Search By Topic: Acquittal/ Quashing of FIR/ Comp./ Sentence undergone

452. (SC) 11-08-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Object of -- Purpose of holding a test identification parade during the stage of investigation is only to ensure that the investigating agency prima facie was proceeding in the right direction where the accused may be unknown or there was a fleeting glance of the accused.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- FIR was registered against unknown persons -- Case of the prosecution solely rests on identification in the TIP -- A test identification parade u/s 9 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence in a criminal prosecution but is only corroborative evidence -- Mere identification in the test identification parade cannot form the substantive basis for conviction unless there are other facts and circumstances corroborating the identification.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification parade/ TIP – Onus to Prove -- Onus lies on the prosecution to establish that the TIP was held in accordance with law -- It is only after the prosecution prima facie establishes a valid TIP having been held, the question of considering any objection to the same arises -- If the prosecution has failed to establish that a TIP was properly held by examining the witnesses to the same, there is nothing for the accused to disprove.

(Para 10)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 395, 397 – Dacoity case -- Test Identification parade/ TIP -- Magistrate conducted the TIP -- Magistrate has not been examined -- No explanation is forthcoming why the Magistrate was not examined -- Only evidence available is that of PW-4 the SHO that during the investigation the TIP was held in the District Jail and he identifies the proceedings in the Court -- Identification of the proceedings is irrelevant as he could not have been present during the TIP -- There cannot be repeated TIPs till such time that the prosecution is successful in obtaining identification of the accused -- PW-1 who is the mother of PW-2, and both of them are stated to have been present in the house when the occurrence took place, did not identify any of the appellants -- Identification by a minor boy and that too in the 3rd and 4th rounds insofar as the present appellants are concerned -- In the nature of the TIP held it is completely non est in the law and the benefit has to go to the accused.

(Para 11,12)

455. (SC) 28-07-2021

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Child witness – Reliability of -- Criminal jurisprudence does not hold that the evidence of a child witness is unreliable and can be discarded -- A child who is aged about 11 to 12 years certainly has reasonably developed mental faculty to see, absorb and appreciate -- Evidence of a child witness alone can also form the basis for conviction -- Mere absence of any corroborative evidence in addition to that of the child witness by itself cannot alone discredit a child witness -- More so when he is the sole witness, a heightened level of scrutiny is called for.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C. – Value of -- Allegation that the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased was serious and specific against her – Held, in the absence of any question having been put to her in this regard u/s 313 Cr.P.C. the appellant has been seriously prejudiced in her defence -- Procedure u/s 313 CrPC is but a facet of the principles of natural justice giving an opportunity to an accused to present the defence -- Burden of proof on an accused in support of the defence taken u/s 313 CrPC is not beyond all reasonable doubt as it lies on the prosecution to prove the charge -- Accused has merely to create a doubt -- It will be for the prosecution then to establish beyond reasonable doubt that no benefit can flow from the same to the accused.

(Para 9, 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Dowry death/ Murder – Acquittal of Jethani -- PW-2/ Child witness was examined nearly one year after the occurrence -- Court has, therefore, to satisfy itself that all possibilities of tutoring or otherwise are ruled out and what was deposed was nothing but the truth -- According to PW-2, the appellant stuffed cloth in the mouth of the deceased, thereafter others tied her up and set her on fire leading to 95% burns -- He states that after the deceased had suffered burn injuries he had seen the entire scenario including the room where the burnt articles were kept including that he was a witness to his sister being put in a vehicle while being taken to the hospital -- He then states that the deceased in that condition was speaking -- At no stage has the witness deposed that the cloth was taken out from her mouth -- It stands to reason that if cloth was stuffed in the mouth of deceased she would have been unable to speak -- PW-8/ Doctor deposed that there was no cloth recovered from the mouth of the deceased -- He states that the mouth of the deceased was closed, the jaws were shut, no cloth was present in the mouth but burnt cloth was present on the whole body starting from the wrist -- More crucially he states that all the 32 teeth were intact – Blisters were present at various parts of the body but he does not talk about any blister being present in the mouth -- No injuries of any nature have been found inside the mouth neither has the cloth been found – Court not satisfied that the evidence of PW-2 attributing a specific role to the appellant is of such a sterling quality so as to inspire confidence in the court to base the conviction on the sole evidence of a child witness -- Appellant was a daughter-in-law like the deceased herself -- Nature of the evidence makes it highly unlikely that she would have engaged in such actions -- Benefit of doubt in the circumstances has to be given to the appellant.

(Para 7, 11-13)

456. (P&H HC) 27-04-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Locus-standi of complainant -- If a forgery had been done and mis-representation has been made, any person can set law in motion.

(Para 22)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 31 -- Summoning order – Challenge to -- Justice hurried is Justice buried -- It is the settled principle that the Magistrate could have always differed with police report, but once it had been approved by the Commissioner of Police, who had been directed by High Court to look into the same and it was on record and the record of the same could have been summoned from the office of the DCP -- Magistrate could not brushed aside and ignored the report, summoning order was passed on the same day the inquiry report (Ex.CW8/C) was exhibited when produced by the complainant -- Thus, the old adage came into play that is “Justice hurried is Justice buried” -- Summoning order is liable to be quashed on this ground.

(Para 26)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 31 -- Forgery case -- Summoning order – Challenge to -- Basis for summoning was on the strength of photocopy of the documents -- Allegations of forgery would not be justified by the Trial Court in the absence of the originals as such and without an opinion of any expert evidence -- Mere the strength of the photocopies produced and in the absence of any sufficient evidence, summoning order on the said basis is not legally sustainable.

(Para 32-35)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 201 – Summoning of accused -- Criminal law should not be set into motion as a matter of course -- Magistrate is not a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence and summoning the accused on the asking is not to be done unless there is cogent evidence and there is a applicability of mind.

(Para 35)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197, 201 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), Section 31 -- Forgery case -- Summoning of government employee as accused – Sanction of government – Requirement of -- Without the necessary sanction the Trial Court was not justified in summoning the said accused and he is entitled to the protection u/s 197 Cr.P.C. and there is a legal bar as such to initiate his summoning.

(Para 35-39)

460. (P&H HC) 07-04-2021

A. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 -- Domestic violence – Prima facie case -- Summoning of -- Section 18 of the 2005 Act stipulates for a protection order in favour of a woman -- Section 20 of the 2005 Act deals with the monetary relief to the aggrieved party and the same can be granted by a Court -- Before issuing notice, the learned Magistrate has to be prima facie satisfied that there have been instances of a domestic violence.

(Para 22)

B. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (43 of 2005), Section 18, 20 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of summoning order -- Abuse of process of law – Petitioners, mother-in-law aged 65 years is 40% disabled from eyes, and is suffering from old age ailments, father-in-law, aged 73 years, is a chronic kidney patient and has been on dialysis thrice a week and married sister-in-law is a Government Teacher and since her marriage in 2009, she has been residing in her matrimonial home and looking after her two minor children -- A pure matrimonial dispute between husband and wife, has been given a colour of the proceedings under the 2005 Act so as to rope in hapless parents-in-law and a married sister-in-law -- They have been roped in with an oblique motive to harass and mentally torture them -- Moreover, the allegations leveled in the complaint are vague, general and omnibus in nature -- Proceedings qua the petitioners, are nothing, but a clear abuse of process of law -- Summoning order and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, are quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 33-36)

461. (SC) 06-04-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Out of three eye-witnesses, two witnesses, turned hostile and did not support the case of the prosecution -- Both these witnesses are close relations of the victim and there is nothing on record to indicate that they were either put under any pressure or that there was any element of suspicion -- Both these witnesses were categorical that the persons who kidnapped the victim were not before the Court in the capacity as the accused – Third witness-informant, the father of the victim, reporting made by this witness, based on which the crime was registered neither shows that he was an eye-witness to the occurrence nor does it disclose that the identity of the accused who had kidnapped the victim was in any way known at the stage when the occurrence took place -- Thus, all three witnesses who were claimed to be the eye-witnesses to the occurrence and on whose testimonies, reliance was placed by the prosecution, are of no help.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 364A, 376, 216, 120B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 11, 106 -- Murder -- Rape -- Kidnapping -- Circumstantial evidence – Though the post-mortem report discloses that the victim was sexually assaulted, the FSL Report on record does not establish any connection of the accused with the sexual assault on the deceased victim -- Dead body of the victim was found lying in an open field -- Record is again not clear as to when the present appellants were arrested and how and in what manner their disclosure statements led to the recovery of the dead body – There are of course circumstances like recovery of clothing apparel as well as tiffin box etc. belonging to the victim -- However, such recoveries by themselves, in the absence of any other material evidence on record pointing towards the guilt of the accused, cannot be termed sufficient to hold that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt -- Not only those circumstances are not conclusive in nature but they also do not form a cogent and consistent chain so as to exclude every other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellants -- Held, prosecution has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 24-27)

466. (SC) 10-03-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet – Inherent power u/s 482 CrPC -- Complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and the High Court at that stage was not under an obligation to go into the matter or examine its correctness -- Whatever appears on the face of the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same.

(Para 23)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an extraordinary power which has to be exercised with great care and circumspection before embarking to scrutinise the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare case, to scuttle the prosecution at its inception.

(Para 28)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Allegations in the complaint will have to be accepted on the face of it and the truth or falsity of which would not be gone into by the Court at this stage, whether the allegations in the complaint were true is to be decided on the basis of the evidence led at the stage of trial.

(Para 30)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the process of the Court -- Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of putting a halt to the known procedure of law, it must use proper circumspection with great care and caution to interfere in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

(Para 31)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Availability of civil/ arbitration remedies -- FIR/ Complaint / Charge-sheet – Legality of -- Ingredients of the offences u/s 406 and 420 IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the course of trial -- Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings, that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing such proceedings.

(Para 32)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Section 226 -- Inherent power of High Court for quashing of complaint/FIR/charge-sheet -- Breach of terms of the contract – Contention that civil dispute or initiation of the arbitral proceedings would not attract the provisions u/s 406, 420, 34 IPC may not hold good -- It can be defence during the course of trial but was not open to be examined by the High Court to take a judicial notice and for quashing of the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

(Para 35)

469. (UK HC) 03-03-2021

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the Act, 1881:

(i) that a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt or other liability;

(ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank;

(iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;

(v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice.

(Para 7)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Once a cheque has been signed and issued in favour of the holder, there is statutory presumption that it is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability -- However, this presumption is a rebuttable one -- If the accused will able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail -- Onus is upon the accused to rebut the presumption and to establish that the cheque in question was not given in respect of any debt or liability, however, for which it is not necessary for the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence, even the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant can be relied upon.

(Para 23)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Legally enforceable debt or liability -- Presumption – Rebuttal -- Respondent-accused denied his signature on the cheque -- Accused has not led any evidence in support of this plea -- Accused even did not come in the witness box to support his case -- Statement of the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not a substantive evidence of defence of the accused but only an opportunity to the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution case -- Mere statement of the accused may not be sufficient to rebut the presumption.

(Para 24, 25)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Complaint against partner -- Partnership Firm not arrayed as accused – Effect of -- For the purpose of Section 141 of the Act, 1881, a firm comes within the ambit of a company – Cheque had been issued by the firm which was subsequently dishonoured, a partner of the firm would not be liable for prosecution u/s 138 of the Act, 1881 without the firm being arraigned as an accused – Ld. Trail court acquitted the accused -- Appeal, by special leave, preferred by the appellant-complainant dismissed.

(Para 1, 30-34)

470. (SC) 01-03-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Complaint as well as FIR – Legality of -- Merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR with the police station with the same allegations and averments -- However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or in exercise of powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- In that case, the complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 5)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Criminal proceedings – Quashing of – Inherent power of High Court -- Inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to achieve salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment -- When the Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it amounts to bringing pressure upon accused, in exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be quashed.

(Para 6.1)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406, 420 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 200, 210, 482 – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of process of law -- Inherent power of High Court -- Complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act pending -- After a period of three months, an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking registration of FIR – Ld. Magistrate declined to order registration of FIR and decided to inquire into the matter by treating the same as complaint case -- Ld. Sessions Judge remanded back the matter to the learned Magistrate with directions to pass a speaking order – Thereafter, after a period of two years, impugned FIR against the appellants with police station with the similar contents and allegations which were levelled in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C – Complainant is not proceeding further with his application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending since last five years – In the FIR, no reference of application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. and complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act – Held, impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process of law and can be said to be filed with a view to harass the appellants -- High Court ought to have exercised the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India/482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have quashed the impugned FIR to secure the ends of justice – Appeal allowed, impugned criminal proceedings/FIR registered u/ss 420/406 IPC quashed.

(Para 7-9)

475. (SC) 02-02-2021

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Appeal against conviction – Acquittal by High Court -- Non-consideration of reasons of trial court and re-appreciation of evidence – Sustainability of -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent/accused without adverting to the reasons given by the Ld. trial Court while convicting the accused and without reappreciating the entire evidence on record in detail cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside -- Appeal before the High Court is restored to its original file.

(Para 6, 6.1, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378 -- Appeal against acquittal/ conviction – Power of Court -- Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal passed by the Learned trial Court, is required to bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused -- Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law -- Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court -- Therefore, while dealing with the cases of acquittal by the trial Court, the Appellate Court would have certain limitations -- So far as the appeal against the order of conviction is concerned, there are no such restrictions and the Court of appeal has wide powers of appreciation of evidence and the High Court has to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record being a First Appellate Court. Keeping in mind that once the Learned Trial Court has convicted there shall not be presumption of innocence as would be there in the case of acquittal.

(Para 6.1-6.2)

483. (P&H HC) 12-01-2021

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Warrant remained unexecuted as accused-petitioner shifted – Proclamation on same address – Legality of – FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Sustainability of -- Without any basis, the Court formed an opinion that the petitioner is intentionally avoiding service and that he is either absconding or concealing himself -- Rather the Court was duty bound to ask the complainant to furnish his fresh address and ensure that the petitioner was duly served before commencing with the coercive process -- Held, trial Court was not required to invoke the provisions of Section 82 of Cr.P.C. -- Declaration of the petitioner as a proclaimed person, and the consequent registration of the impugned FIR cannot be sustained.

(Para 10-12)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Settlement between parties – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Entire amount of the cheque in dispute stands paid -- Complainant does not have any objection, in case, the impugned order and FIR are quashed -- Once there is an amicable settlement between the parties and the main petition u/s 138 of N.I. Act, wherein accused was declared as a proclaimed person, stands withdrawn, proceedings u/s 174-A IPC cannot be permitted to continue -- Impugned order and FIR u/s 174-A, IPC quashed along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

(Para 13, 14)

486. (SC) 05-01-2021

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – No test identification parade – Accused identified first time in court – Finger prints at place of occurrence – Value of – Child eye witness 5 years old (PW5) -- Both accused were unknown faces to PW5, and were not subjected to any Test Identification -- Apart from identification by PW5 in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence -- Thus, even if Court accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction -- These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Orders of conviction and sentence recorded against them set aside.

(Para 16, 35)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Child witness – Corroboration of -- Perspective from which the evidence of a child witness is to be considered -- “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted principle.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 118, 134 -- Dacoity with murder -- Acquittal in – 5 year old Child eye witness -- A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being pointed by accused/HO -- In the absence of any memorandum, the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be admissible u/s 27 of the Act -- It was however observed that such recovery would be admissible u/s 8 of the Act -- Not enough to sustain the finding of guilt -- PW-2 in his cross-examination reveals that he made no attempts to talk to the police though he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning he was sure that the culprits were accused/ HO and his associates, version given by PW2 is, therefore, not free from doubt -- Evidence of PW2 also contains inherent inconsistencies -- Sample fingerprints of accused H.O. did not match with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased -- With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences punishable u/s 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused/HO – Court do not find the material on record sufficient to record conviction of accused/ HO for the offence u/s 396 IPC -- Benefit of doubt given.

(Para 26-28)

499. (SC) 29-10-2020

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of appellant – Conviction by Trial Court affirmed by High Court – Challenge to -- Test Identification parade unworthy  – Forensic evidence withheld – Identification of accused by wearing of lungi – Un-natural behaviour of eye-witness -- Principle in criminal law which propagates that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to their innocence, the view favourable to the accused should be adopted -- Infirmities in the prosecution evidence, made out a case for interference -- Appeal allowed, judgment of trial Court as also of High Court set aside.

(Para 1, 8-16)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114(g) – Adverse inference – Co-accused acquitted -- No chemical analyst report, relevant forensic evidence for the seized shirt of co-accused withheld by the prosecution -- When such vital forensic evidence is kept away, an adverse inference will have to be drawn against the prosecution.

(Para 8.2)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 162 -- Test Identification Parade – Presence of Police – Identity by lungis -- Test Identification evidence (YIP) is not substantive piece of evidence but can only be used, in corroboration of statements in Court -- Major flaw was the presence of the police during the exercise, resultant communications tantamount to statements made by the identifiers to a police officer in course of investigation and they fall within the ban of section 162 of the Code -- Pahchan patra of the TIP mentions that three lungis were presented, the related witness was shown only one lungi for identification -- Such infirmities would render the TIP unworthy of acceptance, for supporting the prosecution.

(Para 10,11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder case -- Unnatural behaviour of the eye-witness – He was known to the deceased and claimed to have seen the assault -- He did not take any pro-active steps in the matter to either report to the police or inform any of the family members -- Such conduct of the eyewitness is contrary to human nature – His testimony deserves to be discarded.

(Para 14)