A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Breach of promise to marry – Rape -- Difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise -- In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise -- So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence u/s 376 IPC – Appellant/ accused acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 20-25)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 277 – Language of record of evidence – General direction to all Courts -- Evidence of the witness has to be recorded in the language of the court or in the language of the witness as may be practicable and then get it translated in the language of the court for forming part of the record --  However, recording of evidence of the witness in the translated form in English language only, though the witness gives evidence in the language of the court, or in his/her own vernacular language, is not permissible -- As such, the text and tenor of the evidence and the demeanor of a witness in the court could be appreciated in the best manner only when the evidence is recorded in the language of the witness -- Original deposition of the witness has to be taken into account and not the translated memorandum in English prepared by the Presiding Judge – Directions given to all courts that while recording the evidence of the witnesses, shall duly comply with the provisions of Section 277 of Cr.PC.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Adulteration of tea with intoxicant substance – Burdon of proof -- Admission u/s 313 Cr.P.C. by the appellant-accused qua bringing tea does not absolve the prosecution from discharging the onus of proof regarding the tea, which was consumed by complainant, being adulterated with any stupefying or intoxicant substance -- No concrete evidence available on record, either forensic or medical, to support the version of the prosecution, except the bald statement of the complainant himself -- Appellant-accused deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed, verdict of conviction, and, order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry death – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Presumption u/s 113-A of Indian Evidence Act -- Principles

(1) The presumption carried in the Indian Evidence Act, is attractable only when the charge drawn against the accused is for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC.

(2) The said statutory provision has a limited effect, in respect of a charge drawn under Section 304-B of the IPC, as the implied presumption, created through the words “shall be deemed to have caused her death”, which hence occur at the end of the relevant statutory provisions, yet do not discharge, the prosecution from adducing evidence qua the deceased being meted cruelty or harassment, in respect of demands of dowry, as, made upon her by her husband, or by his relatives.

(3) That the statutory phrase “and it is shown” which segregates the first, and, second component of the relevant discharging section, cast a conjunctive onus, upon the prosecution to prove the earlier, and, later components' of the relevant charging sections.

(4) That the word “shall be deemed to have caused her death” do not ever discharge the prosecution from adducing evidence rather for unflinchingly proving both the components, as carried in sub-Section (1) of Section 304-B of the IPC.

(5) The evidence necessary for proving the above foundational facts, rather for supporting the ingredients, as carried in Section 304-B IPC, is required to be always adduced by the prosecution, and, the implied presumption, gets strengthened only, when the defence omits to put the relevant exculpatory suggestions to the PWs concerned, and/or fails to secure a favourable answer thereto, rather from the PWs concerned.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court --Leave to appeal against the verdict of acquittal dismissed.

(Para 19, 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 511 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Acquittal of accused -- Variant stands of prosecutrix – Evidence of offence -- Principles

1. For determining the occurrence of blatant, and, gross improvements or embellishments, made by the prosecutrix in her testification, made before the learned Court below, rather with her previously made statement in writing, a keenest perusal of both has to be made.

2. In case the prosecutrix has made variant stands, at different stages of the investigations, about the date and time of the occurrence, thereupon, such variant stands, do become the plank for making a conclusion, that the prosecutrix has made open, rife, and, blatant improvements or embellishments from her earliest recorded statement in writing.

3. In case the prosecutrix makes variant attributions of criminality to the accused respectively in her statement, recorded by the police, and, before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned, thereupon, the said variant stands or inter se digression(s), would leave this Court to conclude, that such digression(s) are rife, and, blatant, and, thus the deposition of the prosecutrix, would be construed to be not amenable for assigning any creditworthiness thereto.

4. In case there is an attribution qua the accused that during the course of the relevant occurrence, he had broken the cord of her salwar, thereupon, it became imperative upon the investigating officer concerned, to collect the salwar as well as the broken cord thereof. Omission to make the above collections would also make deep inroads into the veracity of the genesis of the prosecution case.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 41 – Forged Will – Quashing of FIR – Genuineness of Will upheld upto Supreme Court  in probate proceedings – A judgment by a probate Court as per Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is in rem -- Whether any Court will be able to ignore the findings of the Civil Court regarding genuineness of the Will, answer is no – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6, 12-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Issuance of process -- Enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C – Requirement of – Magistrate did not comply with the provision of Section 202 Cr.P.C., even though the petitioners reside outside the jurisdiction of the court – Non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate before issuance of process is prima facie an abuse of process of Court/ law – Impugned order set aside/ quashed -- Matter remitted to the learned Magistrate for considering the matter afresh as per the relevant provision of law.

(Para 19-26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 506 and 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise/ partial quashing of FIR  -- Petition qua petitioner no. 2 already withdrawn -- Contesting parties amicably resolved their issue -- There appears to be no chance of conviction -- Continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and courts are already over-burdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua petitioner no. 1 and 3.

(Para 2-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioner solemnized marriage with complainant and both are residing together -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time -- FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties have solemnised marriage -- No useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- No chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – Petition allowed – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner(s).

(Para 5-9)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Last seen circumstance – Evidential value -- “last seen” doctrine has limited application, where the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused, and the time of murder, is narrow; furthermore, the court should not convict an accused only on the basis of the “last seen” circumstance.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Murder – Acquittal of accused -- Last seen circumstance – Time gap -- Save the “last seen” theory, there is no other circumstance or evidence -- Importantly, the time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused and the probable time of his death, based on the post mortem report, which was conducted two days later, was silent about the probable time of death, though it stated that death occurred approximately two days before the post mortem, is not narrow -- Given this fact, and the serious inconsistencies in the depositions of the witnesses, as well as the fact that the FIR was lodged almost 6 weeks after the incident, the sole reliance on the “last seen” circumstance even if it were to be assumed to have been proved to convict the accused-appellants is not justified -- Conviction and sentence of the appellant-accused set aside.

(Para 25)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Quashing of Complaint -- Company not impleaded as party – Demand notice to wrong company – Cheque was issued in the capacity of an authorized signatory of BSR Health Ventures Private Limited and was not issued from a personal account -- However, the notice was issued and the complaint was filed against the Director of BSR Super Specialty Hospitals Ltd. – Held, since a wrong notice has been served and a wrong party has been made and further, the Company has also not been arrayed as an accused, the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner would amount to abuse of the process of law -- Criminal proceedings against the petitioner quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 256, 397 -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act – Dismiss in default – Revision -- Case was fixed for furnishing the complete particulars of the accused -- Summoning order had already been passed -- Accused had not put in appearance even once by that time -- Resorting to the step of axing down the complaint by dismissing it in default cannot be held to be a proper exercise of power envisaged under Section 256 Cr.P.C. -- Complaint restored by Ld. A.S.J in revision – Order upheld.

(Para 1, 13, 16)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 256, 397 -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act – Dismiss in default – Maintainability of revision -- Summoning order already passed -- Presence of the accused not secured by the date of dismissal of complaint in default, as he had not been served by that time – Held, discretion was not exercised by the Magistrate judiciously, fairly and without impairing the cause of administration of criminal justice in dismissing the complaint -- Revision in the facts and circumstances of the case, held maintainable.

(Para 15)

Constitution of India, Article 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 432, 433-A -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 148, 302/149, 307/149 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(5) -- Life imprisonment – Pre-mature release – Prayer declined by State on opinion of Special Judge -- Presiding Officer’s opinions do not contain reasons with regard to the factors to be taken into consideration as laid down in case of Laxman Naskar’s case (2002) 2 SCC 595 – Held, petitioners’ applications for remission required to be reconsidered by the respondent authorities afresh -- Special Judge directed to provide an opinion afresh after taking into consideration the relevant factors as laid down in Laxman Naskar’s case – Thereafter, State shall take a final decision on remission afresh expeditiously not later than one month of receiving the opinion of the Special Judge -- Writ petition allowed.

(Para 7)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 67 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 30 -- NDPS case  -- Statement of co-accused -- Statement of co-accused is an inadmissible piece of evidence and similarly statement of accused-respondent recorded u/s 67 of the NDPS Act, cannot be used as a confessional statement.

(Para 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 29 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – NDPS case -- Acquittal of accused – Appeal -- Call Detail Record only established conversation between all accused -- Nature of the conversation cannot be ascertained -- So from the Call Detail Record, it is not proved that accused-respondent had delivered contraband to the other co-accused for transporting -- Similarly just from, the tower location of the accused/respondent at Ratlam in M.P. it is not proved that he had delivered poppy husk in question to the co-accused for transporting the same at Chandigarh -- No evidence on record that when and by whom the poppy husk was purchased -- As offence under NDPS Act is punishable with severe punishment so the strict burden is casted upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond the reasonable doubt -- When there is no substantive evidence on record to connect accused-respondent with the offence then he has been rightly acquitted by the trial Court – Leave to appeal declined.

(Para 14-16)

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 7(1)(a)(ii) -- Fertilizer (Control) Order 1985, Clause 19(1)(a) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Acquittal of accused – Dealer’s criminal liability – Non-standard Fertiliser -- Appellant is only a dealer, manufacturing concern has not been made an accused, moreover, officials of the said manufacturing concern, who were impleaded by name in their individual capacity, have been acquitted by learned Trial Court -- Appeal succeed, inasmuch as, in isolation the appellant cannot be convicted for fault alleged against him – Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 13-15)

Trade Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999), Section 103, 104, 115(4) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Trade Mark offence -- Quashing of FIR –Search and seizure by Sub Inspector – Permission from Registrar -- Provisions of Section 115(4) of the Act clearly violated on two counts: firstly, the entire search and seizure was undertaken by an officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police and secondly, the proceedings were initiated without the opinion of the Registrar, Trade Marks -- Thus, there is a clear statutory embargo to the initiation and continuance of proceedings -- Petition allowed – FIR, order framing charge and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 13-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 124A, 153A, 504, 505(1)(b), 505(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- High Court quashed the criminal proceedings as if the High Court was conducting the mini trial – It is a settled position of law that while exercising powers u/s 482, CrPC, the High Court is not required to conduct the mini trial -- What is required to be considered at that stage is the nature of accusations and allegations in the FIR and whether the averments/allegations in the FIR prima facie discloses the commission of the cognizable offence or not -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is contrary to the decision in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd’s case, (2020) 10 SCC 180 and the other decisions on the points, is unsustainable -- Impugned judgment order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 9, 10, 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 124A, 153A, 504, 505(1)(b), 505(2) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- FIR lodged on 09.12.2021, immediately, on the very next date, the quashing petition was filed and within a period of four days i.e. 14.12.2021, the impugned judgment and order has been passed and the criminal proceedings quashed -- As per the settled position of law, it is the right conferred upon the Investigating Agency to conduct the investigation and reasonable time should be given to the Investigating Agency to conduct the investigation unless it is found that the allegations in the FIR do not disclose any cognizable offence at all or the complaint is barred by any law -- Impugned judgment order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 11-14)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42, 43 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- NDPS case – Appeal against conviction -- Acquittal of accused – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information not reduced into writing and not sent to the police station or higher authority -- Evidence clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance -- Explanation appended to Section 43 of the Act clearly shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression ‘public place’ -- Held, it was mandatory to comply with the provisions of Section 42 of the Act; there was complete non-compliance of the said requirement of law -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Non-examination of Investigation officer – Effect of -- Complainant/injured in his deposition stated that the petitioner was driving his tractor at a fast speed and in a rash and negligent manner and suddenly turned the tractor without giving any indication and it struck their motorcycle, he received injuries whereas the deceased succumbed to his injuries – The injuries and the postmortem report of the deceased duly proved by Doctors -- Recovery memo of the tractor and the motorcycle have been proved by the complainant, PW1 and mechanical reports duly proved by PW3-HC -- Similarly, the lodging of the FIR has been duly proved by PW6-ASI -- Petitioner is the owner of the offending tractor and had got released the same on Superdari -- Non-examination of the Investigating Officer is in no way fatal to the case of the prosecution – Conviction upheld.

(Para 16-18)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving -- Protracted trial – Reduction of sentence -- Petitioner is a first-time offender and the occurrence pertains to the year 2000 -- As many as 22 years have elapsed since then – Court deemed it appropriate to modify the sentence and reduce it to a period of 06 months under Section 304-A IPC -- Quantum of fine and sentence in default shall remain intact (Rs.500/- and in default of fine RI for 01 month).

(Para 11, 20)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(v), (va) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order under SC ST Act -- Private civil dispute between the parties is converted into criminal proceedings -- From the material on record, no case for the offences u/s 3(1)(v) and (va) of the 1989 Act is made out, even prima facie -- None of the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(v) and (va) of Act, 1989 are made out and/ or satisfied -- Initiation of the criminal proceedings is nothing but an abuse of process of law and Court -- High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition quashed and set aside -- Criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants, initiated by the respondent/ original complainant including summons issued by the learned Special Court quashed and set aside.

(Para 3-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 53 -- Prisons Act, 1894 (9 of 1894), Section 55 -- Goa Prisons Rules, 2006, Rule 2(11), 335 -- Life imprisonment – Pre-mature release – Parole period -- Whether the period of parole is to be excluded from the period of sentence while considering 14 years of actual imprisonment – Held, for the purpose of considering actual imprisonment, the period of parole is to be excluded.

(Para 8-10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A IPC -- Complaint u/s 138 of the Act was compromised and the complaint stood dismissed as withdrawn – Held, continuation of proceedings u/s 174-A IPC shall be an abuse of process of law -- Petition allowed and FIR u/s 174-A IPC along with all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 195(1) -- FIR u/s 188 IPC – Quashing of FIR – No complaint in writing by Public Servant as required u/s 195(1) Cr.P.C -- Registration of FIR and commencement of proceedings qua petitioner is impermissible -- FIR quashed.

(Para 9, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Sections 468, 469 -- FIR u/s 188 IPC – Quashing of FIR – Limitation -- Period of limitation would be one year from the date of commission of offence with respect to Section 188 IPC -- SDJM, had taken the cognizance, beyond the period of limitation as detailed in Sections 468 and 469 Cr.P.C. -- Petition allowed, FIR u/s 188 IPC, and subsequent proceedings emanating from it quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 -- Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Section 61 – Quashing of FIR -- Excise matter – Limitation -- Maximum sentence prescribed 2 years -- Trial Court can take cognizance within 3 years -- Held, prosecution was required to file challan within three years whereas a period of 08 years has expired, however, till date challan has not been presented -- In view of mandate of Section 468 Cr.P.C. the petition allowed and FIR quashed.

(Para 2, 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Quashing of proclamation – Accused in aboard -- Accused could not be served through summons, bailable warrants, and even non-bailable warrants -- Petitioner was declared proclaimed offender on 07.11.2015 -- Immigration slips reveals that the petitioner arrived in India on 02.03.2018 – In impugned order there is no reference that the petitioner was away from India – Impugned order is arbitrary, set aside.

(Para 1-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) Section 32 – Acquittal of accused -- Multiple Dying declaration -- Second dying declaration rejected completely by the High Court, is the only piece of evidence which names the appellant as one of the perpetrators of cruelty on the deceased along with the other accused – First dying declaration, the appellant has not been named; rather he along with his father took the deceased in a critically injured state to the hospital – Focus of the first dying declaration is only upon the incident involving pouring of kerosene and setting the deceased on fire -- Second dying declaration, alone elaborates acts of cruelty -- That is the only piece of incriminating evidence against the accused -- Appellant’s conviction and sentence u/s 498-A IPC set aside.

(Para 20,21)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of complaint – Inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- For the quashing of a criminal complaint, the Court, when it exercises its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.

(Para 11)

B. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 3(f), 18(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Manufacturing of drugs without license – Quashing of complaint -- Appellants purchased pyridoxal-5-phosphate, 75 kg (as 3 x 25kg packets), however, no stock was found on the premise of the Appellants -- Alleged breaking up of the impugned substance into smaller packages and further distribution of the same is being classified by the Respondent/ complainant as “manufacturing”

-- The impugned substance, has been categorized as a bulk food substance falling under the definition of food as per Section 3(1)(j) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.

-- The impugned substance has specifically been mentioned as a food ingredient in Serial No.4(ii) of the Schedule-I of the Food Safety and Standards Regulations, 2016.

Alleged substance is not included as a drug in the Indian Pharmacopoeia -- Impugned substance does not require a specific license -- No explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years -- Proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-29)

C. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 3(f), 18(c) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Manufacturing of drugs without license – Delay in complaint – Quashing of complaint -- Inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.

(Para 25)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Leave to appeal -- Granting of special leave to appeal against acquittal is a discretionary power.

(Para 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452, 506, 166, 167 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 12 -- Rape -- Cancellation report in FIR –  Ld. JMIC dismissed the complaint -- Leave to appeal -- Applicant/ prosecutrix was alleged to be raped on 07.01.2016 and 10.02.2016 – She opted to remain silent after alleged incident of 07.01.2016 and approached police on 10.02.2016 i.e. after second incident -- There is gap of one month between first incident and second incident -- Applicant attempted to implicate police officials who did not agree with her complaint -- MLR was not supporting the case of the applicant -- No injury was found over the body of the applicant -- Complainant/applicant failed to make out prima facie case warranting summoning of alleged accused – There is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned order whereby trial Court has dismissed the complaint -- Permission for special leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Compounding of offence – Consent of complainant – Requirement of -- Section 147 of NI Act coupled with inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C., in the interest of justice, High Court is not precluded from compounding the case in absence of consent of complainant where complainant is duly compensated as Section 138 of the NI Act does not provide that it is mandatory for the Court to sentence for imprisonment in all eventualities but there is option to the Court to impose sentence of imprisonment or fine or both.

(Para 9)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Compounding of offence – No-consent case -- Petitioner is 52% handicapped and has deposited in the Court 10% over and above the amount of compensation – Held, complainant has been compensated adequately and therefore, substantive sentence of imprisonment is not necessary -- Accordingly complaint filed by the respondent compounded, impugned judgments/ orders set-aside and petitioner acquitted of the offence charged.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 482 – Cheating and forgery -- Forged sale deed – Quashing of Complaint – Mockery of investigation – Civil dispute pending -- When it is the specific case of the original complainant that at no point of time he had executed the disputed sale deed and his signature on the disputed sale deed has been forged, then the;  

-- first thing the police should have done was to obtain the specimen hand writings of the complainant so as to be compared with the disputed signature on the sale deed through a hand writing expert.

-- second thing which the investigating agency ought to have done is to investigate whether the sale consideration had been paid to the purchaser of the disputed plot or not and if the sale deed consideration had been paid, then in what manner.

-- If it is the case of the original complainant that a conspiracy was hatched, then in such circumstances why did the police drop the purchaser and the other individuals from the charge sheet stating that they are the bona fide purchasers of the plot in question for value without notice.

No convincing legal evidence on record to put the appellant to trial for the alleged offences -- Since the purchaser of the plot in question and others have not been arrayed as accused, the entire theory of criminal conspiracy collapses like a pack of cards -- Civil Court seized of the question as regards the legality and validity of the disputed sale deed -- The matter is sub judice in the Civil Court -- It will not be proper to permit the criminal prosecution to proceed further on the allegation of the sale deed being forged – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-18)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of Complaint – Civil dispute – Criminal texture – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- While exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482 of the CrPC, the High Court has to be conscious that this power is to be exercised sparingly and only for the purpose of prevention of abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice -- Whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not, has to be judged by the High Court -- A complaint disclosing civil transaction may also have a criminal texture -- But the High Court must see whether the dispute which is in substance of a civil nature is given a cloak of a criminal offence -- In such a situation, if civil remedy is available and is in fact adopted, the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceeding to prevent abuse of process of court.

(Para 17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Provision of Section 401 IPC makes the fact of mere belonging to a gang of robbers or thieves punishable offence -- However, 'belonging to' does not mean a casual association with thieves or robbers but requires there shall be an agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves -- Two ingredients required to bring home the charges u/s 401 IPC -- First one is agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery and second is participation by any person in that agreement.

(Para 20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 401 – Belonging to gang of thieves – Acquittal -- Allegation qua the appellants-accused is that they all were present at one place with an intention to commit robbery -- However, there is no allegation that all the appellants-accused were in agreement to habitually commit theft or robbery -- Therefore, in the absence of any allegation to this extent, no offence u/s 401 IPC is made out -- Appellants-accused acquitted.

(Para 20)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Dishonestly receiving stolen property -- Important ingredients to constitute an offence u/s 411 IPC is the 'stolen property' and that any person dishonestly received or retained that stolen property knowingly or have reasons to believe the same to be stolen property.

(Para 21)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 114 -- Dishonestly receiving stolen property – Acquittal -- Onus to prove -- Prosecution has not led any evidence to prove that the alleged motor cycle, which was recovered from one of the appellants, was a 'stolen property' -- Presumption of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can only be invoked once the prosecution discharge their initial burden -- Merely because the accused-appellants could not prove the ownership of the motor cycle, the initial onus still remains upon the prosecution to prove that the recovered bike is a 'stolen property' -- Merely on the basis of presumption, the accused-appellants cannot be held guilty u/s 411 IPC -- Accused-appellants acquitted.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of conviction u/s 308/ 34 IPC -- Complainant is husband of petitioner No.1 and father of petitioner Nos.2 and 3 -- Dispute between family members on account of mis-understanding amicably settled -- Judgment and order vide which petitioners have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment set aside.

(Para 7-9)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 411 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 278(3) -- NDPS case – Acquittal of accused by Trial Court -- Leave to appeal -- Prosecution case that recovery of the contraband from the stolen scooter being driven by the respondent – Scooter was stolen on 26.08.2012 whereas the alleged recovery was made on 30.10.2012 i.e. after a period of 2 months.

-- It is highly improbable that a person would not record DDR or FIR if his vehicle is lost -- Very basis of prosecution case that the scooter from which contraband was recovered not proved with cogent evidence -- This fact is a material fact, however the evidence of the prosecution on this material fact is doubtful and shaky

-- Representative sample drawn by the Judicial Magistrate was not sent for chemical examination -- No explanation given by the IO as to why the representative sample was not sent for chemical examination

-- Form No. 29 stated to be prepared at the spot by ASI bears the signatures of the officiating SHO, when he has not stated that he was present at the spot -- He categorically stated case property as well as the accused were produced before him in the police station.

Held, it is the cardinal principal of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond shadow of doubts – Opinion expressed by the trial court is not only a possible view, but also it is fair and reasonable and cannot be termed as perverse in any manner, thus, it does not warrant interference – There is always presumption of innocence and in case of acquittal, there is double presumption -- Leave to appeal as well as appeal dismissed.

(Para 8-16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 409, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust by government servant – Conspiracy – Quashing of FIR -- Rs.15,000/- received by the co-accused was never ever handed over to the petitioner, recovery was effected from his co-accused – Petitioner was repeatedly asking his co-accused, Kanungo to explain as to why the said amount had not been deposited, letters would conclusively establish that the petitioner had absolutely no role to play in the defalcation of the said amount – It was his co-accused alone who had received the money and not deposited the same – Absolutely no evidence on record to establish conspiracy between the petitioner and his co-accused – FIR qua petitioner quashed.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 409 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 – Criminal breach of trust by government servant – Sanction for prosecution -- For the commission of an offence u/s 409 IPC, sanction for prosecution u/s 197 Cr.P.C. is not required.

(Para 20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338, 427, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Conviction of driver -- Cross-examination of PW-1/ injured (complainant) would clearly establish that he had seen the driver of the offending vehicle when after the accident he came out and ran away leaving the vehicle at the spot -- Merely because the owner of the vehicle was not examined does not in any manner detract from the testimony, who has clearly identified the accused not only at the time of the occurrence but also in the Court -- Thus, by no stretch of imagination can it be held that the identity of the petitioner was not established – PW1 stated that the car was being driven in a rash and negligent manner -- Minor contractions in fact would show that the witnesses in question are not tutored witnesses – Held, the prosecution has established its case against the petitioner beyond any reasonable doubt – Revision dismissed.

(Para 10, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338, 427, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Conviction of driver – Reduction of sentence -- Since the petitioner is a first-time offender and the occurrence is almost 11 years old, the sentence of 01 year imposed by the Lower Appellate Court reduced to a period of 09 months but subject to a payment of Rs.25,000/- as fine to be paid as compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 384, 323, 506, 34, 457, 458 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Lurking house trespass or house breaking – Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties have entered into compromise voluntarily and without any undue influence – FIR and all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom quashed qua petitioners.

(Para 5, 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Cheque by Trust -- Trust not impleaded as party in complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act -- Maintainability of the complaint – Petitioner is admittedly neither the signatory of the cheque nor is there any averment made by the complainant in the complaint that the petitioner was in-charge of and was responsible to the trust for the conduct of its business -- Mandate of Section 141 of NI Act not pleaded and established remotely -- Further proceeding in the complaint is nothing but an abuse of process of Court –Complaint as a whole being unsustainable in the eye of law needs to be quashed and accordingly quashed.

(Para 6-10)

Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Section 5 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) – State appeal against acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Delay of 303 days -- Condonation of delay is no more admissible on the pretext of lethargic working of Government -- Delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot be mechanically condoned, in the absence of 'sufficient cause' for delay -- No explanation put forth for explaining the delay for filing the application -- Reason given is that the file moved at a leisure pace -- Application for condonation of delay dismissed -- Consequently, the application u/s 378 (3) Cr.P.C. is dismissed as time barred.

(Para 5-8)

Public Gambling Act, 1867 (3 of 1867), Section 5, 13-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR / Charge under Gambling Act -- Non-compliance of Section 5 of the Gambling Act and section 155(2) Cr.P.C -- Even no independent witness joined – Proceedings initiated against the petitioner are untenable, especially when the raid leading to lodging of FIR itself was from the threshold marred by procedural irregularity -- Same is a ground sufficient to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings in order to prevent abuse of process of law and secure of ends of justice.

(Para 18-20)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 454 – Theft in dwelling house – Lurking house trespass -- Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- State does not dispute the fact that offence punishable u/s 454 IPC is not stand alone offence and after acquittal of the petitioner of offence punishable under Section 380 IPC, 454 IPC cannot be maintained – Conviction u/s 454 IPC set aside.

(Para 6, 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 380, 411 – Theft in dwelling house – Acquittal u/s 380 IPC -- Recovery from the co-accused -- Petitioner was never charged for offence punishable u/s 411 IPC -- There is no order on record to show that the Trial Court ever exercised power u/s 216 Cr.P.C. to alter the charge -- Thus, the Courts below erred in holding the petitioner guilty of offence punishable under Section 411 IPC in the absence of charge -- Conviction u/s 411 IPC set aside.

(Para 8-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A, 279, 427 – Death  by rash and negligent driving -- Conviction u/s 304-A, 279, 427 IPC – Agony of protracted trial -- Reduction of sentence – Petitioner has undergone the sentence of 6 months and 12 days out of the total sentence of 1 year -- Petitioner facing the agony of protracted trial for the last 09 years approximately, ends of justice would be suitably met, if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to the one already undergone – Sentence reduced already undergone – Apart from fine, petitioner directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased.

(Para 11-13)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 18 – NDPS case -- Recovery of 500 grams opium – Conviction for 6 months and fine of Rs.5,000/- by trial court -- Reduction of sentence -- One appellant has undergone substantive sentence of 4 months, 17 days whereas, other has undergone 4 months, 4 days – Both the appellants are not involved in any other case -- It seems that the appellants have mended their ways of life and joined the mainstream of society -- Considering the age of accused, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, while maintaining balance between deterrence against crime viz-a-viz re-formative approach of punishment, sentence reduced to the period already undergone -- Sentence of fine is ordered to remain intact.

(Para 17, 18)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 – NDPS case -- Protracted trial – Reduction of sentence -- Recovery of 4 kgs 200 grams of poppy straw – Sentenced for a period of 2½ years and fine of Rs.40,000/- by trial court -- Appellant is 70 years old man and facing the agony of protracted trial for about 9 years -- Appellant not involved in any other criminal case -- Appellant has mended his way of life and joined the mainstream of the society -- Sentence of the appellant reduced to the period already undergone i.e. 7 months, 29 days -- Sentence of fine is ordered to remain intact.

(Para 1, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 120-B -- Punjab Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2000 (9 of 2000), Section 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Evasion of VAT – FIR under General Acts – Quashing of FIR -- Provisions of the VAT Act only provide for mandatory penalty -- If a special provision has been made qua a particular subject (Value Added Tax), the said subject is excluded from the general provisions (Indian Penal Code) -- Since the provisions of the VAT Act do not provide for the registration of the FIR and the said Act is a Code in itself, the provisions of the IPC also cannot be invoked -- FIR could not have been registered against a person who was said to have evaded tax -- Petition allowed, FIR, the report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, 506, 447, 386 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Quashing of FIR -- De-facto complainant/second respondent does not disclose any act of the present appellants or their participation in the commission of crime -- They are neither concerned with the sale deed nor in possession of the subject property nor are parties to the civil proceedings and it is not the case of the complainant that either the appellants have played any active/passive role either in scribing the document or are facilitators or witness to the document in reference to which the complaint has been made for cheating and committing forgery or have played any role in delivery of possession of the subject property in question – It appears that the de-facto complainant has implicated the present appellants being members of the family to put pressure for obtaining possession of the subject property and to settle the civil dispute – Held, High Court ought to have exercised its power u/s 482 CrPC for quashing of the criminal complaint and proceedings in consequence thereof qua the present appellants – Appeals allowed, FIR and all the consequential proceedings qua the present appellants stand quashed.

(Para 18-23)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372 – Acquittal of accused – Victim’s right of appeal -- Right to appeal given to a victim under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code is prospective in nature and has been made enforceable w.e.f. 31.12.2009 -- A victim has a right to prefer appeal in respect of three types of the orders referred to in the proviso 2 Section 372 Cr.P.C., if such order has been passed on or after 31.12.2009 and no such right was available to the complainant/victim prior to 31.12.2009.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Constitution of India, Article 19(1), 21 – Life and liberty – Arrest of accused -- Object of arrest is neither punitive nor preventive -- It has become very common to put criminal law in motion even though dispute involved is purely contractual or civil in nature -- Many times arrest entails deprivation of source of income of entire family besides forever stigma in a closely knit society like ours -- There is neither mechanism to compensate a man who is later on found innocent nor acquittal can return valuable time, energy, status, future of family members especially children which is lost on account of incarceration of bread earner of the family -- Detention or arrest not only deprives a person from his fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 but also freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1) of our Constitution --  Life of every human being is most precious gift of God and everyone has very limited span of life which cannot be spoiled on account of incompetence, personal grudge, vengeance of someone; or brutal, illegal, unethical action of the State machinery.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 365, 302, 328, 201, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 446, 482 -- Constitution of India,  Section 21 – Murder trial -- Jump of bail – Quashing of Non-bailable warrants/ Cancellation of bail bond. Held,

i) The object of cancellation of bond or declaration of anyone as proclaimed offender/person is to secure his presence. The petitioner has come forward to face trial and undertakes to appear before trial court on each and every date, thus, his presence would meet ends of justice;

ii) The Petitioner for wasting valuable time and energy of courts as well prosecution is willing to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/-;

iii) The Petitioner is ready to furnish bond/surety to the satisfaction of the trial court;

iv) The petitioner is resident of Jagraon and trial is pending at Ludhiana, thus jurisdictional court and police authorities have direct access over the activities of the petitioner.

v) The petitioner was initially granted regular bail by this Hon'ble High Court;

vi) Trial is pending since 2017 and petitioner is ready to face trial, thus, no prejudice is going to cause to prosecution or complainant;

Petition allowed, petitioner directed to appear before Trial Court on 09.12.2022 and furnish fresh bail bond/surety bond to its satisfaction.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 406, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating with bank -- Sale of mortgaged property -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Matter amicably resolved amongst the parties, as per the compromise policy, the entire amount has been paid by the petitioners to the bank and bank as of now has no claim qua them and has closed the account – Considering the reply by State and the fact that the entire amount has been paid back, it is a fit case for quashing of the FIR on the basis of compromise -- Petitions allowed and FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 304 Part II – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- PW-3-daughter in her cross examination stated that her mother have said something to her father on which the father started beating her mother -- Immediately her father had dressed up and moved her mother to the Hospital where the other family members have gone -- These aspects would indicate that there was no pre-mediation to cause the death and the incident had occurred at the spur of the moment – If these aspects are kept in view as mitigating circumstances, conviction u/s 302 IPC would not be justified -- Hence, appellant held guilty of the offence u/s 304 Part II of IPC -- Appellant has already undergone more 12 years of sentence, period undergone will be sufficient punishment -- Sentence modified, the appellant ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.

(Para 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- Recovery of 10 kg of poppy husk – Conviction for 6 months by Ld. Trial court – Agony of trial for 20 years -- Reduction of sentence -- FIR was registered on 16.04.2002 -- Recovery of the contraband is non-commercial in nature -- Appellant had undergone an actual period of 13 days -- One more case bearing FIR No. 176 dated 17.12.2002 u/s 15 of the NDPS Act was also registered against the appellant, however, the appellant had already undergone the sentence on 27.05.2006 -- In the period of last 20 years, no other case under the NDPS Act has been registered against the appellant -- Ends of justice would be suitably met, if his substantive sentence is reduced to the one already undergone by him -- Conviction maintained, substantive sentence of imprisonment reduced to the one already undergone by him.

(Para 11,12)