A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 365/34, 367/34, 376(2)(g), 302/34, 201/34 IPC – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 137, 165 – Rape with murder – Fair trial – Cross-examination of witness -- Acquittal of accused – Out of the 49 witnesses examined by the prosecution, 10 material witnesses were not cross-examined and many other important witnesses were not adequately cross-examined by the defence counsel – Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act confers unbridled powers upon the trial courts to put any question at any stage to the witnesses to elicit the truth – Judge is not expected to be a passive umpire but is supposed to actively participate in the trial, and to question the witnesses to reach to a correct conclusion – Trial court acted as a passive umpire – Held, appellants-accused were deprived of their rights to have a fair trial, apart from the fact that the truth also could not be elicited by the trial court – Judgments and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and the High Court are set aside – Appellants-accused acquitted by giving them a benefit of doubt.

(Para 34-37)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 357(A) -- Acquittal of accused – Compensation to family – Right of – In view of Section 357(A) Cr.PC, the family members of the deceased-victim would be entitled to the compensation even though the accused have been acquitted.

(Para 35-37)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 29, 45, 47 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Extra-judicial confession – Handwriting expert -- When the extra judicial confession is not duly proved, or does not inspire confidence or is not corroborated by any other reliable evidence, the conviction could not be based solely on such weak piece of evidence -- Prosecution having not examined the handwriting expert for proving the handwritings of the accused no.1 contained in the Inland letter allegedly addressed to the PW-19, nor any expert’s opinion having been obtained, the High Court had rightly discarded the said piece of evidence.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Identification of accused after 6 months –When there was huge time gap of about more than six months between the date of the incident and the date of recording of statements of witnesses by the Investigating Officer, the Test Identification Parade would have assisted the police in identifying the accused seen by the PW-7, however no such TI Parade was held by the Investigating Officer -- Therefore, identification of the accused nos. 2 to 5 at the instance of these witnesses becomes very doubtful.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – It is well settled that if there is considerable time gap between the persons seeing together and the proximate time of the crime, the circumstances of last seen together, even if proved cannot clinchingly fasten the guilt of the accused.

(Para 11)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen together – Failure of the accused, in a case based on circumstantial evidence which included “last seen together theory”, to explain u/s 313 Cr.PC as to under what circumstances the victim suffered death, would also not be a ground to arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the accused were involved in the commission of the alleged crime.

(Para 12)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),Section 45 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Identification of dead body -- Super-imposition report -- Since the super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report, it would be very risky to convict the accused believing the identification of the dead body of the victim through the super-imposition test -- Dead body of the victim was discovered from the place shown by the accused, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to prove that the dead body or the skeleton found at the instance of the accused was that of the victim and of none else.

(Para 13)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Circumstantial evidence -- Motive -- In a case of direct evidence, motive would not be relevant, in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances.

(Para 14)

G. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120(B), 147, 364, 302, 120-B, 149, 201, 396 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 8, 24, 29, 45, 47, 106 – Murder -- Acquittal of accused -- Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession not corroborated by handwriting expert opinion – Last-seen theory after six months of incident without Test Identification parade by I.O. becomes doubtful – Super-imposition report was not supported by any other reliable medical evidence like a DNA report or post-mortem report of dead body – Witness to whom car of deceased sold become hostile – Evidence did not complete the chain to dispel the hypothesis of innocence of the appellants-accused -- Prosecution failed to establish through clinching, clear, cogent and consistent evidence, the chain of events, on the basis of which the guilt of the appellants-accused could be established – Judgements and orders of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court set aside -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 8-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 356, 379, 411, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, voluntary, without any undue influence or pressure – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners only.

(Para 2, 5, 6)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(wa) – Dishonour of cheque -- Complainant – Victim -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is not a victim as defined U/s 2(wa) of Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 372, 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Acquittal – Appeal -- A complainant in a case U/s 138 of NI Act is not entitled to file an appeal against acquittal according to the provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C rather he may prefer an appeal before the Hon’ble High Court invoking the provision of Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 19)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Cause of action – Demand Notice – Presumption of service -- Incorrect address -- Mere issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action, same would arise only when the notice has been communicated to the drawer of the cheque and who fails to liquidate the cheque amount within the stipulated period -- Presumption of receipt of notice by drawer of the cheque can be raised only if the notice has been dispatched through registered post, to his correct address and such inference cannot be drawn if the notice has been sent on the incorrect address of the drawer of the cheque.

(Para 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of – Demand Notice – Service of – Ground of -- Whether the notice of demand has been actually received by the petitioner/accused can be determined only during the trial of the case -- Argument that the impugned complaint deserves to be quashed on the aforesaid ground is, therefore, without any merit.

(Para 11)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Wrong mentioning of particulars of cheques and Memos -- Errors made by the ld. trial Magistrate in recording the particulars of the cheques and the memos cannot be termed as typographical in nature -- These errors are relating to essential aspects of the case and the same clearly reflects that the learned trial Magistrate, while passing the impugned order, has approached the case in a mechanical and negligent manner -- Impugned order passed by the learned trial Magistrate clearly reflects non-application of mind on his part and, as such, is not sustainable in law -- Impugned order, set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court with a direction to pass a fresh order of cognizance on the basis of the material available before him after hearing the complainant/ respondent.

(Para 13-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A (Section 420, 406, 506, 120-B) – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case – Cheating -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Since the matter has been settled between the parties and the petitioners have been acquitted in the proceedings u/s 138 of the N.I. Act and also in FIR u/s 420, 406, 506, 120-B IPC, no fruitful purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings under Section 174-A of IPC -- Petition allowed and the FIR u/s 174-A of IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 10,11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 34, 376, 377, 406, 498-A, 506, 511 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 376 IPC/ Rape – Section 377 IPC/ Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR  -- Court is conscious of the fact that Sections 376/ 377 I.P.C. are heinous offences and non-compoundable -- But in the peculiar facts and circumstances and in the larger interest of both the parties and to secure the ends of justice, Court deemed it appropriate to use its discretion u/s 482 Cr.P.C in favour of the parties – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Proclaimed person –Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A IPC – Offence u/s 406/420 of IPC compounded by ld. JMIC – No fruitful purpose would be served in continuing the proceedings under Section 174-A of IPC -- Petition allowed and FIR under Section 174-A of IPC and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed and also the orders whereby petitioner has been declared as a proclaimed person also set aside.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 323, 379-B, 506, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Snatching case – Compromise quashing of FIR – Compromise found to be genuine, without any pressure or undue influence – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise, ordered to be quashed.

(Para 4, 10)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- NDPS case – Acquittal of accused -- Seal of sample -- Scribe/witness of consent memo -- Independent witness – Sample was drawn in the presence of the learned JMIC on which seal was put, seal was never sent to the forensic laboratory -- Prosecution has, therefore, not been able to prove that there was a recovery of any contraband from the appellant -- No justification as to why two material witnesses ASI/scribe and HC/witness of consent memo were not examined -- Police party did not even care to join the witnesses, who were the shopkeepers of the vicinity and employees of the PRTC workshop which was only 200-300 yards from the place of occurrence, would also cast a shadow upon the prosecution story -- Evidence adduced by the defence through 4 DWs have not been properly appreciated by the learned trial Court and there was no reason to discard the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses especially in view of the fact that the allegations were pertaining to the false implication of the appellant – Appellant, therefore, deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17,18)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3), 197 -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. -- Quashing of -- Cognizance by court – Power of – Nature of -- Even at the stage of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., while directing an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the Magistrate -- Court concerned cannot act in a mechanical and mindless manner -- Application of mind should be reflected in the order -- Mere statement, that he (Presiding Officer) has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant as reflected in the impugned order will not be sufficient and on this sole ground the impugned order being vitiated, deserves to be set aside.

(Para 26)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7, 8, 11, 12, 13(1)d, 13(2), 15, 19 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Corruption case -- Cognizance by Magistrate/ Special court -- Sanction from Government – Requirement of – Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, no Court can take congnizance of offences punishable u/s 7, 11, 13 and 15 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government --  Order directing investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot be passed in the absence of a valid sanction u/s 19 of the Act, 1988 -- No such previous sanction/approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 25, 27)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Money Laundering case -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Held, police cannot investigate offences punishable u/s 3 and 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government in this regard -- Further, the police cannot take cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 3 & 4 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act unless specifically authorized by the Central Government by general or a special order -- Respondent No.2 failed to produce copy of any such general or special order passed by the Central Government -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22)

D. Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 3, 6, 12 – Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (8 of 1975), Section 3, 10,11, 12 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) –Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- Sanction is required to prosecute the public servants under various provisions of Haryana Development and Regulations of Urban Areas Act, 1975 and Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 – No such previous sanction/ approval has been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners -- Consequently, the impugned order being illegal is hereby set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 27, 28)

E. Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981), Section 21,22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43 -- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (29 of 1986), Section 11,15, 16,17, 19, 25 -- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (6 of 1974), Section 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45-A, 46, 47, 48, 49 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by Court – Power of -- Investigation u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. by impugned order – Quashing of -- No Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; the Environment (Protection) Act 1986; the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1974 except on a complaint made by a Board or any officer authorized in this behalf -- No prior notice was issued by respondent No.2 to prosecute the petitioners as required -- Impugned order being illegal set aside qua the petitioners.

(Para 21, 22, 27)

F. Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (16 of 1994), Section 250, 251, 260, 265, 309, 310, 380, 382, 384 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Cognizance by court – Power of -- Court cannot take cognizance of offences under Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 except on the complaint made by the competent authority.

(Para 21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque by husband – Quashing of complaint -- Maintainability of complaint u/s 138 of NI Act against wife/ petitioner – Cheque not from joint account -- The three accused do not constitute a Company or a firm or Association of individuals as contemplated u/s 141 of N.I. Act -- Hence, petitioner cannot be made accused for dishonor of the cheque issued by her husband and he alone can be prosecuted for the same – Proceedings qua petitioner/ wife quashed.

(Para 5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act – Reduction in sentence – Cheque amount was Rs.70,000/- -- Sentence was to pay twice the amount of cheque and to suffer imprisonment for one month -- Amount of fine of Rs.1,40,000/- paid, sentence modified to Rs.1,40,000/- apart from the litigation expenses of Rs.50,000/- by setting aside the order of imprisonment for one month.

(Para 1-3

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of -- Goods purchased by petitioner and cheque was also issued by him – Change in management by agreement and previous liability taken over by someone – Petitioner seeking quashing on the ground of change in management – Held, shifting of liability after issuance of the cheque has no significance, since penal provisions would attack against the person who issued the cheque -- Petition dismissed.

(Para 3-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide -- In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

(Para 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Mens rea -- To convict a person u/s 306 IPC, there has to be clear mens rea to commit offence -- It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide finding no other option and the act must be such reflecting intention of the accused to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide -- Prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and accused abetted the commission of suicide of the deceased -- Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

(Para 36-38)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 498-A -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused -- No evidence that the deceased was meted out with harassment by the appellants just before her death -- Throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard -- Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint -- It is really hard to believe that a well-educated and self-reliant lady would take such things lying down for a substantially long period of 9 years – Several emails exchanged between Appellant No. 1 and sisters of the deceased whereby the Appellant No. 1 was showered with praises for taking care of the deceased in the best possible manner and credit was also given to his parents for supporting the deceased in her career -- Deceased was suffering from bipolar order and also had suicidal ideas from few days before suicide -- Further, the deceased was also undergoing treatment for depression -- Conviction of the appellants is solely based on the oral evidence of mother and sister of the deceased, who are interested witnesses -- Post mortem report does not give the cause of the death – Held, Trial Court wrongly convicted the Appellants and the High Court was also not justified in upholding the conviction of the Appellants u/s 306 and 498A IPC -- Appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them.

(Para 34-46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 324, 323, 148, 149, Cross case under Sections 452, 324, 323, 379-B, 148, 149 – House trespass, unlawful assembly and snatching -- Version Cross-version case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- In the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence under Section 294(b).

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294(b) – Obscene acts and songs -- Mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294(b) IPC.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – Must be to the annoyance of others -- To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294 – Obscene acts and songs – No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the appellants accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence under Section 294 (b) of IPC is made out.

(Para 9)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190(1), 204 – Cognizance  by Court -- Issuance of process – Requirement of law – Taking cognizance of an offence u/s 190(1) of the Cr.P.C. and issue of process under Section 204 are judicial functions and require a judicious approach -- A person against whom no offence is disclosed cannot be put to any harassment by the issue of process -- When the allegations made in the complaint are found to be too vague and general without giving any material particulars of the offence alleged against the accused then the order of the Magistrate issuing process on the basis of the complaint would not be justified as there must be material prima facie, for issuance of process.

(Para 13, 14)

F. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful restraint -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In order to attract application of Section 341 which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that there was obstruction by the accused; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily -- The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction to the complainant -- Averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to even constitute the offence of wrongful restraint -- No case made out against the appellants -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 11-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Legal presumption u/s 118 and 139 of NI Act – Time barred debt – Quashing of summoning order -- Once a cheque is issued and upon getting dishonoured a statutory notice is issued, it is for the accused to dislodge the legal presumption available u/s 118 and 139 reply of the N.I. Act -- Whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time barred debt or not, itself prima facie, is a matter of evidence and could not have been adjudicated in an application filed by the accused u/s Section 482 of the CrPC.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 363, 366-A, 376 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO matter -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Subsequent to the registration of the FIR and after attaining the age of majority, the petitioner has solemnized marriage with the victim/respondent no.3 -- FIR and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, however, qua the petitioner.

(Para 1-3, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 326, 394, 341, 427, 506, 324, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Voluntary causing hurt in committing robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR – Fact that the compromise will bring peace and harmony between the parties, FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate -- Effect of -- Delay in forwarding the FIR may certainly indicate the failure of one of the external checks to determine whether the FIR was manipulated later or whether it was registered either to fix someone other than the real culprit or to allow the real culprit to escape -- While every delay in forwarding the FIR may not necessarily be fatal to the case of the prosecution, Courts may be duty bound to see the effect of such delay on the investigation and even the creditworthiness of the investigation.

(Para 61)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Section 157(1) of the Code requires the officer-in-charge of the police station to send the FIR, “forthwith” -- Delay in transmission of the FIR to the court, may not, per se, be fatal, without anything more -- But in the case on hand, the delay was not small -- FIR said to have been registered on 08.03.2012 was received by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.03.2012 -- It is true that no question was put in cross-examination to the Investigation Officer about this delay -- But the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 is untrustworthy, particularly on the question of the origin and genesis of the first information report -- Therefore the inordinate delay in the FIR reaching the jurisdictional court assumes significance -- Word "forthwith' in Section 157(1) of the Code is to be understood in the context of the given facts and circumstances of each case and a straight-jacket formula cannot be applied in all cases -- But where ocular evidence is found to be unreliable and thus unacceptable, a long delay has to be taken note of by the Court.

(Para 61-66)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 157(1) -- Delay in forwarding FIR to Magistrate – Effect of -- Mandate of Section 157(1) of the Code being clear, the prosecution is expected to place on record the basic foundational facts, such as, the Officer who took the first information report to the jurisdictional court, the authority which directed such a course of action and the mode by which it was complied -- Explaining the delay is a different aspect than placing the material in compliance of the Code.

(Para 68)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Medical examination of accused – Requirement of -- In cases where the victim of rape is alive and is in a position to testify in court, it may be possible for the prosecution to take a chance by not medically examining the accused -- But in cases where the victim is dead and the offence is sought to be established only by circumstantial evidence, medical evidence assumes great importance -- Failure of the prosecution to produce such evidence, despite there being no obstacle from the accused or anyone, will certainly create a gaping hole in the case of the prosecution and give rise to a serious doubt on the case of the prosecution -- Section 53A enables the prosecution to obtain a significant piece of evidence to prove the charge -- Failure of the prosecution in this case to subject the appellant to medical examination is certainly fatal to the prosecution case especially when the ocular evidence is found to be not trustworthy -- Failure to obtain the report of the Forensic Sciences Laboratory on the blood/semen stain on the salwar worn by the victim, compounds the failure of the prosecution.

(Para 80)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 376 -- Rape with Murder – Scrutiny of evidence – Acquittal of accused -- When the offence is heinous, the Court is required to put the material evidence under a higher scrutiny -- Sufficient care has not been taken in the assessment of the statements made by P.Ws. 1 to 3 by Trail Court and High Court -- No one spoke as to who sent the FIR to the court and when it was sent -- Strangely even the copy of the post-mortem report was admittedly received by SHO on the 13.03.2012 though the post mortem was conducted on the 09.03.2012 -- It was the same date on which the FIR reached the Court -- These factors certainly create a strong suspicion on the story as projected by the prosecution – By fixing culpability upon the appellant without any shred of evidence which will stand the scrutiny, the prosecution has done injustice to the appellant -- Court cannot make someone, a victim of injustice, to compensate for the injustice to the victim of a crime -- Appellant is so poor that he could not afford to engage a lawyer even in the Sessions Court, service of an advocate was provided as amicus -- In cases of such nature, the responsibility of the Court becomes more onerous – Court not convinced that the guilt of the appellant stood established beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeals allowed and the conviction and penalty are set aside -- Appellant shall be released forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case.

(Para 83-85)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- Rape -- Onus of proof -- In a case of grave charge of rape, the onus always lies on the prosecution to prove each of the ingredients of the offence, it seeks to establish and the onus never shifts.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(3) -- Rape – Acquittal – Leave to appeal -- Victim alleged that the accused-respondent had gagged her mouth and had torn her clothes before committing the rape upon her -- Victim was a rustic and stoutly built lady and was well nourished -- It was at around 04.30 AM and normally in villages, it is the time for the villagers to wake up -- It is equally unbelievable that the accused-respondent would have sneaked in the house of the victim at such an hour without the consent of the victim -- Moreover, the victim was a grown up married lady and could not only have resisted his move, but could have also raised an alarm -- Victim did not suffer any injury -- Evidence led by the defence makes out that the victim was not having good relations with her husband but had shared a very close and intimate relationship with the respondent -- Father and husband of the victim were sleeping just adjoining the court-yard -- Even where the rape was allegedly committed, her children were sleeping and the story put forth by the prosecution appears to be doubtful – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 6-11)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 467, 468, 471, 420, 120-B – Quashing of FIR -- Dispute settled on civil side – Once the dispute has been settled on the civil side and upheld by High Court in RSA and the said judgment having attained finality, the criminal proceedings cannot be allowed to continue on the same issue as the findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court -- Complaint and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua petitioners.

(Para 13,14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 336, 323, 506, 148, 149, 307, 395 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 – Section 307 (Attempt to murder) – Section 395 (Dacoity) – Compromise quashing of FIR – Since the parties have arrived at a compromise and have decided to live in peace, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 8,9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 109, 115, 116, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal conspiracy -- Partial quashing of FIR on compromise – Submission that petitioner and respondent No.2 are husband and wife and that respondents No.3 to 5 have not approached the complainant to compromise the matter and prays for quashing of the FIR qua the petitioner only – Ld. SDJM submitted a report indicating that the parties had appeared before her and got recorded their respective statements with regard to the validity of the compromise – Compromise is genuine and without any pressure or coercion from any corner – No useful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceedings to continue – FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioner on the basis of compromise.

(Para 2-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 148, 149, 323, 392 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Rioting – Unlawful assembly – No concrete evidence that the appellants attacked and/or caused any injury to the deceased – No evidence what was uttered by the appellants – No evidence that the appellants instigated the other co-accused -- Appellants cannot be convicted for the offence u/s 302 IPC with the aid of Section 149 IPC.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 377, 354, 406, 498A, 34 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Unnatural offence – Matrimonial dispute – Compromise quashing of FIR – Where settlement has taken place, even the offence u/s 377 IPC can be compromised and FIR can be quashed as parties have to move ahead in life -- Offence u/s 354 IPC also allowed to be quashed to put an end to all bickering between the parties and allow them to begin a new chapter of their lives -- FIR for offences under Sections 406/498A/354/377/34 IPC and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness – Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence – Propositions of law on which there can be no controversy – They are,

(i) that as per the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh, (2020) 10 SCC 120 = (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301, the fact that the informant also happened to be the investigator, may not by itself vitiate the investigation as unfair or biased;

(ii) that it is not always necessary that the evidence of the police witnesses have to be corroborated by independent witnesses, as held in Dharampal Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 608 and Mukesh Singh (2020) 10 SCC 120 (2020) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15301;

(iii) that the independent witnesses turning hostile need not necessarily result in the acquittal of the accused, when the mandatory procedure is followed and the other police witnesses speak in one voice as held in Rizwan Khan, (2020) 9 SCC 627; and

(iv) that once it is established that the contraband was recovered from the accused’s possession, a presumption arises under Section 54.

(Para 17)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- Informant as Investigator – Official witness -- Independent witness turn hostile – Corroborative evidence -- To completely disregard the lack of corroboration of the testimony of police witnesses by independent witnesses; and to turn a Nelson’s eye to the independent witnesses turning hostile, then the story of the prosecution should be very convincing and the testimony of the official witnesses notably trustworthy -- If independent witnesses come up with a story which creates a gaping hole in the prosecution theory, about the very search and seizure, then the case of the prosecution should collapse like a pack of cards -- It is no doubt true that corroboration by independent witnesses is not always necessary -- But once the prosecution comes up with a story that the search and seizure was conducted in the presence of independent witnesses and they also choose to examine them before Court, then the Court has to see whether the version of the independent witnesses who turned hostile is unbelievable and whether there is a possibility that they have become turncoats.

(Para 18)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence -- I.O. examined as PW-7 claims to have done everything only in the presence of independent witnesses -- But those independent witnesses not merely denied their presence and participation but also came up with an explanation as to how their signatures found a place in those documents -- In such circumstances, a serious doubt is cast on the very search and seizure allegedly made by PW-7.

(Para 32)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 54 – NDPS case – Recovery of contraband – Presumption of commission of offence – Doubt on search and seizure – Acquittal of accused -- Section 54 of the Act raises a presumption and the burden shifts on the accused to explain as to how he came into possession of the contraband -- But to raise the presumption, it must first be established that a recovery was made from the accused -- The moment a doubt is cast upon the most fundamental aspect, namely the search and seizure, appellant/ accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction of the appellant set aside.

(Para 33A, 34)

A. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Scope of -- Both the Trial Court and the High Court have agreed in their appreciation of evidence and have arrived at concurrent findings of fact -- Ordinarily, in an appeal by special leave against concurrent findings of fact, Supreme Court would not enter into reappreciation of evidence -- However, if the assessment of the Trial Court and the High Court is vitiated by any error of law or procedure or misreading of evidence or any disregard to the norms of judicial process leading to serious prejudice or injustice, this Court may consider interference in an appropriate case so as to prevent miscarriage of justice.

(Para 13)

B. Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder -- Concurrent finding of conviction – Interference by Supreme Court – Re-appreciation of evidence -- Unreasonable behaviour of eye witnesses – Acquittal of accused -- As per the assertion of PW-2 (father) and PW-3 (mother), they had seen their son being assaulted by two persons with weapon -- PW-2 had allegedly fallen unconscious after seeing the blood oozing from the body of his son -- In that situation and scenario, it is difficult to appreciate that these witnesses would go home, take meal and go to bed without bothering about the welfare of their injured son -- This aspect is coupled with the fact that they had allegedly narrated the incident to PW-1 (other son) only when he reached home after having seen the dead body of his brother -- FIR was lodged next day morning at 10 a.m. – Taking all the circumstances into account, testimony of PW-2 and PW-3 could not have been accepted as that of eye-witnesses to the incident from any standpoint – Moreover, PW-4, PW-5, PW-8 and PW-9, who were projected by the prosecution as independent witnesses, did not support the prosecution case at all – Deceased had been brutally assaulted and had received multiple injuries on vital parts but, on the evidence as adduced by the prosecution, it is difficult to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants alone were the authors of such injuries -- Fit case for interference in the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court – Appeal allowed -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 16-22)

C. Criminal trial – Benefit of doubt -- A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt but a fair doubt based upon reasons and common sense -- When a reasonable doubt arises in a matter, benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.

(Para 19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 393, 427 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Section 393 IPC/  Attempt to commit robbery -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the respectables and family members and the parties have decided to keep harmony between them and to live peacefully in future -- Hence, it would be in the interest of justice that parties are allowed to compromise the matter – FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 (2)(a) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act against Proprietor -- Proprietorship Firm not made party – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order – Statutory signification assigned to a 'Company', does visibly cover not only any corporate body, but also covers a firm, or other association of individuals -- Held, Sole proprietary entity though is obviously solitarily owned, yet, the said juristic person, or, legal entity rather becomes 'a person' committing an offence u/s 138, and, besides the said juristic person, is also a 'Company' – Therefore, not only the juristic entity concerned, was amenable for being arrayed as an accused in the petition complaint, but also all those persons responsible to the sole proprietary concern , for the conduct of its business -- Complaint reveals that the sole proprietary concern has not been arrayed as an accused, but only its sole proprietor has been arrayed as an accused – Petition allowed complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act as well as, the summoning order both are quashed and set aside.

(Para 12-17)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Incorrect address -- Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174-A IPC -- Despite of providing repeated opportunities to complainant to file the correct address, needful was not done -- An application was filed that there is no other address except the one mentioned in the complaint -- Without therebeing any basis, to conclude that petitioner was avoiding service the court proceeded to issue warrant of arrest and thereafter passed the impugned order for registration of FIR – Petition allowed, impugned order set aside.

(Para 6, 7)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Corroboration of -- Dying declaration can be the sole basis for recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy, no corroboration is required.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) -- Dying declaration – Court is required to examine as to whether the dying declaration is true and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Multiple dying declarations – Reliance upon -- In case there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon -- However, this is with the condition that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness -- In case there are circumstances wherein the declaration has not been found to be made voluntarily and is not supported by any other evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts of an individual case very carefully and take a decision as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.

(Para 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dowry death – Two Dying declarations – Reliance upon – Acquittal of accused -- Both Dying declarations were recorded by Judicial Magistrates – In first dying declaration deceased has exonerated the appellant and his family members -- In the second dying declaration, she has implicated the appellant as well as his parents -- Prior to recording of First dying declaration, Doctor (PW-1) examined as to whether deceased was in a fit state of mind and conscious to make the statement -- After certification, got Judicial Magistrate (DW-1) herself satisfied as to whether deceased was voluntarily making the statement or not and thereafter, recorded her statement -- Said dying declaration also endorsed by Doctor (PW-1) with the remarks that deceased was conscious throughout while making statement – Second dying declaration was recorded by another Judicial Magistrate after 3 days, without there being examination by a doctor with regard to the fitness of the deceased to make the statement -- Father and sister of deceased were present in the hospital -- Possibility of the second dying declaration being given after tutoring by her relatives cannot therefore be ruled out -- First dying declaration will have to be considered to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the second one -- Trial court, by giving benefit of doubt, acquitted the father and mother of the appellant – Benefit of doubt ought to have been equally given to the appellant when the evidence was totally identical against all the three accused -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 15-22)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cause of action – Pre-mature complaint – Second complaint -- Demand notice period of 15 days not expired -- Complaint filed before fifteen days -- In view of the legal bar created by Section 142 of the NI Act, taking of cognizance by the Court was contrary to the law and the complaint was not maintainable -- Respondent would be at liberty to institute a fresh complaint and to seek the benefit of the proviso by satisfying the trial court of sufficient cause for the delay in instituting the complaint.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 143, 144, 148, 147, 448 and 302, 149, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Murder case -- Acquittal of accused -- Primary charge of the prosecution was that all the 22 accused, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of the deceased and that all of them being members of the unlawful assembly were armed with deadly weapons like clubs, bettu kudli, kodli etc. and that they committed the offence of rioting, trespass and murder -- All these charges have now been held not proved against all the accused including A1 and A2 and the only offence held proved against A1 and A2 is the one u/s 302 IPC – Conviction of only 2 out of the 22 accused cannot be sustained and that too only for the offence u/s 302 when the allegation of unlawful assembly, common object, trespass, rioting etc. are held not proved against all of them -- To overturn verdict of acquittal, handed over by the Sessions Court after disbelieving witnesses, the High Court should have come up with more stronger and cogent reasons – Conviction of the appellants by the High Court cannot be sustained -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 15-27)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Conviction u/s 138 of NI Act --  Upheld by Supreme Court – Compromise/ Settlement between parties – Recalling of order -- In view of the statement made and as full payment has been made along with compensation, order recalled and the special leave petition restored to its original number – Leave granted, impugned order upholding the conviction of the appellant would be treated as settled and compounded -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 2-7)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995, Rule 7 – Case under SC-ST Act -- Investigation by Sub Inspector instead of DSP -- Benefit of doubt – Conviction by Trial Court -- Acquittal in appeal -- Several infirmities and lacunae in the prosecution story :

-- Complainant, who got her statement recorded as PW2 and PW7 another eye-witness did not support the prosecution story at all and declared hostile.

-- Prosecution unable to establish on record that on which date, the incident had taken place – When prosecution is not sure of the date of incident, then the very happening of the incident becomes doubtful.

-- Investigating Officer is not to be below the rank of DSP -- Thus rule having been violated clearly caused prejudice to the accused making the credibility of the prosecution story doubtful.

-- Plausible motive for lodging of the FIR in view of the civil litigation pending between the accused and village Gram Panchayat and lodging of FIR could be a device to put pressure upon the accused in civil litigation and make them leave the village since as per case of the accused, theirs is the only Saini family in the village, which is otherwise inhabited by members of the HARIJAN community.

A reasonable doubt arises about truthfulness of the prosecution story and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused conclusively and affirmatively – Benefit of doubt should have been given to the accused, which was wrongly denied to them by the trial Court – Impugned judgment and order of sentence cannot stand judicial scrutiny and are not sustainable, same are set aside.

(Para 1, 13-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 406 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal breach of trust -- Goods were entrusted with the company, the Managing Director of the said company cannot be prosecuted without the company as an accused -- In the absence of any specific overt act on the part of the petitioner, no offence u/s 406 of IPC can be made out against the petitioner/ Managing Director – Proceedings quashed.

(Para 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- An indirect act of incitement to the commission of suicide would constitute the offence of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of the IPC.

(Para 16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Abetment of suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR – Financial settlement -- FIR u/s 306 of the IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else -- High Court quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant had been compromised -- Impugned orders of the High Court set aside.

(Para 50)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In exercise of power u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.

(Para 49)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Murder – Acquittal – Extra-judicial confession – Recovery from accused -- PW-7 turned hostile, trial court disbelief the alleged recovery of the incriminating material allegedly recovered at the instance of the respondent-accused – Court only leaves with the alleged extra-judicial confession – High Court held that extrajudicial confession was a weak piece of evidence and unless there was some corroboration, the conviction solely on the basis of extra-judicial confession could not be sustained – Held, view taken by the High Court cannot be said to be either impossible or perverse meriting interference -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Consensual relationship – Quashing of FIR -- Parties chose to have physical relationship without marriage for a considerable period of time -- For some reason, the parties fell apart -- It can happen both before or after marriage -- Thereafter also three years passed when respondent No.2 decided to register a FIR -- Facts are so glaring as set out aforesaid that the court have no hesitation in quashing the FIR and bringing the proceedings to a close.

(Para 4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 136 – Cheque bounce case – Security deposit cheque – Quashing of Complaint u/s 138 of NI Act – High Court quashed the complaint -- Dispute between the parties regarding the quality of the material supplied – Respondent/ accused made a complaint in writing of the defective material and then stopped the payment – Respondent has already filed a Civil Suit for damages – Held, the issues between the parties can be effectively resolved through Civil Suit only – Petitioner shall be at liberty either to file counter claim or a separate suit in accordance with law – Observations made by the High Court in its impugned order shall have no bearing on the outcome of the Civil Suit.

(Para 1-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Robbery -- Murder -- Loot of Rs.5 lacs – Conviction based upon recovery – Legality of --  Prosecution is required to establish and prove that the amount which is recovered from the accused is the very amount which the complainant/the person from whom the amount is looted -- When the prosecution has failed to prove that the complainant and the deceased were carrying Rs.5 lakhs cash in the dicky of the scooter and it was the very looted amount which was recovered from the accused, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of recovery of some cash.

(Para 2, 6.1)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 302, 34, 392 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Robbery -- Murder -- Test Identification parade in Court room -- Prior thereto no TIP conducted by the Investigating Agency – When no TIP was conducted the first version of the complainant reflected in the FIR would play an important role -- Nothing has been mentioned in his first statement that he had seen the accused earlier and that he will be able to identify the accused -- In the deposition before the Court, complainant tried to improve the case by deposing that he had seen the accused in the city on one or two occasions -- The aforesaid was not disclosed in the FIR -- Even in the cross-examination as admitted by PW1 he did not disclose any description of the accused -- PW1 has specifically and categorically admitted in the cross-examination that it is incorrect that the accused were known earlier -- It would not be safe and/or prudent to convict the accused solely on the basis of their identification for the first time in the Court -- Conviction u/s 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 IPC quashed and set aside -- Accused acquitted from the charges.

(Para 6, 6.2-6.7, 8)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise post-conviction -- Nature of dispute is predominantly private -- Statement made in the joint petition preferred by the informant and the accused as well as the affidavit filed discloses that the compromised has been entered into voluntarily -- Nature of the offences is also not heinous – Conviction and sentence set aside and quashed.

(Para 7-9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Cheque bounce case – Compromise after conviction -- Compounding of offence -- In conformity with the settlement requisite payment accepted -- It does appear appropriate to accept the terms of settlement between the parties and allow the compounding of offence – Orders passed by the Appellate Court and the Trial Court are set aside.

(Para 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Sections 25, 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR – Alleged commission of an offence constituted u/s 307 of the IPC, does not prima facie appear to be so grave, and, nor is so heinous – When the settlement has occurred, at the pre-charge stage, thereupon, for preserving amity, and, harmony amongst the concerned, besides when given the occurrence of a compromise at the pre-trial stage, rather the victim-complainant, or/and, the ocular witnesses to the occurrence are not likely to support the charge – Settlement/compromise, as validly entered into, enjoins its being revered – Chances of the petitioner being convicted are remote as well as bleak – In sequel, the ordering for the trial of the accused, would result in harassment and humiliation, being caused to the accused, besides would defeat the ends of justice – Petition allowed, FIR and, also all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 13-19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Quashing of proceedings -- Partial payment of cheque amount – Effect of -- Cheque when presented for realization was returned for technical reason -- On the very same date, the accused transferred a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- to the account of the complainant through RTGS – No material placed that the cheque was re-presented towards recovery of balance amount – Ld. Magistrate has committed an error in taking cognizance of the offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – Petition allowed, impugned proceedings quashed.

(Para 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 (2) (n) -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Sections 4, 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO matter – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Dispute amicably settled between the parties – In the event, the Court is satisfied that in order to secure the ends of justice, it should interfere under its inherent powers, it ought to do so -- Respondent no.2/ girl already attained the age of majority, has solemnized marriage with the petitioner and the couple is stated to be residing happily with each other and a male child has also been born from the wedlock -- Possibility of conviction also become remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case will cause injustice not only to the petitioner but also to respondent No.2, who is now legally wedded wife of the petitioner -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – More than one dying declaration – Reliance upon -- Each one of them must be examined with care and caution and only after satisfying itself as to which of the dying declarations appears to be free from suspicious circumstances and has been made voluntarily, should it be accepted -- It is not necessary that in every case, a dying declaration ought to be corroborated with material evidence, ocular or otherwise -- It is more a rule of prudence that courts seek validation of the dying declaration from attending facts and circumstances and other evidence brought on record -- For the very same reason, a certificate by the doctor that the declarant was fit to make a statement, is treated as a rule of caution to establish the truthfulness of the statement made by the deceased.

(Para 19)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Dying declaration – Infirmity in -- Reliance upon -- If a dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused -- In those circumstances, the court must step back and consider whether the cumulative factors in a case make it difficult to rely upon the said dying declaration.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 32(1) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal in murder case -- Oral dying declaration – Reliance upon -- PW-2 and PW-12 have deposed that in her oral dying declaration, the deceased had referred to the dowry demands made on her by the appellant and the fact that he had suspected her character, which led to the alleged incident -- Nowhere in their testimonies is there any reference made to the prosecution version that the appellant was having an illicit relation with a widow residing in the neighbourhood, which was the main cause of acrimony between the couple and had resulted in the incident -- Diametrically different version of the reasons that led to the alleged incident casts a shadow on the entire testimony of PW-2 and PW-12, making it unsafe to rely on them and indict the appellant for the charge framed against him – Held, prosecution has failed to discharge the obligation cast on it of leading trustworthy corroborative evidence to back-up the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-12 – Their evidence cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife -- Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 37-39)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I. Act withdrawn by complainant as compromised – Case of the petitioner that he was not aware of the proceedings u/s 138 of the Act of 1881 and was subsequently arrested and released on bail -- Order declaring the petitioner as proclaimed person would prove to be insignificant inasmuch as the main complaint u/s 138 of the Act itself has been withdrawn -- Petition allowed -- FIR u/s 174-A of the IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed/set aside.

(Para 9-13)