Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 377 – Appeal against sentence – Scope of -- Acquittal from serious offence – Conviction in lesser offence -- When a person is charged with a graver offence but is convicted of the lesser offences, the same amounts to the acquittal of the serious offence and it is not permissible for the High Court to convert the lesser offence into serious offence in an appeal for enhancement of sentence --  High Court can only enhance the sentence provided for the lesser offence of which the person was found guilty.

(Para 11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Acquittal -- Appellant/ complainant happened to be the sole eyewitness but he had neither seen anyone killing his son nor he had deposed that he had seen anyone burning the victim -- He has not deposed anything as to why he had not tried to intervene and save his son from assault or stop the accused persons from taking him away in the car -- He himself had not received any injuries – Appellant/ complainant stated in the FIR that the accused assaulted his son with a knife and iron rod -- He didn’t mention about the use of a pistol by the accused -- However, the police have recovered empty cartridge -- Cause of death as per postmortem is also firing from close range --  Presence of the appellant/ complainant even during the incident appears to be doubtful – Acquittal, upheld.

(Para 8-14)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- NDPS Case – Appeal against acquittal -- Recovery of 15 Kg 600 grams of poppy straw – Independent witness -- Material contradictions in the statements of the police officials regarding setting up of ‘naka’, chasing of the vehicle of the respondents and arrest -- These contradictions assume greater importance and significance when no independent witnesses, though available, have been associated at the time of the alleged recovery -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 26-29, 37)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- NDPS Case – Appeal against acquittal -- Recovery of 15 Kg 600 grams of poppy straw – Accused fled away -- If the respondents had fled away from the spot where ‘naka’ had been laid, then Court see no reason why the police party should not have chased the vehicle of the respondents till the time they were not actually apprehended and why the police party simply stopped, where respondent No.2 is alleged to have thrown jute sack containing poppy straw -- Every reasonable police personnel would have continued chasing the respondents until apprehended – It makes the entire prosecution case unreliable and highly doubtful -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 29, 37)

C. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- NDPS Case – Appeal against acquittal -- Recovery of 15 Kg 600 grams of poppy straw – Facsimile of seal -- Exhibit PX is the report of the Laboratory wherein it is mentioned that the seals on the gunny bag parcel were tallied with the seal impression sent by the SHO on form NCB-1 i.e. Ext. PW16/A -- However, a perusal of Ext. PW16/A shows that facsimile of seal ‘A’ affixed on this form is not at all clear or legible -- This assumes importance because it has not at all been mentioned in the report that the seals on the gunny bag were compared with the sample seals or the sample seals were deposited in the laboratory along with the case property – Ld. Special Judge rightly observed, it cannot be said with certainty that the case property which was examined in the laboratory was the same which was allegedly recovered from the respondents -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 32-34, 37)

D. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 15 -- NDPS Case – Appeal against acquittal -- Recovery of 15 Kg 600 grams of poppy straw – Non-examination of car -- Specific case of the prosecution that some dust of ‘Chura Post’ was lying on the rear seat of the car which car was then taken possession of by the police -- If that be so, then why photographs of the ‘Chura Post’ that was stated to be lying on the rear seat of the car were not taken and, above all, why the so-called dust of ‘Chura Post’ was not sent for chemical analysis, is not at all forthcoming – Held, there is no material on record which may remotely suggest that the respondents had kept the jute bag containing ‘Chura Post’ on the backseat of the car and thereafter had thrown the same, as alleged by the prosecution – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 35-37)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case  -- Demand Notice -- If in a notice while giving the break-up of the claim the cheque amount interest, damages, etc. are separately specified and these additional claims would be severable, such demand would not invalidate the notice -- In a notice of demand made under the N.I. Act demand shall not be omnibus, there must be a clear demand for the cheque amount lest notice will be invalid.

(Para 6)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Cheque bounce case  -- Invalid Demand Notice – Quashing of summoning order -- Omnibus demand for Rs.6,50,000/- was made in addition to the demand for interest @12 per annum since the date of returning of the cheque, Rs.50,000/- towards damages and Rs.5,500/- as notice charge -- Demand is omnibus as relates the amount of Rs.6,50,000/-, it is not the cheque amount – Notice of demand is invalid – Summoning order quashed.

(Para 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Abetment of suicide -- Two suicide notes -- Suicide notes recovered from the person of the deceased mentions that he had loaned Rs. 3,00,000/- to the respondent-accused seven months ago and since he was demanding his money back, she had been blackmailing him -- Different pens and inks were used in writing the suicide notes -- There is no proximity between the alleged act of the accused-respondent and suicide of the deceased – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 7-16)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Abetment of suicide -- Appeal against acquittal -- Power of the Appellate Court to unsettle the order of acquittal on the basis of re-appreciation of the evidence is subject to the settled law that where two views are possible and out of the two, one points towards the innocence of the accused, the view which favours the accused should prevail over the other pointing towards his guilt – No perversity or illegality pointed out – Appeal dismissed.

(Para 14-16)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint – Order declaring the petitioner proclaimed person and the order for registration of FIR u/s 174-A IPC quashed.

(Para 9-13)

A. Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 22 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Covid-19 proclamation – Non-wearing of mask -- When the proclamation was in force, the petitioner was noticed on a public street in the morning at 6.30 am, and when the police officials asked him to wear a mask, he did not cooperate and argued with the police -- It is not alleged that the petitioner was in somebody else's company -- Petitioner was walking alone, so even if he was not wearing a mask, he did not commit any offence that would violate Section 188 IPC – FIR quashed.

(Para 9-12)

B. Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 22 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Covid-19 proclamation – Non-wearing of mask -- It is not the complainant’s case that the petitioner in any manner was instrumental in causing any injury, that is, by spreading the Covid 19 -- Further there is no evidence like medical record that he was tested for Covid or had any visible symptoms thereof -- Thus, in the absence of any harm or obstruction caused to anybody, not wearing of mask would not tantamount to violation of Section 188 IPC -- FIR quashed.

(Para 12)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 -- NDPS Case -- Independent witness -- Association of independent witness is not the requirement of law -- Conviction can be recorded on the basis of statement of police witnesses only, provided their statements inspire confidence and are consistent with the hypothesis suggested against the accused.

(Para 22)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 21 -- NDPS Case – Acquittal -- Material contradictions in the statements of spot witnesses -- Statement of investigating officer, clearly appears that either he was not on the spot or he had manipulated the records with some ulterior motives -- His entire version is quite contrary to the prosecution story – A serious doubt has been created and it is cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that every doubt in prosecution story has to benefit the cause of accused -- In such circumstances the omission of the Investigating Officer to associate independent witness also assumes significance – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 29-35)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 320, 397, 401 -- Cheque bounce complaint -- Conviction by trial Court affirmed by Appellate Court – Acquittal on compromise --  Once a settlement is being effected, then in terms of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 320 Cr.P.C., the accused ought to be acquitted as the offence stands compounded -- Revision petition allowed and the judgment of Appellate Court and judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court set aside -- Petitioner acquitted.

(Para 8-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Abetment to suicide – Quashing of summoning order -- Borrowing of Rs, 60,000/- -- Incident in shop of the first appellant threatening and assaulting complainant and her husband was on 15th June 2017 -- After that, notice u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was issued by “S” to the deceased on 27th June 2017 -- Suicide note was written three days after that, on 30th June 2017 -- Deceased committed suicide three days thereafter -- No allegation that any act was done by the appellants in the close proximity to the date of suicide -- By no stretch of the imagination, the alleged acts of the appellants can amount to instigation to commit suicide -- Offence punishable u/s 306 of IPC not made out -- Continuation of prosecution will be nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 8-13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107 – Abetment to suicide -- Mens-rea – Instigation -- To attract the first clause, there must be instigation in some form on the part of the accused to cause the deceased to commit suicide --  Hence, the accused must have mens rea to instigate the deceased to commit suicide -- The act of instigation must be of such intensity that it is intended to push the deceased to such a position under which he or she has no choice but to commit suicide -- Such instigation must be in close proximity to the act of committing suicide.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Punjab Travel Professionals’ Regulation Act, 2012, Section 13 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Parties  have settled their dispute amicably -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted -- FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 2, 7, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 386, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 482 – Quashing of FIR – After filing of the challan, charges have already been framed by the trial Court – Petitioner has already filed criminal complaint so as to put forth his stand – No justification for quashing of the FIR.

(Para 3, 4)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 120-B -- Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 3, 7 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR/ Chargesheet -- Prosecution's case is that a hydrocarbon mixture was found in the seized tanker, which was being sold by the appellants, representing it to be petrol or diesel – Samples were sent more than two years back for testing, and  report has not yet received -- In the absence of the report, taking the charge sheet as it is, no material is placed on record to show that the liquid in the tanker was neither diesel nor petrol but a mixture of hydrocarbons -- Allegation of cheating is also made on the footing that thousands of customers were supplied with the said mixture instead of petrol or diesel -- It is too late for the State to file a report after a gap of more than two years -- Continuation of the prosecution will be an abuse of the process of law – FIR and the consequent charge sheet filed thereon are quashed and set aside.

(Para 6-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306, 323, 120-B, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Abetment to suicide – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Deceased himself had not left any suicide note alleging anything against the petitioner -- Cause of death was not of any injuries or any attributable act, rather, the same is stated to be by consuming of poison by the deceased -- Complaint by the father of the deceased only, who has already compromised the matter with the petitioner -- Offence u/s 306 IPC can be quashed on the basis of compromise – FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 8-10)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Insecticides Rules, 1971, Rule 27(5) -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 197, 468(2)(c), 470(3), 482 – Complaint under Insecticides Act -- Limitation – Cognizance of complaint -- Sanction Period consumed for obtaining the consent of the State Government to launch the prosecution is liable to be excluded while computing the limitation period -- If period of 5 months and 17 days is excluded for the purpose of computation of limitation, the complaint instituted after 5 years, 6 days from the date of commencement of limitation is beyond limitation period – Summoning order and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed for the reasons that complaint itself is not maintainable, being barred by limitation.

(Para 12-22)

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 (X), (XIV), (XV) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 504, 506 & 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Criminal intimidation -- Offence under SC/ ST Act – Compromise quashing of FIR -- No useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive -- It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted – FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 7, 8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 148, 149, 325, 285 IPC -- Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 27 – Attempt to murder -- Summoning as additional accused -- No specific allegation by the complainant except deposing in the statement that the petitioner No.2 was also sitting in the car, which was being driven by some other person at the time of the incident – It would not satisfy the test laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh's case 2014(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 623 = (2014) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 14978 – Criteria for summoning a person as an additional accused to face the trial with other accused, is higher than the criteria required by the police to file a challan – Revision allowed --  Summoning order set aside.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Recovery during police custody – Admission of guilt -- Evidential value -- It is only the factum of recovery of the articles which can be taken into account and the statement made, if any, while getting the articles recovered which is to the effect of admission of guilt is to be discarded.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27, 106 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Knowledge of PW/ Lambardar is in the nature of hear-say evidence that he had actually overheard some persons naming appellant as the murderer -- PW-3 with whom extra-judicial confession made stepped into the witness box did not support the case of the prosecution and was declared hostile -- Recovery of the auto-rickshaw on its own cannot be said to be an incriminating piece of evidence – Nothing on record either to show that the blood stain found on the recovered ‘datar’ and on the cardigan were of the same blood group or that the same matched with the blood group of the deceased – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 21-25)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Law postulates two-fold requirements before reliance can be placed upon the same :

(i) Every link in the chain of the circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

(ii) All the circumstances must be consistent pointing only towards the guilt of the accused.

(Para 22)

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 (57 of 1994), Sections 4, 5(2) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 120-B – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Determination of sex of the foetus – Quashing of FIR -- Cognizance on police report – Permissibility of -- A complaint has to be filed – Complaint has already been filed by the competent authority -- Police cannot register an independent FIR, on its own -- Police after registering FIR have presented the report u/s 173 Cr.P.C., directly to the Court --  FIR quashed, however, the material collected by the police during the investigation of the said FIR permitted to be used as evidence in the complaint case, subject to the proof of the same, in accordance with law.

(Para 7-9)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Proclaimed offender – Compromise quashing of FIR – Special Power of attorney -- A proclaimed offender cannot seek quashing of the FIR on the basis of a compromise, more so, when he is absconding in multiple cases pending against him -- He cannot short circuit the system by filing petitions through Powers of Attorney unless he was a minor, insane, suffering from disability or for certain compelling circumstances is unable to appear in person.

(Para 8)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 52A, 53, 57 -- NDPS Case – Acquittal -- Sample of contraband/ narcotic substance – Presence/ Certification by Magistrate – Requirement of -- No evidence on record to the effect that the procedure prescribed under sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 52A of the NDPS Act was followed -- In the absence of any material on record to establish that the samples of the seized contraband were drawn in the presence of the Magistrate and that the inventory of the seized contraband was duly certified by the Magistrate, seized contraband and the samples drawn therefrom would not be a valid piece of primary evidence in the trial -- Trial as a whole stands vitiated – Held, failure of the concerned authorities to lead primary evidence vitiates the conviction – Conviction and sentence/ fine set aside – Appeal allowed.

(Para 12-19)

A. Punjab Pre-mature Release of Life Convicts Policy, 2011 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Life sentence till death – Pre-mature release -- Order of the trial Court in sentencing the petitioner to undergo imprisonment for life, with a rider to extend to full life, is clearly in violation of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Sriharan @ Murugan, 2016 (7) SCC 192 -- Such a sentence can be passed either by High Court or by Hon’ble Supreme Court only -- State authorities are not debarred from considering the case of the petitioner for premature release in the light of its policy dated 08.08.2011.

(Para 21-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 426, 427 – Murder -- Life sentence – Subsequent sentence – Concurrent running of Sentence -- Petitioner is already undergoing life imprisonment, therefore, even if she has been convicted and sentenced subsequently, the subsequent sentence is to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of life imprisonment.

(Para 34-36)

C. Constitution of India, Article 161, 226, 227 -- Punjab Pre-mature Release of Life Convicts Policy, 2011 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374 -- Murder -- Life sentence till death by Trial Court – Appeal against conviction pending – Pre-mature release – Petitioner/ lady has already undergone 17 years 2 months and 20 days of actual sentence (Total sentence including remission 22 years 7 months) -- Conduct of the convict during the last five years is to be taken into account -- Jail offence was committed more than 9 years ago -- Conviction and jail offence in question cannot be the reason to withhold the case of the petitioner for premature release -- Respondent-authorities directed to consider the premature release case of the petitioner -- Till the decision is taken by the competent authority regarding premature release of the petitioner as per this order, she be released on interim bail on furnishing requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the ld. CJM concerned -- Order is subject to the final outcome of the Petitioner’s appeal.

(Para 19, 37-45)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of Company -- High Court quashed the criminal proceedings as against respondent nos. 2 and 3 on the ground that they were not the Directors of the Company in default, on the date when the cheques were issued for encashment – Submission that they were Directors of the Company on the date of issue of cheques and further that they had signed the cheques as authorised signatories of the Company not disputed – Trial Court to decide the pending trial expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months -- Impugned order passed by High Court set aside.

(Para 3-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Quashing of summoning order – Revenue entry for more share of land -- Sale-deed based upon expired GPA – Stay was in operation – Effect of -- Allegation that petitioner and her mother in collusion with the revenue officials illegally, despite having the knowledge that their entitlement was only to the extent of 1/5th share, had got their share entered to the extent of 1/4th and thereafter, taking benefit of the error in the entries in the Jamabandi had fraudulently alienated the land to the extent of 1/4th – Held, essential ingredient to attract the mischief of Section 420 of the IPC is clearly amiss -- Complainant has not parted with the property -- Sale of the land, during the time when the stay was in operation, would at best give rise to action for contempt of Court and similarly, registration of sale deed on the basis of expired GPA, would not attract the mischief of Section 420 of the IPC -- Summoning order u/s 420 of the IPC along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed qua the petitioners.

(Para 11-17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating -- Essential ingredients to attract the mischief of Section 420 of the IPC are:

(i) the accused must have intentionally deceived someone;

(ii) by the said deception, the accused must have induced the person so deceived (a) to deliver any property (b) to make alter, or destroy the whole or part of the valuable security or anything which is signed or sealed and which is being capable of being converted into a valuable security;

(iii) the accused had dishonest intention at the inception.

(Para 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375 Exception 2, 294, 376(2)(n), 377, 498A, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape/ Unnatural offence – Husband and wife – Second marriage without divorce -- Quashing of FIR -- As per the amended definition of section 375 (2013), if offender and victim are husband and wife then consent is immaterial and no offence u/s 375 is made out and as such there is no punishment u/s 376 of IPC -- There is repugnancy in the situation when everything is repealed u/s 375 then how offence u/s 377 would be attracted if it is committed between husband and wife.

-- Marriage was solemnized between petitioner and complainant as per Adivasi customs and approval to second marriage for tribes and considered its legal sanctity, the marriage of the petitioner even though divorce from first wife did not take place, cannot be considered to be illegal act on the part of the petitioner as also respondent No.2 has admitted that she is the wife of the petitioner.

-- Petitioner is not punitive for the offence punishable u/s 376(2)(n) and Section 377 of IPC -- For constituting offence u/s 498-A IPC, there is no allegation of any demand of dowry -- For other offences i.e. Sections 294 and 506 of IPC, no date, place and time has been disclosed and as such the complaint is a malicious prosecution as there was inter se dispute between husband and wife.

Petition allowed, FIR quashed.

(Para 11-22)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed person – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the complaint -- FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising out of the FIR quashed.

(Para 9-13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 -- Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal -- Prosecution examined only 3 witnesses -- PW1 and PW2 disclosed in their cross-examination that they had seen the accused for the first time in the Court – PW3/ Doctor proved the postmortem report of the deceased – Prosecution did not examine the Investigating Officer of the case – Prosecution did not prove the site plan of the place of accident or the mechanical examination reports of the vehicles involved in the accident -- Identity of accused/ driver not established -- Conviction by the trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law -- Revision petition allowed, impugned judgments of conviction set aside.

(Para 8-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 279, 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397, 401 -- Death by rash and negligent driving – Acquittal -- Prosecution examined 3 witnesses -- PW1 and PW2 were the occupants of the tractor trolley, though both of them deposed about the manner of accident, but as per their statements, the truck driver had fled away – None of them seen the truck driver at the spot, both disclosed in their cross-examination that they had seen the accused for the first time in the Court – The only other witness examined by the prosecution is PW3-Doctor, who proved the postmortem report of the deceased -- Prosecution did not examine the Investigating Officer -- Prosecution did not prove the site plan of the place of accident or the mechanical examination reports of the vehicles involved in the accident -- Impugned judgments of conviction as recorded by the trial Court and as affirmed by the Appellate Court set aside.

(Para 9-12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Cheque bounce complaint – Acquittal by trial court – Leave to appeal -- Cheque book lost complaint on 7.4.2014 whereas the cheques were presented in August, 2014 -- Applicant failed to give details of month and year when loan was given -- Complainant except making a bald statement that he had advanced the loan, miserably failed to prove existence of legally enforceable debt – Signatures on the cheques not disputed, will in itself be not sufficient for conviction of the respondent – Cheque was returned not only for the reason that payment was stopped but also for material alteration having not been signed by the drawer -- View taken by the court is plausible one – Application for leave to appeal dismissed.

(Para 10-13)

Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (102 of 1956), Section 15(2), 15(3) – Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (34 of 1971), Section 3, 4 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Medical termination of pregnancy – Quashing of FIR -- Sale of MTP Kit itself cannot be said to be an offence punishable under the MTP Act -- FIR and the proceedings subsequent thereto cannot be allowed to continue – Petition allowed – FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 4, 5)

Punjab Excise Act, 1914 (Punjab Act 1 of 1914), Section 61, 1, 14, 75 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 , 482 – Excise matter – Quashing of FIR -- FIR on 25.01.2016, the challan before the trial Court on 03.10.2020 – Reports of sample came on 04.07.2017, whereafter permission u/s 75 of the Act was sought from the Commissioner on 06.02.2020, which was received vide letter dated 24.09.2020 – Held, the prosecution as contemplated by Section 75(2) of the Act cannot said to have been launched within a period of one year of commission of the offence -- Considering the provision of Section 468 CrPC also, the period of three years for taking cognizance by the Court had expired even prior to 06.02.2020 – Proceedings are required to be dropped – FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 3, 4, 7)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195 – False evidence – Prosecution u/s 195 IPC – Locus standi -- Where false evidence is given in Court then, proceedings can be initiated only on the basis of a complaint in writing by that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate -- No proceeding can be maintained at the instance of a private individual even though he may be the person aggrieved in some manner.

(Para 11)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195 – Acquittal of accused -- False evidence – Prosecution u/s 195 IPC --  In the judgment of acquittal, there is no specific finding of the Court as to the giving of false evidence by the respondents/ accused -- Merely because the petitioner was acquitted in FIR would not by itself be a ground to hold that false evidence had been given during the course of proceedings of that case.

(Para 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 269, 270, 188, 341, 506 -- Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Covid-19 FIR – Illegal mining – Visit by political person -- Quashing of FIR:

-- In a democratic country, if a well-established political person, on hearing serious complaints regarding any public issue, decides to verify the same by visiting the spot itself, it cannot be said that he intended to violate any promulgation issued by any government under Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 or Disaster Management Act, 2006.

-- Petitioner had gone on hearing the complaints of illegal mining was a riverbed, which was not at all habited, and the workers had fled away on noticing the presence of the petitioner -- No evidence that at any point in time, the petitioner was having any symptoms of COVID-19 infection -- No other evidence collected by the investigator against the petitioner, which may call for violation of Sections 269, 270, 188, 341, 506 IPC, and Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.

Continuation of criminal proceedings shall amount to an abuse of the process of law, and the Court invokes its inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings -- Petition allowed.

(Para 12-22)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Wrongful restraint -- Visit by political person -- On noticing the presence of the petitioner/ accused on the spot, the workers of the complainant firm had voluntarily fled away -- Petitioner claims that he visited the spot to check the ground reality about the allegations of illicit mining in an environmentally susceptible riverbed area, on receiving significant complaints being the people’s representative, watcher, and mouthpiece -- There is no evidence about stopping sand-laden vehicles or the vehicles going to ferry the sand -- No case for prosecution u/s 341 IPC.

(Para 16, 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 341 – Illegal mining –Visit by political person -- Criminal intimidation -- Petitioner claims that his objective was to check and find out the ground reality of various complaints received by him -- But no threat was made by the petitioner to anybody -- Petitioner's conduct at the spot does not point out any criminal intimidation -- Invocation of Section 506 IPC is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.

(Para 18, 19)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Cheque bounce complaint – Retirement of partner – Public notice -- Quashing of summoning order and complaint -- Premises owned by the appellants was taken on rent by the respondent no.3/firm – Issuance of cheques for rent -- High Court quashed the summoning order and complaints against respondent no.1 accepting the plea that he had retired from the partnership firm – Held, plea not tenable, it would be a matter of evidence to be proved before the trial Court, as to whether any Retirement Deed was issued and a public notice concerning the same was issued, before the complaints were filed -- Not the case set up by the respondent no.1 that in the Partnership Deed he was a sleeping partner in the firm -- Retirement Deed could not be taken on its face value, and treated as clinching evidence to quash the complaints -- Order passed by High Court set aside -- Complaints revived.

(Para 14-21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(4), 482 -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A – Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed offender – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act was for an offence other than aforesaid offences specified in sub section (4) of the section 82 of CR.P.C. – Order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender was/ is not legal -- Said order is the basis of the registration of the FIR u/s 174A IPC against the petitioner and is, therefore, fatal to the FIR in question -- Moreover, petitioner already been acquitted by the trial Court -- Impugned FIR and all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom are liable to be quashed -- FIR alongwith all consequential proceedings arising there from against the petitioner quashed.

(Para 2.3, 7.2-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 195 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – FIR u/s 174A of IPC -- Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), in its present form, encompasses Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) within its purview.

(Para 12.13-12.16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclaimed person/ Proclaimed offender – Procedure -- Courts meticulously adhere to the statutory requirements in letter and spirit both, duly reflecting their compliance on the record prior to pronouncing an individual as a proclaimed person or offender and invoking criminal liability.

(Para 13.1)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Proclaimed person/ Proclaimer offender – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Mandate of -- There is no mandatory prescription in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the Court to invariably initiate separate criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 174-A IPC in every instance where an individual fails to appear as summoned by way of proclamation -- Courts should act judiciously and exercise circumspection before embarking on the stringent path of instituting criminal proceedings u/s 174-A of IPC.

(Para 13.4)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Proclaimed person/ Proclaimer offender – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Order declaring the petitioner as proclaimed person is wholly silent as to when the proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner was issued; what was the date specified therein for the petitioner to appear in Court; when the proclamation was actually published; whether it was publicly read in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which the petitioner ordinarily resided; whether it was affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which the petitioner ordinarily resided or to some conspicuous place of such town or village; whether a copy thereof was also affixed to some conspicuous part of the court-house -- Further, the order does not contain a statement by the Court to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day and in the manner specified in clause (i) of Sub-Section (2) -- These facts were not even noticed in the order passed by the Court – Order is totally non-speaking and does not at all show that while passing it, the Court had applied its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances and taken any conscious decision that it was a fit case to invoke criminal liability of the petitioner for offence u/s 174-A of IPC -- It was/is cryptic, non-speaking and mechanical order sans any reasons or application of mind – Order declaring proclaimed person and FIR Quashed.

(Para 15-17)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Proclaimed person/ Proclaimed offender -- Guidelines framed:

Issuance of proclamation :

i. Preceding the issuance of the proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C., the Court must deliberate upon its previous efforts to secure the presence of the through other legally permissible means. These efforts encompass the issuance of summons, the execution of bailable and/or non-bailable warrants against the accused. The Court must thoroughly document the results stemming from these endeavours, accompanied by pertinent facts and comprehensive details. It is incumbent upon the Court to satisfactorily ascertain that the individual in question has indeed absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of warrant of arrest.

ii. The phrase "reason to believe," as articulated in Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, signifies that the Court must derive its belief from the available evidence and materials that the concerned person has absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of warrant of arrest.

iii. Furthermore, in the proclamation, it must be set forth as to where and when the concerned individual must present himself. A designated location and time must be stipulated. Importantly, the specified date and time for appearance should not be less than a thirty-day from the date of publication of the proclamation.

Publication of proclamation–

iv. The publication of a proclamation, as outlined in Section 82(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, mandates adherence to all three prescribed modes, namely:

(a). The public reading of the proclamation in a conspicuous location within the town or village where the individual ordinarily resides.

(b). The affixation of the proclamation at a prominent spot at the individual's house or homestead.

(c). The display of the proclamation at a prominent location within the precincts of the court house.

v. All the aforesaid three modes of publication of a proclamation have to be adhered to. Failure to follow all or any of them renders the proclamation invalid in the eyes of the law. This is because the three sub-clauses (a) to (c) are mutually exclusive.

vi. If the Court so feels, in addition to the aforementioned trio of methods for securing the accused's presence, it may, at its discretion, also direct the publication of a copy of the proclamation in a daily newspaper circulating within the geographical area where the said individual ordinarily resides.

vii. If the Court, in its discretion orders publication of proclamation in newspaper, it shall also direct that the newspaper agency, upon the publication of the proclamation in the newspaper, shall dispatch a copy thereof to the accused's address, as is the procedure observed in civil matters, in terms of Order 5 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In essence, this supplementary measure ensures that the accused is duly apprised of the legal proceedings against him.

Declaration as “proclaimed person” or “proclaimed offender:

viii. Prior to the declaration of the concerned individual as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender," the Court shall pass a speaking order stating relevant facts and record its satisfaction that the proclamation has been duly and properly published in the prescribed manner.

ix. Furthermore, it must ensure that a period of not less than thirty days has expired between the date of publication of the proclamation and the date indicated in the proclamation for the individual's appearance. If the interval between the proclamation's publication and the date specified therein for appearance falls short of thirty days, such a publication of the proclamation cannot serve as the foundation for designating the individual in question as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender."

x. A person can be declared “Proclaimed offender” only where the proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 82 Cr.P.C. is in respect of any of the offences as per table given below :-

xi. If person accused of the above offences fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect.

xii. In all other alleged offences, the concerned person can and shall be declared as a “proclaimed person”.

Invoking criminal liability for the offence under section 174-A of IPC:

xiii. It is imperative to bear in mind that the primary purpose behind the issuance and publication of proclamations under Section 82, as well as the attachment and sale of an individual's property, is the securing/compelling the appearance of the concerned person, to facilitate the expeditious trial of criminal cases by obviating the often protracted delays which impede their disposal.

xiv. It is noteworthy that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not prescribe an automatic or obligatory invocation of further criminal liability under Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code, in every case where an individual fails to appear pursuant to he being declared as ‘proclaimed person’ or ‘proclaimed offender’ after the publication of the proclamation under subsection (1) of Section 82 of the Code.

xv. Consequently, it follows that even subsequent to the formal declaration of an individual as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender," the Court still retains the discretion to determine whether it is judicious to initiate the rigorous criminal proceedings under Section 174-A of the IPC, being mindful that the offence carries a punishment of imprisonment for up to seven years, coupled with a fine.

xvi. In arriving at such a pivotal decision, the Court should exercise due circumspection, once more apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of each case considering the majesty of law vis-a-vis the nature and gravity of the offence that triggered the publication of the proclamation under subsection (1) of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C.; the potential impact of said offence on the victim or society at large; steps, if any, taken for the attachment and sale of property of the person concerned and the result thereof; the stage/status of the ongoing trial, any mitigating factors that may favor the proclaimed person or offender, and conversely, any aggravating factors against them. It is thereafter, that the Court should pass a speaking and reasoned order for initiating criminal proceedings against the proclaimed person or offender for the offense under Section 174-A of the IPC.

xvii. Once the Court decides to proceed against the petitioner for an offence under Section 174-A of the IPC, it is imperative to institute a formal written complaint in the competent jurisdictional court. This imperative arises from the prevailing provision of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 19)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Misbranding of insecticide -- Proceedings after 3 years -- Quashing of complaint against Dealer – Proceedings qua the manufacturing company and its responsible officers etc., already stand quashed on the grounds that the complaint had been instituted more than 03 years after laboratory report had been received -- No useful purpose would be served by allowing the present proceedings to continue --  Petition allowed – Complaint, summoning order and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO case -- Sodomy with minor boy – Acquittal -- Blood group of accused matched with the semen found on underwear of victim -- Affirmative incriminatory opinion recorded against the accused – Held, existence of semen stains on the underwear of the victim-boy, did require that the blood group of the victim also being collected by the investigating officer – In the event similarity of blood group of the accused and the victim conclusion would become sparked from the DNA specialist – Investigating officer did not collect the blood sample of the victim -- Resultantly, the opinion would beget thereto an exculpatory effect -- No apposite DNA profiling made – Benefit of doubt is to be accorded to the appellant-convict -- Victim completely resiling from his statements – Appeal allowed, convicting and sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17-19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – False complaint – Kalandra u/s 182 Cr.P.C – Quashing of Kalandra -- Complaint to the Superintendent of Police which was entrusted to DSP, who found the complaint to be false – SHO lodged the impugned Kalandra u/s 182 IPC before the Magistrate – Held, impugned Kalandra/ complaint is not maintainable being a clear violation of the provisions contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Superintendent of Police or any officer superior to him could have filed the Kalandra u/s 182 IPC – Continuation of proceedings on such Kalandra/ complaint is sheer abuse of process of law – Impugned Kalandra/ DDE u/s 182 IPC and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 8-14)

A. Abkari Act (1 of 1077), Section 8  -- Investigation officer -- Simply because the person who detected the commission of the offence, is the one who filed the report or investigated, such an investigation cannot be said to be bad in law.

(Para 21)

B. Abkari Act (1 of 1077), Section 8  -- Police official witnesses – No independent witness -- Law is well settled that if the evidence of a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy then basing the conviction thereupon, cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground -- Testimonies of official witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined.

(Para 22-26)

C. Abkari Act (1 of 1077), Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Delay in producing Contraband before the Magistrate – Day after the arrest of the Appellant, 2nd October, 2003 was a holiday and therefore the contraband seized was, upon directions produced before the concerned Magistrate on the next working day, that being, 3 October 2003 -- This being the uncontroverted position, the production of the seized Arrack cannot be said to be delayed.

(Para 27)

D. Abkari Act (1 of 1077), Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Delay in completion of investigation – Mere urging that delay casts a suspicion on the investigation, without any evidence being led in furtherance thereof, cannot be sustained -- Inordinate delay has been taken as presumptive proof of prejudice, but in particular cases where the accused is in custody -- Accused was released on bail on 21st October 2003 -- Hence, the presumption of prejudice will not apply in the instant facts.

(Para 28-30)

E. Abkari Act (1 of 1077), Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Dealy in investigation/ trial – Sentence reduced to 3 months -- Considering the facts that the offence in question is dated 1st October 2003; the final report after delayed investigation was submitted on 17th April 2006, appellant was convicted on 3rd November 2008, and that more than 20 years have passed since the commission of the offence, sentence modified, appellant to serve a period of three months, simple imprisonment.

(Para 31-33)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A, 386 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Threat to withdraw FIR – Extortion -- Quashing of FIR -- To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC -- Nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons – No offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out -- FIR quashed.

(Para 16, 24-26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 195A – False evidence -- The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 383, 386 – Extortion -- One of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. -- Delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury -- Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition -- Nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear -- In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.

(Para 22-24)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 – Inherent powers of Court – Quashing of FIR -- Once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/ complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings -- Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/ registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.

(Para 26)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If the accused are already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9, 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Appellants already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful -- Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the mobile used by the accused to show that their location was at the place of incident -- Mobile numbers alleged to have been used by accused is not in his name but one person resident of Kanpur -- No evidence placed on record to show as to how the said SIM came to be in possession of the accused – Apart from that, if at the time of the incident both accused were at the same place and according to the prosecution inside the house of the deceased, and they were talking to each other on telephone, this itself creates a doubt on the prosecution version -- Evidence with regard to last seen theory is totally unreliable -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 14, 15, 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Guilt of accused – Circumstantial evidence -- Circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established -- Facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty -- Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused -- It is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 18, 19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of  trial – Held, such an exercise, is not permissible while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 5, 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Quashing of proceedings -- Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of IPC is very limited -- High Court has almost conducted a mini trial and quashed the proceedings -- High Court has elaborately discussed the statements of the witnesses recorded u/s 161 of the Cr.P.C. -- It is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the chargesheet -- Order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 4-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 333, 353, 451 – Deter public servant to discharge his duty -- Caused fracture in little right finger – House trespass -- Appellant held guilty of the offences punishable u/s 333, 353 and 451 of the IPC – Leniency in sentence shown considering the facts and circumstances that:

a. For espousing the cause of the labourers, the appellant visited the office of the Directorate;

b. Evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 (a peon working in the Office of the Commissioner) indicated that the appellant had sent a slip of her name to PW-6 which was kept on the table of PW-6 as she wanted to meet him. After waiting for a considerable time, as she was not allowed to meet PW-6, she forced her entry to his cabin and complained that she was made to wait;

c. PW-1 admitted that the appellant was not annoyed with her. She stated that the appellant did not indulge in any scuffle with her. When she tried to stop the appellant, she was pushed by the appellant and that is how she received injury to her little right finger;

d. The incident is more than thirty years old;

e. During the last thirty and a half years, when the trial and appeal were pending, the appellant was all throughout on bail. Even in this appeal, an exemption has been granted to her from the requirement of surrendering;

f. During this long period of more than 30 long years, there was no allegation of any objectionable activity by her; and

g. The appellant is a female whose present age is 62 years.

appellant sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and fine of Rs.30,000/- for the offence u/s 333 IPC, fine of Rs.20,000/- u/s 353 IPC and sentence for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/ u/s 451 IPC -- Substantive sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Trivial nature of offence -- Long pendency of trial -- Quashing of Chargesheet -- Considering the nature of allegations which are of very trivial nature and considering the fact that there is no progress made in the proceedings since the chargesheet was filed in the year 2015, continuing the proceedings would be a persecution and harassment to the appellant -- Proceedings pending in the court of CJM against the appellant quashed and set aside.

(Para 3-7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of company – Non-signatory to cheque – Vicarious liability – Quashing of complaint -- Complainant alleged that the appellants/ accused were liable for transactions of the company and that they were fully aware of the issuance of the cheques and dishonour of the cheques – Most important averment required is that the directors were in charge of, and were responsible for the conduct of the company – Appellants/ accused are neither the signatories to the cheques nor are whole-time directors -- Statutory notice was admittedly not served to the accused -- Complaint quashed qua appellants/ accused.

(Para 9-11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of company – Vicarious liability -- Incharge of the company – Responsible for conduct of business of company -- Only by saying that a person was in charge of the company at the time when the offence was committed is not sufficient to attract sub-section 1 of Section 141 of the NI Act -- Words "was in charge of" and "was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company" cannot be read disjunctively and the same ought be read conjunctively in view of use of the word "and" in between.

(Para 19-21)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk -- Punishment for allowing vehicle -- Presumption of culpable mental state -- Crucial words used in section 25 are “knowingly permits it to be used for the commission of the offense by any other persons.” -- Intent of Section 25 and Section 35 is parametria the same but carves a special role upon the investigation while proving an offense u/s 25 of the NDPS Act because of the usage of the word “knowingly.” -- Thus, the presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act is similar to the intent of Section 25 of the NDPS Act, and as such, Section 35 of the NDPS Act would not dilute the burden that the Legislature had put upon the investigator in section 25 of the NDPS Act – Held, presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act would not apply in the case u/s 25 of the NDPS Act if there is not even an iota of evidence regarding knowingly permitting the usage of the things mentioned in Section 35 of the NDPS Act for the commission of the offence.

(Para 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk – No evidence that the appellant knew about the other two convicts transporting the poppy husk in his tractor trolly or that he had permitted them to do so for this purpose -- Essential requirements to prove knowledge are missing -- Impugned judgment convicting the appellant u/s 25 of the NDPS Act is not in consonance with the law -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal – Non-examination of Viscera – Consumption of tranquillizer -- Post-mortem report refrains to give any opinion about the cause of demise on the premise that the report of the chemical examiner upon the viscera of the deceased is awaited – Non-making of examination(s) thereof, cannot lead to an opinion, that the deceased had died on account of his either voluntary consuming or becoming forcibly administered rather any tranquillizer -- When no candid material exist(s) on record suggestive about the cause of demise of the deceased, irrespective of the fact that the body of the deceased was found in the premises of the convict-appellant,  no conclusion can be made that the convict-appellant had any incriminatory role in the demise of the deceased -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 19, 29)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal – Report of the pathologist – Report states that the condition of the lungs of the deceased showed mild congestion and the said fact is also spoken by PW-16 in his cross-examination -- Cause of demise of the deceased was owing to a lung infection, which may have remained untreated -- Consequently, the demise of the deceased appears to be natural than homicidal -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 21, 29)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 406, 34 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Matrimonial dispute -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- It was a matrimonial dispute which has been amicably settled and thus the parties must be given a chance to move on with their lives -- FIR and consequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Mediation settlement – Printed Performa -- Settlement agreements drafted by the Mediation Centres on a printed proforma – Settlement on the printed proforma sometimes gives an impression that there is no application of mind and the settlement deed has been drafted mechanically -- Mediation Centres and the Family Courts directed to ensure that the settlement deeds are drafted properly and it should not be on a printed proforma.

(Para 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Mutation in favour of the petitioner is relating to only that land, which was validly allotted and he had made the complete payment -- If the revenue official had initially entered a deficient mutation and the same is corrected subsequently; either on the application of the petitioner or otherwise, no fault could be found with that – Any other fact, regarding some DDR entry or some order or absence of any other order passed by any Authority is only ancillary fact; which cannot be raised to the level of introducing criminality -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 4-6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Quashing of FIR –  Permissibility of -- Submission that challan has been filed, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed -- Court not found any substance in the said argument -- Once, the complaint itself is baseless, then merely because some witnesses have repeated the ipse dixit of the complaint which is based on non-existent facts or the facts against the undisputed record, before the Investigating Officer; that does not lend any legal or jurisprudential support to the report filed by the Investigating Officer -- FIR can be quashed even after filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 5, 6)