A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder – Acquittal -- Ante-timed FIR -- Original FIR clearly shows that there is some interpolation in the time of its lodging mentioned therein -- It is evident from naked eye that ‘1’ has been converted into ‘9’ and ‘5’ has been rounded off to make ‘0’ whereas ‘PM’ has been converted into ‘AM’ -- In other words, 1:50 PM has been changed to 9:00 AM -- Trial Court completely lost sight of the fact that not only the time has been changed but the word ‘PM’ has also been interpolated and converted into ‘AM’ – Thus FIR has been ante-timed from 1:50 PM to 9:00 AM -- This entitles the accused to be given the benefit of doubt.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder -- Delay in sending FIR report to court – FIR report was sent to the Court with the delay of about 4 days -- FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and a valuable piece of evidence especially for the purpose of appreciating the evidence adduced at the trial -- FIR casts a doubt on its authenticity.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder – Acquittal -- Appellant no. 2 died -- Unnatural behaviour and conduct of the eyewitnesses/ son and nephew of the deceased, ante-timing of the FIR and that the ‘loi’ (blanket) and the cycle alleged to be that of the accused/appellants left behind at the site of the incident were not produced before the Court, compels the Court to doubt the presence of the son and nephew of the deceased at the site -- Delay in conducting the post-mortem – There is difference in the name of the weapons of crime – Accused/ appellant No.1 acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt.

(Para 10, 23-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(N), 506, 294, 323 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 – Rape – Quashing of FIR – Delay in lodging of FIR – Long standing relationship between prosecutrix and petitioner – There is no allegation that there was false promise to marry – There is also FIR against other men by prosecutrix which shows that FIR has been lodged malafidely due to break in their relationship or for some other ulterior motives – FIR quashed, writ petition allowed.

(Para 7-9)

Constitution of India, Article 22(5), 226 – Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3, 4 -- Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (VI of 1978), Section 13 -- Quashing of detention order -- Non supply of the dossier to the detenu – Legality of -- Detenu cannot be expected to make a meaningful exercise of his Constitutional and Statutory rights guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, unless and until the material on which detention order is based, is supplied to him – Failure on part of detaining authority to supply material, relied at the time of making detention order to detenu, renders detention order illegal and unsustainable – Petition allowed, Jail Superintendent directed to release the detenu forthwith.

(Para 4-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 285, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Petitioners/ accused had put the scrap articles on fire, which had caused damage to the property of complainant -- Nature of dispute between the parties is by and large private in nature -- Final outcome of prosecution against the petitioners either way is not going to harm the interest of society at large -- Both sides belong to the same area and have their business premises nearby – Petition allowed, FIR u/s 285 and 34 of IPC alongwith consequent criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 6-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 489C – Fake currency -- Recovery of two fake currency notes of Rs.100 each – Acquittal by Trial Court -- Judgment of acquittal strengthen the presumption of the innocence of the accused -- Articles recovered in Dharamshala were not sealed on the spot – No independent witness examined -- Prosecution has neither disclosed the name of the manager and the staff of the said Dharamshala, in whose presence the alleged recovery is said to have taken place, nor the signature of any of them is on the recovery memo, nor the register of Dharamshala has been produced by the prosecution – Acquittal order by the Trial Court, upheld -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 13-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 26 -- Section 25 of the Act, 1872 is broadly worded and it excludes from evidence a confession made by the accused to a police officer under any circumstances and a confession made by a person while he was in the custody of the police is also inadmissible u/s 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.

(Para 15)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135 – Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters) Regulations, 2007, Regulation 21.2(c), 37.2 (a)(ii) – Theft of electricity -- Complaint of meter burnt was given by the appellant to the respondent department -- Entire material washed out and is not available -- Case of the respondent department becomes doubtful that whether wire was connected by the appellant or by the respondent Department and therefore, appellant is liable to get the benefit of the extended scope of Regulation 21.2(c) of the Supply Code 2007 – Procedure regarding seizure of equipments used for the purpose of theft or tampering was not followed by the raiding team -- Meter in question was not taken into the possession, no photography or videography of the incident was conducted – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 8-12)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Mens rea -- Delay of two days in FIR -- Except abusing the complainant with her caste name, there is no allegation that the appellant with a view to intentionally insult or intimidate or humiliate the complainant, abused her and that too in a place within the public view -- To attract the offence punishable u/s 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST Act, the mens rea is the essential ingredient -- If in the course of a quarrel or due to some other grouse, the accused abused the complainant by using the caste name, the said act by itself does not automatically attract the offence Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST Act -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 10-14)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Public view -- The expression “public view” as enshrined in Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST, has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties.

(Para 10)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Incident of 08.00 PM on 22.05.2005 -- Complainant had ample opportunity to report the matter to the police, still the report was lodged at about 7:30 PM on 24.05.2005, after a delay of about two days and there is no explanation for the said delay -- Prosecution did not lead any evidence to indicate the sufficient reasons for reporting the matter so late -- Lodging of the complaint after an unexplained and inordinate delay is also a strong circumstance to doubt the commission of offence.

(Para 11)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 243 -- Defence witness – Evidential value -- Deposition of a defence witness cannot be discarded or disbelieved only on the ground that he was supporting the case of the accused -- Every defence witness has to be treated at par with a prosecution witness and if the deposition of a defence witness is found to be creditworthy, the same can always be believed and relied upon by the courts.

(Para 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Dishonour of cheque -- Maintainability of the complaint – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Complaint against Director in absence of the company – Held, for maintaining prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, the company must be joined as an accused -- The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself --  Trial court acquitted the accused -- Application for leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 2, 8, 9, 14)

A. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 18(A)(1), Section 28 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468, 469 – Limitation – Bar to take cognizance – Quashing of criminal complaint/ proceedings -- Maximum punishment of one year for alleged offence -- Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. bars the concerned Court from taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation – Report of the Laboratory was received on 05.03.2009 & thus, the limitation to file complaint would expire on 04.03.2010 while the same has been filed by the Drug Inspector on 07.06.2012 i.e. approximately after 3 years and 3 months when period of limitation was long over – Despite of there being no application for condonation of delay, summoning order dated 08.06.2012 was passed by the Court clearly beyond jurisdiction -- Entire proceedings right from registration of the complaint are rendered unsustainable.

(Para 8-10)

B. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 18(A)(1), Section 28 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Firm as accused without any representative -- Quashing of criminal complaint/ Summoning order -- In the complaint, only the firm has been arrayed as accused without impleading it through any of its authorised representative -- Criminal proceedings against the company only, when sentence of imprisonment cannot be imposed on the juristic person are an exercise in futile -- Petition allowed, Criminal Complaint, summoning order and all other consequential proceedings quashed .

(Para 11, 12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 353, 332, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR  -- Acquittal -- Offences alleged are petty in nature – No impediment in accepting the prayer made by petitioners for quashing of FIR – FIR alongwith consequential proceedings i.e. Police Challan quashed and set aside and petitioner acquitted of the charges framed against him.

(Para 10, 11)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22(c) -- NDPS Case – Acquittal – FSL Report – Case property travelled in an untampered condition to the FSL -- However, the chemical examiner at the FSL after making examinations of the stuff inside the sealed cloth parcels, omits to mention in the report Ex.PW-1/J, about his re-enclosing the examined stuff inside the cloth parcels and affix the seals of the FSL – It was required to be mandatorily done -- Primary evidence for proving the charge drawn against the accused come under a cloud of deep suspicion -- Charge drawn against the accused did not come to be cogently established – Appeal allowed, judgment of conviction and sentence set aside, appellant acquitted of the charge.

(Para 13-19)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 325 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Miscarriage – No medical evidence -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though wife of the complainant, was pregnant, there is absolutely no evidence on record of a miscarriage having taken place on account of beatings being meted out by the petitioners and their co-accused -- Similarly, there is absolutely no evidence of the injured suffering an injury attracting Section 325 IPC -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8, 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 342, 452 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Wrongful confinement -- House trespass – Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Complainant party and the accused reside on different floors of the same house -- Therefore, while on the one hand, it is doubtful if either of the offence was made out, on the other hand, it would be a travesty of justice to allow the instant proceedings to continue against the petitioners given the fact that there are multiple litigations pending between the parties, and therefore, their false implication cannot be ruled out – Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Hurt – Long delay -- Quashing of complaint/ summoning order -- Though prima facie, the medical evidence would suggest that an offence is made out, however, the occurrence pertains to September 2006, the present complaint came to be instituted in June 2012, the summoning order came to be passed in August 2016 and the matter has come up for hearing now in May 2023 -- Therefore, it would be a travesty of justice to permit the prosecution of the petitioners for an offence u/s 323 IPC alone after 17 years of the alleged occurrence -- Complaint, summoning order and subsequent proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 147, 148, 149, 324, 506 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27, 54, 59 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Conviction by Trial court – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Acquittal -- Petitioners and private respondents are closely related to each other -- Steps taken by the parties to instant petition cannot be said to have any adverse impact on the interest of the society as a whole -- Dispute was more or less private in nature -- FIR along with all consequential proceedings quashed -- Conviction and sentence set aside and petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 11-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 159, 160 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Affray – Quashing of FIR -- Alleged fight was between two friends, dining together at a Dhaba on a highway in the wee hours of the morning -- Allegation of them being under the influence of liquor was not shown to have been confirmed by the medical report -- No injury was reflected – No material that there was a supervening apprehension of threat or danger to a third person present at the spot, eventuating in the peace being disturbed -- Suffice it to say that the FIR ex facie lacks the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 159 IPC, for which the petitioner has been made to stand trial -- Allowing the proceedings to continue against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of law -- FIR and consequential proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 5-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Kidnapping -- Quashing of Charge-sheet and entire criminal proceedings – Main accused acquitted and married the victim -- Victim did not support the case of prosecution – Both the applicants are in-laws of victim with whom the main accused and victim are residing peacefully with girl child -- Held, if in the above scenario the applicants are directed to face the trial, it would be the travesty of justice and abuse of process of law for the reason that this trial would result into acquittal – Supplementary charge-sheet quashed and accordingly the summoning order as well as the entire proceedings of Criminal Case quashed.

(Para 8-10)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view – Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son) -- Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent.

(Para 17)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe – If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language -- Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks.

(Para 18)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) -- Intentionally insulting a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view – Trial of accused -- Before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. but at least in the charge-sheet so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the offence.

(Para 18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Attempt to murder – Injuries not dangerous -- Mere factum that the injuries sustained by the complainant, not being life endangering injuries, would not make convict to escape from penal liability as enshrined in Section 307 of the IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307 -- Attempt to murder – Acquittal -- Non-sharing of mens rea -- Only convict was in command of the steering wheel of the offending vehicle, whereas, the other co-accused were sitting thereins with him -- Unless, there was evidence on record suggestive, that the other co-accused in the offending vehicle, instigating him to ply the offending vehicle in an ill-manner, so as to result in its colliding with the Activa Honda driven by the complainant-victim, thereupon, there would be no sharing of mensrea – No such evidence is existing on record -- Co-accused did not join him, through theirs instigating or goading him --Acquittal of co-accused upheld.

(Para 26)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 22 -- NDPS case – Non-deposit of case property in judicial malkhana – Acquittal -- Case property produced before the Magistrate, direction given to deposit in Judicial Malkhana but it was never deposited, it remained in the Police Station -- Non-deposit in the judicial malkhana was sought to be explained by stating that there was no space – No statement of Incharge of judicial malkhana ever recorded -- No application was presented before the Magistrate to modify the direction – Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 30-36)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Murder – Acquittal -- Separate charge u/s 452 read with 120-B of IPC was framed against all accused except the appellant – Thus charge framed against the appellant was of being a party to criminal conspiracy -- There is also a charge that all the accused fired bullets from their revolver -- Appellant’s presence with a weapon outside the premises where the offence took place – Prosecution examined 37 witnesses -- Appellant was not confronted during his examination u/s 313 of CrPC with the only allegation of the prosecution against him – Serious prejudice was caused to the appellant – 27 years have passed since the date of the incident -- Appellant has already undergone incarceration for a period of 10 years and 4 months -- Option of remand will be unjust -- Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside.

(Para 18-23)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Circumstances appearing against accused – Putting the same to accused – Law summarised as follows:

(i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction;

(ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence;

(iii) The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused;

(iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused;

(v) If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident;

(vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and

(vii) In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC.

(viii) While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered.

(Para 16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque dishonoured after its validity/ 3 months – Quashing of complaint -- Cheque in question was issued on 18.05.2018, which was ultimately dishonoured by Banker of the accused on 8.11.2018 -- In view of RBI circular dated 04.11.2011, maximum validity period for a cheque could be for 3 months only and even on the cheque in question it was specified that the same is valid for 3 months only – Substantive provision i.e. Section 138 of NI Act is that cheque be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier – Petition allowed and complaint with all subsequent proceedings including summoning order quashed.

(Para 4-7)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21, 50 -- NDPS Case – Acquittal – Non-compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act – It is not the case of the prosecution that polythene from which the police party recovered the contraband was already thrown away by the appellant but it was in the hand of the appellant -- Thus, compliance of Section 50 of NDPS Act is imperative in nature, which had not been made – Recovery of 10 grams heroin, which is non-commercial quantity -- Nothing on record to show that the appellant has any criminal antecedents -- Police party did not join any independent witness -- Held, prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the reasonable doubt as the compliance of provisions of Section 50 of NDPS Act has not been made in this case -- Appeal allowed -- Impugned order convicting and sentencing the appellant set aside and the appellant is acquitted.

(Para 9, 10)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(15) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – FIR under SC/ST Act – Duty of police officer -- Officers, who institute an FIR, based on any complaint, are duty-bound to be vigilant before invoking any provision of a very stringent statute, like the SC/ST Act, which imposes serious penal consequences on the concerned accused -- Officer has to be satisfied that the provisions he seeks to invoke prima facie apply to the case at hand – Police not to mechanically apply the law, dehors reference to the factual position.

(Para 38)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 427, 420, 419, 406, 471, 468, 448, 120B – Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(15) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- There is a huge, and quite frankly, unexplained delay of over 60 years in initiating dispute with regard to the ownership of the land in question, and the criminal case has been lodged only after failure to obtain relief in the civil suits, coupled with denial of relief in the interim therein to the respondent no.2/her family members -- Resort to criminal proceedings is with ulterior motives, for oblique reasons and is a clear case of vengeance -- Even if the allegations are taken to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the appellant -- Complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive – High Court fell in error in not invoking its wholesome power u/s 482 of the Code to quash the FIR -- FIR, as also any proceedings emanating therefrom, quashed and set aside.

(Para 37-39)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce case – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC-- FIR on account of absence of the petitioner which was subsequently regularized on his appearance after he was granted bail by the Court -- Continuation of the proceedings u/s 174-A of IPC shall be abuse of the process of the Court – Order declaring Proclaimed Person along with subsequent proceedings arising out of the same including FIR u/s 174-A of IPC quashed, subject to payment of Rs.25,000/-.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A -- Accident by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal – Defence witness -- Two deaths have taken place in the accident -- Instead of believing the defence of the accused, which is corroborated by the testimony of DW1 and DW2, the Courts below have relied upon the testimony of PW1 and PW2, sons of the deceased -- A defence witness is as competent as the prosecution witness and testimony of both of them stand on the same pedestal -- It is duty of the Court to analyse the statements of both the sides on equal parameters in order to judge their truthfulness -- Defence pleaded by the accused and supported by DW1 and that of DW2 is highly probable and, therefore accused deserve to be given the strong benefit of doubt – Petitioner/ accused is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 11, 12)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) – Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Presumption – Rebuttal -- There is a difference between an ‘ordinary criminal case’ and a ‘complaint under Section 138 of NI Act’ -- In ordinary criminal case, presumption of innocence is in favour of accused, whereas in a case in complaint under NI Act, presumption is in favour of complainant with reverse onus upon the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 258 – Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Notice of accusation – Discharge of accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In case ingredients for filing complaint u/s 138 of NI Act are in existence, then presumption is there, as provided under law, and to rebut the same, definitely, evidence would be required, which would be possible only in the trial Court, but in case essential ingredients are lacking, then the trial Court, at the time of framing of charge/putting notice of accusation, can quash the criminal proceedings.

(Para 21)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Security Cheque -- Presumption is in favour of the complainant and against the petitioner/accused – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Magistrate for summoning the petitioner – Petitioner shall have every right to rebut the presumption by placing on record relevant material before the Trial Court at appropriate stage during trial -- Quashing petition dismissed.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Petitioners/ accused are residents of Kapurthala, much beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts at Chandigarh, it was required for learned Magistrate to make compliance of the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction of the court – Non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C. -- In case inquiry as contemplated u/s 202 Cr.P.C is conducted through the Police or any person authorised by the court and the accused is involved in the inquiry, he will be able to put forth his defence and then, on the basis of the report to be submitted by the Police or the authorised person, Court will be in a better position to come to the conclusion as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not, for summoning of the accused – Matter remanded back to the trial Court to make compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C and only thereafter, proceed further in accordance with law.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 Part I – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Appellant tried to commit suicide along with her children in disappointment and frustration over the quarrel picked up by her paramour but her life was prevented by her niece -- Case not covered under the exceptions enumerated u/s 300 of the IPC -- More so, when there was no consent from the persons who were fed and died upon consuming the pesticide administered by the  Appellant -- Court not persuaded to convert the conviction from Section 302, IPC to Section 304 Part I, IPC.

(Para 14-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Life imprisonment – Premature release -- Appellant tried to commit suicide herself along with her children not with a view to continue her illicit relationship with her paramour but rather, in disappointment and frustration over the quarrel picked up by her paramour – Positive recommendation of the State Level Committee for premature release of the appellant, has been rejected by the State – Held, it cannot be simply bracketed as a ‘cruel and brutal’ offence -- No valid reason/ justifiable ground for the State not accepting the recommendation of the State Level Committee for premature release -- Appellant held entitled to the benefit of premature release.

(Para 16-21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce case – Compromise after Conviction – Acquittal -- Since the revisionist and the complainant have settled the dispute, the offence u/s 138 of the Act gets compounded -- Consequently, the revisionist is entitled to acquittal from the charges as levelled against him -- Orders under challenge set aside -- Revisionist acquitted.

(Para 1, 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide – Mere allegation of harassment of deceased by the accused named in the FIR may not be sufficient to conclude guilt, if any, under Section 306 IPC, rather to bring the accused in the ambit of section 306 IPC, it is required to be established on record that deceased committed suicide after being instigated and abetted by the accused.

(Para 44)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide – No evidence that deceased was meted with harassment by the accused just prior to her death and she was instigated /abetted to commit suicide -- As such, no case under Section 306 IPC is made out – Accused acquitted.

(Para 45-47)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Proof -- It is a basic rule of the criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however, strong cannot take place of proof – In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof -- Large distance between “may be true” and “must be true”, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution.

(Para 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Acquittal -- Dowry death – Demand of dowry – Presumption -- Prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassed by the appellants for or in connection with any demand of dowry – In order to presume the dowry death, it is a condition precedent that there must be unimpeachable evidence in relation to dowry demand -- As per evidence on record, there is no positive and cogent evidence about demand of dowry, and, nexus between demand of dowry and harassment could not be established -- Therefore, conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 38-41)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Duty of trial judge -- A trial judge has tremendous powers to “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant” -- It is in fact the duty of the Trial Judge to do so if it is felt that some important and crucial question was left from being asked from a witness -- Duty of the presiding judge of a criminal trial is not to watch the proceedings as a spectator or a recording machine but he has to participate in the trial “by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.”

(Para 11)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 101, 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- When the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Act would not be applicable under the peculiar facts and the circumstances of the case -- Discovery u/s 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased -- This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Compounding of offence after conviction – Acquittal of accused -- Offence u/s 138 of the NI Act can be compounded at any stage and overrides the effect of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C. -- Section 147 of the NI Act was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law and the section commences with a non obstante clause -- Consequently, in light of the compromise Petition filed before High Court, compounding of the offence allowed -- Order of conviction handed out to the petitioners set aside -- Petitioners are consequently acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(1) -- Compounding after conviction u/s 138 of NI Act -- Total cheque amount received by the complainant and the complainant has given consent for compounding the offence -- Keeping in mind the object of Section 147 of the NI Act, which is an enabling provision which provides for compounding the offence inserted by way of amendment towards special law, would give overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 320 of Cr.PC, matter considered as compounded -- Judgment and order of conviction and sentence quashed and set aside.

(Para 4-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 336, 506 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Act endangering life or personal safety of others -- Acquittal -- Test identification Parade (TIP) -- When it is established from the testimony of witnesses that occurrence took place at about 10:30 p.m., with no source of light, it is highly doubtful as to how the two police officials identified the accused, particularly when there is no evidence on record that they knew the accused earlier -- No Test Identification Parade was ever conducted -- Complainant and alleged eye-witness have not supported the prosecution case – Appeal accepted, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Murder – Eye witness turned hostile -- Two purported ocular witnesses to the occurrence PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution case, turned hostile -- In a grilling cross-examination, rather both completely denied making their respective previous statements in writing to the police officer nor did they make any affirmative answer to any incriminatory affirmative suggestion put to each of them by the Public Prosecutor -- Thus stems an inference that prosecution has been unable to invincibly substantiate the charge(s) drawn against the accused.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) in Court – Reliance upon -- Injured eye witness (PW-15) made a previous statement to the police officer discloses;

“…. That person was with muffled face and he said to shoot me because I am the person of that party. In between the person who having gun, shooted me. I can identify that voice and face thoroughly if he was produced before me, because that person was faced me prior somewhere. The person, who shooted me, I can identify him. if he was produced before me because his face was uncovered. After hitting of bullet shot, I became unconscious…….”

Held, unless the investigating officer during the course of his carrying investigations into the crime FIR, had held a valid identification parade with the participation thereins of PW-15 to enable to identify the accused, the identification of the accused by PW-15 in Court was a frail and uncreditworthy -- PW-15 was legally incapacitated to identify for the first time the accused in Court --  Therefore, no evidentiary vigour can be assigned thereto -- Prosecution case which becomes rested, upon the deposition of PW-15, thus cannot succeed.

(Para 17-20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Disclosure statement – Recovery of revolver and three live cartridges -- Ballistic expert’s opinion --  Report of the ballistic expert is of grave importance -- No conclusive opinion was made by the ballistic expert with respect to lead bullet mark CB/1 contained in parcel ‘D’ becoming fired from 0.32 inch revolver – Held, the inconclusivity of opinion leads to an inference that the recovery of 0.32 inch revolver was a recovery not related to the crime event nor also the accused can be conclusively said to make user of the said recovered fire arm in his committing the fatal assault upon deceased -- Impugned verdict of conviction and sentence(s) of imprisonment as well as of fine required to be quashed and set aside – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 23-28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Murder -- Last seen theory -- Presence of two accused persons missing in FIR – Had the complainant been aware of the narrative as put forward by PW-14, before registration of FIR, there was no reason for him, who is a father who lost his son, to conceal such essential information -- Non-disclosure of vital information qua presence of accused with the looted goats and sheep of complainant and names of two accused persons, clearly establishes that PW14 is an introduced witness, who was examined just to complete the chain of circumstances -- Story of last seen stands badly contradicted by the contents of FIR.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report reveals that human blood was detected on the stick, and, knife (Chhura), however, the report is inconclusive qua ‘Human Blood Group’ – It was imperative for the Investigation Officer to have made efforts to collect the finger print impressions from the recovered stick, knife (Chhura), liquor bottle, and, the two glasses, and thereafter, to get them compared with the finger print impressions of the accused persons – However, the Investigation Officer concerned has evidently not carried out any such exercise -- The omission of the prosecution proves fatal to the prosecution story.

(Para 30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Murder -- Disclosure statement – Demarcation of places – Relevance -- Nothing recovered from appellant/ accused, in pursuance of his disclosure statement except demarcation of certain places, vis-à-vis, the place where liquor was consumed by accused persons, the place of occurrence, the place from where the dead body was thrown into canal, and, the place where accused persons had left the looted goats and sheep -- Such a disclosure statement does not establish the guilt of the appellant/accused, as the disclosures made therein were already in the knowledge of the Investigation Officer.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report unveils matching of the POP casts of foot and footwear impressions of respondent/accused with the ones lifted from the crime scene -- Whether the acquittal of respondent/ accused can be converted into conviction, solely on the basis of the FSL report, answer is in negative – Samples of foot prints of the accused persons were not taken in the presence of any Magistrate -- Except the FSL Report, there is no other corroborative incriminating evidence available on record -- As such, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, wherefrom the FSL Report may gain vigor, a finding of acquittal cannot be turned into a finding of guilt.

(Para 45, 46)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 10(4)(iii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Insecticide Act – Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order -- Role of Distributor/ Dealer -- Where the Insecticide Inspector had drawn the sample of insecticide from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer to the distributor who further supplied it to the dealer from whom the sample had been taken, neither the distributor nor the dealer could be held to be liable.

-- Sample has been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied to the dealer by the distributor who received it in a similar condition from the manufacturer and even licence of the dealer stands restored on the ground that the sample had been taken from a sealed container, the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the complaint and the summoning order would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Courts

-- Alleged violation of Rule 10(4) (iii) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 cannot be sustained as against the petitioners since as per the terms of the licence of distributor, the insecticide could be purchased through direct supply -- Therefore, if there was a restriction on the sale of the insecticide from a particular premises, the same would apply to the manufacturer alone and not to the distributor or to the dealer.

Complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed qua the petitioners only.

(Para 18-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order of public servant – Cognizance on complaint -- To constitute the offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites for taking cognizance of an offence u/s 188 IPC is a complaint filed by the concerned public servant.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269, 270 – Covid-19 – Likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – There must be some material to suggest that petitioner’ actions were likely to spread infection of a dangerous disease -- No Covid-19 test of the petitioner was conducted to show that he was infected from the virus – Not mentioned in the FIR that which specific guideline was violated by the petitioner -- Only allegation made against the petitioner is that he was not wearing a mask, though it has been denied by the petitioner on affidavit -- Charges under section 269, 270, IPC also cannot stand -- Allegations are same against other accused as well, thus, FIR is quashed not only qua the present petitioner; but also for other accused person as well.

(Para 5-7, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 105d(ii) – Quashing of proclamation proceedings -- Accused left for aboard -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 of Cr.P.C were initiated against the petitioner at his local address despite of report regarding petitioner being abroad -- In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was absconding or deliberately concealing himself from the proceedings of the Court as he has already left for another country 02 years back -- It was obligatory for the trial Court to execute the process through the Embassy of the concerned country as stipulated u/s 105 d (ii) of Cr.P.C – Order declaring the petitioner as Proclaimed person set aside.

(Para 8, 11)

Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 174 (c) – Obstructing running of train by rash and negligent act – Acquittal -- No sign board, notice or milestone was installed by the Railways on the site of the occurrence, depicting that an optical fibre cable wire was installed underneath the land which could have alerted any person undertaking any work there -- Respondent-accused could not have judged without any notice in this regard that there was an optical fibre cable wire underneath -- Cutting of underground optical fibre cable wire -- It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent-accused was driving the JCB machine in a rash and negligent manner – Respondent-accused had been deputed by the Forest Department to dig the roots of the trees so that these trees could be uprooted – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 2, 4, 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 324, 325, 341, 506, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Lalkara -- Except lalkaras, no specific attribution or specific role of petitioner No.1 has been disclosed, no reliable evidence on record against him – Summoning order set aside qua petitioner no.1.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 -- Acquittal of Doctor and Nurse -- Death by medical negligence – Sanction of Government for prosecution: 

-- Reports of medical experts go in favour of the doctor and staff nurse concerned, however, the said reports were not taken into consideration at the time of registration of FIR -- FIR was registered only when PW14, who is a civil servant, having no medical science background, gave report to the effect that both the petitioners have committed medical negligence – Held, FIR in the instant case was registered by the police in contravention to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, (2005) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15083.

-- Petitioners were discharging their public duties while performing delivery of child in a Government hospital -- As such, criminal prosecution of the petitioners is not maintainable without the sanction of State Government as per provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.

Impugned judgment/order of conviction passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, and judgment passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and both the petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 388, 389, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR – High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable cases on the basis of settlement between the parties -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, outcome of free consent of the parties and is without coercion from any quarter – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding of offence after conviction -- Agreed amount deposited -- 5% of agreed amount deposited in High Court Legal Services Authority – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act compounded u/s 147 of Act -- Criminal Revision allowed, the judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court set aside and the accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 1-4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Punishment -- Accused will be liable to be punished under the first part of Section 174A IPC, i.e. up to three years' imprisonment or with fine or with both; and not under second part of Section 174A IPC.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 468, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Limitation of 3 years -- Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance of an offence punishable under first part of Section 174A IPC cannot be taken after the expiry of three years -- Though the petitioner was declared proclaimed person vide order dated 02.07.2018 but the FIR in question u/s 174A IPC registered on 09.08.2022 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of three years -- Court will be debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence u/s 174A IPC --  FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Misbranding of insecticide – Liability of dealer -- Quashing of Complaint / Summoning order --  Dealer could not be held to be liable as he could not have possibly known even with due diligence that the insecticide was mis-branded as the same had been received by him in a sealed condition and he was also selling the same ahead in the same condition – Samples had been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer/supplier to the petitioners/ dealers -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 468, 469 -- Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 6, 7A, 12 – Offence and penalties – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -- Commencement of the period of limitation – Complainant-Department had the knowledge of the alleged offence on 09.07.2012 -- FIR on 28.09.2016 – Maximum sentence prescribed may extend to 03 years -- Court would have taken cognizance only within a period of 03 years of the date of the knowledge of the offence i.e. 09.07.2012 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented only on 26.04.2019 and the sanction was granted even later on 07.06.2019 without which the Court could not have taken cognizance -- Almost 07 years had elapsed -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 10-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 56, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability – Part payment of cheque amount -- Indorsement of part of sum due on cheque – Requirement of -- Cheque must be issued in discharge of any debt or other liability either in whole or in part -- After issuing the cheque, the drawer of the cheque made a payment of certain amount -- A sum of Rs. 6036.83/- was paid by the drawer of the cheque against bill No. 3537 on 3rd April, 1995 after the cheque was drawn on 29th March, 1995 and before it was returned on 24th April, 1995 – Held, the entire cheque amount cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt -- Accused persons cannot be said to have committed any offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act – Ld. appellate Court was not justified in affirming the order of conviction in view of Section 56 of the N.I. Act – Impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Proclaimed person – Proceedings u/s 138 NI Act have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint – FIR u/s 174-A of IPC along with all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (Punjab Act 2 of 2013),  Section 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 470, 471, 120-B -- Smuggling of human -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statements of the parties recorded and the compromise is genuine and has been arrived at between them without any coercion or undue influence – FIR along with all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-3)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)