Search By Topic: Acquittal/ Quashing of FIR/ Comp./ Sentence undergone

504. (P&H HC) 15-05-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections u/s 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Quashing of complaint/summoning order after Proclaimed offender order – Held, it would be in the interest of justice to see at the first instance whether any offence is made out against the petitioners as per allegations levelled against them in the complaint or not -- Because if the complaint fails, as a necessary corollary, all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom would automatically go.

(Para 1, 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections u/s 498-A, 506, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Summoning order -- Proclaimed offender order – Quashing of -- Father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law – Role of – Specific allegations – Requirement of – No direct and specific allegations against the petitioners that they had given beatings to the complainant or demanded any dowry article or misappropriated the shtridhan It has become a common practice to use the provisions of Section 498-A IPC as a weapon rather than shield by disgruntled wives – Casual reference of their names that husband of the complainant gave her beatings at the instance of petitioners – Held, case in hand is a sheer abuse of process of law -- Consequently, the complaint and all subsequent proceedings including the summoning order and order declaring proclamation offender, qua petitioners are quashed.

(Para 1,18,19)

505. (P&H HC) 14-05-2020

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Ingredients of offence – Strict interpretation -- To constitute the offence under the Act, it must be alleged that the accused intentionally insulted or intimidated with intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe in any public place within public view -- Since these are the penal provisions, the same are to be given a strict construction and if any of the ingredients are found lacking, it would not constitute the offence under the SC/ST Act.

(Para 10-15)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Offence under SC/ST Act – Talks on mobile – Mens rea -- Alleged conversation over the mobile phone was not in a public gaze nor witnessed by any third party, the alleged use of caste words cannot be said to have been committed within the public view -- Merely uttering such wrong words in the absence of any public view does not show any intention or mens rea to humiliate the complainant who besides being Sarpanch, belongs to Scheduled Caste community -- It would not, thus, ipso-facto, constitute acts of commission of offence, which are capable of being taken cognizance under the SC and ST Act, 1989.

(Para 10-12)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section 3(i)(r), 3(i)(s) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Offence under SC/ST Act and IPC -- Discharge by Trial court – Power of -- It is a settled law that if two views are possible and one gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at that stage, it is not to be seen whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

(Para 13)

506. (P&H HC) 12-05-2020

A. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 24(2) -- Chemical Examiner’s report – Manufacturer right -- Copy of – Although Section 24(2) of the Insecticides Act, 1968 does not itself lay down that Chemical Examiner’s report is to be conveyed to the manufacturing firm or to other accused but it is expected in the interest of natural justice and fair trial that a copy of the Chemical Examiner's report be conveyed to the manufacturing firm also especially if the manufacturing firm is also to be prosecuted.

(Para 12)

B. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 24(2) -- Chemical Examiner’s report – Re-examination of – Right of -- Provisions of section 24(2) of the Act do not mandate that each and every of the accused is to be afforded an individual opportunity of re-analysis -- If in a given case, re-analysis has been got done at the instance of any one of the accused, then certainly there is no need for any further re-analysis.

(Para 13-15)

C. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Managing Director – Role of -- Managing director need not be assigned a specific work as he, in such capacity is overall in-charge of conduct of business of the firm -- Thus, cannot escape from his liability on account of the insecticide having been found misbranded which was manufactured by the company of which he is the Managing Director.

(Para 23-25)

D. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Quality Incharge – Role of -- A person who is monitoring the quality of the product being manufactured by the firm is the key person who would be responsible for ensuring quality of the product -- He is also liable to be prosecuted on account of misbranding of the insecticide in question.

(Para 27)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190 – Complaint – Contents of -- Complaint is not expected to be encyclopedic and it is only during the course of trial that the complainant can fully substantiate the averments and allegations made in the complaint as regards the role and responsibility of the accused.

(Para 28)

F. Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 – Godown Incharge – Role of -- Since the insecticide in question, in any case is in sealed condition, therefore the Godown Incharge whose primary job is to keep the articles intact and to further pass on the same to the Distributors and Dealers and is himself not supposed to sell the same cannot be said to have committed any offence under Insecticides Act 1968 so as to have rendered himself liable for prosecution -- As such, the complaint qua him deserves to be quashed.

(Para 29)

512. (P&H HC) 05-03-2020

    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Cheque bounce case of Company – Incharge of the affairs of the Company, no document to support – Accused neither Director nor a signatory of cheque -- Quashing of complaint --

(a)     The complaint is based on a Memorandum of Understanding, which is not signed by the petitioner and is rather signed by accused No.3. The dishonoured cheques were given to the complainant at the time of signing of the Memorandum of Understanding.

(b)     The cheque numbers of the disputed cheques are duly mentioned in the body of the Memorandum of Understanding signed by accused No.3, which show that he was the person In-charge of the Company as he entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of accused No.1-Company and had issued the cheques in favour of the complainant.

(c)     Even the cheques are not signed by the petitioner and the same are signed by accused Nos.2 and 3.

(d)     In the complaints, the only allegation in para 3 is that accused No.4-petitioner is In-charge of the affairs of accused No.1-Company, however, there is no document to support this version and rather in the reply filed by the complainant in High Court, nowhere reflects that the petitioner is the In-charge of the affairs of accused No.1-Company, in any manner.

(e)     There is nothing on record to support the complaints that the petitioner is one Director of accused No.1-Company as it is the case of the petitioner that he never remained the Director of accused No.1-Company at any stage and this fact is not disputed in the reply.

Summoning orders and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 15,16)

514. (P&H HC) 03-03-2020

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Extrajudicial confession is a weak type of evidence however, it cannot be discarded outrightly.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 – Murder -- Extra-judicial confession – Blood on danda – Blood grouping of -- As per FSL report, human blood was detected but blood group was not ascertained, there is no result, with regard to, blood grouping -- Blood so allegedly found, on the danda, does not stand sufficiently connected to be that of deceased -- No other sufficient evidence, coming on record -- Circumstance relating to extra-judicial confession, has been rightly discarded by the trial Court.

(Para 26, 27)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Injury by fall – Possibility of -- Doctor deposed possibility cannot be ruled out of suffering of the injuries, in case a person, under intoxication falls on stones or forcefully strikes against the wall and in cross-examination that injury of fracture of rib, can be result of fall on a hard surface -- Considering the same, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the injuries in question were caused by lathi of budberry tree and this also gives dent to the prosecution version.

(Para 28)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 106 – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Motive -- In case based on circumstantial evidence, motive gains importance -- Dispute, which had taken place about one and half year ago, relating to boundary wall of the fields, relating to which, compromise effected -- No satisfactory evidence, coming on record -- Even, no evidence, relating to the matter having given quietus, by the police, as such, has been led -- In the light of the same, the motive part, does not stand established.

(Para 29)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 24, 106 – Murder -- Extra-judicial confession – Blood on danda/ weapon of offence -- Blood grouped not connected with the blood of deceased – Doctor deposition that possibility cannot be ruled out of suffering of the injuries falls on stones or forcefully strikes against the wall and in cross-examination that injury of fracture of rib, can be result of fall on a hard surface -- Motive of previous quarrel not proved --  Prosecution version cannot be termed to be free from doubt and precisely, benefit of such doubt so arising, ought to be extended to the appellant – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside.

(Para 26-31)

525. (P&H HC) 10-02-2020

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22, 41, 50 -- Personal Search – Procedure of -- Personal search of the juvenile was conducted by Lady Constable, though there was no recovery -- On search of the box which was put in a carry bag, fifteen injections of Buprenorphine 2 ML each were recovered – Police was required to comply with the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act -- Investigating officer did not record reasons for his belief which necessitated the search of the juvenile without producing her before the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and no such copy of reasons to belief was sent to the superior officials within 72 hours -- Search and seizure proceedings get vitiated as the very purpose of introducing an independent official witness in the form of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate during the search and seizure gets defeated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 11, 12)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- Acquittal of accused – Interference in appeal -- Even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused -- In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption of innocence; and secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible -- Finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse and the same is affirmed.

(Para 12)

527. (SC) 10-02-2020

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 482 -- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), Section 9 – Civil suit – Handwriting expert report – F.I.R. w.r.t. forged receipts – Sustainability of -- Quashing of FIR -- Handwriting expert in civil suit has opined that signatures in all the four receipts did not tally with the sample signatures which were of respondent No.2 -- It was only thereafter, FIR was registered -- In the Summary Suit, issue No.5 has been framed by the Court “whether the defendant proved that the plaintiff has fabricated the forged signature illegally and created forged receipts” – Held, when the issue as to the genuineness of the receipts is pending consideration in the civil suit, the FIR ought not to have been allowed to continue as it would prejudice the interest of the parties and the stand taken by them in the civil suit -- Based on the sole opinion of the handwriting expert, the FIR ought not to have been registered -- Continuation of FIR would amount to abuse of the process of Court – Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR allowed.

(Para 18, 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Sections 45, 72, 118(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint -- Presumption of legal enforceability debt – Rebuttal of -- ‘Y’ admitted the issuance of cheques -- Once the issuance of cheque is admitted/established, the presumption would arise u/s 139 of the N.I. Act in favour of the holder of cheque that is the complainant-appellant No.3 -- Burden lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption by adducing evidence -- High Court did not keep in view that until the accused discharges his burden, the presumption u/s 139 of N.I. Act will continue to remain -- When disputed questions of facts are involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 20)

536. (SC) 16-12-2019

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Overt Act – Prosecution mainly rests on the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, who were the eye-witnesses of the incident : 

-- Accused No.3 had a motive to commit the murder of the deceased, inasmuch as he was eyeing the property which was being cultivated by the deceased on a Batai basis. Murder was committed through the overt acts of the two accused other than the appellant.

-- Moot question, whether the appellant also participated in the offence, especially since he has not been shown to be a friend or relative of the other accused, or to have any specific motive for murdering the deceased.

-- Post-mortem report and the evidence of the doctor made amply clear that the death was caused due to incised injuries, of such a nature which could have been caused by the axe and sickle carried by the other two accused.

-- Other two injuries, being a laceration and an abrasion, which could possibly be attributed to the appellant, may even have been a result of the deceased falling to the ground, since injuries such as bruises, abrasions and lacerations may very well be sustained as a result of a fall -- Thus, there does not appear to be strong evidence of the active participation of the appellant in the offence.

-- In their examination-in-chief, witnesses deposed that the appellant assaulted the deceased with a lathi on his knee and head, it was proved in the cross-examination that these statements made before the Court were “improvements” -- If these improvements are excluded from consideration from the evidence of PWs 14 and 15, it can be safely said that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt about the active involvement of the appellant in the offence in question through any overt act.

Proceeding on the basis that the appellant was present on the spot of the offence -- Court did not find that the commission of the offence of murder stands proved as against the appellant with the help of Section 34, IPC, either.

(Para 6-10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34 -- Common intention -- Principle of joint criminal liability -- In order to invoke the principle of joint liability in the commission of a criminal act, the prosecution should show that the criminal act was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all -- If this is shown, the liability for the offence may be imposed on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone -- It may be difficult to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual, and in most cases it has to be inferred from the facts and relevant circumstances of the case – Totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused persons had the common intention to commit the offence with which they could be convicted.

(Para 12,13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Murder – Common intention – Motive – Relation of parties -- Appellant had no specific motive to participate in the commission of the offence, did not have any rivalry with the deceased or his family, and has not been shown to be a friend, relative or hireling of the other two accused – Prosecution has failed to prove any common intention on the appellant’s part, inasmuch as there is no hint of any motive or reason for him to have either participated in pre-planning the murder of the deceased, or to develop the common intention to do so while present at the spot of the offence -- Evidence against the appellant is shaky and insufficient to bring home guilt against him, benefit of doubt must enure to him -- Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court as against the appellant stands set aside -- Appellant is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 13,14)

542. (SC) 07-11-2019

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Review of order in criminal proceedings – Power of High Court -- High Court could not have recalled its earlier order u/s 482 Cr.P.C, inasmuch as there is no provision for recalling or reviewing an order passed by it in criminal matters.

(Para 2)

B. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Child marriage – Adult Wife -- Prosecution of boy aged 17 years – Permissibility of -- Protection order passed in favour of married couple – Later-on boy age found to be 17 years – On application of father of girl, High Court recalled protection order and direction given for registration of FIR against boy for offence u/s 9 of Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Held, High Court could not have recalled its earlier order and there was no exceptional circumstance calling for an exercise of the High Court’s inherent powers – FIR quashed.

(Para 2-6)

C. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy – Permissibility of -- Held, it can be treated as a child marriage but cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9 -- FIR against boy quashed.

(Para 3-6)

D. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 2(a), 2(b), 9 – Interpretation of Statute -- Mischief Rule -- Marginal note -- Adult Wife -- Boy aged 18 to 21 years – Child marriage -- Prosecution of boy -- Intention behind punishing only male adults contracting child marriages is to protect minor young girls from the negative consequences thereof by creating a deterrent effect for prospective grooms who, by virtue of being above eighteen years of age are deemed to have the capacity to opt out of such marriages – Hence, cannot be brought under the ambit of Section 9, as this is not the mischief that the provision seeks to remedy -- Marginal note of Section 9, which reads “Punishment for male adult marrying a child” -- Where any ambiguity exists with regard to the interpretation of a legislative provision, the marginal note can be used in aid of construction, having regard to the object of the legislation and the mischief it seeks to remedy – Held, the words “male adult above eighteen years of age, contracts a child marriage” in Section 9 of the 2006 Act should be read as “male adult above eighteen years of age marries a child”.

(Para 3)

546. (SC) 20-08-2019

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) – NDPS Matter -- Reverse burden of proof – Culpable mental state -- Prosecution shall be put to a stricter test for compliance with statutory provisions -- If at any stage, the accused is able to create a reasonable doubt, as a part of his defence, to rebut the presumption of his guilt, the benefit will naturally have to go to him.

(Para 9)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) -- Search and seizure -- Recovery of contraband – Large vacant space below signature of witness – Doubt in – It is clearly abnormal and cannot be lightly wished away especially when the independent witnesses have deposed that they were not present at the time of such search and seizure -- It certainly creates a doubt with regard to the veracity of the allegations made by the prosecution.

(Para 11)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 18(b) – Acquittal in NDPS matter -- Identity of sample/contraband -- Late production of sample seized in court – Effect of -- No credible evidence that the FSL sample produced related to the very same contraband stated to have been seized from the appellant – No reasonable explanation why the sample seized from the appellant and deposited in the Malkhana could not be produced in the Court except after a long gap of one year – Appeal against conviction allowed.

(Para 12-19)