Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279 – Death by rash and negligence driving -- Conviction for 2 years – Petitioner has already undergone 7 months and 9 days -- Petitioner faced agony of trial for the last more than ten years -- Fit case, where the substantive sentence imposed upon the petitioner can be reduced to the period already undergone by him i.e. seven months -- Condition imposed that he would pay Rs. 20,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased. Saurabh Bakshi’s case 2015 (2) RCR (Criminal), 495 relied.

(Para 15, 16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed offender / person – F.I.R. u/s 174-A of IPC – Quashing of -- Petitioner has undergone substantive sentence in the proceedings u/s 138 of the N. I. Act -- Petitioner made the payment to the complainant who entered into a compromise with the petitioner after his claim was satisfied, sentence was reduced to the period already undergone by him – Both F.I.R.s registered u/s 174-A IPC are hereby quashed along with all the subsequent proceedings, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/- to be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-A, 279, 337, 338, 427 – Death by rash and negligent driving -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Continuation of criminal proceedings between the parties would be an abuse of the process of law and the present compromise is for their benefit and will bring peace and harmony between them -- Petition allowed, FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case -- DDR for misplace of cheque – Presumption u/s 139 of NI Act – Rebuttal of -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- DDR Ex.DW.1/A dated 18.9.2012, recorded on the statement of accused, he has averred that his cheque book of account of HDFC Bank has been misplaced containing cheques of the serial Nos.220856 to 220865 -- Number of present cheque is 220861 -- DDR has been registered even before the advancement of loan as stated by the complainant -- Presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act has been duly rebutted – No ground to grant leave to appeal.

(Para 8-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 30 -- Cheque bounce case – Void agreement – Presumption u/s 139 of NI Act – Rebuttal of -- Statement of account is not pertaining to any loan raised by the accused but the same is regarding chit fund/lottery system run by the complainant -- Transaction comes under the agreement by way of wager, which is void as per Section 30 of the Contract Act -- Both the parties were involved in chit fund/lottery system -- Presumption u/s 139 of Act can be rebutted by raising probable defence – Accused raised probable defence – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 10-12)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- Divorce by compromise – Criminal case not withdrawn by wife – Contempt petition dismissed – Quashing of FIR – Held, if the parties had arrived at a settlement and decided to withdraw the cases filed by each of the parties against the other, the compromise ought to be effectuated in complete sense – Leaving aside the technicalities, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to quash the proceedings which were initiated at the instance of the respondent-wife -- Further proceedings in said FIR now stand quashed.

(Para 8)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B, 25 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce by compromise – Right of daughter for maintenance etc. -- Waiver of – Permissibility of -- As per term 6 of Consent Terms, It was certainly open to the wife to give up any claim so far as maintenance or permanent alimony or stridhan but she could not have given up the rights which vest in the daughter insofar as maintenance and other issues are concerned -- By exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Clause (6) of the Consent Terms set-aside.

(Para 8,9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Signature not denied on cheque -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Presumption of Complainant being holder of cheque and the signature on the cheque having not been denied by the accused, presumption shall be drawn that cheque was issued for the discharge of any debt or other liability – Presumption u/s 139 is a rebuttable presumption.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Law summarised in following manner:-

(i)      Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

(ii)     The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

(iii)    To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

(iv)    That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

(v)     It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant -- Evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts – Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 24-29)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During the period from 2009 to November, 2011, amount of Rs.18 lakhs was given by the complainant to different persons including the accused, which put a heavy burden to prove the financial capacity when it was questioned on behalf of the accused -- It was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity -- Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence -- Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 25-28)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Acquittal from -- Back wages – Right of -- If an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Suspension of employees -- Dropping of proceedings – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant suspended on 23.10.1979 -- Disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983 --  Suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987 and re-instated -- By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry -- Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial -- Held, Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

(Para 7)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Conviction in Criminal case – Dismissal of employee – Acquittal by Appellate court – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (3) -- Rape case – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Prosecutrix was major and educated girl -- She was chatting with the respondent/accused on mobile despite the fact that prosecutrix was knowing well that accused was married man and having three children -- Prosecutrix-'X' remained in touch with the respondent-accused for a sufficient long time about two years even after commission of rape -- Categorically admitted photographs that of her with accused, when she was in regular relationship with accused and she also travelled with accused in his car and also got clicked the photographs with accused -- Past conduct of the family of the prosecutrix, whereby her family is facing criminal cases besides herself, are also ample evidence to disapprove the case of prosecution – Acquittal order passed by Trial court affirmed.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (3) – Acquittal by Trial Court -- – Leave to appeal -- It is a settled position that there have to be strong, cogent and compelling reasons to set aside acquittal of the accused -- In case of acquittal, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, it stands reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by acquittal by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n) – Rape – Consensual physical relationship -- Acknowledged consensual physical relationship does not constitute the offence of rape.

(Para 7)

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 8,12, 25 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Custody of children -- Suicide by wife – FIR u/s 306 IPC against husband – Acquittal of husband – Where pursuant to the suicide of the mother, without knowing the circumstances leading to the death and further without waiting for the outcome of the criminal trial, if the minors are put in the custody of the maternal grandparents, they would always end up in believing anything against the father -- As of now, the children are of the age of 11 years and 8 years respectively -- Trial Court’s finding that the respondent-father should be allowed to exercise his right of custody of the children, cannot be found fault with.

(Para 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 323, 324, 326, 452/ Sections 323, 324, 342, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Compromise between parties – Version cross-version case – Both FIR all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners, subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/-, per petition.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 325, 324 (379-B deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Case is at the initial stage, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – Petition accepted, consequently, the impugned DDR u/s 323, 34, 379-B IPC (Sections 379-B IPC deleted later on and Section 325 IPC added later on) in FIR u/s 324, 323, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto are quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Arbitration proceedings – Non-disclosure of issuance of cheque in arbitration matter -- Trial Court has taken one of the two possible views and High Court while exercising the powers in appeal against acquittal cannot substitute its views with the view taken by learned Magistrate.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Acquittal in Cheque bounce case -- Security cheque presented before agreed date – Rs. 7,00,000/- is to be paid in 30 installments, starting from 18.1.2012 -- If till said date, entire amount is not returned, complainant will have right to present cheque given as security, before bank – Thirty months were to lapse on 18.7.2014 – Complainant presented cheque in question before bank on 25.10.2012 – Held, at the time of presentation of cheque before bank, there was no legally enforcement debtor liability – Complainant had received certain amounts, which has not been mentioned in his complainant and what is balance – Offence u/s 138 is not made out.

(Para 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Rebuttal of presumption -- Standard of proof for rebuttal of the presumption u/s 139 of the Act is guided by a preponderance of probabilities.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Loan of Rs.15 lacs -- Legal enforceable liability – Presumption of -- Rebuttal of -- Defence was that the cheque was issued to the complainant on an assurance of a loan which would be obtained from a financial institution – Entire amount alleged to have been paid without obtaining a receipt or document evidencing the payment of the amount – Complainant failed to establish the source of funds -- Nothing was stated by the complainant in regard to the fate of the earlier two cheques which were allegedly issued by the accused -- Non-disclosure of the facts pertaining to the earlier two cheques, and the steps, if any, taken for recovery was again a material consideration which indicated that there was a doubt in regard to the transaction – Presumption stands rebutted -- Order of acquittal passed by the first appellate court was justified.

(Para 13-15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by company – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque singed by Director of company – Demand notice to Director – Complaint against Director – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Maintainability of complaint – Held, in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was not maintainable – In the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused – High Court was in error in rejecting the petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 14-18)

Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Sections 66(B), 66(C), 66(D), 66(E), 67, 67(A) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Petition on various grounds -- However, during the pendency of petition, mediation took place -- Settlement/agreement arrived – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom are ordered to be quashed.

(Para 2-10)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468(2)(c), 482 -- Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Limitation to prosecute starts from the date of receipt of report of public analysts and not from the date of collection of sample -- If, the complaint is filed beyond the period of limitation of three years, the same is not maintainable -- Premises was raided on 16.07.2011 – First report qua misbranding of first sample received on 25.07.2011 and second report on 01.02.2012 – Sanction applied on 19.08.2014 and the same was granted on 10.11.2014 i.e. within three months -- In case, the period of three months is excluded, the impugned complaint filed on 22.07.2015 can still easily be declared being hopelessly time barred -- Impugned complaint and summoning order along with all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141  -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of summoning order and complaint – Maintainability of petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Revisional Jurisdiction -- Alternative remedy available – Objection of -- Held, in exercise of revisional power, Court of Sessions or the High Court is not vested with the power of quashing a criminal complaint -- This power is available to the High Court alone under Section 482 Cr.P.C., whereunder the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, can pass orders to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- Thus, the prayer made in this petition could not have been granted by the revisional Court and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Court of Sessions in the first instance.

(Para 5)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Liability of Ex-officio Director -- Every person who was incharge of the business of the Company and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business is vicariously liable apart from the Company itself -- Such a person may be somebody other than a 'Director' so long as he is an officer of the Company -- However, an Ex-officio Director is not liable.

(Para 8)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Ex-officio-Director of the Company -- Petitioner-Director had resigned and cheque in dispute had been issued much later -- For imposing vicarious liability upon the petitioner, as a person responsible for the business of the company, it was necessary to make specific averments in the complaint regarding his role in the conduct of the business of the Company -- No such averment having been made, the Magistrate was not justified in summoning the petitioner.

(Para 21)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Summoning of accused -- At the stage of summoning of an accused person, the trial Court/Magistrate must be satisfied on the basis of material produced before it that prima facie the accused persons have committed an offence.

(Para 21)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482  -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company – Liability of Director of the Company – Quashing of Complaint and summoning order -- Averment made in the legal notice “You address No. 3 being Chairman/Director of addressee No. 1 are also being incharge and being responsible person of address No. 1 company for conduct to the business of the Company are also liable for the punishment prescribed under the Act ibid.” – Held, averments made in the legal notice u/s 138 of the Act cannot be construed to be averments made in the complaint -- Even the averments made in the legal notice, do not fulfill the requirement of law -- Summoning orders as well as Complaints alongwith consequential proceedings having arisen therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 25-27)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 204 – Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Summoning of Directors of the Company -- Held in order to reduce litigation it would be appropriate for the concerned Magistrates to seek copies of Form No. 32 and the latest Annual Return filed by the Company so that only those persons who are Directors on the date of commission of the offence are summoned – Directions given that in all cases where the accused is a 'Company', before issuing summons to the accused persons the trial Court/Magistrate shall direct the complainant to produce a copy of Form No. 32 and the annual Return filed by the Company in order to determine the persons, who were Directors on the date of commission of the offence -- In cases where the accused–Director is the Chairman or Managing Director or Joint Managing Director or authorized signatory of the cheque, they may be summoned without any averment regarding their role in the conduct of the affairs of the Company -- For summoning of any other Director or officer of the Company the necessary averment regarding their role in the conduct of the business of the Company, must be insisted upon -- In respect of whole time Directors, mere reproduction of the words of Section 141 of the Act would be sufficient.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468,473,482 – Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Report of the Government Analyst received by the complainant on 26.06.2007 -- Complaint could have been filed, at the best, within a period of 3 years from the date of receipt of report of the Government Analyst -- However, the complaint has been filed after 8 years from the said date -- No application for extension of time under provision of 473 Cr.P.C – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,30(3), 33 -- Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 473, 482 – Misbranded article -- Dealer’s prosecution – Quashing of complaint -- Sample was taken as a sealed container in original packing -- This fact duly finds mention in the Form XX prepared by the Insecticide Inspector; on the spot at the time of taking of the sample -- Petitioners-dealer would be, entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) of the Insecticide Act – Initiation and continuation of a complaint and the consequent proceedings against the petitioners-dealer, are not legally justified and sustainable – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 2, 15,16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Quashing of FIR and charge -- Prosecutrix already married -- Physical relation with false assurance of marriage – Held without getting divorce, she could not have married to the petitioner – It is quite clear and evident that the complainant had developed a relationship during the subsistence of her marriage and the relationship was consensual in nature -- Being a major and a person who was competently running a beauty parlour shop, it could not be said that she would be unaware of the consequences of the relationship she was entering into and that no marriage could be solemnized without obtaining the divorce from the first one – FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same are quashed. Prashant Bharti’s case, 2013 AIR(SC)(Crl.)1778 relied.

(Para 6-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 323, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise/ compounding of offence after conviction -- Conviction and sentenced for 10 years – A report has been submitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, wherein it has been reported that statement of the petitioners has been recorded and compromise entered between the parties is genuine, without any pressure, coercion or undue influence – Parties allowed to compound the offence -- Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence stands set aside.

(Para 1-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 353, 332, 186, 341, 342, 506, 435, 511, 427, 148, 149, 379-B -- National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 8-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to murder – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Section 307 IPC can be considered for compounding on the basis of compromise -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – Accordingly, the petition allowed,  FIR and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, ordered to be quashed subject to payment of costs in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited in the Office of District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 10-12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 50 – Contraband of charas -- Search before Magistrate or Gazetted officer – Non-compliance of -- Appellant (accused) was apprised of his right to be searched in the presence of either a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer but despite telling him about his legal right available to him u/s 50 in relation to the search, the appellant (accused) gave his consent in writing to be searched by the police officials (raiding party) –Search and recovery made from the appellant does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 50 for the following reasons.

-- First, appellant was not produced before any Magistrate or Gazetted Officer;

-- Second, due to the aforementioned first reason, the search and recovery of the contraband “Charas” was not made from the appellant in the presence of any Magistrate or Gazetted Officer;

-- Third, none of the police officials of the raiding party, who recovered the contraband “Charas” from him, was the Gazetted Officer and nor they could be and, therefore, they were not empowered to make search and recovery from the appellant of the contraband “Charas” as provided u/s 50 of the NDPS Act except in the presence of either a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer;

-- Fourth, in order to make the search and recovery of the contraband articles from the body of the suspect, the search and recovery has to be in conformity with the requirements of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

Prosecution examined as many as five police officials of the raiding police party but none of them deposed that the search/recovery was made in presence of any Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer -- Non-compliance of the mandatory procedure prescribed u/s 50 of the NDPS Act is fatal to the prosecution case, the appellant is entitled to claim its benefit to seek his acquittal -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 26-30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Age of the prosecutrix – School Leaving Certificate – Evidential Value of -- Prosecutrix gave her age as 18 years in her statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and when she appeared in the witness box claimed herself to be 16 years old – Entry in the school leaving certificate (Ex.P1), without proving its source, was not sufficient to conclude that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of occurrence -- Despite being referred to the dental and radiological opinion regarding the age of the prosecutrix, she was not taken thereto for examination -- Held, it can be said that the prosecutrix was major and an attempt had been made by the prosecution to withhold her correct age.

(Para 32-38)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Kidnapping and rape – Consenting party – Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction can be based on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix, but at the same time, it cannot be mechanically applied to every case of sexual assault -- In the first version given to the Magistrate in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C., she had stated that she had gone of her own, but later she retracted therefrom while appearing in the witness box and alleged kidnapping and rape by the accused for the obvious reason that she had succumbed to the pressure of her parents – Victims taken to Safidon in three wheeler, but she had not raised alarm – Stand of the prosecutrix that she had told the three wheeler driver about her kidnapping but no help was extended, does not convince the Court – Victims had changed three vehicles to reach Safidon, she had the opportunity to raise alarm and seek help – Place from where she had remained with the accused was a construction site where other huts were constructed – Accused used to leave her in the earthen hut for hours together, she remained there for more than four days and it is highly improbable that the stay was without her consent – Medical evidence also goes contrary to her version – Victims went missing on 25.10.2014, but the matter was reported on 27.10.2014, no explanation as to why the matter was reported so late to the police – Circumstances support to the plea of accused that the prosecutrix had left home on her own and she was neither confined, abducted or raped – Judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside, accused is acquitted.

(Para 40-48)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 -- Supplementary charge-sheet – Direction of Commission for adding charge under SC/ST Act – Power of -- No external agency can dictate the course of investigation in a criminal case -- It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the police -- Court also cannot supervise the investigation -- However, in exceptional situations, Superior Courts may monitor an investigation -- But that is not the same as supervision -- Supplementary Report filed by the Police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.

(Para 7-9)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Direction of Commission for adding charge under SC/ST Act – Power of -- Commission is empowered to conduct an inquiry to “whether proper charge sheet has been filed mentioning the relevant sections of IPC together with the PCR Act, 1955 and SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 in Court” -- This is not a power to dictate the course of the investigation -- Commission is competent to point out any lapses or laches in the investigation -- Commission could only have brought to notice of the Police the need for a proper or further investigation and it was for the Police to take a call.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 -- Partly quashing of charge – Power of High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part -- U/s 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the CrPC or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice – A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers u/s 482 to the extent of the abuse -- No requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part.

(Para 7-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Cheque bounce case – Sentence for simple imprisonment of one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.11,50,000/-, in default, to suffer further simple imprisonment for six months -- Parties amicably settled their dispute -- Parties to abide by the terms and conditions as contained in the Memorandum of Settlement without fail -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and sentence imposed upon the appellant quashed.

(Para 2-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Non-appearance of the petitioner before Ld. Trial Court is justified for the reason that he was not served at the given address -- After passing of the order, the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail -- Matter compromised, complainant has withdrawn the complaint u/s 138 of the NIA Act -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Section 174-A IPC would amount to abuse of process of law – Order declaring proclaimed person and subsequent FIR quashed.

 (Para 1, 7,8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 258 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Discharge of accused – Compounding of offence -- Court can close the proceedings and discharge the accused on satisfaction that the cheque amount with assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect –Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the Court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused -- Court is entitled to close the proceedings in exercise of its powers u/s 143 of the Act read with Section 258 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11, 18 (i)-(iii), 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Online hearing of case – Online appearance of accused – Exemption of accused from personal appearance -- Service of summons can be by post/ e-mail/ courier -- Summons ought to indicate that the accused could make specified payment by deposit in a particular account before the specified date and inform the court and the complainant by e-mail -- If the accused complies with such summons and informs the Court and the complainant by e-mail, the Court can ascertain the objection, if any, of the complainant and close the proceedings unless it becomes necessary to proceed with the case -- Some cases of Section 138 cases can be decided online -- If complaint with affidavits and documents can be filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of the complainant or the accused -- Only if the accused contests, need for appearance of parties may arise which may be through counsel and wherever viable, video conferencing can be used -- Personal appearances can be dispensed with.

(Para 16, 17, 20)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 64 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Discretion of the Magistrate to hold that it was undesirable to try the case summarily as sentence of more than one year may have to be passed -- Court has jurisdiction u/s 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award suitable compensation with default sentence under Section 64 IPC and with further powers of recovery under Section 431 Cr.P.C -- With this approach, prison sentence of more than one year may not be required in all cases.

(Para 12, 18(iv))

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 264, 357(3) – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Procedure for summoning -- Evidence of the complaint can be given on affidavit -- Bank’s slip being prima facie evidence of the dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to record any further preliminary evidence -- Such affidavit evidence can be read as evidence at all stages of trial or other proceedings – Normal rule for trial of cases under Chapter XVII of the Act is to follow the summary procedure except where exercise of power under second proviso to Section 143 becomes necessary.

(Para 18(iv), (v), 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Chapter XXIA -- Cheque bounce complaint – Plea bargaining -- Speedy trial -- It will be open to the Court to consider the provisions of plea bargaining -- Trial can be on day to day basis and endeavour must be to conclude it within six months.

(Para 20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138,139 -- Friendly loan of Rs. 20 lacs – Acquittal of accused --

--       Complainant has not mentioned in his complaint as to for what purpose, he had advanced such a substantial amount as loan to the accused.

--       While appearing in the witness box applicant has deposed that the loan was advanced to the respondent in the presence of her father-in-law but she has not examined this witness in support of her claim.

--       No other witness has been examined by her regarding the loan transaction. Applicant has also not produced on record any receipt or pronote for grant of loan to the accused. Therefore, the act and conduct of the applicant is highly improbable, as no sane person is expected to advance such a substantial amount as loan to any other person without any documentation or even receipt or acknowledgement.

--       Complainant has also failed to mention the date, month and year of advancement of loan or issuance of cheque in question by the accused in her favour either in her pleadings or in her evidence.

–       Complainant has also not produced any document which may show her income/expenditure/ account of business income or the income tax return, which may draw an inference that she is financially well placed.

--       She has not given any detail as to what business or profession she is carrying.

--       Only contention, which the complainant has raised is that she has advanced a loan of Rs.20 lakhs to the accused as she had sold an industrial shed at Panchkula, but neither such sale deed nor any other relevant document has been produced on record by the complainant, which can substantiate the plea that the amount of Rs.20 lakhs was collected by her after the sale of the said industrial unit situated in Panchkula.

When no evidence to connect the respondent-accused with the alleged offence is available on record, no case is made out for interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal.

(Para 10-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Petitioner could not appear before the trial Court as he was stated to have not been served at the address, where he was residing -- After the passing of the impugned order declaring him as a proclaimed person, he had surrendered before the trial Court and was ordered to be released on bail -- In such circumstances, especially, when the petitioner has duly surrendered before the trial Court, continuation of proceedings under Section 174-A IPC would be an abuse of the process of Court.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 438, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Cheque bounce case – Proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. – FIR u/s 174-A – Quashing of – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Held, looking to the nature of the prosecution against the petitioner-accused under Section 138 of the Act, it would make no difference if he allowed a chance to participate in the prosecution against him, without finding any fault with the trial Court's order -- Petitioner will have to furnish bail bonds with the trial Court on his appearance before the trial Court and shall attend the trial with promptitude for its disposal in accordance with law – In that view of the matter, proclamation order and consequent FIR u/s 174-A of IPC are quashed under the inherent powers of High Court.

(Para 3,4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Alteration in cheque -- Report from F.S.L., show that in the cheque in question '0' has been inserted to make the cheque from Rs.48,000/- to Rs.4,80,000/- -- In another cheque, digit '2' has been added, Rs.20,000/- converted to Rs.2,20,000 -- Nothing on the record to rebut this report – Held, cheque itself becomes void instrument even if the liability exists towards the accused – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Acquittal in – Friendly loan amounting to Rs.11,30,000/- to the accused – However, there is no evidence that the complainant had the capacity to advance Rs.11,30,000/- or that amount allegedly given on loan to the respondent is shown in the Income Tax Return – Respondent-accused stated that the appellant had misused the cheque which he gave to his (appellant) brother, this fact is duly proved by the statement of independent witness -- Except self serving statement of the appellant there is no material evidence on record to prove the factum of advancement of loan – Ld. Trial Court acquitted the respondent -- Even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused -- In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in his favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible.

(Para 5,6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal – Appellant secured loan amount of Rs.2,00,000/- from one person and handed over to the accused -- However, there is no evidence that said person had the capacity to advance Rs.2,00,000/- or that amount allegedly given on loan to the appellant is shown in the Income Tax Return or in any other record maintained by said person -- Appellant has not even examined that person -- In his cross-examination, the appellant had stated that he had given the loan amount to the respondent on interest -- However, the appellant does not hold any licence for money lending -- No document was accepted by the appellant regarding advancing of loan or that respondent has furnished any security for repayment of amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- appears to be highly improbable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 5-7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Except self serving statement of the appellant there is no material evidence on record to prove the factum of legally enforceable debt of the respondent towards appellant – No oral or documentary evidence to prove the advancement of loan – In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in accused’s favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible – Keeping in view the above, the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.

(Para 7)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 41-A – Arrest of Advocate/ Doctor – Procedure of law violated – Life and liberty of accused -- Compensation to accused arrested -- Arrest of the petitioners was not made by following the procedure of arrest -- Dignity of the petitioners, a doctor and a practicing Advocate has been seriously jeopardized -- It is an assault on his/her identity – Said identity is sacrosanct under the Constitution – Article 21 has been violated and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation – Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (1997) 1 SCC 416, there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of Cr.PC -- A sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation is awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence -- It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.

(Para 22-27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheating – Civil Dispute -- On a perusal of the FIR, it is clear to us that the dispute is purely of a civil nature, but a maladroit effort has been made to give it a criminal colour – No ingredient of Section 420 IPC is remotely attracted -- Even if it is a wrong, the complainant has to take recourse to civil action – Not the case where cognizance of the offence can be taken by the court and the accused can be asked to face trial -- Entire case projects a civil dispute and nothing else – Prosecution initiated against the petitioners stands quashed.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Compounding of offence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- There is a distinction between the power of the Court to compound an offence under Section 320 Cr. P.C. and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr. P.C.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) -- Offence u/s 304 A of IPC – Nature of -- It would indeed be paradoxical and incorrect to hold that the offence under Section 304-A is private in nature -- When a person or persons lose their life/lives due to the rash and negligent act of the accused, the question of mens rea or intention in such a situation pales into insignificance.

 (Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 482 – Death due to negligence driving – Offence u/s 304A IPC – Compromise with the victims’ family – Quashing of FIR -- To quash the proceedings under Section 304-A solely on the basis of a settlement or compromise arrived at between the accused and the legal representatives is not permissible -- Inclusion of the legal representatives in the definition of victim does not clothe him/them to enter into such a settlement, though the legal representative, undoubtedly has the authority to file an appeal or receive compensation -- However, power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. can nevertheless be exercised in appropriate matters where it is felt that a prima facie case is not made out in consonance with the settled principles of law – There can indeed be no fetter on this power to act for securing the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of law – However this observation for a moment is not to be construed as taking the possibility of a conviction being bleak due to settlement, to be a relevant factor for quashing the FIR under Section 304-A IPC.

(Para 19,20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa), 482 – Death due to negligence driving – Offence u/s 304A IPC – Compromise with the victims’ family – Quashing of FIR – Reference: whether the crime registered u/s 304-A IPC can be quashed on the basis of compromise arrived at by the legal heir/legal representative of the victim/deceased with the offender – Reference is answered in the negative as there can be no quashing of an offence registered u/s 304-A and subsequent proceedings, solely on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the legal heirs/representatives of the victim (deceased) and the accused.

(Para 1, 20)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 406, 420, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cruelty – Misappropriation of Istridhan – Criminal breach of trust -- FIR against sister-in-law and her husband – Quashing of FIR -- Main grouse of the complainant was that with respect to the illness of husband before the marriage -- There is not even a whisper that the petitioners were entrusted with any dowry articles -- Entrustment is sine-quo-non for the offence under Section 406 IPC -- It cannot be believed that the petitioners who are admittedly residing separately were entrusted with the istridhan -- No overt act had been attributed to the petitioners, not even a single instance of harassment or cruelty or demand of dowry had been referred against the petitioners – On the basis of wild allegations, the petitioners cannot be put to the ordeal of trial -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would be sheer abuse of process of law -- Impugned FIR and consequent proceedings taken therein, against the petitioners are quashed.

(Para 18,19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Cheque bounce case – Acquittal in -- Rebuttal of presumption – Leave to appeal -- In the reply to legal notice, the accused has specifically mentioned that he had borrowed an amount of Rs.10,000/- from complainant and not Rs.4 lacs and the cheque was handed over to the complainant as security cheque – Nothing in the complaint or in the evidence as to on which date and in which month and year, what amount was given to the accused as loan -- It was necessary, specifically, when the accused is alleging that he has taken loan of Rs.10,000/- only -- One pen has been used for signing the cheque, other pen has been used for putting the date on the cheque and third pen has been used for filling the amount in words as well as in figure -- No cogent evidence on the record to show as to why a huge amount of Rs.4 lacs was given without getting any receipt or getting executed any security document i.e. pronote etc. from the accused -- Nothing on the record to show that from where Rs.4 lacs was withdrawn and paid to the accused – Presumption u/s 139 stand rebutted – Order of acquittal passed by the Ld. Trial Court upheld.

(Para 8-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Cheque bounce case – Acquittal in – Leave to appeal -- No agreement to sell for harvesting combine -- No document regarding ownership of the harvesting combine -- Nothing on the record regarding the payment of Rs.10 lacs by the complainant to the accused – Accused has also appeared as defence witness and stated that she had litigation with “AS” and after received full and final payment he withdrew the complaint and complainant misused the cheque by taking the same from “AS” – In cross-examination, the accused admitted that he has taken cheque from “AS” – Presumption u/s 139 of the Act has been duly rebutted -- Nothing to show the capacity of the complainant to pay such a huge amount -- Amount in question has not been shown in the income tax return nor bank record has been produced to show from where this amount has been withdrawn – Finding of Trial Court acquitting the accused upheld.

(Para 8-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 304-B -- Dowry death – Acquittal of accused -- Rs.20,000/- for the purchase of agricultural land was demanded by father-in-law when husband was in Dubai – Husband is stated to have returned to India from Dubai eight to ten months, after the above demand -- A female child was born about a year after the return of husband to India -- After the birth of the female child, deceased-wife had remained in her maternal house, for about four to five months -- Even if the above oral allegation is accepted as correct, it was a demand made about two years before the occurrence -- Same was too remote to the occurrence, and therefore, would not satisfy the requirement of “soon before her death” contemplated under Section 304B(1) of the Indian Penal Code -- Demand of sewing-machine was clarified by mother of girl during her cross-examination that her daughter knew tailoring and the sewing-machine was given to her for tailoring clothes -- This was really a gift and therefore, cannot be considered as a part of the demand made by inlaws husband for himself or for his family members -- This allegation is inconsequential -- High Court was, therefore, fully justified in acquitting the accused.

(Para 16-21)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case -- Liability to pay amount – Drawer of cheque -- Appellant-complainant supplied goods to M/s. Shah Agencies – Accused carried their business in the names of M/s. Shah Enterprises and M/s. Shah Agencies -- In part discharge of the liability of M/s. Shah Agencies, two cheques for Rs. 5 lakhs each were issued by the accused on an account maintained by M/s. Shah Enterprises – Cheques were dishonoured due to insufficient fund -- Case made out in the complaint was that the goods were sold and supplied to M/s. Shah Enterprises and the liability was of M/s. Shah Enterprises -- While in the affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, the Complainant came out with a case that the liability was that of M/s. Shah Agencies as goods were sold and supplied to M/s. Shah Agencies and it was not the case of the appellant that the accused had agreed to take over and discharge the liabilities of M/s. Shah Agencies – Acquittal of accused upheld.

(Para 1, 4, 11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Liability to pay amount – Drawer of cheque -- First and foremost essential ingredient for attracting a liability under this Section is that the person who is to be made liable should be the drawer of the cheque and should have drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for discharge, in whole or part, of any debt or other liability.

(Para 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142(b) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act within 15 days of notice of demand – Maintainability of – Quashing of -- Complaint was premature and not maintainable -- Impugned complaint and subsequent proceedings taken therein are quashed – Permission given to complainant to file fresh complaint within one month -- Delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act.

(Para 11-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Offence by Company – Vicarious liability of Director – Quashing of complaint:

(i)    In order to make the company liable u/s 138 of the Act vicariously, the Director can be prosecuted if there is specific recital that the Directors thereof were at the time when offence the offence committed, were responsible for the conduct and day to day business of the complaint -- Director, who had resigned long back before the cheque was presented cannot be prosecuted --  One of the Director in the array of accused was never Director of the company since its incorporation and still he has been arrayed as accused in the capacity of Director -- The certification to this effect is computerized information, which is perse admissible under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act, rather this document has not been denied with reference to any evidence to the contrary.

(ii)   Averments even if made in the complaint that the Director was in-charge, the same can be negated if the High Court comes across some unimpeachable/acceptable circumstance, which may lead to the conclusion that the Director could never have been in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the relevant time and therefore, making such Director as an accused to stand trial would be an abuse of process of law.

(iii)  It is mandatory in terms of Section 138 and 141 of the Act to specifically aver in the complaint that Director was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, when the offence was committed and he was responsible for day to day functioning of the company -- Role of the Director in a company is a question of fact depending upon the nomenclature of the company and other circumstances prevailing therein -- There cannot be any universal application of the rule that a Director of company is in-charge of its day to day affairs.

(iv)   Section 141 of the Act is a penal provision creating criminal liability -- As per nature of the offence it has to be strictly construed -- It is not sufficient to make bald cursory statement in a complaint that Director/Directors is/are in-charge of and are responsible for the conduct of the business of the company without specifying anything more as to the role of the Director/Directors -- It is requirement of law that the complainant must spell out as to how and in what manner the accused are in-charge of the affairs of the company in the conduct of its business and thus responsible for the same.

(v)    Some times a Director is not the active Director and he may be non executive Director, who was no doubt a custodian of governance of the company, but at the same time was not involved in day to day affairs running of its business -- For making such a Director liable there must have been specific averment in the complaint as to how and in what manner such a Director was responsible for conduct of business of the company -- In the absence of such plea the Court can definitely come to rescue of such Director against whom the proceedings are nothing but a pure abuse of process of law.

(vi)   “no criminal proceedings shall be initiated against the Director/accused unless specific allegations should comeforth in complaint, earmarking unambiguous role in the context of charge and responsibility in discharge of day to functioning of the company so as to prevent embarking on a fishing expedition to try and unearth material against the Director.

Complaint is liable to quashed being abuse of process of law and is deficient in formulising vicarious liability of the petitioners in terms of Section 141 of the Act.

(Para 9-19)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Power of attorney – Cognizance by Magistrate – Power of -- Magistrate had taken cognizance of the complaint without prima facie establishing the fact as to whether the Power of Attorney existed in first place and whether it was in order – Complaint against the appellant was not preferred by the payee or the holder in due course and the statement on oath of the person who filed the complaint has also not stated that he filed the complaint having been instructed by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque – Held, it was not open to the Magistrate to take cognizance -- Proceedings in question against the appellant are quashed.

(Para 16, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 204 -- Section 138 – Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Power of attorney – Cognizance by Magistrate – Power of -- Except mentioning in the cause title there is no mention of, or a reference to the Power of Attorney in the body of the said complaint nor was it exhibited as part of the said complaint -- In the list of evidence there is just a mere mention of the words “Power of Attorney”, however there is no date or any other particulars of the Power of Attorney mentioned in the complaint -- Even in the verification statement, there is not even a whisper that she is filing the complaint as the Power of Attorney holder of the complainant -- Even the order of issue of process does not mention that the Magistrate had perused any Power of Attorney for issuing process – Magistrate wrongly took cognizance in the matter and the Court below erred in putting the onus on the appellant rather than the complainant -- Proceedings in question against the appellant are quashed.

(Para 17-19)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act – Power of attorney – Complaint was filed by one claiming to be General Power of Attorney of the complainant company – Complaint was not signed either by Managing Director or Director of the Company -- PW-1/R gave evidence on behalf of company who is only the employee of the Company -- As per Resolution of the Company i.e. Ex.P3 Managing Director and Director are authorized to file suits and criminal complaints against the debtors for recovery of money and for prosecution and they were authorized to appoint or nominate any other person to appear on their behalf in the Court and engage lawyer etc. -- But nothing on the record suggest that an employee is empowered to file the complaint on behalf of the Company -- Managing Director and Director are authorized persons of the Company to file the complaint by signing and by giving evidence -- At best the said persons can nominate any person to represent themselves or the Company before the Court –Employee of the Company signed the complaint and the Deputy General Manager of the Company/ PW-1 gave evidence as if he knows everything though he does not know anything -- Nothing on the record to suggest that he was authorized by the Managing Director or any Director -- Magistrate rightly acquitted the appellant.

(Para 20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Complaint against Director of the Company – Partial quashing of Complaint – Petitioner is alleged to have issued cheque – Cheque placed on the file does not bear the signature of the petitioner – Form No.32 show that he had joined the said company as Director on 11.07.2009 and another Form No.32 to show that he resigned from the post of Director of the Company on 24.07.2009, which means that on the date of issuance of the cheque i.e. 29.12.2012, he had nothing to do with the said company – It being so, the complaint qua the petitioner along with the summoning order stands quashed.

(Para 2,3)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia) -- Divorce – Mental cruelty -- False criminal complaint -- It is now beyond cavil that if a false criminal complaint is preferred by either spouse it would invariably and indubitably constitute matrimonial cruelty, such as would entitle the other spouse to claim a divorce.

(Para 1)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia) -- Divorce by husband – Mental cruelty -- False criminal complaint by wife -- Wife has admitted in her cross-examination that she did not mention all the incidents on which her Complaint is predicated, in her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C -- It is not her case that she had actually narrated all these facts to the Investigating Officer, but that he had neglected to mention them – This is clearly indicative of the fact that the criminal complaint was a contrived afterthought -- Criminal complaint was “ill advised” -- Adding thereto is the factor that the High Court had been informed of the acquittal of the Husband and members of his family -- In these circumstances, the High Court ought to have concluded that the Wife knowingly and intentionally filed a false complaint, calculated to embarrass and incarcerate the husband and seven members of his family and that such conduct unquestionably constitutes cruelty as postulated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act.

(Para 5)

C. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(ia) -- Divorce by husband – False criminal complaint by wife lateron – Whether mental cruelty and ground for divorce -- Criminal complaint was filed by the wife after filing of the husband’s divorce petition, and being subsequent events could have been looked into by the Court -- In any event, both the parties were fully aware of this facet of cruelty which was allegedly suffered by the husband -- When evidence was lead, as also when arguments were addressed, objection had not been raised on behalf of the Wife that this aspect of cruelty was beyond the pleadings – Held, wife had filed a false criminal complaint, and even one such complaint is sufficient to constitute matrimonial cruelty – Marriage of parties dissolved.

(Para 6-8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Director of company – Resignation of – Dishonour of cheque – Liability of – Quashing of complaint -- One of the petitioner /accused / Director of company had resigned from the Company on 16.02.2013 and the Board of Directors have accepted her resignation on 18.02.2013 and the other had tendered his resignation on 21.02.2013 i.e before the cheque was issued -- Registrar of Companies was informed about resignation on 16.09.2013 and June, 2013 respectively -- This gap would not make the petitioners liable for dishonor of the cheques, which was presented on 27.05.2013 and was dishonored – Petitioners were not involved in day to day affairs of the company and no liability can be thus fastened upon them – Complaint and summoning order are quashed.

(Para 27, 28)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings -- Compounding of offence -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court :

--      Power conferred u/s 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences u/s 320 of the Code. No doubt, u/s 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

--       When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i)   ends of justice, or

(ii)  to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(Para 31 (I), (II))

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376, 395 – Heinous offence offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. – Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings -- Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

(Para 31 (III))

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988) -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- For offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

(Para 31 (III)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence of civil character – Matrimonial disputes -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(Para 31 (IV))

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court – While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(Para 31 (V))

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings :

--       Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.

--       However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision.

--       It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(Para 31 (VI))

G. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise quashing of criminal proceedings – Timing of compromise – Role of -- While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role :

--       Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed.

--       Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.

--       On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

(Para 31 (VII))

H. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 – Attempt of murder -- Compromise after conviction -- Where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court -- Here charge is proved u/s 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.

(Para 31 (VII))

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 –Non-compoundable offence – Compromise quashing -- Inherent powers of High Court -- Section 320 CrPC is not exercisable in relation to a case of non-compoundable offence -- Refusal to invoke power u/s 320 CrPC, however, does not debar the High Court from resorting to its inherent power u/s 482 CrPC and pass an appropriate order so as to secure the ends of justice.

(Para 10, 14,15)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise in Non-compoundable offence -- Inherent power of High Court -- Stage of case -- Magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. with a view to prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to not only the non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar u/s 320 CrPC but such a power, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no express bar.

(Para 17)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420,467,468 – Compromise after conviction – Inherent power of High Court -- Negation of the compromise would disharmonize the relationship and cause a permanent rift amongst the family members who are living together as a joint family – It would also lead to denial of complete justice which is the very essence of justice delivery system – Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking of power u/s 482 CrPC after conviction of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain safeguards – Petition allowed, judgement and order of conviction set aside.

(Para 4, 10, 20-22)