Prosecution of the Company/ Directors – Company declared Sick -- Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act -- In a case in which the BIFR has submitted its report declaring a company as ‘sick’ and has also issued a direction u/s 22-A restraining the company or its directors not to dispose of any of its assets except with consent of the Board then the contention raised that a criminal case for the alleged offence u/s 138 NI Act cannot be instituted during the period in which the restraint order passed by the BIFR remains operative cannot be rejected outright -- Whether the contention can be accepted or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case -- For instance, before the date on which the cheque was drawn or before expiry of the statutory period of 15 days after notice, a restraint order of the BIFR u/s 22-A was passed against the company then it cannot be said that the offence u/s 138 NI Act was completed -- In such a case it may reasonably be said that the dishonoring of the cheque by the bank and failure to make payment of the amount by the company and/or its Directors is for reasons beyond the control of the accused -- In such circumstances it would be unjust and unfair and against the intent and purpose of the statute to hold that the Directors should be compelled to face trial in a criminal case.

(Para 19, 20)