Search By Topic: Acquittal/ Quashing of FIR/ Comp./ Sentence undergone

56. (SC) 08-08-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161, 162 -- First Information Report (FIR) -- First version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable would be required to be treated as the FIR -- FIR was lodged much later based on the statement of PW-11, it would be relegated to the category of a statement u/s 161 CrPC -- Same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162 CrPC -- Prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Daily diary report  (Roznamcha) -- Since the Police Constable (PW-12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station -- A reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of (PW-12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record -- Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution -- Neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL -- Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant-accused and acquitted them of the offence charged.

(Para 20, 48)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 21, 26, 27 – Admission to doctors – Confession to Medical officer -- Admissibility of -- Confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested -- As such, the noting made by the Medical Officer (PW-2) in the injury reports of accused/ appellant would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Court not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act.

(Para 40. 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement -- Identification of crime place -- The circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the instance of the accused is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements -- This disclosure is irrelevant.

(Para 41, 45)

64. (P&H HC) 12-07-2024

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Offence u/s 304-B IPC is such wherein presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act may be drawn against the accused and the onus to establish innocence shifts upon the accused -- The necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC may be spelt out as follows:

(i) that deceased died due to burning or bodily injury or any other un-natural death;

(ii) that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;

(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in connection with demand of dowry;

(v) that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption – Death within 7 years of marriage – Proof of -- Nikahnama assailed by the accused on the ground that the same has not been duly proved, but no such objection as regards exhibiting of said document was raised when the same was exhibited -- Although the DW examined by the accused has attempted to project that the marriage of deceased was solemnized more than 7 years prior to date of death, but there is no documentary evidence to support the said assertion – Nikahnama accepted so as to hold that death occurred within less than 7 years of marriage of the deceased.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty by father-in-law – Acquittal -- A perusal of the FIR would show that when the husband had come to take back his wife from her parental home, it was he who raised the demand of Rs.10,000/- -- Whenever any mishap occurs, it is very common that parents and relatives of the deceased-girl, would name not only her husband who would be the prime accused, but other members of the family also so as to wreak vengeance -- Father-in-law given benefit of doubt, his conviction for offence u/s 498-A set aside.

(Para 21, 26, 27)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Demand of cash post marriage – Whether qualify as dowry -- Demands of cash would qualify to be termed as ‘demand of dowry’ and that any such demand even if made post marriage would not lose the character of ‘demand of dowry’.

(Para 23)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Marriage had taken place barely about 4 years prior to the death -- As per the testimony of the witnesses, whenever the deceased/ husband used to come to her parental home she used to disclose the demand of Rs.10,000/- by the accused -- It is further borne out from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-4 that the deceased had last visited her parental home about 2 months back and even at that time she had disclosed about the demand of dowry made by the accused -- Demand of dowry which were raised even two months prior to her death cannot escape from his liability on account of unnatural death of the deceased in matrimonial home on account of poison which will fully qualify to be termed as a ‘dowry death’.

(Para 24-26)

68. (HP HC) 18-06-2024

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Victim’s age – Birth and death register of Gram Panchayat -- Proof of -- Victim’s date of birth was recorded as 28.10.2002 -- During cross-examination of the victim, on the suggestion given to her, she had specifically stated that her date of birth was 28.10.2002, which corroborates the entry in the birth and death register of the concerned Gram Panchayat – Held,  the evidence led by the prosecution is conclusive to prove that the date of birth of the victim was 28.10.2002.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Sole witness of prosecutrix -- Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without corroboration from any other evidence -- If the Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial which would lend assurance to her testimony.

(Para 14)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape – Victim travelled a long distance in the company of accused persons throughout the night and had many opportunities to disclose her fate to the world at large --  As per her statement recorded u/s 164, Cr.PC, a police man met her at some place at Una-Hoshiarpur road, however, she had not disclosed anything to the police man also -- This conduct of the victim is unusual -- Statement of victim u/s 164 Cr.P.C. is not in consistence with her deposition before the Court -- Her deposition does not inspire confidence.

(Para 21, 39)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- It is not a substantive piece of evidence and such tests are meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency in order to ensure that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding in the right direction -- The Test Identification Parade is not a substantive evidence but it can only be used in corroboration of the statements in Court

(Para 32)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- When the accused persons were produced before the ACJM, the photographs of the accused persons were annexed to the conviction slip -- Thus the possibility of the victim having seen the photographs of accused persons during their custody with the police and also subsequently before the TIP cannot be ruled out -- There is no record to suggest that non-suspected selected for the parade were of the same age, height, general appearance and position as that of the accused persons -- Moreover, there is a delay in conducting the TIP as the accused persons were taken in custody on 13.02.2018, but the application for conducting of TIP was moved by the Investigating Officer on 16.02.2018, which delay the prosecution has failed to explain -- Father of the victim, in his cross-examination, admitted that a lady police having two stars on her shoulders, was also present at the time of TIP -- Thus, it cannot be said the TIP was conducted in accordance with the guidelines -- As such, it cannot be held to be sustainable in the eyes of law and no reliance could be placed upon the Test Identification Parades.

(Para 33-37)

F. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Acquittal of accused – Disciplinary action against Investigation Agency -- Investigation in the case was conducted in a casual and perfunctory manner -- Prosecution has withheld the CCTV footage, SFSL reports with respect to the medical examinations of the victim as well as the accused persons and also with respect to the articles which were seized from the vehicles allegedly involved in the commission of the crime in order to connect the accused persons with the commission of the offence -- Director General of Police directed to take appropriate disciplinary and departmental inquiry against the erring police officials for having conducted a shoddy investigation, that eventually led to the acquittal of the appellants herein.

(Para 46)

70. (HP HC) 18-06-2024

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act are not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt -- Mere fact that the dead body of the deceased was found two kilometers back from place where the appellant had left him, could not be a ground to doubt the statement -- False explanation cannot be used as an additional link to fortify the prosecution case -- Suspicion, howsoever strong, it may be, cannot take the place of proof -- A moral conviction, however, strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law -- The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence in a case can be stated to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction – Findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and do not in any manner re-concile with the evidence on record -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17, 19-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence -- If the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established and that those circumstances must be conclusive in nature unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused -- Moreover all the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a complete chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence -- Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 23)

79. (MP HC) 28-05-2024

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 377 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural sex by husband – Quashing of FIR/ charge -- Consent -- Respondent no.2/wife was residing with her husband during the subsistence of their marriage and as per amended definition of "rape" u/s 375 of IPC by which insertion of penis in the mouth of a woman has also been included in the definition of "rape" and any sexual intercourse or act, by the husband with his wife not below the age of fifteen years is not a rape, therefore, consent is immaterial – Held, allegations made in the FIR does not constitute offence u/s 377 of IPC against the petitioner no.1 -- Offence u/s 377 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 5, 15, 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Obscene act in any public place -- Prima facie, there is no evidence available on record by which it can be ascertained that the accused persons have committed any obscene act in any public place – Said incidents have been occurred in the premises of the house which is surrounded by walls, hence offence u/s 294 of IPC is not made out against the petitioners -- Offence u/s 294 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 16, 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation – Quashing of FIR -- An omnibus statement regarding threatening to kill, which is not sufficient to establish the charge of offence u/s 506 of IPC because the said threaten must consist the ingredients of fear and frightening -- Allegations not containing any date, time and place -- Respondent no.2 had never stated that she was frightened by said threatening, hence offence u/s 506 of IPC not made out against the petitioners -- Offence u/s 506 of IPC against the petitioners quashed.

(Para 17, 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Cruelty – Dowry case -- To make out an offence u/s 498A IPC complainant has not only to allege demand for dowry but also that she was subjected to cruelty by her husband or relatives of the husband for non-fulfilment of their unlawful demand.

(Para 18)

80. (J&K&L HC) 24-05-2024

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 156(3), 177, 190 -- Registration of FIR – Territorial jurisdiction -- Power of Magistrate – A Magistrate can order investigation of only those cases which the Court has jurisdiction to enquire into and try under Chapter XV of J&K CrPC which is applicable to the case -- Section 177 of CrPC which falls in Chapter XV provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.

(Para 10)

B. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 188, 561A -- Quashing of FIR -- Territorial jurisdiction -- A proposal for insurance policy from the travel agent of deceased  at Delhi and it was forwarded to the authorised agent of petitioner/ company stationed at Delhi -- Travel insurance was to take effect from Delhi as the deceased had booked himself from Delhi to Frankfurt -- Death of the deceased in Switzerland -- Thus, neither any event nor its consequence has taken place within the territorial limits of either CJM or within the territorial limits of Police Station, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu -- Neither the petitioner-company, nor respondent No.2 is a State subject -- They are not even registered as companies within the jurisdiction of erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir -- Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 4 of RPC and Section 188 of CrPC would not be attracted -- Order of Ld. CJM, Jammu, directing the SHO to register the impugned FIR and investigate the same is, without jurisdiction – FIR quashed.

(Para 11-13, 21)

C. Jammu and Kashmir State Ranbir Penal Code, 1989 (XII of 1989), Section 304 (II), 420, 409, 467, 468 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 561A -- Medical insurance policy – Non-honour of medi-claim – FIR for cheating, forgery & culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Quashing of FIR -- Transaction between the insurer and the insured is purely contractual in nature, if any of the parties to this contract defaults in honouring its commitment, it cannot form a basis for launching a criminal prosecution -- Merely because, on the basis of non-payment of compensation under the insurance policy to the complainant, her son breathed his last, it cannot be stated that the petitioner-company was, in any manner, responsible for his death and it cannot be prosecuted for a serious offence like culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Petitioner/ company cannot be held responsible for forgery of the cancellation letter purported to have been issued by deceased through his agent – FIR quashed.

(Para 14-21)

83. (Allahabad HC) 21-05-2024

A. Constitution of India, Article 233, 234 -- Judicial Officer – Code of Conduct -- Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary -- Judge’s official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of the propriety and probity -- The standard of conduct is higher than expected from a layman and also higher than expected of an advocate -- Even his private life must adhere to high standard of propriety and probity, higher than those deemed acceptable for others.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Judicial Officer – Involvement/ Becoming party in litigation/ FIR – A Judge who himself wants to become a party in a proceeding then he must quit his office first, to maintain the standard of purity and unblemished character -- It is not possible that he remain as a sitting Judge on one hand and after using his power prevail upon his subordinate officer to affect arrest his adversary.

(Para 23)

C. Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Quashing of FIR -- F.I.R. does not disclose any offence -- Same has been procured by the C.J.M. after exerting threats upon the concerned S.I. – Taking into account the prima facie findings and the material collected by the S.I.T., F.I.R. is driven by malafides and in the colourable exercise of power -- F.I.R. quashed exercising the extra ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

(Para 26, 28)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- FIR -- Judicial Officer as first informant – Instructions given -- Except in the matter of grave and severe nature like murder, suicide, rape or other sexual offences, dowry death, dacoity and in rest of the remaining cases, if any, judicial officer or Judge wants to become the first informant in his personal capacity in any F.I.R., he must take his concerned District Judge into confidence and after having the assent from the District Judge, he can become an informant of any F.I.R.

(Para 27)

89. (HP HC) 10-05-2024

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS Case -- Prior information – Search warrant – Independent witness -- Police received prior information but did not obtain the search warrant because the police apprehended that case property would be destroyed by the delay in procuring the warrant, therefore, it resorted to the provisions of Section 42(2) -- The fact that independent witnesses have not stated anything about preparing the rukka and information under Section 42(2) in their presence and sending the police official with the same shows that there was no compliance with Section 42(2) and the same is fatal to the prosecution case.

(Para 23)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Number of person present at the spot – Inconsistency in – Effect of – Recovery of 1 Kg 200 grams of charas from accused’s house -- Inconsistency regarding the number of persons present on the spot is not minor because the presence of the persons is so intricately connected to the recovery that any inconsistency in the former would affect the latter – Inconsistency cannot be ignored.

(Para 2, 24, 26)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Number of seals – Inconsistency in – Effect of -- Recovery of 1 Kg 200 grams of charas from accused’s house -- Inconsistency regarding the number of seals put on the parcel would show that the testimonies of the witnesses regarding the putting of the seals are not correct, which would affect the integrity of the case property adversely -- Inconsistency cannot be ignored.

(Para 2, 25, 26)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Date of arrest – Inconsistency in – Effect of -- Inconsistency regarding the date of the arrest of the accused will make the whole case of the prosecution suspect because if the accused was arrested on 06.07.2016 and was to be produced before the learned Court on 07.07.2016, the whole of the prosecution case that information was received on 07.07.2016 and recovery was effected on 07.07.2016 in the presence of the accused will become suspect -- Inconsistency cannot be ignored.

(Para 26)

E. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985),  Section 20 – NDPS Case -- Photography of search – Evidential value -- Recovery of 1 Kg 200 grams of charas from accused’s house -- Heavy reliance was placed upon photographs and video recorded the process of search -- Photographs and the video recording could have been used to lend corroboration to the testimonies of the witnesses but when the testimonies are themselves suspect, there can be no question of their corroboration -- Photographs and the video recording by themselves are not substantive pieces of evidence upon which, a conviction can be recorded.

(Para 27)