A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118(a) – Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Presumption – Rebuttal -- There is a difference between an ‘ordinary criminal case’ and a ‘complaint under Section 138 of NI Act’ -- In ordinary criminal case, presumption of innocence is in favour of accused, whereas in a case in complaint under NI Act, presumption is in favour of complainant with reverse onus upon the accused.

(Para 20)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 258 – Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Notice of accusation – Discharge of accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- In case ingredients for filing complaint u/s 138 of NI Act are in existence, then presumption is there, as provided under law, and to rebut the same, definitely, evidence would be required, which would be possible only in the trial Court, but in case essential ingredients are lacking, then the trial Court, at the time of framing of charge/putting notice of accusation, can quash the criminal proceedings.

(Para 21)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Complaint for dishonor of cheque – Security Cheque -- Presumption is in favour of the complainant and against the petitioner/accused – No illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Magistrate for summoning the petitioner – Petitioner shall have every right to rebut the presumption by placing on record relevant material before the Trial Court at appropriate stage during trial -- Quashing petition dismissed.

(Para 22, 23)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Petitioners/ accused are residents of Kapurthala, much beyond the jurisdiction of the Courts at Chandigarh, it was required for learned Magistrate to make compliance of the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 202 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 500, 34 – Defamation -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction of the court – Non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C. -- In case inquiry as contemplated u/s 202 Cr.P.C is conducted through the Police or any person authorised by the court and the accused is involved in the inquiry, he will be able to put forth his defence and then, on the basis of the report to be submitted by the Police or the authorised person, Court will be in a better position to come to the conclusion as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding or not, for summoning of the accused – Matter remanded back to the trial Court to make compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C and only thereafter, proceed further in accordance with law.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 Part I – Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Appellant tried to commit suicide along with her children in disappointment and frustration over the quarrel picked up by her paramour but her life was prevented by her niece -- Case not covered under the exceptions enumerated u/s 300 of the IPC -- More so, when there was no consent from the persons who were fed and died upon consuming the pesticide administered by the  Appellant -- Court not persuaded to convert the conviction from Section 302, IPC to Section 304 Part I, IPC.

(Para 14-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Life imprisonment – Premature release -- Appellant tried to commit suicide herself along with her children not with a view to continue her illicit relationship with her paramour but rather, in disappointment and frustration over the quarrel picked up by her paramour – Positive recommendation of the State Level Committee for premature release of the appellant, has been rejected by the State – Held, it cannot be simply bracketed as a ‘cruel and brutal’ offence -- No valid reason/ justifiable ground for the State not accepting the recommendation of the State Level Committee for premature release -- Appellant held entitled to the benefit of premature release.

(Para 16-21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce case – Compromise after Conviction – Acquittal -- Since the revisionist and the complainant have settled the dispute, the offence u/s 138 of the Act gets compounded -- Consequently, the revisionist is entitled to acquittal from the charges as levelled against him -- Orders under challenge set aside -- Revisionist acquitted.

(Para 1, 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide – Mere allegation of harassment of deceased by the accused named in the FIR may not be sufficient to conclude guilt, if any, under Section 306 IPC, rather to bring the accused in the ambit of section 306 IPC, it is required to be established on record that deceased committed suicide after being instigated and abetted by the accused.

(Para 44)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide – No evidence that deceased was meted with harassment by the accused just prior to her death and she was instigated /abetted to commit suicide -- As such, no case under Section 306 IPC is made out – Accused acquitted.

(Para 45-47)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Proof -- It is a basic rule of the criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however, strong cannot take place of proof – In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof -- Large distance between “may be true” and “must be true”, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution.

(Para 37)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-B – Acquittal -- Dowry death – Demand of dowry – Presumption -- Prosecution has to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassed by the appellants for or in connection with any demand of dowry – In order to presume the dowry death, it is a condition precedent that there must be unimpeachable evidence in relation to dowry demand -- As per evidence on record, there is no positive and cogent evidence about demand of dowry, and, nexus between demand of dowry and harassment could not be established -- Therefore, conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 38-41)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 165 -- Duty of trial judge -- A trial judge has tremendous powers to “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant” -- It is in fact the duty of the Trial Judge to do so if it is felt that some important and crucial question was left from being asked from a witness -- Duty of the presiding judge of a criminal trial is not to watch the proceedings as a spectator or a recording machine but he has to participate in the trial “by evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order to ascertain the truth.”

(Para 11)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 101, 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- When the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long gap of time between last seen and the time of death of the deceased, Section 106 of the Act would not be applicable under the peculiar facts and the circumstances of the case -- Discovery u/s 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased -- This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 2-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Compounding of offence after conviction – Acquittal of accused -- Offence u/s 138 of the NI Act can be compounded at any stage and overrides the effect of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C. -- Section 147 of the NI Act was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law and the section commences with a non obstante clause -- Consequently, in light of the compromise Petition filed before High Court, compounding of the offence allowed -- Order of conviction handed out to the petitioners set aside -- Petitioners are consequently acquitted of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320(1) -- Compounding after conviction u/s 138 of NI Act -- Total cheque amount received by the complainant and the complainant has given consent for compounding the offence -- Keeping in mind the object of Section 147 of the NI Act, which is an enabling provision which provides for compounding the offence inserted by way of amendment towards special law, would give overriding effect to sub-section (1) of Section 320 of Cr.PC, matter considered as compounded -- Judgment and order of conviction and sentence quashed and set aside.

(Para 4-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 336, 506 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Act endangering life or personal safety of others -- Acquittal -- Test identification Parade (TIP) -- When it is established from the testimony of witnesses that occurrence took place at about 10:30 p.m., with no source of light, it is highly doubtful as to how the two police officials identified the accused, particularly when there is no evidence on record that they knew the accused earlier -- No Test Identification Parade was ever conducted -- Complainant and alleged eye-witness have not supported the prosecution case – Appeal accepted, impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.

(Para 12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Murder – Eye witness turned hostile -- Two purported ocular witnesses to the occurrence PW-1 and PW-2 did not support the prosecution case, turned hostile -- In a grilling cross-examination, rather both completely denied making their respective previous statements in writing to the police officer nor did they make any affirmative answer to any incriminatory affirmative suggestion put to each of them by the Public Prosecutor -- Thus stems an inference that prosecution has been unable to invincibly substantiate the charge(s) drawn against the accused.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) in Court – Reliance upon -- Injured eye witness (PW-15) made a previous statement to the police officer discloses;

“…. That person was with muffled face and he said to shoot me because I am the person of that party. In between the person who having gun, shooted me. I can identify that voice and face thoroughly if he was produced before me, because that person was faced me prior somewhere. The person, who shooted me, I can identify him. if he was produced before me because his face was uncovered. After hitting of bullet shot, I became unconscious…….”

Held, unless the investigating officer during the course of his carrying investigations into the crime FIR, had held a valid identification parade with the participation thereins of PW-15 to enable to identify the accused, the identification of the accused by PW-15 in Court was a frail and uncreditworthy -- PW-15 was legally incapacitated to identify for the first time the accused in Court --  Therefore, no evidentiary vigour can be assigned thereto -- Prosecution case which becomes rested, upon the deposition of PW-15, thus cannot succeed.

(Para 17-20)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Disclosure statement – Recovery of revolver and three live cartridges -- Ballistic expert’s opinion --  Report of the ballistic expert is of grave importance -- No conclusive opinion was made by the ballistic expert with respect to lead bullet mark CB/1 contained in parcel ‘D’ becoming fired from 0.32 inch revolver – Held, the inconclusivity of opinion leads to an inference that the recovery of 0.32 inch revolver was a recovery not related to the crime event nor also the accused can be conclusively said to make user of the said recovered fire arm in his committing the fatal assault upon deceased -- Impugned verdict of conviction and sentence(s) of imprisonment as well as of fine required to be quashed and set aside – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 23-28)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 – Murder -- Last seen theory -- Presence of two accused persons missing in FIR – Had the complainant been aware of the narrative as put forward by PW-14, before registration of FIR, there was no reason for him, who is a father who lost his son, to conceal such essential information -- Non-disclosure of vital information qua presence of accused with the looted goats and sheep of complainant and names of two accused persons, clearly establishes that PW14 is an introduced witness, who was examined just to complete the chain of circumstances -- Story of last seen stands badly contradicted by the contents of FIR.

(Para 25, 26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report reveals that human blood was detected on the stick, and, knife (Chhura), however, the report is inconclusive qua ‘Human Blood Group’ – It was imperative for the Investigation Officer to have made efforts to collect the finger print impressions from the recovered stick, knife (Chhura), liquor bottle, and, the two glasses, and thereafter, to get them compared with the finger print impressions of the accused persons – However, the Investigation Officer concerned has evidently not carried out any such exercise -- The omission of the prosecution proves fatal to the prosecution story.

(Para 30)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Murder -- Disclosure statement – Demarcation of places – Relevance -- Nothing recovered from appellant/ accused, in pursuance of his disclosure statement except demarcation of certain places, vis-à-vis, the place where liquor was consumed by accused persons, the place of occurrence, the place from where the dead body was thrown into canal, and, the place where accused persons had left the looted goats and sheep -- Such a disclosure statement does not establish the guilt of the appellant/accused, as the disclosures made therein were already in the knowledge of the Investigation Officer.

(Para 34, 35)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45 – Murder -- FSL Report unveils matching of the POP casts of foot and footwear impressions of respondent/accused with the ones lifted from the crime scene -- Whether the acquittal of respondent/ accused can be converted into conviction, solely on the basis of the FSL report, answer is in negative – Samples of foot prints of the accused persons were not taken in the presence of any Magistrate -- Except the FSL Report, there is no other corroborative incriminating evidence available on record -- As such, in the absence of any corroborative evidence, wherefrom the FSL Report may gain vigor, a finding of acquittal cannot be turned into a finding of guilt.

(Para 45, 46)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 10(4)(iii) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Offence under Insecticide Act – Quashing of Complaint/ Summoning order -- Role of Distributor/ Dealer -- Where the Insecticide Inspector had drawn the sample of insecticide from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer to the distributor who further supplied it to the dealer from whom the sample had been taken, neither the distributor nor the dealer could be held to be liable.

-- Sample has been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied to the dealer by the distributor who received it in a similar condition from the manufacturer and even licence of the dealer stands restored on the ground that the sample had been taken from a sealed container, the continuance of the proceedings arising out of the complaint and the summoning order would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Courts

-- Alleged violation of Rule 10(4) (iii) of the Insecticide Rules, 1971 cannot be sustained as against the petitioners since as per the terms of the licence of distributor, the insecticide could be purchased through direct supply -- Therefore, if there was a restriction on the sale of the insecticide from a particular premises, the same would apply to the manufacturer alone and not to the distributor or to the dealer.

Complaint, summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed qua the petitioners only.

(Para 18-21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order of public servant – Cognizance on complaint -- To constitute the offence, there must be disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant -- Pre-requisites for taking cognizance of an offence u/s 188 IPC is a complaint filed by the concerned public servant.

(Para 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269, 270 – Covid-19 – Likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – There must be some material to suggest that petitioner’ actions were likely to spread infection of a dangerous disease -- No Covid-19 test of the petitioner was conducted to show that he was infected from the virus – Not mentioned in the FIR that which specific guideline was violated by the petitioner -- Only allegation made against the petitioner is that he was not wearing a mask, though it has been denied by the petitioner on affidavit -- Charges under section 269, 270, IPC also cannot stand -- Allegations are same against other accused as well, thus, FIR is quashed not only qua the present petitioner; but also for other accused person as well.

(Para 5-7, 11)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 105d(ii) – Quashing of proclamation proceedings -- Accused left for aboard -- Proclamation proceedings u/s 82 of Cr.P.C were initiated against the petitioner at his local address despite of report regarding petitioner being abroad -- In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was absconding or deliberately concealing himself from the proceedings of the Court as he has already left for another country 02 years back -- It was obligatory for the trial Court to execute the process through the Embassy of the concerned country as stipulated u/s 105 d (ii) of Cr.P.C – Order declaring the petitioner as Proclaimed person set aside.

(Para 8, 11)

Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), Section 174 (c) – Obstructing running of train by rash and negligent act – Acquittal -- No sign board, notice or milestone was installed by the Railways on the site of the occurrence, depicting that an optical fibre cable wire was installed underneath the land which could have alerted any person undertaking any work there -- Respondent-accused could not have judged without any notice in this regard that there was an optical fibre cable wire underneath -- Cutting of underground optical fibre cable wire -- It cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent-accused was driving the JCB machine in a rash and negligent manner – Respondent-accused had been deputed by the Forest Department to dig the roots of the trees so that these trees could be uprooted – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 2, 4, 6, 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 324, 325, 341, 506, 148, 149 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Summoning as additional accused – Lalkara -- Except lalkaras, no specific attribution or specific role of petitioner No.1 has been disclosed, no reliable evidence on record against him – Summoning order set aside qua petitioner no.1.

(Para 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197 -- Acquittal of Doctor and Nurse -- Death by medical negligence – Sanction of Government for prosecution: 

-- Reports of medical experts go in favour of the doctor and staff nurse concerned, however, the said reports were not taken into consideration at the time of registration of FIR -- FIR was registered only when PW14, who is a civil servant, having no medical science background, gave report to the effect that both the petitioners have committed medical negligence – Held, FIR in the instant case was registered by the police in contravention to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew's case, (2005) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 15083.

-- Petitioners were discharging their public duties while performing delivery of child in a Government hospital -- As such, criminal prosecution of the petitioners is not maintainable without the sanction of State Government as per provisions of Section 197 of Cr.P.C.

Impugned judgment/order of conviction passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, and judgment passed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, set aside and both the petitioners are acquitted.

(Para 2, 24-29)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 388, 389, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR – High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable cases on the basis of settlement between the parties -- Compromise effected between the parties is genuine, outcome of free consent of the parties and is without coercion from any quarter – FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed, qua the petitioners.

(Para 4-6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Compromise/ Compounding of offence after conviction -- Agreed amount deposited -- 5% of agreed amount deposited in High Court Legal Services Authority – Offence u/s 138 of NI Act compounded u/s 147 of Act -- Criminal Revision allowed, the judgments of the trial Court and the Appellate Court set aside and the accused is acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 1-4)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Punishment -- Accused will be liable to be punished under the first part of Section 174A IPC, i.e. up to three years' imprisonment or with fine or with both; and not under second part of Section 174A IPC.

(Para 9)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 468, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) , Section 138 – Cheque bounce case – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Limitation of 3 years -- Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance of an offence punishable under first part of Section 174A IPC cannot be taken after the expiry of three years -- Though the petitioner was declared proclaimed person vide order dated 02.07.2018 but the FIR in question u/s 174A IPC registered on 09.08.2022 i.e. much beyond the period of limitation of three years -- Court will be debarred from taking cognizance of such an offence u/s 174A IPC --  FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticide Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Misbranding of insecticide – Liability of dealer -- Quashing of Complaint / Summoning order --  Dealer could not be held to be liable as he could not have possibly known even with due diligence that the insecticide was mis-branded as the same had been received by him in a sealed condition and he was also selling the same ahead in the same condition – Samples had been drawn from the original packing as had been supplied by the manufacturer/supplier to the petitioners/ dealers -- Complaint, the summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand quashed.

(Para 10-13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 468, 469 -- Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (41 of 1963), Section 6, 7A, 12 – Offence and penalties – Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation -- Commencement of the period of limitation – Complainant-Department had the knowledge of the alleged offence on 09.07.2012 -- FIR on 28.09.2016 – Maximum sentence prescribed may extend to 03 years -- Court would have taken cognizance only within a period of 03 years of the date of the knowledge of the offence i.e. 09.07.2012 -- Report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. was presented only on 26.04.2019 and the sanction was granted even later on 07.06.2019 without which the Court could not have taken cognizance -- Almost 07 years had elapsed -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 10-14)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 56, 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legally enforceable liability – Part payment of cheque amount -- Indorsement of part of sum due on cheque – Requirement of -- Cheque must be issued in discharge of any debt or other liability either in whole or in part -- After issuing the cheque, the drawer of the cheque made a payment of certain amount -- A sum of Rs. 6036.83/- was paid by the drawer of the cheque against bill No. 3537 on 3rd April, 1995 after the cheque was drawn on 29th March, 1995 and before it was returned on 24th April, 1995 – Held, the entire cheque amount cannot be said to be legally enforceable debt -- Accused persons cannot be said to have committed any offence within the meaning of Section 138 of the N.I. Act – Ld. appellate Court was not justified in affirming the order of conviction in view of Section 56 of the N.I. Act – Impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC -- Proclaimed person – Proceedings u/s 138 NI Act have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint – FIR u/s 174-A of IPC along with all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 10, 11)

Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (Punjab Act 2 of 2013),  Section 13 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 470, 471, 120-B -- Smuggling of human -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statements of the parties recorded and the compromise is genuine and has been arrived at between them without any coercion or undue influence – FIR along with all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 1-3)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Mere death of the deceased being unnatural in the matrimonial home within seven years of marriage will not be sufficient to convict the accused under Section 304B and 498A IPC.

(Para 23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Acquittal -- Presumption regarding dowry death -- Cruelty or harassment has to be soon before the death.

-- None of the witnesses stated about the cruelty or harassment to the deceased by the appellant or any of his family members on account of demand of dowry soon before the death or otherwise. Rather harassment has not been narrated by anyone. It is only certain oral averments regarding demand of motorcycle and land which is also much prior to the incident. The aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution does not fulfil the pre-requisites to invoke presumption under Section 304B IPC or Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act. Even the ingredients of Section 498A IPC are not made out for the same reason as there is no evidence of cruelty and harassment to the deceased soon before her death.

-- DW-1, who was head of the village at the time of incident, stated that the information about the death was given to the parents of the deceased and other family members and belongings of the deceased were handed over to her maternal grandmother and uncle after cremation -- His statement is in line with the admission made by (PW-3)/ maternal grandmother, PW-2/ maternal uncle of the deceased -- Meaning thereby that there was no suspicion regarding the death of the deceased.

On a collective appreciation of the evidence led by the prosecution, prerequisites to raise presumption u/s 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act having not been fulfilled, the conviction of the appellant cannot be justified.

(Para 16-23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Kidnapping – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- No chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – FIR under Sections 363 and 366A of IPC, and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5-7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Suicide note – Reliance upon -- Trial Court has not found the suicide note to be trustworthy -- As per the report of the FSL, no definite opinion could be given regarding the suicide note having been executed by deceased -- Trial Court also found that it was quite strange that the deceased, in a semiconscious state, took out a note and handed over the same to his brother instead of doing so when he was in his senses – High Court do not find any illegality and error  in this finding.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Prosecution did not give any immediate cause which could have driven deceased to commit suicide -- Still further, no evidence was brought on record to show that accused incited, goaded or aided the commission of suicide -- It was, therefore, rightly held that the ingredients of Sections 107 and 306 IPC did not stand fulfilled.

(Para 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Revision – Sentence of cheque amount – While suspending the sentence High Court imposed a condition that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- -- Further, imposed condition that the petitioner shall deposit another sum of Rs.1,50,000/- within a period of four weeks after immediately coming out on bail – Both the conditions were duly complied with by the petitioner – Petitioner ready and willing to settle the remaining cheque amount within the stipulated time fixed by this Court – Conviction confirmed, sentence set aside on condition that the petitioner shall deposit the remaining cheque amount namely a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- on or before 29.05.2023.

(Para 5-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 283 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Opening of shop in residential area -- Quashing of FIR -- There is no specific averment to the effect that any danger obstruction or injury has been caused to any person, nor it is coming forth that any public way or public line of navigation has been obstructed by the petitioners in any way -- It is difficult to perceive how by opening his shop in a residential area, petitioner has committed the offense under this section -- FIR quashed.

(Para 8, 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 427 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Mischief causing damage – Quashing of FIR -- With respect to offense u/s 427, there is no averment that what mischief has been committed by the petitioner or to whom loss or damage has been caused through that mischief -- Mere vague allegations in the FIR, consisting of words used in the definition of an offense, in the absence of any corroborating details, does not lead to prima facie satisfaction for constituting that offence -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- There is double presumption of innocence in favour of the respondent-accused -- Initial presumption of innocence is on account of the basic principle of criminal law that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty -- Secondly, said presumption is reinforced by the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court after trial based on the evidence – In these circumstances, onus is heavy on the petitioner/ complainant to show the illegality or impropriety of the finding recorded by the trial Court.

(Para 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405 – Criminal breach of trust – Following ingredients must be proved to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust –

(A) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion over property;

(B) that the person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted that property to his own use, or (b) dishonestly used or disposed of that property or willfully suffered any other person to do so in violation, (i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, (ii) of any legal contract made, touching the discharge of such trust.

(Para 9)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 405, 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Misappropriation of 1657 bags i.e. 1055 quintals 50 kg and 942 grams of paddy -- 6614 bags weighing 4286 quintals 60 kg paddy were stored for the purpose of milling -- Prosecution utterly failed to prove the dominion of the accused over the said property – Civil suit filed by the petitioner/ complainant/ FCI for recovery, on the same allegations, has already been dismissed by the Civil Court despite the fact that burden of proof in the civil suit is of much lesser degree compared to the criminal case – Prosecution utterly failed to prove the entrustment of the paddy bags, which was allegedly misappropriated – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10, 12, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 313, 34, 406, 498-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Causing miscarriage without woman’s consent – Cruelty -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- Alleged offences are of pre-dominantly private in nature and no moral turpitude or interest of public at large is involved -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time – FIR under Sections 313, 34, 406 and 498A of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 148, 149, 323, 325 -- Attempt to murder – Unlawful assembly – Acquittal -- Conviction by trial Court upheld by High court – Challenge to -- In fight, lathi and kassi (spade) were allegedly used, these are the normal agricultural implements which are used in the rural areas, which the appellants were carrying in their trolley – Due consideration not given to the injuries suffered by the appellants, entire stress on the injuries suffered by the complainant party or the evidence led by them and defence of the appellants has not been touched – Both the parties suffered injuries in free fight and the passage, which was the root cause of the fight, has been held to be the passage owned by Gram Panchayat and Rafiamm and not belonging to the complainant party -- Conviction and sentence of the appellants cannot be legally sustained, set aside.

(Para 12-15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 326, 341, 506B – Attempt to murder – Grievous hurt by dangerous weapon -- Acquittal u/s 307 IPC -- Incident taken place 23/24 years ago -- Root cause as per appellant that injured was having inappropriate relations with his wife -- Weapon used is a scissors which is not a normal weapon of offence in case there is any intention to cause death -- Injury, a scratch below the neck, incised wound on the left thigh and a small cut size 1 ½ cm x 1 cm x 5 cm below the ribs – Appellant was doing the work of a tailoring -- The scissors which was seized by the police is small scissors which is used by tailors – Held, offence will not fall within Section 307 I.P.C. – Held, conviction u/s 307 IPC cannot be sustained however conviction u/s 326, 341 IPC, 506B sustained.

(Para 6, 7)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326, 341, 506B – Grievous hurt by dangerous weapon -- Conviction u/s 326, 341, 506B IPC -- Sentence reduced to already undergone  (11 months and 24 days) -- Appellant had already undergone actual sentence of 11 months and 24 days -- Considering the fact that the incident had taken place about 23/24 years ago, sentence awarded to the appellant deserves to be reduced to the period already undergone -- Amount of fine imposed is sustained, in case of non-deposit of fine, the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for a period of one month.

(Para 7, 8)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability -- Vicarious liability is a specific species and assumes critical importance, particularly when there is criminal liability involved and therefore, cannot be taken lightly -- If such an extension of principle of vicarious liability were to remain, it would go against the very grain and texture.

(Para 13)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Officer in Company -- Vicarious liability – Merely holding a designation or office in a company not sufficient for liability under section 141.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Bald averment against petitioner – Some accused dropped -- Bald averments against Accused No. 3-8 being directors of Accused-Company and in-charge of and responsible for the conduct, affairs and business of the company -- No specific averment made that this was so at the time of the commission of the offence -- Signatory of the cheque was also the Managing Director of the Company would be deemed to be in-charge, it was not as if the complainant was remediless -- Considering that Accused No.4 to 8 were dropped by the complainant, there was no reason for the complainant to have continued with proceedings against Accused No.3.

(Para 18)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Incharge of Company – Vicarious liability – Letter head of company – Reliance upon -- Merely the mention of the name of Accused No.3 on the letter head as being the Head of the Group, does not ipso facto or ipso jure make him in-charge of and responsible for the affairs and business of the company at the time the offence was committed.

(Para 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Non-Executive Director – Non-executive director may be the custodian of governance of the Company but are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of running its business and only monitor executive activities of the Company -- Phraseology used in Section 141 of the Act of being in charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of Company is a reference to an “executive activity” which imports an element of running day-to-day affairs of the Company and would not be extended to a role which is essentially supervisory, policy oriented, of oversight or regulatory i.e. non-executive in character.

(Para 21)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142 -- Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 175 – Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 104, 203 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Non-executive Co-chairman – Managing Director and executive directors are appointed for a company to ensure that all executive decisions – Non Executive Directors are to advice or oversight of the functioning of the company -- Even the role of ‘Chairman’/ ‘Chairperson’ is not typically of an executive nature -- Creeping up an escalating liability to Chairpersons of large conglomerates/ companies for cheques issued in day-to-day affairs of the business of a company would unfairly and unnecessarily expand the provisions of vicarious liability under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act – No prejudice is caused to the complainant as the signatory of the cheque, the Managing Director is already arrayed as accused -- Proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 13, 22-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Malicious prosecution – On conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted -- Held, Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage -- Same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial -- Order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings against the accused set aside.

(Para 4-5.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 394, 397 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Robbery – Acquittal – Trial court convicted the appellant and high Court confirmed the same -- Nothing on record that the pistol was ever used -- Recovery of pistol from the appellant is seriously doubtful -- As per the memo prepared at the time of his personal search, it is mentioned that nothing was recovered from him, however, in the memo of possession regarding the pistol, it is stated that during the course of the investigation, the appellant was arrested and his personal search was carried out and from the left side pocket of his pyjama country-made pistol was recovered – Two versions demolished the case of the prosecution – Material witness, who is named in the FIR and on whose arrival at the scene of crime the accused ran away, has not been produced by the prosecution -- Appeals allowed, judgment and order passed by the High Court and the Trial Court as regards the appellant set aside.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 370, 384, 406, 420, 506 -- Emigration Act, 1983 (31 of 1983), Section 24 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Trafficking of person – Cheating – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR --  Compromise is genuine and has been entered into without any undue influence or threat -- FIR along with all consequential proceedings having arisen therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of Proclaimed person order/ FIR u/s 174-A IPC – Since the petitioner has joined the trial, order declaring proclaimed person has lost its significance -- Petitioner is no longer a proclaimed person and thus, continuing with the FIR would be oppressive -- Accordingly quashed.

(Para 1, 2)

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 7 – Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1988, Clause 3, 7 -- Acquittal -- Unauthorised possession of gas cylinders -- Action taken by sub-Inspector of the Police who, as per the Government Order, is not authorised -- It is a settled law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all -- Other methods are necessarily forbidden – Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellants u/s 7 of the Act set aside.

(Para 14-17)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7 -- Corruption case – Acquittal – Demand of illegal gratification – Recovery of money -- Complainant as well as shadow witness turned hostile -- No evidence produced on record to prove the demand of illegal gratification -- PW-8 is only a witness who stated that he had recovered the money from the appellant -- Conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be legally sustained -- Appeal allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court and that of the Trial Court are set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 11-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide -- Insulting the deceased by using abusive language or maltreatment will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of the suicide is imperative -- Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against the indictment -- Mens rea to commit the offence is a sine qua non to convict a person under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 9-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Acquittal -- Simply because of the fact that the wife (deceased) committed suicide in matrimonial home, itself does not make her in-laws and husband liable for harassment and abetment to commit suicide -- No concrete or conclusive evidence to prove their complicity in the commission of the crime -- Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained – Acquittal affirmed.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court – Trustworthiness of witness -- Complainant stepped into the witness box as PW-6, in her examination-in-chief, she identified the accused, however, in the cross examination, she stated that the police had called her to the police station and had told her that her mobile phone had been recovered -- She stated in the cross examination that she had not told the police that the person in the police station was the same who had snatched the purse from her before the questioning of the accused started -- It has further come on record that no description of the accused had been given by the complainant at the time of registration of the FIR and even the number of the motorcycle could not be noted down by the complainant -- Cross examination of the complainant definitely created a dent in the case of the prosecution which was rightly considered by the trial Court.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court -- Recovery of mobile and Rs. 12,000 on disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- No bill of mobile was produced on record -- It was not proved that the mobile phone which had been released on Sapurdari was the same which had been allegedly recovered from the accused -- PW-6-complaiannt duly stated in her evidence that the bill of the mobile phone and the details of the Sim had been handed over to the police, but nowhere the IMEI number was mentioned nor the bill of the mobile phone saw the light of the day – Insofar as the amount of Rs.12,000/- is concerned, there is nothing to show that these were the same Rs.12,000/- rupees which had been snatched from the complainant -- Anyone could be in possession of a sum of Rs.12,000/- and the mere recovery of the same from the said person would not mean that they had been snatched from someone -- Recovery alleged to have been made in pursuance to the disclosure statement suffered by the respondent-accused not proved -- No reliance can be placed upon the disclosure statement – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 377, 498A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Matrimonial dispute – Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Grievance of respondent No.2 was that petitioner is not solemnizing marriage and he had developed physical relation on the pretext of marriage -- Petitioner has solemnized marriage with the victim and her grievance stands resolved – She is happily cohabiting with the petitioner, thus, denial of prayer of the petitioner not only would be against the interest of petitioner but also victim and her family members -- FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal of accused -- Prosecution rests upon three circumstances (a) the alleged confessional statement of accused/ appellant made before PW-1 and PW-7; (b) prior animosity/“tension” between appellant and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of the keys of the shop of the deceased and his currency notes amounting to Rs.300/- on the asking of the accused/appellant -- There is a significant time gap between when the deceased was lastly seen and the time of the crime – In respect of recovery of keys and the money, there is no independent corroborated material except for the confessional statement of the accused, which also is not proven on record -- Keys, the currency notes and the blood stained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis -- Neither the chain of circumstances completely established nor the guilt of the accused alone, having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeal allowed and the appellant acquitted of all the charges framed against him.

(Para 3, 16, 20, 24-29)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Quashing of complaint against partner/ wife – Vicarious liability – Partnership firm -- Cheque from personal account of husband -- Petitioner is not a signatory to the cheque and the said cheque was issued on personal account of accused No.1/ husband – Though the petitioner is a partner in the partnership firm and amounts were taken from the finance firm, it would not be proper for the complainant to prosecute the petitioner, who is not a signatory to the said cheque – Petitioner is not vicariously liable u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act -- Petition allowed.

(Para 3-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC – Surrender and bail – Effect of -- Petitioner was declared proclaimed person, however, surrendered before the Trial Court and after noticing that he had not appeared earlier and since the offence in question is bailable, he was admitted to regular bail -- Later on, FIR u/s 174-A IPC was registered against the petitioner on the basis of the order declaring him proclaimed person -- FIR and all the consequent proceedings arising out of the same quashed. Rahul Dureja’s case, 2022(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 248 relied.

(Para 2-5)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42 – NDPS case – Acquittal – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information was not reduced into writing -- Consequently, there was no question of sending the secret information to the police station or higher police officers -- Thus, there was breach of mandatory provision of Section 42 of the Act and the learned Trial Court has wrongly convicted the appellant -- Appellant is liable to be acquitted.

(Para 12-14)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS case – Secret information – Ruqa -- Sending of ruqa for recording of the FIR in the police station can never be termed as sufficient compliance of Section 42 of the Act.

(Para 13)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS case – Secret information – Information to higher police officers -- As per the mandate of Section 42 of the Act, when there is total and definite non-compliance of such statutory provisions, the question of prejudice looses its significance -- It will per se amount to prejudice.

(Para 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery memorandum – Non-preparation of – Acquittal of accused -- Trial court found that the evidence of PWs 10 to 12 before whom confession was made were contradictory to each other -- Conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence – Trial court disbelieved the recovery of clothes and weapon on two grounds -- Firstly, that there was no memorandum statement of the accused as required u/s 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and secondly, the recovery of the knife was from an open place accessible to one and all –View taken by the trial court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal/impossible to warrant interference -- High Court has grossly erred in interfering with the well-reasoned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant set aside – Acquittal by Trial Court, affirmed.

(Para 12-22)