Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 470, 482 – Misbranded articles -- Quashing of complaint -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Time spent in sanction – Exclusion of -- Officer tried to explain the delay, that initially incomplete consent/sanction was granted, later necessary correction was sought and if this period is excluded then there is no delay in filing the complaint – Held, this plea cannot be accepted -- Complaint and all the consequential proceedings including the summoning order quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 6-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act -- Dismissal of complaint – Appellant/complainant has averred that the amount of cheque is part of sale consideration which stands belied from the reading of registered sale deed -- Once on preponderance of probabilities the defence creates doubt, the onus shifts on the complainant to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt and the protective umbrella of Section 139 of the N.I. Act is no more available. Dismissal of complaint order, upheld. Rangappa’s case, (2010) 11 SCC 441 relied.

(Para 1,7)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 498-A, 506 – Dowry case – Criminal breach of trust – Embezzlement of istridhan – Quashing of FIR -- FIR is a document first in point of time is very foundation of the case – Only general, vague and ambiguous allegations, no specific entrustment of any of the articles of Ishtridhan to any of accused-petitioners nor there is any allegation that they have embezzled the same and refused to return back these articles which were meant for the exclusive use of the bride/complainant – Husband is residing where he was employed and where too the complainant wife had put up after the marriage – Material question arises how the articles of Ishtridhan have come about in possession of the in-laws – Proceedings held to be misuse of the process of the court against innocent relations of the husband resulting in gross miscarriage of justice, needs to be set aside -- FIR and all the proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 3, 4)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42, 67 – Acquittal in NDPS matter -- Investigation by Assistant Sub-Inspector – Assistant Sub Inspector, the investigating officer of this case is a C.2 Constable which is an upper rank for the post of Constable, substantive rank still continues to be that of Constable and is drawing pay of the Constable – Provisions of the Act of 1985 are stringent and provide for severe punishment -- In such a situation, it is the duty of the investigating agency to strictly comply with the requirements of the Act – Accused acquitted.

(Para 2-7)

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13(1)(i-a) – Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 498-A -- Divorce petition by husband -- Acquittal of husband -- Cruelty as a ground -- Husband acquitted after a trial for offence u/s 498-A of IPC, levelled by the wife – Ground for divorce made out – Decree of divorce granted.

(Para 14-16)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Review of order in criminal proceedings – Power of High Court -- High Court could not have recalled its earlier order u/s 482 Cr.P.C, inasmuch as there is no provision for recalling or reviewing an order passed by it in criminal matters.

(Para 2)

B. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Child marriage – Adult Wife -- Prosecution of boy aged 17 years – Permissibility of -- Protection order passed in favour of married couple – Later-on boy age found to be 17 years – On application of father of girl, High Court recalled protection order and direction given for registration of FIR against boy for offence u/s 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Held, High Court could not have recalled its earlier order and there was no exceptional circumstance calling for an exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers – FIR quashed.

(Para 2-6)

C. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy – Permissibility of -- Held, it can be treated as a child marriage but cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9 -- FIR against boy quashed.

(Para 3-6)

D. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Interpretation of Statute -- Mischief Rule -- Marginal note -- Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy -- Intention behind punishing only male adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out of such marriages – Hence, cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks to remedy -- Marginal note of Section 9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child” -- Where any ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy – Held, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage” in Section 9 of the 2006 Act should be read as “male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child”.

(Para 3)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 21A, 21B, 21C, 22A, 22B, 22C, 42(1), 50 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- NDPS case -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- What weighed with the trial Court was the fact that both the notices u/s 42(1) and 50 of the NDPS Act were defective -- Further even on merits there was material difference in the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the point of time on which the notice u/s 50 was served upon the respondent/ accused – State has not been able to justify the infraction of the mandate of Sections 42(1) and Section 50 or explain the discrepancies in the statements -- Application seeking leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-A, 279, 337, 338, 427 – Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal of -- Testimony of PW-3 which includes his cross-examination does not make out a case that he had seen the accident with his own eyes and he had not seen the accused on the spot – There was no 'Test Identification Parade' of the accused and even during trial, he has not been able to identify the accused person – He was unable to note-down complete number of the offending vehicle as well -- Testimony of remaining witnesses more or less becomes formal in nature -- Apart from that, there was no material evidence available -- Revision accepted. impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set-aside.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379-B, 379 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 54 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner only, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/-.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) – NDPS Matter -- Reverse burden of proof – Culpable mental state -- Prosecution shall be put to a stricter test for compliance with statutory provisions -- If at any stage, the accused is able to create a reasonable doubt, as a part of his defence, to rebut the presumption of his guilt, the benefit will naturally have to go to him.

(Para 9)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) -- Search and seizure -- Recovery of contraband – Large vacant space below signature of witness – Doubt in – It is clearly abnormal and cannot be lightly wished away especially when the independent witnesses have deposed that they were not present at the time of such search and seizure -- It certainly creates a doubt with regard to the veracity of the allegations made by the prosecution.

(Para 11)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) – Acquittal in NDPS matter -- Identity of sample/contraband -- Late production of sample seized in court – Effect of -- No credible evidence that the FSL sample produced related to the very same contraband stated to have been seized from the appellant – No reasonable explanation why the sample seized from the appellant and deposited in the Malkhana could not be produced in the Court except after a long gap of one year – Appeal against conviction allowed.

(Para 12-19)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 200 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 34 -- Civil dispute – Criminal proceedings – Abuse of process of law -- After coming to know that the property was mortgaged with the Bank, the original complainant himself paid the mortgage money and got the mortgage redeemed and got the sale deed executed in his name – Complainant filed an application u/s 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which came to be rejected by the Ld. Magistrate -- Said order was not assailed by the complainant -- Thereafter he filed a private complaint u/s 200 Cr.P.C. which was pending before the Ld. Magistrate -- Despite the above, he filed a writ petition before the High Court, which is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- High Court ought to have closed the proceedings – For settling a civil dispute, the criminal complaint is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4.1-4.3)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409, 506, 120-B/34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(2) -- Cheating and forgery – Acquittal of – Leave to appeal -- Accused are Sarpanch and her husband -- Main allegation against the respondents/accused is that they had affixed the thumb impressions in the muster-roll regarding disbursement of the amount of Rs. 4212/- in August and Rs. 2268/- in October – Muster-roll Ex. P1, was prepared by the Gram Sachiv -- All the Panches of the Gram Panchayat had signed the said muster-roll -- Other members of the Gram Panchayat, who were signatories to the muster-roll (Ex. P1), had not been arrayed as accused -- Even complainant had also put his thumb impressions on the said muster-roll -- On the complaint moved by the complainant, the Deputy Commissioner, exonerated of the charges levelled against them -- Even  as per the FSL report, the thumb impressions were not matchable – Appellate court acquitted the respondents – Leave to appeal declined.

(Para 12-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 379-B, 506, 148 & 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to murder – Snatching case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Although the FIR involves Section 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act, however, the fact of the case will show that the alleged weapon recovered in the case is licensed gun of the petitioner and the injury allegedly caused to the injured/witness was not that much serious, therefore, the FIR u/s 307 IPC and Sections 25/27 of Arms Act can be quashed on the basis of compromise -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted -- FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed qua the present petitioner.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304-A – Death by negligent driving – Conviction u/s 279/304-A IPC for 1 year – Petitioner has already undergone 4 months and 11 days of actual sentence – Petitioner is a professional driver never been convicted in any other such case -- He is a first time offender – He is on bail since 29.11.2011 -- Now sending the petitioner behind bar at this stage, would be very harsh and inequitable -- Petitioner-driver was also injured in the same accident -- Sentence awarded reduced to already undergone.

(Para 4, 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279 – Death by rash and negligence driving -- Conviction for 2 years – Petitioner has already undergone 7 months and 9 days -- Petitioner faced agony of trial for the last more than ten years -- Fit case, where the substantive sentence imposed upon the petitioner can be reduced to the period already undergone by him i.e. seven months -- Condition imposed that he would pay Rs. 20,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased. Saurabh Bakshi’s case 2015 (2) RCR (Criminal), 495 relied.

(Para 15, 16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed offender / person – F.I.R. u/s 174-A of IPC – Quashing of -- Petitioner has undergone substantive sentence in the proceedings u/s 138 of the N. I. Act -- Petitioner made the payment to the complainant who entered into a compromise with the petitioner after his claim was satisfied, sentence was reduced to the period already undergone by him – Both F.I.R.s registered u/s 174-A IPC are hereby quashed along with all the subsequent proceedings, however, subject to payment of costs of Rs.3,000/- to be deposited with the District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 9-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 304-A, 279, 337, 338, 427 – Death by rash and negligent driving -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Continuation of criminal proceedings between the parties would be an abuse of the process of law and the present compromise is for their benefit and will bring peace and harmony between them -- Petition allowed, FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case -- DDR for misplace of cheque – Presumption u/s 139 of NI Act – Rebuttal of -- Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- DDR Ex.DW.1/A dated 18.9.2012, recorded on the statement of accused, he has averred that his cheque book of account of HDFC Bank has been misplaced containing cheques of the serial Nos.220856 to 220865 -- Number of present cheque is 220861 -- DDR has been registered even before the advancement of loan as stated by the complainant -- Presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act has been duly rebutted – No ground to grant leave to appeal.

(Para 8-11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), Section 30 -- Cheque bounce case – Void agreement – Presumption u/s 139 of NI Act – Rebuttal of -- Statement of account is not pertaining to any loan raised by the accused but the same is regarding chit fund/lottery system run by the complainant -- Transaction comes under the agreement by way of wager, which is void as per Section 30 of the Contract Act -- Both the parties were involved in chit fund/lottery system -- Presumption u/s 139 of Act can be rebutted by raising probable defence – Accused raised probable defence – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 10-12)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173 -- Divorce by compromise – Criminal case not withdrawn by wife – Contempt petition dismissed – Quashing of FIR – Held, if the parties had arrived at a settlement and decided to withdraw the cases filed by each of the parties against the other, the compromise ought to be effectuated in complete sense – Leaving aside the technicalities, Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to quash the proceedings which were initiated at the instance of the respondent-wife -- Further proceedings in said FIR now stand quashed.

(Para 8)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13-B, 25 – Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Divorce by compromise – Right of daughter for maintenance etc. -- Waiver of – Permissibility of -- As per term 6 of Consent Terms, It was certainly open to the wife to give up any claim so far as maintenance or permanent alimony or stridhan but she could not have given up the rights which vest in the daughter insofar as maintenance and other issues are concerned -- By exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, Clause (6) of the Consent Terms set-aside.

(Para 8,9)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Signature not denied on cheque -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Presumption of Complainant being holder of cheque and the signature on the cheque having not been denied by the accused, presumption shall be drawn that cheque was issued for the discharge of any debt or other liability – Presumption u/s 139 is a rebuttable presumption.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Presumption of – Rebuttal of – Law summarised in following manner:-

(i)      Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability.

(ii)     The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.

(iii)    To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely.

(iv)    That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.

(v)     It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs.6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant -- Evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts – Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 24-29)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 139 -- Legal enforceable liability – Financial capacity – Onus of proof – Acquittal of accused -- During the period from 2009 to November, 2011, amount of Rs.18 lakhs was given by the complainant to different persons including the accused, which put a heavy burden to prove the financial capacity when it was questioned on behalf of the accused -- It was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity -- Court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence -- Order acquitting the accused by Trial Court, upheld.

(Para 25-28)

A. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Acquittal from -- Back wages – Right of -- If an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious.

(Para 6)

B. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Criminal case against employee – Suspension of employees -- Dropping of proceedings – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant suspended on 23.10.1979 -- Disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983 --  Suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987 and re-instated -- By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the Appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry -- Appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial -- Held, Appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

(Para 7)

C. Constitution of India, Article 311 -- Conviction in Criminal case – Dismissal of employee – Acquittal by Appellate court – Delay in re-instatement -- Back Salary – Right of --  Appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003.

(Para 1, 7, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (3) -- Rape case – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Prosecutrix was major and educated girl -- She was chatting with the respondent/accused on mobile despite the fact that prosecutrix was knowing well that accused was married man and having three children -- Prosecutrix-'X' remained in touch with the respondent-accused for a sufficient long time about two years even after commission of rape -- Categorically admitted photographs that of her with accused, when she was in regular relationship with accused and she also travelled with accused in his car and also got clicked the photographs with accused -- Past conduct of the family of the prosecutrix, whereby her family is facing criminal cases besides herself, are also ample evidence to disapprove the case of prosecution – Acquittal order passed by Trial court affirmed.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (3) – Acquittal by Trial Court -- – Leave to appeal -- It is a settled position that there have to be strong, cogent and compelling reasons to set aside acquittal of the accused -- In case of acquittal, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, it stands reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by acquittal by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2)(n) – Rape – Consensual physical relationship -- Acknowledged consensual physical relationship does not constitute the offence of rape.

(Para 7)

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), Section 8,12, 25 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Custody of children -- Suicide by wife – FIR u/s 306 IPC against husband – Acquittal of husband – Where pursuant to the suicide of the mother, without knowing the circumstances leading to the death and further without waiting for the outcome of the criminal trial, if the minors are put in the custody of the maternal grandparents, they would always end up in believing anything against the father -- As of now, the children are of the age of 11 years and 8 years respectively -- Trial Court’s finding that the respondent-father should be allowed to exercise his right of custody of the children, cannot be found fault with.

(Para 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 323, 324, 326, 452/ Sections 323, 324, 342, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Compromise between parties – Version cross-version case – Both FIR all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners, subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000/-, per petition.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 325, 324 (379-B deleted) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Case is at the initial stage, it would be in the interest and justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – Petition accepted, consequently, the impugned DDR u/s 323, 34, 379-B IPC (Sections 379-B IPC deleted later on and Section 325 IPC added later on) in FIR u/s 324, 323, 34 of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising thereto are quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 (4) -- Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Arbitration proceedings – Non-disclosure of issuance of cheque in arbitration matter -- Trial Court has taken one of the two possible views and High Court while exercising the powers in appeal against acquittal cannot substitute its views with the view taken by learned Magistrate.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Acquittal in Cheque bounce case -- Security cheque presented before agreed date – Rs. 7,00,000/- is to be paid in 30 installments, starting from 18.1.2012 -- If till said date, entire amount is not returned, complainant will have right to present cheque given as security, before bank – Thirty months were to lapse on 18.7.2014 – Complainant presented cheque in question before bank on 25.10.2012 – Held, at the time of presentation of cheque before bank, there was no legally enforcement debtor liability – Complainant had received certain amounts, which has not been mentioned in his complainant and what is balance – Offence u/s 138 is not made out.

(Para 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Legally enforceable liability – Rebuttal of presumption -- Standard of proof for rebuttal of the presumption u/s 139 of the Act is guided by a preponderance of probabilities.

(Para 10)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 -- Loan of Rs.15 lacs -- Legal enforceable liability – Presumption of -- Rebuttal of -- Defence was that the cheque was issued to the complainant on an assurance of a loan which would be obtained from a financial institution – Entire amount alleged to have been paid without obtaining a receipt or document evidencing the payment of the amount – Complainant failed to establish the source of funds -- Nothing was stated by the complainant in regard to the fate of the earlier two cheques which were allegedly issued by the accused -- Non-disclosure of the facts pertaining to the earlier two cheques, and the steps, if any, taken for recovery was again a material consideration which indicated that there was a doubt in regard to the transaction – Presumption stands rebutted -- Order of acquittal passed by the first appellate court was justified.

(Para 13-15)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by company – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque singed by Director of company – Demand notice to Director – Complaint against Director – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Maintainability of complaint – Held, in the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was not maintainable – In the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused – High Court was in error in rejecting the petition u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. – Appeal allowed, Complaint quashed.

(Para 14-18)

Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), Sections 66(B), 66(C), 66(D), 66(E), 67, 67(A) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Petition on various grounds -- However, during the pendency of petition, mediation took place -- Settlement/agreement arrived – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom are ordered to be quashed.

(Para 2-10)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468(2)(c), 482 -- Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Limitation to prosecute starts from the date of receipt of report of public analysts and not from the date of collection of sample -- If, the complaint is filed beyond the period of limitation of three years, the same is not maintainable -- Premises was raided on 16.07.2011 – First report qua misbranding of first sample received on 25.07.2011 and second report on 01.02.2012 – Sanction applied on 19.08.2014 and the same was granted on 10.11.2014 i.e. within three months -- In case, the period of three months is excluded, the impugned complaint filed on 22.07.2015 can still easily be declared being hopelessly time barred -- Impugned complaint and summoning order along with all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141  -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Summoning of accused – Quashing of summoning order and complaint – Maintainability of petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Revisional Jurisdiction -- Alternative remedy available – Objection of -- Held, in exercise of revisional power, Court of Sessions or the High Court is not vested with the power of quashing a criminal complaint -- This power is available to the High Court alone under Section 482 Cr.P.C., whereunder the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, can pass orders to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice -- Thus, the prayer made in this petition could not have been granted by the revisional Court and, therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had an alternative remedy before the Court of Sessions in the first instance.

(Para 5)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Liability of Ex-officio Director -- Every person who was incharge of the business of the Company and responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business is vicariously liable apart from the Company itself -- Such a person may be somebody other than a 'Director' so long as he is an officer of the Company -- However, an Ex-officio Director is not liable.

(Para 8)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Ex-officio-Director of the Company -- Petitioner-Director had resigned and cheque in dispute had been issued much later -- For imposing vicarious liability upon the petitioner, as a person responsible for the business of the company, it was necessary to make specific averments in the complaint regarding his role in the conduct of the business of the Company -- No such averment having been made, the Magistrate was not justified in summoning the petitioner.

(Para 21)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Summoning of accused -- At the stage of summoning of an accused person, the trial Court/Magistrate must be satisfied on the basis of material produced before it that prima facie the accused persons have committed an offence.

(Para 21)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482  -- Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company – Liability of Director of the Company – Quashing of Complaint and summoning order -- Averment made in the legal notice “You address No. 3 being Chairman/Director of addressee No. 1 are also being incharge and being responsible person of address No. 1 company for conduct to the business of the Company are also liable for the punishment prescribed under the Act ibid.” – Held, averments made in the legal notice u/s 138 of the Act cannot be construed to be averments made in the complaint -- Even the averments made in the legal notice, do not fulfill the requirement of law -- Summoning orders as well as Complaints alongwith consequential proceedings having arisen therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 25-27)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 204 – Cheque bounce case – Offence by Company -- Summoning of Directors of the Company -- Held in order to reduce litigation it would be appropriate for the concerned Magistrates to seek copies of Form No. 32 and the latest Annual Return filed by the Company so that only those persons who are Directors on the date of commission of the offence are summoned – Directions given that in all cases where the accused is a 'Company', before issuing summons to the accused persons the trial Court/Magistrate shall direct the complainant to produce a copy of Form No. 32 and the annual Return filed by the Company in order to determine the persons, who were Directors on the date of commission of the offence -- In cases where the accused–Director is the Chairman or Managing Director or Joint Managing Director or authorized signatory of the cheque, they may be summoned without any averment regarding their role in the conduct of the affairs of the Company -- For summoning of any other Director or officer of the Company the necessary averment regarding their role in the conduct of the business of the Company, must be insisted upon -- In respect of whole time Directors, mere reproduction of the words of Section 141 of the Act would be sufficient.

(Para 28, 29)

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,33 – Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468,473,482 – Misbranded article -- Limitation of 3 years to file complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Report of the Government Analyst received by the complainant on 26.06.2007 -- Complaint could have been filed, at the best, within a period of 3 years from the date of receipt of report of the Government Analyst -- However, the complaint has been filed after 8 years from the said date -- No application for extension of time under provision of 473 Cr.P.C – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i),17,18,29,30(3), 33 -- Insecticide Rules 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 473, 482 – Misbranded article -- Dealer’s prosecution – Quashing of complaint -- Sample was taken as a sealed container in original packing -- This fact duly finds mention in the Form XX prepared by the Insecticide Inspector; on the spot at the time of taking of the sample -- Petitioners-dealer would be, entitled to the protection of Section 30(3) of the Insecticide Act – Initiation and continuation of a complaint and the consequent proceedings against the petitioners-dealer, are not legally justified and sustainable – Complaint and summoning order quashed.

(Para 2, 15,16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Quashing of FIR and charge -- Prosecutrix already married -- Physical relation with false assurance of marriage – Held without getting divorce, she could not have married to the petitioner – It is quite clear and evident that the complainant had developed a relationship during the subsistence of her marriage and the relationship was consensual in nature -- Being a major and a person who was competently running a beauty parlour shop, it could not be said that she would be unaware of the consequences of the relationship she was entering into and that no marriage could be solemnized without obtaining the divorce from the first one – FIR and all proceedings arising out of the same are quashed. Prashant Bharti’s case, 2013 AIR(SC)(Crl.)1778 relied.

(Para 6-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B, 323, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Snatching case -- Compromise/ compounding of offence after conviction -- Conviction and sentenced for 10 years – A report has been submitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, wherein it has been reported that statement of the petitioners has been recorded and compromise entered between the parties is genuine, without any pressure, coercion or undue influence – Parties allowed to compound the offence -- Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence stands set aside.

(Para 1-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 307, 353, 332, 186, 341, 342, 506, 435, 511, 427, 148, 149, 379-B -- National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), Section 8-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to murder – Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Section 307 IPC can be considered for compounding on the basis of compromise -- Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – Accordingly, the petition allowed,  FIR and all the consequential proceedings, arising therefrom, ordered to be quashed subject to payment of costs in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited in the Office of District Legal Services Authority.

(Para 10-12)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20, 50 – Contraband of charas -- Search before Magistrate or Gazetted officer – Non-compliance of -- Appellant (accused) was apprised of his right to be searched in the presence of either a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer but despite telling him about his legal right available to him u/s 50 in relation to the search, the appellant (accused) gave his consent in writing to be searched by the police officials (raiding party) –Search and recovery made from the appellant does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 50 for the following reasons.

-- First, appellant was not produced before any Magistrate or Gazetted Officer;

-- Second, due to the aforementioned first reason, the search and recovery of the contraband “Charas” was not made from the appellant in the presence of any Magistrate or Gazetted Officer;

-- Third, none of the police officials of the raiding party, who recovered the contraband “Charas” from him, was the Gazetted Officer and nor they could be and, therefore, they were not empowered to make search and recovery from the appellant of the contraband “Charas” as provided u/s 50 of the NDPS Act except in the presence of either a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer;

-- Fourth, in order to make the search and recovery of the contraband articles from the body of the suspect, the search and recovery has to be in conformity with the requirements of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

Prosecution examined as many as five police officials of the raiding police party but none of them deposed that the search/recovery was made in presence of any Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer -- Non-compliance of the mandatory procedure prescribed u/s 50 of the NDPS Act is fatal to the prosecution case, the appellant is entitled to claim its benefit to seek his acquittal -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 26-30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Age of the prosecutrix – School Leaving Certificate – Evidential Value of -- Prosecutrix gave her age as 18 years in her statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C. and when she appeared in the witness box claimed herself to be 16 years old – Entry in the school leaving certificate (Ex.P1), without proving its source, was not sufficient to conclude that the prosecutrix was minor on the date of occurrence -- Despite being referred to the dental and radiological opinion regarding the age of the prosecutrix, she was not taken thereto for examination -- Held, it can be said that the prosecutrix was major and an attempt had been made by the prosecution to withhold her correct age.

(Para 32-38)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376(2) –  Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Kidnapping and rape – Consenting party – Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction can be based on the solitary statement of the prosecutrix, but at the same time, it cannot be mechanically applied to every case of sexual assault -- In the first version given to the Magistrate in statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C., she had stated that she had gone of her own, but later she retracted therefrom while appearing in the witness box and alleged kidnapping and rape by the accused for the obvious reason that she had succumbed to the pressure of her parents – Victims taken to Safidon in three wheeler, but she had not raised alarm – Stand of the prosecutrix that she had told the three wheeler driver about her kidnapping but no help was extended, does not convince the Court – Victims had changed three vehicles to reach Safidon, she had the opportunity to raise alarm and seek help – Place from where she had remained with the accused was a construction site where other huts were constructed – Accused used to leave her in the earthen hut for hours together, she remained there for more than four days and it is highly improbable that the stay was without her consent – Medical evidence also goes contrary to her version – Victims went missing on 25.10.2014, but the matter was reported on 27.10.2014, no explanation as to why the matter was reported so late to the police – Circumstances support to the plea of accused that the prosecutrix had left home on her own and she was neither confined, abducted or raped – Judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside, accused is acquitted.

(Para 40-48)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 -- Supplementary charge-sheet – Direction of Commission for adding charge under SC/ST Act – Power of -- No external agency can dictate the course of investigation in a criminal case -- It is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the police -- Court also cannot supervise the investigation -- However, in exceptional situations, Superior Courts may monitor an investigation -- But that is not the same as supervision -- Supplementary Report filed by the Police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.

(Para 7-9)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Direction of Commission for adding charge under SC/ST Act – Power of -- Commission is empowered to conduct an inquiry to “whether proper charge sheet has been filed mentioning the relevant sections of IPC together with the PCR Act, 1955 and SCs & STs (POA) Act, 1989 in Court” -- This is not a power to dictate the course of the investigation -- Commission is competent to point out any lapses or laches in the investigation -- Commission could only have brought to notice of the Police the need for a proper or further investigation and it was for the Police to take a call.

(Para 8)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(1)(x) -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 -- Partly quashing of charge – Power of High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part -- U/s 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the CrPC or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice – A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers u/s 482 to the extent of the abuse -- No requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part.

(Para 7-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 -- Cheque bounce case – Sentence for simple imprisonment of one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.11,50,000/-, in default, to suffer further simple imprisonment for six months -- Parties amicably settled their dispute -- Parties to abide by the terms and conditions as contained in the Memorandum of Settlement without fail -- Impugned order passed by the High Court set aside and sentence imposed upon the appellant quashed.

(Para 2-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Non-appearance of the petitioner before Ld. Trial Court is justified for the reason that he was not served at the given address -- After passing of the order, the petitioner has been granted anticipatory bail -- Matter compromised, complainant has withdrawn the complaint u/s 138 of the NIA Act -- Continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Section 174-A IPC would amount to abuse of process of law – Order declaring proclaimed person and subsequent FIR quashed.

 (Para 1, 7,8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 258 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Discharge of accused – Compounding of offence -- Court can close the proceedings and discharge the accused on satisfaction that the cheque amount with assessed costs and interest is paid and if there is no reason to proceed with the punitive aspect –Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the Court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused -- Court is entitled to close the proceedings in exercise of its powers u/s 143 of the Act read with Section 258 Cr.P.C.

(Para 11, 18 (i)-(iii), 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Online hearing of case – Online appearance of accused – Exemption of accused from personal appearance -- Service of summons can be by post/ e-mail/ courier -- Summons ought to indicate that the accused could make specified payment by deposit in a particular account before the specified date and inform the court and the complainant by e-mail -- If the accused complies with such summons and informs the Court and the complainant by e-mail, the Court can ascertain the objection, if any, of the complainant and close the proceedings unless it becomes necessary to proceed with the case -- Some cases of Section 138 cases can be decided online -- If complaint with affidavits and documents can be filed online, process issued online and accused pays the specified amount online, it may obviate the need for personal appearance of the complainant or the accused -- Only if the accused contests, need for appearance of parties may arise which may be through counsel and wherever viable, video conferencing can be used -- Personal appearances can be dispensed with.

(Para 16, 17, 20)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(3), 431 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 64 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial -- Discretion of the Magistrate to hold that it was undesirable to try the case summarily as sentence of more than one year may have to be passed -- Court has jurisdiction u/s 357(3) Cr.P.C. to award suitable compensation with default sentence under Section 64 IPC and with further powers of recovery under Section 431 Cr.P.C -- With this approach, prison sentence of more than one year may not be required in all cases.

(Para 12, 18(iv))

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138, 143 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 264, 357(3) – Cheque bounce complaint – Summary trial – Procedure for summoning -- Evidence of the complaint can be given on affidavit -- Bank’s slip being prima facie evidence of the dishonor of cheque, it is unnecessary for the Magistrate to record any further preliminary evidence -- Such affidavit evidence can be read as evidence at all stages of trial or other proceedings – Normal rule for trial of cases under Chapter XVII of the Act is to follow the summary procedure except where exercise of power under second proviso to Section 143 becomes necessary.

(Para 18(iv), (v), 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Chapter XVII, Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Chapter XXIA -- Cheque bounce complaint – Plea bargaining -- Speedy trial -- It will be open to the Court to consider the provisions of plea bargaining -- Trial can be on day to day basis and endeavour must be to conclude it within six months.

(Para 20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118(a), 138,139 -- Friendly loan of Rs. 20 lacs – Acquittal of accused --

--       Complainant has not mentioned in his complaint as to for what purpose, he had advanced such a substantial amount as loan to the accused.

--       While appearing in the witness box applicant has deposed that the loan was advanced to the respondent in the presence of her father-in-law but she has not examined this witness in support of her claim.

--       No other witness has been examined by her regarding the loan transaction. Applicant has also not produced on record any receipt or pronote for grant of loan to the accused. Therefore, the act and conduct of the applicant is highly improbable, as no sane person is expected to advance such a substantial amount as loan to any other person without any documentation or even receipt or acknowledgement.

--       Complainant has also failed to mention the date, month and year of advancement of loan or issuance of cheque in question by the accused in her favour either in her pleadings or in her evidence.

–       Complainant has also not produced any document which may show her income/expenditure/ account of business income or the income tax return, which may draw an inference that she is financially well placed.

--       She has not given any detail as to what business or profession she is carrying.

--       Only contention, which the complainant has raised is that she has advanced a loan of Rs.20 lakhs to the accused as she had sold an industrial shed at Panchkula, but neither such sale deed nor any other relevant document has been produced on record by the complainant, which can substantiate the plea that the amount of Rs.20 lakhs was collected by her after the sale of the said industrial unit situated in Panchkula.

When no evidence to connect the respondent-accused with the alleged offence is available on record, no case is made out for interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal.

(Para 10-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR-- Petitioner could not appear before the trial Court as he was stated to have not been served at the address, where he was residing -- After the passing of the impugned order declaring him as a proclaimed person, he had surrendered before the trial Court and was ordered to be released on bail -- In such circumstances, especially, when the petitioner has duly surrendered before the trial Court, continuation of proceedings under Section 174-A IPC would be an abuse of the process of Court.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 438, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Cheque bounce case – Proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. – FIR u/s 174-A – Quashing of – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court -- Held, looking to the nature of the prosecution against the petitioner-accused under Section 138 of the Act, it would make no difference if he allowed a chance to participate in the prosecution against him, without finding any fault with the trial Court's order -- Petitioner will have to furnish bail bonds with the trial Court on his appearance before the trial Court and shall attend the trial with promptitude for its disposal in accordance with law – In that view of the matter, proclamation order and consequent FIR u/s 174-A of IPC are quashed under the inherent powers of High Court.

(Para 3,4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case – Alteration in cheque -- Report from F.S.L., show that in the cheque in question '0' has been inserted to make the cheque from Rs.48,000/- to Rs.4,80,000/- -- In another cheque, digit '2' has been added, Rs.20,000/- converted to Rs.2,20,000 -- Nothing on the record to rebut this report – Held, cheque itself becomes void instrument even if the liability exists towards the accused – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce case – Acquittal in – Friendly loan amounting to Rs.11,30,000/- to the accused – However, there is no evidence that the complainant had the capacity to advance Rs.11,30,000/- or that amount allegedly given on loan to the respondent is shown in the Income Tax Return – Respondent-accused stated that the appellant had misused the cheque which he gave to his (appellant) brother, this fact is duly proved by the statement of independent witness -- Except self serving statement of the appellant there is no material evidence on record to prove the factum of advancement of loan – Ld. Trial Court acquitted the respondent -- Even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused -- In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in his favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible.

(Para 5,6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal – Appellant secured loan amount of Rs.2,00,000/- from one person and handed over to the accused -- However, there is no evidence that said person had the capacity to advance Rs.2,00,000/- or that amount allegedly given on loan to the appellant is shown in the Income Tax Return or in any other record maintained by said person -- Appellant has not even examined that person -- In his cross-examination, the appellant had stated that he had given the loan amount to the respondent on interest -- However, the appellant does not hold any licence for money lending -- No document was accepted by the appellant regarding advancing of loan or that respondent has furnished any security for repayment of amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- appears to be highly improbable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 5-7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal in cheque bounce case – Leave to appeal -- Except self serving statement of the appellant there is no material evidence on record to prove the factum of legally enforceable debt of the respondent towards appellant – No oral or documentary evidence to prove the advancement of loan – In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in accused’s favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible – Keeping in view the above, the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.

(Para 7)

A. Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 41, 41-A – Arrest of Advocate/ Doctor – Procedure of law violated – Life and liberty of accused -- Compensation to accused arrested -- Arrest of the petitioners was not made by following the procedure of arrest -- Dignity of the petitioners, a doctor and a practicing Advocate has been seriously jeopardized -- It is an assault on his/her identity – Said identity is sacrosanct under the Constitution – Article 21 has been violated and the petitioners were compelled to face humiliation – Not only there are violation of guidelines issued in the case of D.K. Basu (1997) 1 SCC 416, there are also flagrant violation of mandate of law enshrined under Section 41 and Section 41-A of Cr.PC -- A sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) towards compensation is awarded to each of the petitioners to be paid by the State of M.P. within three months hence -- It will be open to the State to proceed against the erring officials, if so advised.

(Para 22-27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheating – Civil Dispute -- On a perusal of the FIR, it is clear to us that the dispute is purely of a civil nature, but a maladroit effort has been made to give it a criminal colour – No ingredient of Section 420 IPC is remotely attracted -- Even if it is a wrong, the complainant has to take recourse to civil action – Not the case where cognizance of the offence can be taken by the court and the accused can be asked to face trial -- Entire case projects a civil dispute and nothing else – Prosecution initiated against the petitioners stands quashed.

(Para 28, 29)