Search By Topic: Acquittal/ Quashing of FIR/ Comp./ Sentence undergone

559. (P&H HC) 10-02-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 41, 50 -- Personal Search – Procedure of -- Personal search of the juvenile was conducted by Lady Constable, though there was no recovery -- On search of the box which was put in a carry bag, fifteen injections of Buprenorphine 2 ML each were recovered – Police was required to comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act -- Investigating officer did not record reasons for his belief which necessitated the search of the juvenile without producing her before the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and no such copy of reasons to belief was sent to the superior officials within 72 hours -- Search and seizure proceedings get vitiated as the very purpose of introducing an independent official witness in the form of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate during the search and seizure gets defeated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- Acquittal of accused – Interference in appeal -- Even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused -- In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption of innocence; and secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible -- Finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse and the same is affirmed.

(Para 12)

561. (SC) 10-02-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Civil suit – Handwriting expert report – F.I.R. w.r.t. forged receipts – Sustainability of -- Quashing of FIR -- Handwriting expert in civil suit has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of respondent No.2 -- It was only thereafter, FIR was registered -- In the Summary Suit, issue No.5 has been framed by the Court “whether the defendant proved that the plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts” – Held, when the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit -- Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered -- Continuation of FIR would amount to abuse of the process of Court – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR allowed.

(Para 18, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 45, 72, 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint -- Presumption of legal enforceability debt – Rebuttal of -- ‘Y’ admitted the issuance of cheques -- Once the issuance of cheque is admitted/established, the presumption would arise u/s 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of cheque that is the complainant-appellant No.3 -- Burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence -- High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden, the presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act will continue to remain -- When disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 20)

570. (SC) 16-12-2019

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Overt Act – Prosecution mainly rests on the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, who were the eye-witnesses of the incident : 

-- Accused No.3 had a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, inasmuch as he was eyeing the property which was being cultivated by the deceased on a Batai basis. Murder was committed through the overt acts of the two accused other than the appellant.

-- Moot question, whether the appellant also participated in the offence, especially since he has not been shown to be a friend or relative of the other accused, or to have any specific motive for murdering the deceased.

-- Post-mortem report and the evidence of the doctor made amply clear that the death was caused due to incised injuries, of such a nature which could have been caused by the axe and sickle carried by the other two accused.

-- Other two injuries, being a laceration and an abrasion, which could possibly be attributed to the appellant, may even have been a result of the deceased falling to the ground, since injuries such as bruises, abrasions and lacerations may very well be sustained as a result of a fall -- Thus, there does not appear to be strong evidence of the active participation of the appellant in the offence.

-- In their examination-in-chief, witnesses deposed that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a lathi on his knee and head, it was proved in the cross-examination that these statements made before the Court were “improvements” -- If these improvements are excluded from consideration from the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, it can be safely said that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt about the active involvement of the appellant in the offence in question through any overt act.

Proceeding on the basis that the appellant was present on the spot of the offence -- Court did not find that the commission of the offence of murder stands proved as against the appellant with the help of Section 34, IPC, either.

(Para 6-10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- Principle of joint criminal liability -- In order to invoke the principle of joint liability in the commission of a criminal act, the prosecution should show that the criminal act was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all -- If this is shown, the liability for the offence may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone -- It may be difficult to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual, and in most cases it has to be inferred from the facts and relevant circumstances of the case – Totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused persons had the common intention to commit the offence with which they could be convicted.

(Para 12,13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Appellant had no specific motive to participate in the commission of the offence, did not have any rivalry with the deceased or his family, and has not been shown to be a friend, relative or hireling of the other two accused – Prosecution has failed to prove any common intention on the appellant’s part, inasmuch as there is no hint of any motive or reason for him to have either participated in pre-planning the murder of the deceased, or to develop the common intention to do so while present at the spot of the offence -- Evidence against the appellant is shaky and insufficient to bring home guilt against him, benefit of doubt must enure to him -- Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court as against the appellant stands set aside -- Appellant is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 13,14)

576. (SC) 07-11-2019

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Review of order in criminal proceedings – Power of High Court -- High Court could not have recalled its earlier order u/s 482 Cr.P.C, inasmuch as there is no provision for recalling or reviewing an order passed by it in criminal matters.

(Para 2)

B. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Child marriage – Adult Wife -- Prosecution of boy aged 17 years – Permissibility of -- Protection order passed in favour of married couple – Later-on boy age found to be 17 years – On application of father of girl, High Court recalled protection order and direction given for registration of FIR against boy for offence u/s 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Held, High Court could not have recalled its earlier order and there was no exceptional circumstance calling for an exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers – FIR quashed.

(Para 2-6)

C. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy – Permissibility of -- Held, it can be treated as a child marriage but cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9 -- FIR against boy quashed.

(Para 3-6)

D. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Interpretation of Statute -- Mischief Rule -- Marginal note -- Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy -- Intention behind punishing only male adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out of such marriages – Hence, cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks to remedy -- Marginal note of Section 9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child” -- Where any ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy – Held, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage” in Section 9 of the 2006 Act should be read as “male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child”.

(Para 3)

580. (SC) 20-08-2019

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) – NDPS Matter -- Reverse burden of proof – Culpable mental state -- Prosecution shall be put to a stricter test for compliance with statutory provisions -- If at any stage, the accused is able to create a reasonable doubt, as a part of his defence, to rebut the presumption of his guilt, the benefit will naturally have to go to him.

(Para 9)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) -- Search and seizure -- Recovery of contraband – Large vacant space below signature of witness – Doubt in – It is clearly abnormal and cannot be lightly wished away especially when the independent witnesses have deposed that they were not present at the time of such search and seizure -- It certainly creates a doubt with regard to the veracity of the allegations made by the prosecution.

(Para 11)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) – Acquittal in NDPS matter -- Identity of sample/contraband -- Late production of sample seized in court – Effect of -- No credible evidence that the FSL sample produced related to the very same contraband stated to have been seized from the appellant – No reasonable explanation why the sample seized from the appellant and deposited in the Malkhana could not be produced in the Court except after a long gap of one year – Appeal against conviction allowed.

(Para 12-19)

591. (SC) 09-04-2019

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Signature not denied on cheque -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Presumption of Complainant being holder of cheque and the signature on the cheque having not been denied by the accused, presumption shall be drawn that cheque was issued for the discharge of any debt or other liability – Presumption u/s 139 is a rebuttable presumption.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Law summarised in following manner:-

(i)      Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

(ii)     The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

(iii)    To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

(iv)    That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

(v)     It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant -- Evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts – Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 24-29)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During the period from 2009 to November, 2011, amount of Rs.18 lakhs was given by the complainant to different persons including the accused, which put a heavy burden to prove the financial capacity when it was questioned on behalf of the accused -- It was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity -- Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence -- Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 25-28)

592. (SC) 01-04-2019

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Acquittal from -- Back wages – Right of -- If an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Suspension of employees -- Dropping of proceedings – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant suspended on 23.10.1979 -- Disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983 --  Suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987 and re-instated -- By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry -- Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial -- Held, Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

(Para 7)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Conviction in Criminal case – Dismissal of employee – Acquittal by Appellate court – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

593. (P&H HC) 27-03-2019

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (3) -- Rape case – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Prosecutrix was major and educated girl -- She was chatting with the respondent/accused on mobile despite the fact that prosecutrix was knowing well that accused was married man and having three children -- Prosecutrix-'X' remained in touch with the respondent-accused for a sufficient long time about two years even after commission of rape -- Categorically admitted photographs that of her with accused, when she was in regular relationship with accused and she also travelled with accused in his car and also got clicked the photographs with accused -- Past conduct of the family of the prosecutrix, whereby her family is facing criminal cases besides herself, are also ample evidence to disapprove the case of prosecution – Acquittal order passed by Trial court affirmed.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (3) – Acquittal by Trial Court -- – Leave to appeal -- It is a settled position that there have to be strong, cogent and compelling reasons to set aside acquittal of the accused -- In case of acquittal, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, it stands reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by acquittal by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n) – Rape – Consensual physical relationship -- Acknowledged consensual physical relationship does not constitute the offence of rape.

(Para 7)