A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability -- Vicarious liability is a specific species and assumes critical importance, particularly when there is criminal liability involved and therefore, cannot be taken lightly -- If such an extension of principle of vicarious liability were to remain, it would go against the very grain and texture.

(Para 13)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Officer in Company -- Vicarious liability – Merely holding a designation or office in a company not sufficient for liability under section 141.

(Para 15)

C. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Bald averment against petitioner – Some accused dropped -- Bald averments against Accused No. 3-8 being directors of Accused-Company and in-charge of and responsible for the conduct, affairs and business of the company -- No specific averment made that this was so at the time of the commission of the offence -- Signatory of the cheque was also the Managing Director of the Company would be deemed to be in-charge, it was not as if the complainant was remediless -- Considering that Accused No.4 to 8 were dropped by the complainant, there was no reason for the complainant to have continued with proceedings against Accused No.3.

(Para 18)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Incharge of Company – Vicarious liability – Letter head of company – Reliance upon -- Merely the mention of the name of Accused No.3 on the letter head as being the Head of the Group, does not ipso facto or ipso jure make him in-charge of and responsible for the affairs and business of the company at the time the offence was committed.

(Para 19)

E. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 -- Vicarious liability – Non-Executive Director – Non-executive director may be the custodian of governance of the Company but are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of running its business and only monitor executive activities of the Company -- Phraseology used in Section 141 of the Act of being in charge and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of Company is a reference to an “executive activity” which imports an element of running day-to-day affairs of the Company and would not be extended to a role which is essentially supervisory, policy oriented, of oversight or regulatory i.e. non-executive in character.

(Para 21)

F. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141, 142 -- Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), Section 175 – Companies Act, 2013 (No. 18 of 2013), Section 104, 203 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Non-executive Co-chairman – Managing Director and executive directors are appointed for a company to ensure that all executive decisions – Non Executive Directors are to advice or oversight of the functioning of the company -- Even the role of ‘Chairman’/ ‘Chairperson’ is not typically of an executive nature -- Creeping up an escalating liability to Chairpersons of large conglomerates/ companies for cheques issued in day-to-day affairs of the business of a company would unfairly and unnecessarily expand the provisions of vicarious liability under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act – No prejudice is caused to the complainant as the signatory of the cheque, the Managing Director is already arrayed as accused -- Proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 13, 22-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Malicious prosecution – On conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted -- Held, Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage -- Same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial -- Order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the criminal proceedings against the accused set aside.

(Para 4-5.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 394, 397 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Robbery – Acquittal – Trial court convicted the appellant and high Court confirmed the same -- Nothing on record that the pistol was ever used -- Recovery of pistol from the appellant is seriously doubtful -- As per the memo prepared at the time of his personal search, it is mentioned that nothing was recovered from him, however, in the memo of possession regarding the pistol, it is stated that during the course of the investigation, the appellant was arrested and his personal search was carried out and from the left side pocket of his pyjama country-made pistol was recovered – Two versions demolished the case of the prosecution – Material witness, who is named in the FIR and on whose arrival at the scene of crime the accused ran away, has not been produced by the prosecution -- Appeals allowed, judgment and order passed by the High Court and the Trial Court as regards the appellant set aside.

(Para 9-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 370, 384, 406, 420, 506 -- Emigration Act, 1983 (31 of 1983), Section 24 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Trafficking of person – Cheating – Extortion – Compromise quashing of FIR --  Compromise is genuine and has been entered into without any undue influence or threat -- FIR along with all consequential proceedings having arisen therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 2-4)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of Proclaimed person order/ FIR u/s 174-A IPC – Since the petitioner has joined the trial, order declaring proclaimed person has lost its significance -- Petitioner is no longer a proclaimed person and thus, continuing with the FIR would be oppressive -- Accordingly quashed.

(Para 1, 2)

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 7 – Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 1988, Clause 3, 7 -- Acquittal -- Unauthorised possession of gas cylinders -- Action taken by sub-Inspector of the Police who, as per the Government Order, is not authorised -- It is a settled law that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all -- Other methods are necessarily forbidden – Appeal allowed, conviction and sentence of the appellants u/s 7 of the Act set aside.

(Para 14-17)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7 -- Corruption case – Acquittal – Demand of illegal gratification – Recovery of money -- Complainant as well as shadow witness turned hostile -- No evidence produced on record to prove the demand of illegal gratification -- PW-8 is only a witness who stated that he had recovered the money from the appellant -- Conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be legally sustained -- Appeal allowed, impugned order passed by the High Court and that of the Trial Court are set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 11-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Mens rea -- Essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide -- Insulting the deceased by using abusive language or maltreatment will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide -- To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of the suicide is imperative -- Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against the indictment -- Mens rea to commit the offence is a sine qua non to convict a person under Section 306 IPC.

(Para 9-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Acquittal -- Simply because of the fact that the wife (deceased) committed suicide in matrimonial home, itself does not make her in-laws and husband liable for harassment and abetment to commit suicide -- No concrete or conclusive evidence to prove their complicity in the commission of the crime -- Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained – Acquittal affirmed.

(Para 15, 16)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court – Trustworthiness of witness -- Complainant stepped into the witness box as PW-6, in her examination-in-chief, she identified the accused, however, in the cross examination, she stated that the police had called her to the police station and had told her that her mobile phone had been recovered -- She stated in the cross examination that she had not told the police that the person in the police station was the same who had snatched the purse from her before the questioning of the accused started -- It has further come on record that no description of the accused had been given by the complainant at the time of registration of the FIR and even the number of the motorcycle could not be noted down by the complainant -- Cross examination of the complainant definitely created a dent in the case of the prosecution which was rightly considered by the trial Court.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379-A -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Snatching case -- Acquittal by trial court -- Recovery of mobile and Rs. 12,000 on disclosure statement – Reliance upon -- No bill of mobile was produced on record -- It was not proved that the mobile phone which had been released on Sapurdari was the same which had been allegedly recovered from the accused -- PW-6-complaiannt duly stated in her evidence that the bill of the mobile phone and the details of the Sim had been handed over to the police, but nowhere the IMEI number was mentioned nor the bill of the mobile phone saw the light of the day – Insofar as the amount of Rs.12,000/- is concerned, there is nothing to show that these were the same Rs.12,000/- rupees which had been snatched from the complainant -- Anyone could be in possession of a sum of Rs.12,000/- and the mere recovery of the same from the said person would not mean that they had been snatched from someone -- Recovery alleged to have been made in pursuance to the disclosure statement suffered by the respondent-accused not proved -- No reliance can be placed upon the disclosure statement – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 34, 377, 498A, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Matrimonial dispute – Unnatural offence – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Contesting parties have amicably resolved their issue, thus, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 6-8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Grievance of respondent No.2 was that petitioner is not solemnizing marriage and he had developed physical relation on the pretext of marriage -- Petitioner has solemnized marriage with the victim and her grievance stands resolved – She is happily cohabiting with the petitioner, thus, denial of prayer of the petitioner not only would be against the interest of petitioner but also victim and her family members -- FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal of accused -- Prosecution rests upon three circumstances (a) the alleged confessional statement of accused/ appellant made before PW-1 and PW-7; (b) prior animosity/“tension” between appellant and the deceased; and (c) the recovery of the keys of the shop of the deceased and his currency notes amounting to Rs.300/- on the asking of the accused/appellant -- There is a significant time gap between when the deceased was lastly seen and the time of the crime – In respect of recovery of keys and the money, there is no independent corroborated material except for the confessional statement of the accused, which also is not proven on record -- Keys, the currency notes and the blood stained clothes were not sent for chemical analysis -- Neither the chain of circumstances completely established nor the guilt of the accused alone, having committed the crime to be proven, much less beyond reasonable doubt -- Appeal allowed and the appellant acquitted of all the charges framed against him.

(Para 3, 16, 20, 24-29)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Quashing of complaint against partner/ wife – Vicarious liability – Partnership firm -- Cheque from personal account of husband -- Petitioner is not a signatory to the cheque and the said cheque was issued on personal account of accused No.1/ husband – Though the petitioner is a partner in the partnership firm and amounts were taken from the finance firm, it would not be proper for the complainant to prosecute the petitioner, who is not a signatory to the said cheque – Petitioner is not vicariously liable u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act -- Petition allowed.

(Para 3-6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174-A -- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 – Cheque bounce case -- Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174-A of IPC – Surrender and bail – Effect of -- Petitioner was declared proclaimed person, however, surrendered before the Trial Court and after noticing that he had not appeared earlier and since the offence in question is bailable, he was admitted to regular bail -- Later on, FIR u/s 174-A IPC was registered against the petitioner on the basis of the order declaring him proclaimed person -- FIR and all the consequent proceedings arising out of the same quashed. Rahul Dureja’s case, 2022(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 248 relied.

(Para 2-5)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15, 42 – NDPS case – Acquittal – Non-compliance of Section 42 of NDPS Act -- Secret information was not reduced into writing -- Consequently, there was no question of sending the secret information to the police station or higher police officers -- Thus, there was breach of mandatory provision of Section 42 of the Act and the learned Trial Court has wrongly convicted the appellant -- Appellant is liable to be acquitted.

(Para 12-14)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS case – Secret information – Ruqa -- Sending of ruqa for recording of the FIR in the police station can never be termed as sufficient compliance of Section 42 of the Act.

(Para 13)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 42 – NDPS case – Secret information – Information to higher police officers -- As per the mandate of Section 42 of the Act, when there is total and definite non-compliance of such statutory provisions, the question of prejudice looses its significance -- It will per se amount to prejudice.

(Para 13)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24, 27 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery memorandum – Non-preparation of – Acquittal of accused -- Trial court found that the evidence of PWs 10 to 12 before whom confession was made were contradictory to each other -- Conviction can be based on extra-judicial confession, but in the very nature of things, it is a weak piece of evidence – Trial court disbelieved the recovery of clothes and weapon on two grounds -- Firstly, that there was no memorandum statement of the accused as required u/s 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and secondly, the recovery of the knife was from an open place accessible to one and all –View taken by the trial court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal/impossible to warrant interference -- High Court has grossly erred in interfering with the well-reasoned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court -- Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant set aside – Acquittal by Trial Court, affirmed.

(Para 12-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227, 228 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings after framing of charges -- Inherent power of High court -- Without considering the application on merits to quash the criminal proceedings, the High Court dismissed the application as the discharge application is pending before Trial Court – In Anand Kumar Mohatta’s case (2019) 11 SCC 706 the Supreme Court observed and held that High court can exercise jurisdiction u/s 482 of Cr.P.C even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court -- Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced, and the allegations have materialized into a charge sheet -- On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge sheet after investigation -- Case remanded back to the High Court to consider the quashing petition/petition u/s 482 CrPC afresh in accordance with law and on its own merits at the earliest.

(Para 2-4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326, 324, 323, 506, 148, 149 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised in such like situation in order to prevent unnecessary vagaries of criminal trial to be faced by the parties, when there are remote chances of conviction of the accused – Impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed, on the basis of compromise qua the petitioners only.

(Para 1-6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 120-B, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR -- Agreement to sell – Breach of contract – FIR against vendor – Refund of earnest money -- No civil proceedings were initiated -- Had there been any civil proceedings initiated, the question of readiness and willingness of the vendee is also an aspect to be examined by the Court – In first complaint there were no allegations against the appellant rather it was only against the property dealers and only request was for return of the amount paid by the respondent No.2/ complainant -- Entire idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount allegedly paid -- Criminal Courts are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil disputes -- Complaint in question on the basis of which F.I.R. was registered was filed nearly three years after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed -- Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court -- Petition filed by appellant for quashing of F.I.R. allowed -- F.I.R. and all the subsequent proceedings therewith quashed.

(Para 8-14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 420, 120-B, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Breach of contract – Criminal proceedings – Sustainability of -- A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction -- Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings.

(Para 13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Abetment of suicide -- In order to bring the case within the purview of ‘Abetment’ u/s 107 IPC, there has to be an evidence with regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid on the part of the accused -- For the purpose proving the charge u/s 306 IPC, also there has to be an evidence with regard to the positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid to drive a person to commit suicide.

(Para 10)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Cruelty – Abetment of suicide -- Nothing comes out from evidence as to whether the death was suicidal or not -- None of the witnesses mother, father, uncle and mediator of marriage  examined by the prosecution had any knowledge as to whether the deceased had jumped into the well or she had accidently slipped into the well -- PW-21/ Doctor opined that the death of the deceased was due to the drowning as a result of Asphyxia, there was no opinion given by her nor any opinion was sought from her as to whether it was a suicide committed by the deceased or it was an accident by which she fell down in the well -- Even if it is presumed that the deceased had committed suicide, there was no evidence whatsoever adduced by the prosecution that there was an abetment on the part of any of the accused which had driven her to commit suicide -- No evidence worth the name to show that any of the appellants-accused had either instigated or intentionally aided or abetted the deceased to commit suicide or had caused any abetment as contemplated u/s Section 107 of the IPC -- While upholding the conviction of the appellants u/s 498A, appellants acquitted from the charges u/s 306 of IPC by giving them benefit of doubt.

(Para 11-17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A -- Suicide within 7 year of marriage – Presumption u/s 113-A of Evidence Act -- Mere fact of commission of suicide by itself would not be sufficient for the court to raise the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, and to hold the accused guilty of Section 306 IPC.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 24, 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- No one has seen the commission of crime -- Basic links in the chain of circumstances starts with motive, then move on to last seen theory, recovery, medical evidence, expert opinions if any and any other additional link which may be part of the chain of circumstances.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 -- Circumstantial evidence – Role of Motive -- In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive has an important role to play -- Motive may also have a role to play even in a case of direct evidence but it carries much greater importance in a case of circumstantial evidence than a case of direct evidence -- It is an important link in the chain of circumstances.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 201, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 24, 27 -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution not come forward with any motive – Dead body not recovered, only a limb was recovered but no DNA testing was carried out – In respect to last seen theory in the first information (PW-7) not mentioned that deceased left his house along with the appellant and ‘juvenile K’ although in his statement before the Trial Court stated so but when confronted with his statement u/s 161 CrPC and also about the entry in the police records, he had no explanation for the same -- PW-25/ mother, the main witness of the last seen stated that when she returned from the office around 5 PM on 19.06.2007, she saw deceased/son going out on the motor bike of his father and she followed her son upto the gate and saw the appellant and ‘juvenile K’ standing at the gate, this witness in her cross-examination when confronted with her statement u/s 161 CrPC said that no such statement is there, although according to her, she had told the Investigating Officer that she had seen the appellant and ‘juvenile K’ at her gate – If the extra-judicial confession accepted, the statement of last seen theory given by the mother (PW-25) becomes difficult to be given any credibility -- Recoveries which is an important link in the chain of circumstances the recoveries have been from an open place – Major links of the chain of circumstances have not been proved -- Appellant would be entitled to benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed and the appellant acquitted of all the charges.

(Para 15-22)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Retracted extra-judicial confession – Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and especially when it has been retracted during trial – It requires strong evidence to corroborate it and also it must be established that it was completely voluntary and truthful.

(Para 21)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 34 -- Attempt to murder -- Common intention -- Without there being any punishment to the main accused, who otherwise is main assailant, his accomplish cannot be burdened in isolation with the punishment of imprisonment -- Applying the principle of parity, appellant cannot be put at disparity, especially, considering the act/role done by main accused.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 34 – Attempt to murder -- Common intention -- There is a serious doubt of sharing of common intention by the appellant with main accused -- No material available on record to hold that appellant was already having knowledge that main accused is keeping knife in his pocket, that too for the purpose of causing murder of the injured (PW1) – Thus, for the act done by main accused, without there being a sound evidence of prior knowledge,  appellant should not be held guilty.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Attempt to murder -- Common intention -- Appellant charged u/s 307 r/w 34 of IPC -- Prosecution failed to put any material or the evidence while recording statement of the appellant u/s 313 Cr.P.C. referring therein the evidence regarding sharing of common intention by the appellant and then making attempt to cause murder -- Appellant acquitted of charges.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 96, 97, 103, 104, 105, 324, 326, 341 – Grievous hurt by dangerous weapon -- Acquittal -- Right of private defence -- Fields in which the occurrence took place was in the cultivating possession of the accused party -- Civil litigations pending between the parties pertaining to demarcation of the land -- Complainant party alongwith as many 200-250 persons went to the land in question for taking its possession, while the accused were working in the fields -- In this background, the complainant party had no right to aggress into the land in question for taking its possession – Held, accused party were within their legal right to defend themselves as well as their property -- If in the course of defending themselves, some injuries were caused to the complainant, the accused party could not be labelled as aggressors or even having exceeded their right of self defence – Acquittal of the accused upheld.

(Para 6-8)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 96, 97, 103, 104, 105 -- Right of private defence -- Plea of -- If the accused did not take a specific plea of self defence, it would not adversely affect their plea of self defence in the light of the evidence on record.

(Para 6)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 148, 149, 323, 324, 307, 302, 506 – Murder -- Appeal against acquittal -- Trial Court acquitting all the respondents/ accused holding that none of the eyewitnesses supported the case of the prosecution – In appeal High Court found that acquittal by Trial Court  was based on proper appreciation of evidence and facts – Held, in cases where a reversal of acquittal is sought, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, on grounds of it surviving the rigours of a full trial, is strengthened and stands fortified -- An additional layer of protection is granted to an accused -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 6, 11,12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Acquittal of accused -- Rash and negligent driving -- Victim was himself negligent as he tried to alight from a moving bus and fell down -- Victim was not supposed to alight from the moving bus unless it had come to a complete halt -- It cannot be stated that petitioner-bus driver drove the bus in rash and negligent manner so as to attract Section 304-A IPC -- Petitioner acquitted of the charges.

(Para 8-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 341, 506, 393, 509, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to commit robbery – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- FIR u/s 323, 341, 506 (393, 509, 34 added in challan) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners on the basis of compromise.

(Para 10, 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Causing death by negligence –Compromise quashing of FIR – Victim died due to electric shock -- Quashing of cases u/s 304-A IPC, other than roadside accidents, can be quashed -- In the closely-knit village community, when the parties have buried their hatchets, the continuation of criminal proceedings will not advance the reformative purposes of jurisprudence just for the sake of deterrence -- Continuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever – By invoking the inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC, FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the petitioners quashed.

(Para 1, 6, 7, 9, 19)

A. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 15, 21B(3), 23(2), 28 -- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 2(b) -- Divorce – Remarriage during pendency of appeal – Civil Contempt -- Section 21B(3) states that the appeal will be disposed expeditiously within a period of three months -- Despite a lapse of 13 years, the appeal has not been decided, though the Act casts upon a duty on the Appellate Court to dispose it off within three months – A spouse cannot be held guilty u/s 15 of the Act without referring to Section 21B(3) of the Act -- Spouse cannot be made to wait for endless period if the Court is not able of deciding the appeal, especially when the same has been admitted -- Contempt petition dismissed.

(Para 21(a)(b)(d)(e), 22)

B. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 15, 21B(3), 23(2), 28 -- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (70 of 1971), Section 2(b) -- Divorce – Remarriage during pendency of appeal – Civil Contempt -- Violation of Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act amounts to civil contempt under Section 2(b) of the Act -- However, when there is no specific restraint order from remarrying after three months period expired u/s 21B(3) for disposal of the appeal, considering that the respondent waited for 10 years and ultimately decided to move on to secure her future and performed the second marriage, no willful disobedience made out – Contempt petition dismissed.

(Para 21(f), 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 494 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 13, 15, 21B(3) -- Divorce – Remarriage during pendency of appeal – Bigamy – Suo-moto quashing of summoning order -- There is no specific restraint order from remarrying after three months period expired under Section 21B(3) for disposal of the appeal – Respondent waited for 10 years and ultimately decided to move on to secure her future and performed the second marriage -- Summoning order u/s 494 IPC observing that respondent-wife has performed the marriage in violation of Section 15 of Hindu Marriage Act not sustainable -- Suo moto power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. exercised, summoning order and subsequent prosecution in pursuance thereto quashed.

(Para 23)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 506, 148, 149 -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to murder – Compromise quashing of FIR – Petitioners submitted that there are no injuries as alleged in the FIR and offence u/s 307 IPC is not made out – Private respondents also affirmed the submissions and has submitted that there was no injury pertaining to the offence u/s 307 IPC and they have compromised the matter with their free will – Held, continuation of the proceedings would be merely an abuse of process of the Court and by allowing and accepting the prayer of the petitioners by quashing the FIR would be securing the ends of justice, which is primarily the object of the legislature enacting u/s 482 Cr.P.C -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners on the basis of compromise.

(Para 6, 7, 13, 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D, 506 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO -- Gang rape -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioner solemnized marriage with the victim and she is happily cohabiting with the petitioner, thus, denial of prayer of the petitioner not only would be against the interest of petitioner but also victim and her family members -- Further, there appears to be no chance of conviction, thus, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – FIR u/s 376D and 506 of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioner(s).

(Para 1-5)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), 375 Exception 2, 376 – POCSO – Rape – Consensual sex with wife aged above 15 years -- Acquittal of accused -- Incident of August-September, 2012 -- Parents and prosecutrix have not supported the prosecution case -- Prosecutrix specifically denied that she was kidnapped forcibly -- Prosecutrix married to the appellant and have also begotten a child out of the said wedlock -- Sexual act by the appellant with the prosecutrix, who are husband and wife, with the latter being above 15 years of age would not amount to rape as per Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC -- Conviction is not sustainable -- Appeal allowed, appellant is directed to be set at liberty.

(Para 4, 8-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 365, 376, 120B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR – Ordinarily FIR u/s 376 of IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise, however, in the present case, prosecutrix is duly wedded wife of one of the petitioners and others are close relatives of her husband – It further appears that FIR was outcome of family discord – Denial of prayer of the petitioners not only would be against the interest of petitioner but also victim and her family members – Further, there appears to be no chance of conviction, thus, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and it is well-known fact that courts are already overburdened – Petition allowed, FIR u/s 365, 376 and 120B of IPC and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner(s).

(Para 5)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Last seen theory based on circumstantial evidence may be a weak kind of evidence by itself to base conviction solely on such theory, when the said theory is proved coupled with other circumstances such as the time when the deceased was last seen with the accused, and the recovery of the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the accused does owe an explanation u/s 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to the circumstances under which death might have taken place -- If the accused offers no explanation or furnishes a wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established and some other corroborative evidence in the form of recovery of weapon etc. forming a chain of circumstances is established, the conviction could be based on such evidence.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 7, 27, 106 – Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Murder -- Homicidal death -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Petitioner had taken the deceased with him on the previous day evening and thereafter he was also seen with the deceased by the witness (PW-4) and the very next day early morning, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in the field at village -- Time gap between the period when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the corpse of the deceased being quite proximate, the non-explanation of the petitioner with regard to the circumstance under which and when the petitioner had departed the company of the deceased was a very crucial circumstance proved against him -- Enmity between the deceased and the petitioner had also surfaced -- Corroborative evidence with regard to recovery of the weapon-axe alleged to have been used in the commission of crime from the petitioner, also substantiated the case of prosecution -- Entire oral as well as documentary evidence having been threadbare considered by the Sessions Court as also High Court while holding the petitioner guilty of the charged offence – No need again reappreciate the same in the petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India – Special Leave Petition dismissed.

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 120-B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Bonafide purchaser – Forgery with bank records -- Quashing of FIR -- Petitioner purchased the remaining half share from PNB and thus, entire loan amount of the complainant stands liquidated -- It is co-accused, who had forged the fictitious clearance letter on the letter pad of the bank -- Petitioner or his vendors had nothing to do either with the loan initially taken or the guarantor or with the documents produced by them or with the fictitious clearance letter --  As per the reply of the respondent No.1/State, no criminal liability of the petitioner was found – Held, it will be a futile exercise to continue the proceedings of the FIR in question -- FIR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, qua the petitioner, quashed.

(Para 7-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Abetment of suicide -- No intentional aiding or goading or incitement on the part of the appellants -- A person living in penury, addicted to drugs and alcohol, with his family also having left him, not being able to manage the stresses of life and on finding himself having been driven to the wall, sadly ending the same by setting himself ablaze --  For this, the appellants cannot be held liable -- They could have been held liable for assault and simple hurt etc. but no charges were framed -- Appellants have undergone some amount of imprisonment also and they have also been facing the ordeal of trial for the last almost 13 years from the date of the incident – Judgment of conviction and the order of sentence are not sustainable -- Appeals allowed.

(Para 26-28)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 118, 138, 139 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Acquittal of accused -- Legal enforceable liability -- No direct transaction between the complainant and the accused-petitioner -- Entire story runs around the mother of the complainant, who is a vital witness, but she has not been produced and examined as a witness before the trial Court -- During obtaining loan from the bank, involvement of a third party witness was spoken by the complainant, but said person has not been examined as witness – Held, disputed question of facts and crucial persons like mother of the complainant and third party witness not being examined, conviction based on sole deposition of PW-1, the complainant, cannot be appreciated -- Complainant failed to establish "legally enforceable debt" -- Revision allowed, impugned judgment and order of sentence quashed.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A -- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (25 of 1955), Section 11 -- Void marriage – Conviction u/s 498-A IPC – Sustainability of -- Marriage found to be null and void, as such the conviction u/s 498-A IPC would not be sustainable. Shivcharan’s case (2007) 15 SCC 369 relied.

(Para 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 -- Acquittal of accused – Interference in -- Ld. trial Judge by an elaborate reasoning, arrived at after appreciation of evidence, has found that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – High court reversed the judgment – Held, in an appeal/revision, the High court could have set aside the order of acquittal only if the findings as recorded by the trial Court were perverse or impossible – No perversity in the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge -- Held, High Court ought not to have interfered with the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Judge -- Appeals allowed, judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside.

(Para 8-11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Rash and negligent driving – High speed of car itself is not an offence -- Testimony that the offending car came from the opposite side and struck against the motorcycle, all witnesses clearly stated that the car was being driven at high speed -- None of them whispered even a single word as to how the car was being driven in rash or negligent manner -- Accident took place on a wide road, driving car on such road at high speed, in itself does not amount to rash or negligent driving – Conviction set aside.

(Para 7-13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Rash and negligent driving – Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- Apparent from the testimony of eye-witnesses projected by the prosecution i.e. PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 that none of them saw the petitioner-accused driving the car at the spot -- Test Identification got conducted in the police station is of no relevance, as only accused was shown to PW-9 -- Identification of the accused for the first time in the Court, when the witnesses did not have the opportunity to see the face of the driver of the offending vehicle at the spot, is of no significance -- As per the FIR version, the car driver had fled from the spot after talking to ‘S’, who was occupying one of the motorcycle, prosecution gave up PW - ‘S’ for reasons best known to it -- Had ‘S’ been examined and established the identity of accused as car driver, then statement of other witnesses could have been believed that it is the accused, who was driving the car – Held, prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused – Conviction set aside.

(Para 10-13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rash and negligent driving – Criminal liability of owner of vehicle – Release of vehicle on superdari – Effect of -- Accused-petitioner is the registered owner of the offending car and he got the car released on superdari as owner but this in itself cannot be a reason to draw conclusion that he was driving the offending car at the relevant time -- PW-9 deposed that car was occupied by two persons and he cannot say as to who was driving the car – Ld. First Appellate Court fell in grave error by observing that as the accused was the owner of the car, so it was for him to explain u/s 106 of the Evidence Act as to who was driving his car -- Onus was on the prosecution to prove that it is the accused-petitioner, who was driving the offending car at the relevant time, which the prosecution has failed to establish -- Conviction set aside.

(Para 11-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce case – Quashing of complaint and summoning order – Cheque was issued by brother of petitioner no.2 -- Said cheque was not issued by him as an authorized signatory of the petitioner-firm -- Petitioners admittedly are neither signatory to the cheque in question, nor was it drawn from their bank account -- Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for an offence u/s 138 of the NI Act -- Even if the loan amount had been deposited in the bank account of petitioner No.2, it would still not be sufficient enough ground to fasten his liability u/s 138 of the NI Act – Petition allowed, complaint and summoning order quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 6,7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 353, 186, 506, 341, 323, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 195 – Quashing of FIR u/s 186 IPC -- Bar provided u/s 195 read with Section 190 Cr.P.C. is a condition requisite for initiation of proceedings and cognizance of offence punishable u/s 172 to 188 IPC both inclusive cannot be taken except on the complaint in writing by the person as prescribed u/s 195 Cr.P.C – Addition of other offences cannot have an effect of diluting bar as contained in Section 195 qua offence punishable u/s 186 IPC – Prosecution of the petitioners u/s 186 IPC cannot be sustained -- However, qua rest of the offences u/s Sections 341, 353, 332, 506, 34 IPC, the proceedings ordered to continue.

(Para 8-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 498A, 427, 504, 506 -- Constitution of India, Article 142 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Matrimonial dispute -- Compromise quashing of FIR / Charge -- High Court rejected the quashing petition -- Held, in cases of offences relating to matrimonial disputes, if the Court is satisfied that the parties have genuinely settled the disputes amicably, then for the purpose of securing ends of justice, criminal proceedings inter-se parties can be quashed – Petition allowed, criminal proceedings in charge sheet arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 4-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised with care and caution and sparingly -- To wit, exercise of the said power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of process of law.

(Para 3)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 156(3) – Registration of FIR -- In order to cause registration of an F.I.R. and consequential investigation based on the same the petition filed u/s 156(3), Cr.P.C., must satisfy the essential ingredients to attract the alleged offences – If such allegations in the petition are vague and are not specific with respect to the alleged offences it cannot lead to an order for registration of an F.I.R. and investigation on the accusation of commission of the offences alleged.

(Para 10)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468, 420, 120B -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature -- Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. -- Circumstances, coupled with the fact that in respect of the issue involved is of civil nature, the respondent had already approached the jurisdictional civil court by instituting a civil suit and it is pending -- Attempt on the part of the respondent is to use the criminal proceedings as weapon of harassment against the appellants – Case invites invocation of the power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR -- Permitting continuance of the criminal proceedings against the appellants in the aforesaid circumstances would result in abuse of the process of Court and also in miscarriage of justice – FIR and all further proceeding based on the same qua the appellants are quashed and set aside.

(Para 11,12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Breach of promise to marry – Rape -- Difference between giving a false promise and committing breach of promise -- In case of false promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfill his promise -- So, it would be a folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to prosecute a person for the offence u/s 376 IPC – Appellant/ accused acquitted from the charges levelled against him.

(Para 20-25)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 277 – Language of record of evidence – General direction to all Courts -- Evidence of the witness has to be recorded in the language of the court or in the language of the witness as may be practicable and then get it translated in the language of the court for forming part of the record --  However, recording of evidence of the witness in the translated form in English language only, though the witness gives evidence in the language of the court, or in his/her own vernacular language, is not permissible -- As such, the text and tenor of the evidence and the demeanor of a witness in the court could be appreciated in the best manner only when the evidence is recorded in the language of the witness -- Original deposition of the witness has to be taken into account and not the translated memorandum in English prepared by the Presiding Judge – Directions given to all courts that while recording the evidence of the witnesses, shall duly comply with the provisions of Section 277 of Cr.PC.

(Para 25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 328 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 – Adulteration of tea with intoxicant substance – Burdon of proof -- Admission u/s 313 Cr.P.C. by the appellant-accused qua bringing tea does not absolve the prosecution from discharging the onus of proof regarding the tea, which was consumed by complainant, being adulterated with any stupefying or intoxicant substance -- No concrete evidence available on record, either forensic or medical, to support the version of the prosecution, except the bald statement of the complainant himself -- Appellant-accused deserves the benefit of doubt -- Appeal allowed, verdict of conviction, and, order of sentence set aside.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304-B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113-A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Dowry death – Abetment to suicide – Acquittal of accused – Leave to appeal -- Presumption u/s 113-A of Indian Evidence Act -- Principles

(1) The presumption carried in the Indian Evidence Act, is attractable only when the charge drawn against the accused is for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC.

(2) The said statutory provision has a limited effect, in respect of a charge drawn under Section 304-B of the IPC, as the implied presumption, created through the words “shall be deemed to have caused her death”, which hence occur at the end of the relevant statutory provisions, yet do not discharge, the prosecution from adducing evidence qua the deceased being meted cruelty or harassment, in respect of demands of dowry, as, made upon her by her husband, or by his relatives.

(3) That the statutory phrase “and it is shown” which segregates the first, and, second component of the relevant discharging section, cast a conjunctive onus, upon the prosecution to prove the earlier, and, later components' of the relevant charging sections.

(4) That the word “shall be deemed to have caused her death” do not ever discharge the prosecution from adducing evidence rather for unflinchingly proving both the components, as carried in sub-Section (1) of Section 304-B of the IPC.

(5) The evidence necessary for proving the above foundational facts, rather for supporting the ingredients, as carried in Section 304-B IPC, is required to be always adduced by the prosecution, and, the implied presumption, gets strengthened only, when the defence omits to put the relevant exculpatory suggestions to the PWs concerned, and/or fails to secure a favourable answer thereto, rather from the PWs concerned.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court --Leave to appeal against the verdict of acquittal dismissed.

(Para 19, 24)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 511 – Rape – Attempt to rape – Acquittal of accused -- Variant stands of prosecutrix – Evidence of offence -- Principles

1. For determining the occurrence of blatant, and, gross improvements or embellishments, made by the prosecutrix in her testification, made before the learned Court below, rather with her previously made statement in writing, a keenest perusal of both has to be made.

2. In case the prosecutrix has made variant stands, at different stages of the investigations, about the date and time of the occurrence, thereupon, such variant stands, do become the plank for making a conclusion, that the prosecutrix has made open, rife, and, blatant improvements or embellishments from her earliest recorded statement in writing.

3. In case the prosecutrix makes variant attributions of criminality to the accused respectively in her statement, recorded by the police, and, before the learned Judicial Magistrate concerned, thereupon, the said variant stands or inter se digression(s), would leave this Court to conclude, that such digression(s) are rife, and, blatant, and, thus the deposition of the prosecutrix, would be construed to be not amenable for assigning any creditworthiness thereto.

4. In case there is an attribution qua the accused that during the course of the relevant occurrence, he had broken the cord of her salwar, thereupon, it became imperative upon the investigating officer concerned, to collect the salwar as well as the broken cord thereof. Omission to make the above collections would also make deep inroads into the veracity of the genesis of the prosecution case.

For the reasons assigned, no reason to interfere with the impugned verdict of acquittal, as made by the learned trial Court -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 1, 20, 21)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 467, 468, 471, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 41 – Forged Will – Quashing of FIR – Genuineness of Will upheld upto Supreme Court  in probate proceedings – A judgment by a probate Court as per Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act is in rem -- Whether any Court will be able to ignore the findings of the Civil Court regarding genuineness of the Will, answer is no – FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 1, 6, 12-13)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200, 202 -- Accused residing beyond jurisdiction – Issuance of process -- Enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C – Requirement of – Magistrate did not comply with the provision of Section 202 Cr.P.C., even though the petitioners reside outside the jurisdiction of the court – Non-compliance of Section 202 Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate before issuance of process is prima facie an abuse of process of Court/ law – Impugned order set aside/ quashed -- Matter remitted to the learned Magistrate for considering the matter afresh as per the relevant provision of law.

(Para 19-26)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 376, 506 and 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise/ partial quashing of FIR  -- Petition qua petitioner no. 2 already withdrawn -- Contesting parties amicably resolved their issue -- There appears to be no chance of conviction -- Continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time and courts are already over-burdened – Petition allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua petitioner no. 1 and 3.

(Para 2-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Petitioner solemnized marriage with complainant and both are residing together -- There appears to be no chance of conviction, the continuance of the proceedings would just waste valuable judicial time -- FIR and all other consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 7)