A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Legal presumption u/s 118 and 139 of NI Act – Time barred debt – Quashing of summoning order -- Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a statutory notice is issued, it is for the accused to dislodge the legal presumption available u/s 118 and 139 reply of the N.I. Act -- Whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time barred debt or not, itself prima facie, is a matter of evidence and could not have been adjudicated in an application filed by the accused u/s Section 482 of the CrPC.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO matter -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Subsequent to the registration of the FIR and after attaining the age of majority, the petitioner has solemnized marriage with the victim/respondent no.3 -- FIR and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, however, qua the petitioner.

(Para 1-3, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 394, 341, 427, 506, 324, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Voluntary causing hurt in committing robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR – Fact that the compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties, FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120-B – Quashing of FIR -- Dispute settled on civil side – Once the dispute has been settled on the civil side and upheld by High Court in RSA and the said judgment having attained finality, the criminal proceedings cannot be allowed to continue on the same issue as the findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court -- Complaint and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua petitioners.

(Para 13,14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 336, 323, 506, 148, 149, 307, 395 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 – Section 307 (Attempt to murder) – Section 395 (Dacoity) – Compromise quashing of FIR – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 109, 115, 116, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal conspiracy -- Partial quashing of FIR on compromise – Submission that petitioner and respondent No.2 are husband and wife and that respondents No.3 to 5 have not approached the complainant to compromise the matter and prays for quashing of the FIR qua the petitioner only – Ld. SDJM submitted a report indicating that the parties had appeared before her and got recorded their respective statements with regard to the validity of the compromise – Compromise is genuine and without any pressure or coercion from any corner – No useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioner on the basis of compromise.

(Para 2-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 148, 149, 323, 392 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Rioting – Unlawful assembly – No concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased – No evidence what was uttered by the appellants – No evidence that the appellants instigated the other co-accused -- Appellants cannot be convicted for the offence u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 377, 354, 406, 498A, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural offence – Matrimonial dispute – Compromise quashing of FIR – Where settlement has taken place, even the offence u/s 377 IPC can be compromised and FIR can be quashed as parties have to move ahead in life -- Offence u/s 354 IPC also allowed to be quashed to put an end to all bickering between the parties and allow them to begin a new chapter of their lives -- FIR for offences under Sections 406/498A/354/377/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness – Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence – Propositions of law on which there can be no controversy – They are,

(i) that as per the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh, (2020) 10 SCC 120 = (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301, the fact that the informant also happened to be the investigator, may not by itself vitiate the investigation as unfair or biased;

(ii) that it is not always necessary that the evidence of the police witnesses have to be corroborated by independent witnesses, as held in Dharampal Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 608 and Mukesh Singh (2020) 10 SCC 120 (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301;

(iii) that the independent witnesses turning hostile need not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused, when the mandatory procedure is followed and the other police witnesses speak in one voice as held in Rizwan Khan, (2020) 9 SCC 627; and

(iv) that once it is established that the contraband was recovered from the accused’s possession, a presumption arises under Section 54.

(Para 17)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness -- Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence -- To completely disregard the lack of corroboration of the testimony of police witnesses by independent witnesses; and to turn a Nelson’s eye to the independent witnesses turning hostile, then the story of the prosecution should be very convincing and the testimony of the official witnesses notably trustworthy -- If independent witnesses come up with a story which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very search and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse like a pack of cards -- It is no doubt true that corroboration by independent witnesses is not always necessary -- But once the prosecution comes up with a story that the search and seizure was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and they also choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile is unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have become turncoats.

(Para 18)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- I.O. examined as PW-7 claims to have done everything only in the presence of independent witnesses -- But those independent witnesses not merely denied their presence and participation but also came up with an explanation as to how their signatures found a place in those documents -- In such circumstances, a serious doubt is cast on the very search and seizure allegedly made by PW-7.

(Para 32)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence – Doubt on search and seizure – Acquittal of accused -- Section 54 of the Act raises a presumption and the burden shifts on the accused to explain as to how he came into possession of the contraband -- But to raise the presumption, it must first be established that a recovery was made from the accused -- The moment a doubt is cast upon the most fundamental aspect, namely the search and seizure, appellant/ accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction of the appellant set aside.

(Para 33A, 34)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Scope of -- Both the Trial Court and the High Court have agreed in their appreciation of evidence and have arrived at concurrent findings of fact -- Ordinarily, in an appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of fact, Supreme Court would not enter into reappreciation of evidence -- However, if the assessment of the Trial Court and the High Court is vitiated by any error of law or procedure or misreading of evidence or any disregard to the norms of judicial process leading to serious prejudice or injustice, this Court may consider interference in an appropriate case so as to prevent miscarriage of justice.

(Para 13)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Unreasonable behaviour of eye witnesses – Acquittal of accused -- As per the assertion of PW-2 (father) and PW-3 (mother), they had seen their son being assaulted by two persons with weapon -- PW-2 had allegedly fallen unconscious after seeing the blood oozing from the body of his son -- In that situation and scenario, it is difficult to appreciate that these witnesses would go home, take meal and go to bed without bothering about the welfare of their injured son -- This aspect is coupled with the fact that they had allegedly narrated the incident to PW-1 (other son) only when he reached home after having seen the dead body of his brother -- FIR was lodged next day morning at 10 a.m. – Taking all the circumstances into account, testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 could not have been accepted as that of eye-witnesses to the incident from any standpoint – Moreover, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8 and PW-9, who were projected by the prosecution as independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution case at all – Deceased had been brutally assaulted and had received multiple injuries on vital parts but, on the evidence as adduced by the prosecution, it is difficult to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants alone were the authors of such injuries -- Fit case for interference in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court – Appeal allowed -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 16-22)

C. Criminal trial – Benefit of doubt -- A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt but a fair doubt based upon reasons and common sense -- When a reasonable doubt arises in a matter, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

(Para 19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 393, 427 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 393 IPC/  Attempt to commit robbery -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 (2)(a) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act against Proprietor -- Proprietorship Firm not made party – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order – Statutory signification assigned to a 'Company', does visibly cover not only any corporate body, but also covers a firm, or other association of individuals -- Held, Sole proprietary entity though is obviously solitarily owned, yet, the said juristic person, or, legal entity rather becomes 'a person' committing an offence u/s 138, and, besides the said juristic person, is also a 'Company' – Therefore, not only the juristic entity concerned, was amenable for being arrayed as an accused in the petition complaint, but also all those persons responsible to the sole proprietary concern , for the conduct of its business -- Complaint reveals that the sole proprietary concern has not been arrayed as an accused, but only its sole proprietor has been arrayed as an accused – Petition allowed complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act as well as, the summoning order both are quashed and set aside.

(Para 12-17)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Incorrect address -- Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174-A IPC -- Despite of providing repeated opportunities to complainant to file the correct address, needful was not done -- An application was filed that there is no other address except the one mentioned in the complaint -- Without therebeing any basis, to conclude that petitioner was avoiding service the court proceeded to issue warrant of arrest and thereafter passed the impugned order for registration of FIR – Petition allowed, impugned order set aside.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cause of action – Pre-mature complaint – Second complaint -- Demand notice period of 15 days not expired -- Complaint filed before fifteen days -- In view of the legal bar created by Section 142 of the NI Act, taking of cognizance by the Court was contrary to the law and the complaint was not maintainable -- Respondent would be at liberty to institute a fresh complaint and to seek the benefit of the proviso by satisfying the trial court of sufficient cause for the delay in instituting the complaint.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act --  Upheld by Supreme Court – Compromise/ Settlement between parties – Recalling of order -- In view of the statement made and as full payment has been made along with compensation, order recalled and the special leave petition restored to its original number – Leave granted, impugned order upholding the conviction of the appellant would be treated as settled and compounded -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 2-7)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Case under SC-ST Act -- Investigation by Sub Inspector instead of DSP -- Benefit of doubt – Conviction by Trial Court -- Acquittal in appeal -- Several infirmities and lacunae in the prosecution story :

-- Complainant, who got her statement recorded as PW2 and PW7 another eye-witness did not support the prosecution story at all and declared hostile.

-- Prosecution unable to establish on record that on which date, the incident had taken place – When prosecution is not sure of the date of incident, then the very happening of the incident becomes doubtful.

-- Investigating Officer is not to be below the rank of DSP -- Thus rule having been violated clearly caused prejudice to the accused making the credibility of the prosecution story doubtful.

-- Plausible motive for lodging of the FIR in view of the civil litigation pending between the accused and village Gram Panchayat and lodging of FIR could be a device to put pressure upon the accused in civil litigation and make them leave the village since as per case of the accused, theirs is the only Saini family in the village, which is otherwise inhabited by members of the HARIJAN community.

A reasonable doubt arises about truthfulness of the prosecution story and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused conclusively and affirmatively – Benefit of doubt should have been given to the accused, which was wrongly denied to them by the trial Court – Impugned judgment and order of sentence cannot stand judicial scrutiny and are not sustainable, same are set aside.

(Para 1, 13-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Goods were entrusted with the company, the Managing Director of the said company cannot be prosecuted without the company as an accused -- In the absence of any specific overt act on the part of the petitioner, no offence u/s 406 of IPC can be made out against the petitioner/ Managing Director – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- An indirect act of incitement to the commission of suicide would constitute the offence of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of the IPC.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Abetment of suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR – Financial settlement -- FIR u/s 306 of the IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else -- High Court quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant had been compromised -- Impugned orders of the High Court set aside.

(Para 50)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In exercise of power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.

(Para 49)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Murder – Acquittal – Extra-judicial confession – Recovery from accused -- PW-7 turned hostile, trial court disbelief the alleged recovery of the incriminating material allegedly recovered at the instance of the respondent-accused – Court only leaves with the alleged extra-judicial confession – High Court held that extrajudicial confession was a weak piece of evidence and unless there was some corroboration, the conviction solely on the basis of extra-judicial confession could not be sustained – Held, view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be either impossible or perverse meriting interference -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Consensual relationship – Quashing of FIR -- Parties chose to have physical relationship without marriage for a considerable period of time -- For some reason, the parties fell apart -- It can happen both before or after marriage -- Thereafter also three years passed when respondent No.2 decided to register a FIR -- Facts are so glaring as set out aforesaid that the court have no hesitation in quashing the FIR and bringing the proceedings to a close.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 136 – Cheque bounce case – Security deposit cheque – Quashing of Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – High Court quashed the complaint -- Dispute between the parties regarding the quality of the material supplied – Respondent/ accused made a complaint in writing of the defective material and then stopped the payment – Respondent has already filed a Civil Suit for damages – Held, the issues between the parties can be effectively resolved through Civil Suit only – Petitioner shall be at liberty either to file counter claim or a separate suit in accordance with law – Observations made by the High Court in its impugned order shall have no bearing on the outcome of the Civil Suit.

(Para 1-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Robbery -- Murder -- Loot of Rs.5 lacs – Conviction based upon recovery – Legality of --  Prosecution is required to establish and prove that the amount which is recovered from the accused is the very amount which the complainant/the person from whom the amount is looted -- When the prosecution has failed to prove that the complainant and the deceased were carrying Rs.5 lakhs cash in the dicky of the scooter and it was the very looted amount which was recovered from the accused, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of recovery of some cash.

(Para 2, 6.1)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Robbery -- Murder -- Test Identification parade in Court room -- Prior thereto no TIP conducted by the Investigating Agency – When no TIP was conducted the first version of the complainant reflected in the FIR would play an important role -- Nothing has been mentioned in his first statement that he had seen the accused earlier and that he will be able to identify the accused -- In the deposition before the Court, complainant tried to improve the case by deposing that he had seen the accused in the city on one or two occasions -- The aforesaid was not disclosed in the FIR -- Even in the cross-examination as admitted by PW1 he did not disclose any description of the accused -- PW1 has specifically and categorically admitted in the cross-examination that it is incorrect that the accused were known earlier -- It would not be safe and/or prudent to convict the accused solely on the basis of their identification for the first time in the Court -- Conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 IPC quashed and set aside -- Accused acquitted from the charges.

(Para 6, 6.2-6.7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise post-conviction -- Nature of dispute is predominantly private -- Statement made in the joint petition preferred by the informant and the accused as well as the affidavit filed discloses that the compromised has been entered into voluntarily -- Nature of the offences is also not heinous – Conviction and sentence set aside and quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Cheque bounce case – Compromise after conviction -- Compounding of offence -- In conformity with the settlement requisite payment accepted -- It does appear appropriate to accept the terms of settlement between the parties and allow the compounding of offence – Orders passed by the Appellate Court and the Trial Court are set aside.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR – Alleged commission of an offence constituted u/s 307 of the IPC, does not prima facie appear to be so grave, and, nor is so heinous – When the settlement has occurred, at the pre-charge stage, thereupon, for preserving amity, and, harmony amongst the concerned, besides when given the occurrence of a compromise at the pre-trial stage, rather the victim-complainant, or/and, the ocular witnesses to the occurrence are not likely to support the charge – Settlement/compromise, as validly entered into, enjoins its being revered – Chances of the petitioner being convicted are remote as well as bleak – In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would result in harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused, besides would defeat the ends of justice – Petition allowed, FIR and, also all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 13-19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of proceedings -- Partial payment of cheque amount – Effect of -- Cheque when presented for realization was returned for technical reason -- On the very same date, the accused transferred a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- to the account of the complainant through RTGS – No material placed that the cheque was re-presented towards recovery of balance amount – Ld. Magistrate has committed an error in taking cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Petition allowed, impugned proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2) (n) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO matter – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Dispute amicably settled between the parties – In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so -- Respondent no.2/ girl already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other and a male child has also been born from the wedlock -- Possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act withdrawn by complainant as compromised – Case of the petitioner that he was not aware of the proceedings u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 and was subsequently arrested and released on bail -- Order declaring the petitioner as proclaimed person would prove to be insignificant inasmuch as the main complaint u/s 138 of the Act itself has been withdrawn -- Petition allowed -- FIR u/s 174-A of the IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed/set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 365, 452, 366, 506 -- Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016), Section 3(i), 101(3)(a) -- Constitution of India, Article 226 -- Acquittal of juvenile in rape case – Criminal writ petition against -- Place of occurrence i.e. the shop of the accused is situated in a public place, however, as per the deposition of the victim she was forcibly taken from her home to the shop by forcibly making her to sit on the motorcycle of the accused is also improbable as there was strong possibility of the family members coming to know of the same -- Besides this, the ocular version is not even medically corroborated beyond reasonable doubt -- Once the accused is acquitted there lies double the presumption of innocence in his favour -- Interference can be in a situation when there are perversities in the findings arrived at by the Trial Court -- If there are two views possible then the one favouring the accused should be adopted -- Keeping in view the overall facts and circumstances of the case and evidence adduced on record on the anvil of the law settled, Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Juvenile Justice Board in acquitting the accused -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 6-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 285, 307, 323, 506, 34 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 – Attempt to murder -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 14)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power u/s 482 of Cr.P.C – Scope of – Power is not to be invoked as a matter of routine but to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to secure ends of justice -- This section gives the power to High Court to entertain applications which are not contemplated in the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the event, it is felt that the ends of justice will require that the Court can invoke the extraordinary powers which are to be exercised with restraint and not lightly -- In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Respondent no.2/girl has already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other -- In such circumstances, the possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2/girl, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- As such, it is a fit case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code, so as to secure the ends of justice -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law -- FIR qua the petitioner quashed.

(Para 8-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Reduction of sentence to fine, default sentence intact -- Cheque of Rs.3 Lacs – Conviction by Trial Court for one year with fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default whereof the appellant was directed to undergo S.I. for six months -- Out of Rs.5000/-, Rs.2500/- was to be paid to the complainant – High Court reduced the sentence from one year to three months – Considering the fact that the appellant is an old lady of 69 years, the substantive sentence substituted by fine in the sum of Rs.50,000/- in addition to the fine already deposited by the appellant; Rs.55,000/- shall be the sentence for the offences committed by the appellant -- Default sentence awarded by the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court and the High Court kept intact.

(Para 3-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Sexual harassment case -- Quashing of FIR – Compromise between parties -- FIR is an outcome of a petty dispute, which has been settled -- Perusal of the allegations levelled in the FIR shows that the ingredients of Section 354-A, IPC are not fulfilled -- As the parties have decided to bury the hatchet, continuation of the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and the same deserve to be set aside – Petition allowed.

(Para 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s Section 174-A – Compromise in cheque bounce case – Complaint has been dismissed as withdrawn -- Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 379, 411 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Theft – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Conviction u/s 379, 411 for three years with fine – Appeal against conviction dismissed – Acquittal after compromise in revision --  Held, occurrence can be categorized as purely personal/ criminal act of private nature -- No injury has been caused -- Compromise is without any coercion or compulsion and has been entered into willingly and voluntarily -- Occurrence took place in the year 2017 and there is nothing on record to show that any untoward incident had taken place after the same -- Petitioner is widowed lady of 51 years of age and the complainant has stated that he has primarily entered into compromise on account of old age of the petitioner and on account of the fact that no loss has been caused to him – Criminal Revision allowed, judgment passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and the petitioner acquitted of the charges framed against her.

(Para 17, 18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Probation – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint -- Matter pertains to an incident that occurred in the year 2000 and the present appeal has been pending since 2012 – No material on record that the accused-petitioner has any criminal antecedents – Held, the accused-petitioner are entitled to the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 -- Petitioner ordered to be released on probation, u/s 4 of the Act.

(Para 12-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 401, 482  -- Cheque bounce case – Compromise after conviction – Compounding of offence -- Exemption from 15% of Cheque amount -- Petitioner is stated to be a poor farmer, who had taken the said loan for treatment of his son, who was suffering from cancer and stated to be 67 years of age – Petitioner exempted from paying 15% of the cheque amount -- Application u/s 320 Cr.P.C. read with Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for compounding of offence allowed -- Judgment and order of sentence set aside.

(Para 17-19)

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 7, 10 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 482 – FIR under Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act -- Quashing of FIR – Maximum sentence is three years -- Limitation of three years to take cognizance -- Sale deed was executed on 28.04.2011 -- Communication dated 23.02.2012 was sent by the DTP, Kurukshetra to Superintendent of Police on 28.09.2016 leading to the registration of the FIR on 29.09.2016 -- Respondent no.2 was aware of the alleged offence, if any, on 01.12.2011/13.12.2011 and, therefore, the court could have taken cognizance within three years of that date i.e. 01.12.2014/13.12.2014 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.PC was submitted on 17.08.2017 -- Thus, the court could clearly not have taken cognizance beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 Cr.PC -- Petition allowed and the FIR u/s 10 of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 12-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Compromise after conviction – Compounding of offence -- Cheque amount paid -- No one appeared to oppose the application on behalf of the private respondent, in spite of service of notice -- Since amount of both the dishonoured cheques (each of Rs.1,00,000/-) has been paid and the disputes have been compromised, the offence may be compounded -- Sentence of imprisonment of the petitioner set aside.

(Para 1, 2)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Snatching case – Leave to appeal against acquittal -- Complaint was registered against the unknown persons -- Incident was around 9 PM, no description of the accused was mentioned by the complainant -- No details like International Mobile Equipment Identity of the mobile or the number of snatched currency notes, no test identification parade was conducted by the IO -- IO made arrest next day from the bus stand of village and there was no basis to support as to how IO identified accused -- IO in his deposition deposed that arrest was on the identification of the complainant -- IO faulted in his cross-examination when he stated that neither identification memo was prepared nor the arrest memo was got signed from the complainant -- None of the documents bear the signatures of accused – Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of connecting the accused with the alleged incident – Statement of the IO when read as a whole including his answers in cross-examination itself is not enough to prove the case of the prosecution –  With so many dents created in the story of the prosecution, the view taken by the trial Court is a plausible and based upon sound record -- No case is made out of illegality on facts or law much less perversity -- Leave to file appeal is declined.

(Para 2-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 148, 149, 447, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Investigation pending -- Inherent powers of High Court – Allegation that petitioners attempted to take forcible possession of the land in question -- Perusal of the FIR shows that the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offences are present, therefore, it is not a case where the intervention of the Court is warranted for quashing of the FIR -- Investigation in the case is pending, therefore, it is apparent that the petition is pre-mature -- Court not inclined to exercise the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at this stage.

(Para 3-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 370, 406, 420 – (Immigration) Emigration Act, 1983 (31 of 1983), Section 24 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Trafficking of person -- Compromise between the parties – Held, compromise is in the welfare and interest of the parties and will enable the parties to live in peace and enjoy their life in a dignified manner -- Also there is no legal impediment in translating their wishes into reality by putting an end to the criminal prosecution initiated on the basis of FIR in question – Petition allowed and FIR and all the subsequent proceedings thereof quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 7-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 34, 406, 498-A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR -- Continuation of the prosecution would result in sheer abuse of process of law, controversy does not indicate that the same involves heinous or serious offences and furthermore, the matrimonial dispute has been sought to be amicably settled – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise are ordered to be quashed.

(Para 6-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174-A IPC – Compromise in cheque bounce case – Complaint u/s 138 NI Act withdrawn --  Held, since the main complaint stands withdrawn the matter being compromised between the parties, therefore, continuation of the proceedings under Section 174-A IPC would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law – FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof quashed qua the petitioner subject to payment of cost of Rs.7000/- to the Legal Services Authority.

(Para 5-7)