Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82(4), 482 -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A – Cheque bounce complaint – Proclaimed offender – Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Complaint u/s 138 of N.I.Act was for an offence other than aforesaid offences specified in sub section (4) of the section 82 of CR.P.C. – Order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate declaring the petitioner a proclaimed offender was/ is not legal -- Said order is the basis of the registration of the FIR u/s 174A IPC against the petitioner and is, therefore, fatal to the FIR in question -- Moreover, petitioner already been acquitted by the trial Court -- Impugned FIR and all subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom are liable to be quashed -- FIR alongwith all consequential proceedings arising there from against the petitioner quashed.

(Para 2.3, 7.2-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 195 – Constitution of India, Article 21 – FIR u/s 174A of IPC -- Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), in its present form, encompasses Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) within its purview.

(Para 12.13-12.16)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 -- Proclaimed person/ Proclaimed offender – Procedure -- Courts meticulously adhere to the statutory requirements in letter and spirit both, duly reflecting their compliance on the record prior to pronouncing an individual as a proclaimed person or offender and invoking criminal liability.

(Para 13.1)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Proclaimed person/ Proclaimer offender – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Mandate of -- There is no mandatory prescription in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the Court to invariably initiate separate criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 174-A IPC in every instance where an individual fails to appear as summoned by way of proclamation -- Courts should act judiciously and exercise circumspection before embarking on the stringent path of instituting criminal proceedings u/s 174-A of IPC.

(Para 13.4)

D. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Proclaimed person/ Proclaimer offender – FIR u/s 174A IPC – Order declaring the petitioner as proclaimed person is wholly silent as to when the proclamation u/s 82 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner was issued; what was the date specified therein for the petitioner to appear in Court; when the proclamation was actually published; whether it was publicly read in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which the petitioner ordinarily resided; whether it was affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or homestead in which the petitioner ordinarily resided or to some conspicuous place of such town or village; whether a copy thereof was also affixed to some conspicuous part of the court-house -- Further, the order does not contain a statement by the Court to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day and in the manner specified in clause (i) of Sub-Section (2) -- These facts were not even noticed in the order passed by the Court – Order is totally non-speaking and does not at all show that while passing it, the Court had applied its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances and taken any conscious decision that it was a fit case to invoke criminal liability of the petitioner for offence u/s 174-A of IPC -- It was/is cryptic, non-speaking and mechanical order sans any reasons or application of mind – Order declaring proclaimed person and FIR Quashed.

(Para 15-17)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82 – Proclaimed person/ Proclaimed offender -- Guidelines framed:

Issuance of proclamation :

i. Preceding the issuance of the proclamation under section 82 Cr.P.C., the Court must deliberate upon its previous efforts to secure the presence of the through other legally permissible means. These efforts encompass the issuance of summons, the execution of bailable and/or non-bailable warrants against the accused. The Court must thoroughly document the results stemming from these endeavours, accompanied by pertinent facts and comprehensive details. It is incumbent upon the Court to satisfactorily ascertain that the individual in question has indeed absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of warrant of arrest.

ii. The phrase "reason to believe," as articulated in Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, signifies that the Court must derive its belief from the available evidence and materials that the concerned person has absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of warrant of arrest.

iii. Furthermore, in the proclamation, it must be set forth as to where and when the concerned individual must present himself. A designated location and time must be stipulated. Importantly, the specified date and time for appearance should not be less than a thirty-day from the date of publication of the proclamation.

Publication of proclamation–

iv. The publication of a proclamation, as outlined in Section 82(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, mandates adherence to all three prescribed modes, namely:

(a). The public reading of the proclamation in a conspicuous location within the town or village where the individual ordinarily resides.

(b). The affixation of the proclamation at a prominent spot at the individual's house or homestead.

(c). The display of the proclamation at a prominent location within the precincts of the court house.

v. All the aforesaid three modes of publication of a proclamation have to be adhered to. Failure to follow all or any of them renders the proclamation invalid in the eyes of the law. This is because the three sub-clauses (a) to (c) are mutually exclusive.

vi. If the Court so feels, in addition to the aforementioned trio of methods for securing the accused's presence, it may, at its discretion, also direct the publication of a copy of the proclamation in a daily newspaper circulating within the geographical area where the said individual ordinarily resides.

vii. If the Court, in its discretion orders publication of proclamation in newspaper, it shall also direct that the newspaper agency, upon the publication of the proclamation in the newspaper, shall dispatch a copy thereof to the accused's address, as is the procedure observed in civil matters, in terms of Order 5 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In essence, this supplementary measure ensures that the accused is duly apprised of the legal proceedings against him.

Declaration as “proclaimed person” or “proclaimed offender:

viii. Prior to the declaration of the concerned individual as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender," the Court shall pass a speaking order stating relevant facts and record its satisfaction that the proclamation has been duly and properly published in the prescribed manner.

ix. Furthermore, it must ensure that a period of not less than thirty days has expired between the date of publication of the proclamation and the date indicated in the proclamation for the individual's appearance. If the interval between the proclamation's publication and the date specified therein for appearance falls short of thirty days, such a publication of the proclamation cannot serve as the foundation for designating the individual in question as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender."

x. A person can be declared “Proclaimed offender” only where the proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 82 Cr.P.C. is in respect of any of the offences as per table given below :-

xi. If person accused of the above offences fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect.

xii. In all other alleged offences, the concerned person can and shall be declared as a “proclaimed person”.

Invoking criminal liability for the offence under section 174-A of IPC:

xiii. It is imperative to bear in mind that the primary purpose behind the issuance and publication of proclamations under Section 82, as well as the attachment and sale of an individual's property, is the securing/compelling the appearance of the concerned person, to facilitate the expeditious trial of criminal cases by obviating the often protracted delays which impede their disposal.

xiv. It is noteworthy that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not prescribe an automatic or obligatory invocation of further criminal liability under Section 174-A of the Indian Penal Code, in every case where an individual fails to appear pursuant to he being declared as ‘proclaimed person’ or ‘proclaimed offender’ after the publication of the proclamation under subsection (1) of Section 82 of the Code.

xv. Consequently, it follows that even subsequent to the formal declaration of an individual as a "proclaimed person" or "proclaimed offender," the Court still retains the discretion to determine whether it is judicious to initiate the rigorous criminal proceedings under Section 174-A of the IPC, being mindful that the offence carries a punishment of imprisonment for up to seven years, coupled with a fine.

xvi. In arriving at such a pivotal decision, the Court should exercise due circumspection, once more apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of each case considering the majesty of law vis-a-vis the nature and gravity of the offence that triggered the publication of the proclamation under subsection (1) of Section 82 of the Cr.P.C.; the potential impact of said offence on the victim or society at large; steps, if any, taken for the attachment and sale of property of the person concerned and the result thereof; the stage/status of the ongoing trial, any mitigating factors that may favor the proclaimed person or offender, and conversely, any aggravating factors against them. It is thereafter, that the Court should pass a speaking and reasoned order for initiating criminal proceedings against the proclaimed person or offender for the offense under Section 174-A of the IPC.

xvii. Once the Court decides to proceed against the petitioner for an offence under Section 174-A of the IPC, it is imperative to institute a formal written complaint in the competent jurisdictional court. This imperative arises from the prevailing provision of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.

(Para 19)

Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29, 33 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Misbranding of insecticide -- Proceedings after 3 years -- Quashing of complaint against Dealer – Proceedings qua the manufacturing company and its responsible officers etc., already stand quashed on the grounds that the complaint had been instituted more than 03 years after laboratory report had been received -- No useful purpose would be served by allowing the present proceedings to continue --  Petition allowed – Complaint, summoning order and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 7)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – POCSO case -- Sodomy with minor boy – Acquittal -- Blood group of accused matched with the semen found on underwear of victim -- Affirmative incriminatory opinion recorded against the accused – Held, existence of semen stains on the underwear of the victim-boy, did require that the blood group of the victim also being collected by the investigating officer – In the event similarity of blood group of the accused and the victim conclusion would become sparked from the DNA specialist – Investigating officer did not collect the blood sample of the victim -- Resultantly, the opinion would beget thereto an exculpatory effect -- No apposite DNA profiling made – Benefit of doubt is to be accorded to the appellant-convict -- Victim completely resiling from his statements – Appeal allowed, convicting and sentence set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17-19)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – False complaint – Kalandra u/s 182 Cr.P.C – Quashing of Kalandra -- Complaint to the Superintendent of Police which was entrusted to DSP, who found the complaint to be false – SHO lodged the impugned Kalandra u/s 182 IPC before the Magistrate – Held, impugned Kalandra/ complaint is not maintainable being a clear violation of the provisions contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Superintendent of Police or any officer superior to him could have filed the Kalandra u/s 182 IPC – Continuation of proceedings on such Kalandra/ complaint is sheer abuse of process of law – Impugned Kalandra/ DDE u/s 182 IPC and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 8-14)

A. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Investigation officer -- Simply because the person who detected the commission of the offence, is the one who filed the report or investigated, such an investigation cannot be said to be bad in law.

(Para 21)

B. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Police official witnesses – No independent witness -- Law is well settled that if the evidence of a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy then basing the conviction thereupon, cannot be questioned, and the same shall stand on firm ground -- Testimonies of official witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent witnesses were not examined.

(Para 22-26)

C. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Delay in producing Contraband before the Magistrate – Day after the arrest of the Appellant, 2nd October, 2003 was a holiday and therefore the contraband seized was, upon directions produced before the concerned Magistrate on the next working day, that being, 3 October 2003 -- This being the uncontroverted position, the production of the seized Arrack cannot be said to be delayed.

(Para 27)

D. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Delay in completion of investigation – Mere urging that delay casts a suspicion on the investigation, without any evidence being led in furtherance thereof, cannot be sustained -- Inordinate delay has been taken as presumptive proof of prejudice, but in particular cases where the accused is in custody -- Accused was released on bail on 21st October 2003 -- Hence, the presumption of prejudice will not apply in the instant facts.

(Para 28-30)

E. Abkari Act, Section 8  -- Constitution of India, Article 21 -- Dealy in investigation/ trial – Sentence reduced to 3 months -- Considering the facts that the offence in question is dated 1st October 2003; the final report after delayed investigation was submitted on 17th April 2006, appellant was convicted on 3rd November 2008, and that more than 20 years have passed since the commission of the offence, sentence modified, appellant to serve a period of three months, simple imprisonment.

(Para 31-33)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 195A, 386 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Threat to withdraw FIR – Extortion -- Quashing of FIR -- To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC -- Nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons – No offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out -- FIR quashed.

(Para 16, 24-26)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 191, 195A – False evidence -- The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice.

(Para 16)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 383, 386 – Extortion -- One of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. -- Delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury -- Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition -- Nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear -- In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.

(Para 22-24)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Constitution of India, Article 226 – Inherent powers of Court – Quashing of FIR -- Once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/ complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings -- Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/ registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation.

(Para 26)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- If the accused are already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9, 106 -- Circumstantial evidence – Appellants already shown to the witnesses in the Police Station, then the sanctity of TIP before the court is doubtful -- Call Detail Records (CDRs) of the mobile used by the accused to show that their location was at the place of incident -- Mobile numbers alleged to have been used by accused is not in his name but one person resident of Kanpur -- No evidence placed on record to show as to how the said SIM came to be in possession of the accused – Apart from that, if at the time of the incident both accused were at the same place and according to the prosecution inside the house of the deceased, and they were talking to each other on telephone, this itself creates a doubt on the prosecution version -- Evidence with regard to last seen theory is totally unreliable -- Appellants acquitted.

(Para 14, 15, 22)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Guilt of accused – Circumstantial evidence -- Circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established -- Facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty -- Circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused -- It is a settled principle of law that however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 18, 19)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 – Quashing of Proceedings – Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Whether the testimony of the witnesses is trustworthy or not has to be found out from the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of the witnesses when they stand in the box at the stage of  trial – Held, such an exercise, is not permissible while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C.

(Para 5, 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Quashing of proceedings -- Inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C – Trustworthy of witness -- Scope of interference, while quashing the proceedings u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and that too for a serious offence like Section 302 of IPC is very limited -- High Court has almost conducted a mini trial and quashed the proceedings -- High Court has elaborately discussed the statements of the witnesses recorded u/s 161 of the Cr.P.C. -- It is not permissible for the High Court to go into the correctness or otherwise of the material placed by the prosecution in the chargesheet -- Order passed by the High Court set aside.

(Para 4-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 333, 353, 451 – Deter public servant to discharge his duty -- Caused fracture in little right finger – House trespass -- Appellant held guilty of the offences punishable u/s 333, 353 and 451 of the IPC – Leniency in sentence shown considering the facts and circumstances that:

a. For espousing the cause of the labourers, the appellant visited the office of the Directorate;

b. Evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 (a peon working in the Office of the Commissioner) indicated that the appellant had sent a slip of her name to PW-6 which was kept on the table of PW-6 as she wanted to meet him. After waiting for a considerable time, as she was not allowed to meet PW-6, she forced her entry to his cabin and complained that she was made to wait;

c. PW-1 admitted that the appellant was not annoyed with her. She stated that the appellant did not indulge in any scuffle with her. When she tried to stop the appellant, she was pushed by the appellant and that is how she received injury to her little right finger;

d. The incident is more than thirty years old;

e. During the last thirty and a half years, when the trial and appeal were pending, the appellant was all throughout on bail. Even in this appeal, an exemption has been granted to her from the requirement of surrendering;

f. During this long period of more than 30 long years, there was no allegation of any objectionable activity by her; and

g. The appellant is a female whose present age is 62 years.

appellant sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month and fine of Rs.30,000/- for the offence u/s 333 IPC, fine of Rs.20,000/- u/s 353 IPC and sentence for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/ u/s 451 IPC -- Substantive sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 504, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Trivial nature of offence -- Long pendency of trial -- Quashing of Chargesheet -- Considering the nature of allegations which are of very trivial nature and considering the fact that there is no progress made in the proceedings since the chargesheet was filed in the year 2015, continuing the proceedings would be a persecution and harassment to the appellant -- Proceedings pending in the court of CJM against the appellant quashed and set aside.

(Para 3-7)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of company – Non-signatory to cheque – Vicarious liability – Quashing of complaint -- Complainant alleged that the appellants/ accused were liable for transactions of the company and that they were fully aware of the issuance of the cheques and dishonour of the cheques – Most important averment required is that the directors were in charge of, and were responsible for the conduct of the company – Appellants/ accused are neither the signatories to the cheques nor are whole-time directors -- Statutory notice was admittedly not served to the accused -- Complaint quashed qua appellants/ accused.

(Para 9-11)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Cheque bounce complaint – Directors of company – Vicarious liability -- Incharge of the company – Responsible for conduct of business of company -- Only by saying that a person was in charge of the company at the time when the offence was committed is not sufficient to attract sub-section 1 of Section 141 of the NI Act -- Words "was in charge of" and "was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company" cannot be read disjunctively and the same ought be read conjunctively in view of use of the word "and" in between.

(Para 19-21)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk -- Punishment for allowing vehicle -- Presumption of culpable mental state -- Crucial words used in section 25 are “knowingly permits it to be used for the commission of the offense by any other persons.” -- Intent of Section 25 and Section 35 is parametria the same but carves a special role upon the investigation while proving an offense u/s 25 of the NDPS Act because of the usage of the word “knowingly.” -- Thus, the presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act is similar to the intent of Section 25 of the NDPS Act, and as such, Section 35 of the NDPS Act would not dilute the burden that the Legislature had put upon the investigator in section 25 of the NDPS Act – Held, presumption u/s 35 of the NDPS Act would not apply in the case u/s 25 of the NDPS Act if there is not even an iota of evidence regarding knowingly permitting the usage of the things mentioned in Section 35 of the NDPS Act for the commission of the offence.

(Para 13)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 25, 35 – NDPS case – Transportation of poppy husk – No evidence that the appellant knew about the other two convicts transporting the poppy husk in his tractor trolly or that he had permitted them to do so for this purpose -- Essential requirements to prove knowledge are missing -- Impugned judgment convicting the appellant u/s 25 of the NDPS Act is not in consonance with the law -- Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal – Non-examination of Viscera – Consumption of tranquillizer -- Post-mortem report refrains to give any opinion about the cause of demise on the premise that the report of the chemical examiner upon the viscera of the deceased is awaited – Non-making of examination(s) thereof, cannot lead to an opinion, that the deceased had died on account of his either voluntary consuming or becoming forcibly administered rather any tranquillizer -- When no candid material exist(s) on record suggestive about the cause of demise of the deceased, irrespective of the fact that the body of the deceased was found in the premises of the convict-appellant,  no conclusion can be made that the convict-appellant had any incriminatory role in the demise of the deceased -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 19, 29)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Acquittal – Report of the pathologist – Report states that the condition of the lungs of the deceased showed mild congestion and the said fact is also spoken by PW-16 in his cross-examination -- Cause of demise of the deceased was owing to a lung infection, which may have remained untreated -- Consequently, the demise of the deceased appears to be natural than homicidal -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 21, 29)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 406, 34 -- Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Matrimonial dispute -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- It was a matrimonial dispute which has been amicably settled and thus the parties must be given a chance to move on with their lives -- FIR and consequent proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

B. Mediation settlement – Printed Performa -- Settlement agreements drafted by the Mediation Centres on a printed proforma – Settlement on the printed proforma sometimes gives an impression that there is no application of mind and the settlement deed has been drafted mechanically -- Mediation Centres and the Family Courts directed to ensure that the settlement deeds are drafted properly and it should not be on a printed proforma.

(Para 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Mutation in favour of the petitioner is relating to only that land, which was validly allotted and he had made the complete payment -- If the revenue official had initially entered a deficient mutation and the same is corrected subsequently; either on the application of the petitioner or otherwise, no fault could be found with that – Any other fact, regarding some DDR entry or some order or absence of any other order passed by any Authority is only ancillary fact; which cannot be raised to the level of introducing criminality -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 4-6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B, 218 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Cheating and forgery – Challan presented -- Quashing of FIR –  Permissibility of -- Submission that challan has been filed, therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed -- Court not found any substance in the said argument -- Once, the complaint itself is baseless, then merely because some witnesses have repeated the ipse dixit of the complaint which is based on non-existent facts or the facts against the undisputed record, before the Investigating Officer; that does not lend any legal or jurisprudential support to the report filed by the Investigating Officer -- FIR can be quashed even after filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. before the trial Court -- FIR and all consequent proceedings, quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 50 – NDPS case -- Offer u/s 50 of the NDPS Act -- Independent witness did not support the case of the prosecution -- As per Section 50 of the NDPS Act, option required to be given was that he has a right to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer; whereas the option which was given to him was that whether the accused opted to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Civil Gazetted Officer or before him – Word ‘Magistrate’ was missing from the notice -- Mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act were not complied with, which goes to the root of the case and no conviction can be based on such a defective option – Impugned judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be upheld -- Appeal allowed, bail bonds discharged.

(Para 9, 11)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) – Cheque bounce complaint – Appeal against acquittal -- Accused paid an amount of Rs.50,000/- during proceedings of the complaint clearly stating that he be given time to pay the balance amount – He did not dispute at that time that his liability was only to the extent of Rs.50,000/- -- This statement, making payment of Rs.50,000/- by the accused, also indicates that accused had the legal liability towards the complainant – Cheque for Rs. 2,25,658.08 dishonored on account of insufficient funds – Respondent/ accused failed to make payment despite statutory notice -- Acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be at all sustained, set aside -- Accused-respondent held guilty u/s 138 of the NI Act and convicted.

(Para 15-17)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 279, 304-A – Death by rash and negligent driving – Sentence for 2 months 29 days -- Considering that petitioner is first time offender and has faced agony of trial for a considerable long period, to meet the ends of justice sentence reduced to 2 months & 29 days, the period already undergone by him.

(Para 9-11)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 324, 148, 149 -- Version and cross-version case – Acquittal -- Once the genesis of occurrence has been suppressed, it is not a case where the Court can separate grain from chaff and believe that the silence of the complainants does not prejudice the case of the accused -- Injuries received by the accused were not simple which could be ignored, but were dangerous to life -- Non-explanation of injuries on the accused can be fatal to the prosecution's case – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 1, 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 34, 323 – Hurt – Common intention – Acquittal -- Prosecution did not clearly establish that the appellants/ accused assaulted the deceased -- In the absence of any incriminating material or other corroborative evidence pointing the participation of appellants-accused in the incident, the conviction u/s 323 read with Section 34 of IPC cannot be sustained – Appeal allowed, appellants acquitted.

(Para 9-12)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 366 -- Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (6 of 2007), Section 10 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164 -- Penetrative sexual assault – Marriage with minor girl – Acquittal -- In statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC, the victim deposed that she was in love with the appellant, had consumed poison, and had even been hospitalized because she was adamant to live with the appellant -- No doubt, she resiled from her statement, yet, the medical evidence indicated that the victim had a ruptured hymen; there was no external injury at her private parts – Prosecution was not able to establish that there was any penetrative sexual assault as a result of coercion or compulsion on the part of the appellant – Held, M’s statement u/s 164 of the Cr. PC contained a truthful narration of the events -- Impugned judgment set aside the charge u/s 366 IPC against the appellant -- Charges u/s 6 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 10 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, cannot be sustained -- Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 20-22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 468 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 338 – Grievous hurt endangering life or personal safety – Limitation – Cognizance by court -- No Court shall take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation and the period of limitation shall be 03 years, if the offence is punishable with an imprisonment for a term exceeding 01 year, but not exceeding 03 years and the period of limitation shall commence from the date of the registration of the FIR – FIR is dated 24.07.2011, even till today, a formal charge-sheet has not been filed by the police and the cognizance in the present case shall be barred by the period of limitation -- Prosecution is apparently barred by limitation – FIR u/s 338 of IPC alongwith all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 299 , 302, 304A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 313 -- Murder – Culpable homicide – Death by Fire arm -- Gross negligence -- When the incident occurred, the change lever was not kept in a safety position by the appellant and therefore, SAF got cocked which resulted in the firing of five bullets -- Appellant must take the blame for not taking the elementary precaution of keeping the change lever in the safety position -- U/s 313 of CrPC, the case of the prosecution that he intentionally opened fire by aiming at the deceased was not put to the appellant -- Theory of the prosecution that the appellant fired intentionally has not been established – Accidental fire took place and that is how the appellant became responsible for the death – Not a case of culpable homicide as defined u/s 299 of IPC -- Gross negligence on the part of the appellant which led to a loss of human life -- Appellant is guilty of a lesser offence punishable u/s 304A of IPC, conviction u/s 302 of the IPC set aside.

(Para 14-20)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 147 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Compounding after conviction – Waiver of compounding charges -- Acquittal -- Conviction for two years with fine of Rs.2,000/- and Rs.18,00,000/- to be paid to the complainant-respondent as compensation, affirmed by Sessions Court -- Petitioner permitted to compound the offence -- Considering the mitigating circumstances,  compounding charges reduced to Rs.10,000/- -- Judgment of conviction/ order of sentence recorded set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him.

(Para 14)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 307, 323, 325, 148, 149 –  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 54, 59A – Attempt to murder/307-IPC – Rioting, armed with deadly weapon/148-IPC – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statement of parties with regard to compromise recorded -- No useful purpose would be served to continue with the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant F.I.R. – F.I.R and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5, 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 341, 323, 506 –  Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Attempt to commit culpable homicide/308-IPC – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Statement of parties with regard to compromise recorded -- No useful purpose would be served to continue with the proceedings before the trial Court in the instant F.I.R. – F.I.R and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise quashed qua the petitioner.

(Para 5, 6)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal -- A provision which does not take into consideration our societal realities and proceed on an assumption, that every sexual indulgence with a minor, irrespective of whether she was capable of being an equal participant in the act, has definitely created a situation, resulting in acquittal of the accused in cases of consensual sexual relationship, where the gap in the age of accused and that of victim is small.

(Para 27)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363 – Kidnapping -- Prosecutrix aged 17 years and 5-6 months – Accused and the prosecutrix were indulged in a love affair and in cross-examination, she specifically admitting about the same -- Girl on her own, left her house and accompanied the accused, where she travelled in distinct States and made no attempt to flee away and rather addressed letters to the concerned police stations about she willingly accompanying the accused and referring to “Nikah”, being performed with the accused -- Ld. Special Judge has rightly derived a conclusion that there is no evidence, establishing that the accused had taken away or enticed her and, therefore, an offence under Section 363 of IPC is not made out.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 -- Aggravated penetrative sexual assault -- Consensual relationship – Rape with minor – Acquittal – Prosecutrix continued to stay with the accused and physical relationship was established between them, considering that she was aged 17 years and 5-6 months, a conclusion was derived by Ld. Special Judge that the act of the accused amounted to an offence of rape as, she being minor, sexual relationship maintained with her, either with or without consent, would amount to rape – Evidence on record has clearly made out a case for consensual sex -- Held, ld. Special Judge has erred in convicting the appellant u/s 376 of IPC and u/s 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 28-30)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant -- Necessary ingredients of an offence u/s 188 IPC are:-

(a) there must be an order promulgated by a public servant,

(b) such public servant must be lawfully empowered to promulgate such order,

(c) Such order should direct the accused to abstain from an act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management,

(d) Accused disobeys the order knowingly,

(e) Such obedience must cause or tend to cause –

(i) obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed; or

(ii) danger to human life, health or safety; or

(iii) causes or tend to cause riot or affray.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195 – Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Cognizance by court -- No Court can take cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC except on a written complaint made by the concerned public servant, whose order has been disobeyed.

(Para 6-8)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 269 -- Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life – Essential ingredients for commission of offence under Section 269 IPC are:

(i) The disease in question was infectious and dangerous to human life.

(ii) The accused did an act, which was likely to felicitate spreading of the disease

(iii) The accused did the act unlawfully or negligently

(iv) The accused knew or had reason to believe that his act was likely to spread the disease.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188, 269 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 – FIR -- Police report -- Cognizance by Court -- In view of the bar placed by Section 195 CrPC, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance on the challan filed by the Police for offence u/s 188 IPC -- Not the case of the respondent/State that the petitioner was suffering from corona virus or any other disease on the date of alleged offence, which could spread the infection to others and thus, ingredients of Section 269 IPC are completely missing – FIR u/s 188 & 269 of the IPC and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.

(Para 9-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 – Abetment of suicide – Acquittal -- Deposition only pointed out that the deceased was over burdened with work; he was not satisfied with the performance of subordinate staff in discharging the official duties; he had an apprehension that the subordinate staff along with RBI official conspired against him and planted the counterfeit currency in cash chest -- Deposition of the complainant and her son had not proved abetment of suicide – Trial court acquitted the accused -- No case made out for interference.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Cognizance of -- FIR – Police report – Sustainability of -- Proceedings u/s 188 of the IPC can only be initiated on the basis of complaint in writing by the concerned public servant -- No FIR can be registered for the offence u/s 188 of the IPC and no report u/s 173 of Cr.P.C. to the concerned Court can be filed on the basis of evidence collected in the said FIR.

(Para 7)

B. Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Penalty -- Cognizance of -- FIR – Police report – Sustainability of -- Any offence under the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 is deemed to be an offence u/s 188 of the IPC – So procedure u/s 188 of the Code is to be followed by the prosecuting agency for prosecuting a person under the Epidemic Diseases Act -- No complaint has been filed but police after registration of the FIR submitted the challan – Held, it is a clear violation of the provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C.

(Para 11)

C. Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 51, 60 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 2(d) -- Punishment for obstruction – Cognizance of offence – Maximum punishment for Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act is two years, so offence is non cognizable and complaint is required to be filed in the Court and Court can take cognizance only on the complaint made by the concerned authority for violation of any provision of the said Act.

(Para 13)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 188 -- Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 (3 of 1897), Section 3 -- Disaster Management Act, 2005 (53 of 2005), Section 51, 60 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 173, 195, 482 -- Disobedience of order duly promulgated by public servant – Obstruction of officer/ employee – Quashing of FIR -- Investigation was completed and final report u/s 173(2) Cr.P.C. was filed before the concerned Magistrate -- Mandatory provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. not followed -- Only complaint could be filed by the officer whose orders were violated and not by the police on the basis of investigation -- Registration of FIR is abuse of the process of law -- Petition allowed, FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua petitioner quashed.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 299, 308 -- Appellant/ Bus Conductor -- Attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Question is whether the appellant had knowledge that he, by virtue of the act of ringing the bell, was likely to cause death -- It is not possible to say that the appellant while ringing the bell, had knowledge that his act is likely to cause the death of PW-1 – In the absence of intention and knowledge as contemplated by Section 299 of IPC, the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder was not made out.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222(2) – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 308, 338 -- By applying principles incorporated in sub-section (2) of Section 222 of the Cr.P.C, the Court can consider whether the appellant has committed any other offence which is a minor offence in comparison to the offence for which he is tried – Appellant charged u/s 308 IPC, however convicted u/s 338 IPC.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 338, 308 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 222(2) – Charges u/s 308 IPC – Conviction u/s 338 IPC -- It was the duty of the appellant as a conductor to take care of the passengers -- Hence, before he rang the bell and gave a signal to the driver to start the bus, he ought to have verified whether all passengers had safely boarded the bus -- Appellant did not verify whether the passengers had properly boarded the bus -- This was an act of recklessness on his part -- Grievous hurt was caused to PW-1 as she suffered fracture of pelvis – Appellant is guilty of the commission of an offence punishable u/s 338 of IPC -- Omission to frame charge u/s 338 of IPC will not be fatal -- Appellant has undergone the sentence for only 36 days -- Considering the fact that the incident is of the year 2005 and other factual aspects, a sentence of simple imprisonment for six months will be an appropriate punishment -- High Court had imposed a fine of Rs. 50,000/- which amount has been deposited -- In addition to the sum of Rs.50,000/- already deposited -- Appellant to deposit an additional amount of Rs.25,000/-.

(Para 14,15)

A. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1) – Child witness -- In case of a child witness under 12 years of age, unless satisfaction as required by the said proviso is recorded, an oath cannot be administered to the child witness.

(Para 7)

B. Oaths Act, 1969 (44 of 1969), Section 4(1) – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Child witness -- In the deposition of PW-1, it is mentioned that his age was 12 years at the time of the recording of evidence -- Proviso to Section 4 of the Oaths Act will not apply -- However, in view of the requirement of Section 118 of the Evidence Act, the learned Trial Judge was under a duty to record his opinion that the child is able to understand the questions put to him and that he is able to give rational answers to the questions put to him -- The Trial Judge must also record his opinion that the child witness understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why he is of the opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth.

(Para 7)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 – Child witness -- Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence -- A child witness of tender age is easily susceptible to tutoring -- However, that by itself is no ground to reject the evidence of a child witness -- Court must make careful scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness -- Scrutiny of the evidence of a child witness is required to be made by the Court with care and caution -- It is advisable to record the preliminary questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.

(Para 8, 9)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 324, 449, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Investigation Officer did not make investigation by recording the statements of the elder brothers of PW-1/ Minor for verifying whether they were away from the house on the date of the incident -- Shoes of the appellant did not match the moulds of the imprint of the shoe taken by the prosecution -- Possibility of the PW-1/ minor witness, being tutored cannot be ruled out -- There is no support or corroboration to the testimony of PW-1, apart from other deficiencies in the prosecution case -- It will not be safe to base the conviction only on the testimony of PW-1/ Minor which does not inspire confidence – Appeal allowed, impugned judgments aside and the appellant is acquitted of the offences.

(Para 10,11)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Circumstantial evidence -- Strong suspicion -- It cannot take place of a proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 8)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 24 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Extra-judicial confession -- No reason as to why the accused persons would go 100 kms. away and confess to PW-2 -- Conduct also appears to be unnatural, though IO (PW-11) was known to PW-2 and the telephone which was installed in his house was in a working condition, he did not find it necessary to inform him through telephone -- Courts below have erred in relying on the extra-judicial confession.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- According to PW-11, the gun which was recovered from the car had two empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11) -- Evidence of Doctor (PW-5), who had conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, would show that there was no external exit wound, and wad and pellets were preserved and sealed – No evidence collected as to whether the said gun belonged to the appellant MK, even the Ballistic Expert has not been examined to show that the wad and pellets were fired from the empty cartridges (Ex. P10 and P11)

-- In view of the serious doubt with regard to the credibility of the witnesses on the issue of extra-judicial confession and last seen theory, the failure to examine Ballistic Expert would be a glaring defect in the prosecution case.

Held, prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and, as such, the accused are entitled to benefit of doubt -- Judgment of the Trial Court quashed and set aside, appellants shall stand discharged.

(Para 22-27)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Legal/ Demand notice – Non-issuance of – Acquittal -- Authorised representative of Bank in his cross-examination specifically stated that he had not issued the notice -- Not only this, he had not produced the original record -- Applicability of Section 138 of the Act would be on the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the amount within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice -- Testimony of authorised representative of bank had not substantiated the complaint, he neither had personal knowledge of the facts nor produced the original file -- Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 8-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Rape – Ingredients -- Consent of the opposite sex -- If there is an element of consent available or is apparently made out from allegations, it cannot be termed to be a rape -- It is only when the ingredient of Section 375 of the IPC is satisfied in the FIR registered by the complainant, that a person could be punished for the penal provisions provided under Section 376 of the IPC, and not otherwise.

(Para 4, 5)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal case -- Consensual sex on pretext of marriage -- For over the last 1-1/2 decades, prosecutrix was in an intimate relationship with the applicant -- Physical relationship was established at the residence of both the parties and even after, when the applicant had even got married with some other lady -- When the complainant had voluntarily established a relationship even after knowing the fact, that the applicant is already a married person, the element of consent itself imbibes in it -- Falsity of an assurance of marriage is to be tested at its initial stage of inception, and not at a subsequent stage -- Initial stage, cannot be said to have been prolonged for 15 years, and even continued after the marriage of the applicant – Criminal case quashed.

(Para 6-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420, 120-B -- Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), Section 7 -- Insecticides Act, 1968 (46 of 1968), Section 29 – Quashing of FIR -- No allegation of any cheating -- In CRM-M-7268-2008, Pardeep Kumar Garg and other’ case, decided on 23.05.2012, FIR was quashed as complaint is maintainable and registration of FIR is misuse of process of law -- FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioners quashed – Order will not stand in the way of any proceedings being taken after following the due process of law.

(Para 5, 13-15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 323, 341, 379-B -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(2)(va) – Snatching – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Offence for which the accused have been charged are not of serious nature -- Compromise will go a long way in ironing out the differences for betterment of future life of the parties -- Petition for quashing the FIR allowed qua the petitioners.

(Para 5, 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 83 – Cheque bounce complaint -- Service of summons – Proclaimed person -- It is not borne out as to how the petitioners were duly served before initiating proceedings u/s 83 Cr.P.C. -- Such a recourse is not sustainable in law i.e. without recording satisfaction by learned Magistrate as contained u/s 82(3) Cr.P.C. to the effect that Court found that proclamation was duly published -- 30 days’ time, as mandated by Section 82 Cr.P.C. was not granted -- Impugned orders cannot be sustained -- Petition allowed, impugned orders quashed qua petitioner.

(Para 6)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 182 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 195(1)(a) – False complaint to Superintendent of Police – Kalandra u/s 182 IPC by SHO – Held, kalandra for the offence u/s 182 IPC could be instituted only by the Superintendent of Police or his superior to whom the alleged false complaint was made and not by the SHO – Therefore, no cognizance of the alleged offence can be taken -- Petition allowed, impugned Kalandra quashed along with all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

(Para 6-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of Final report/ Police report -- Consensual relationship – Prosecutrix was a married woman having her husband and children and was fully aware that the petitioner was also a married man -- She maintained sexual relationship with the accused on many occasions and stayed with the petitioner/ accused in a room in a hotel -- It is difficult to conclude that the prosecutrix had not given consent for the sexual relationship -- Impugned criminal proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed, exercising the inherent power conferred on the Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. – Petition allowed.

(Para 22-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Acquittal -- Delay of 28 days in giving the complaint – To commit the offence punishable u/s 376 IPC no sane person would take two accomplices, that too after committing a similar offence earlier -- Complainant was not present on both the occasions -- There is no attempt to recover the knife from the appellant as it is a specific case of the prosecution that he committed the offence by threatening to harm the prosecutrix -- No reason as to why the sole eye-witness has not been examined – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 8-13)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Rape – Statement of prosecutrix -- Evidence of the prosecutrix will have to be kept at a higher pedestal but then, such a testimony will have to satisfy the conscience of the Court -- It has to be seen contextually in the light of the other evidence available.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder – Acquittal -- Ante-timed FIR -- Original FIR clearly shows that there is some interpolation in the time of its lodging mentioned therein -- It is evident from naked eye that ‘1’ has been converted into ‘9’ and ‘5’ has been rounded off to make ‘0’ whereas ‘PM’ has been converted into ‘AM’ -- In other words, 1:50 PM has been changed to 9:00 AM -- Trial Court completely lost sight of the fact that not only the time has been changed but the word ‘PM’ has also been interpolated and converted into ‘AM’ – Thus FIR has been ante-timed from 1:50 PM to 9:00 AM -- This entitles the accused to be given the benefit of doubt.

(Para 12, 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder -- Delay in sending FIR report to court – FIR report was sent to the Court with the delay of about 4 days -- FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and a valuable piece of evidence especially for the purpose of appreciating the evidence adduced at the trial -- FIR casts a doubt on its authenticity.

(Para 13)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 – Murder – Acquittal -- Appellant no. 2 died -- Unnatural behaviour and conduct of the eyewitnesses/ son and nephew of the deceased, ante-timing of the FIR and that the ‘loi’ (blanket) and the cycle alleged to be that of the accused/appellants left behind at the site of the incident were not produced before the Court, compels the Court to doubt the presence of the son and nephew of the deceased at the site -- Delay in conducting the post-mortem – There is difference in the name of the weapons of crime – Accused/ appellant No.1 acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt.

(Para 10, 23-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(N), 506, 294, 323 --  Constitution of India, Article 226 – Rape – Quashing of FIR – Delay in lodging of FIR – Long standing relationship between prosecutrix and petitioner – There is no allegation that there was false promise to marry – There is also FIR against other men by prosecutrix which shows that FIR has been lodged malafidely due to break in their relationship or for some other ulterior motives – FIR quashed, writ petition allowed.

(Para 7-9)

Constitution of India, Article 22(5), 226 – Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (46 of 1988), Section 3, 4 -- Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (VI of 1978), Section 13 -- Quashing of detention order -- Non supply of the dossier to the detenu – Legality of -- Detenu cannot be expected to make a meaningful exercise of his Constitutional and Statutory rights guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, unless and until the material on which detention order is based, is supplied to him – Failure on part of detaining authority to supply material, relied at the time of making detention order to detenu, renders detention order illegal and unsustainable – Petition allowed, Jail Superintendent directed to release the detenu forthwith.

(Para 4-7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 285, 34 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Petitioners/ accused had put the scrap articles on fire, which had caused damage to the property of complainant -- Nature of dispute between the parties is by and large private in nature -- Final outcome of prosecution against the petitioners either way is not going to harm the interest of society at large -- Both sides belong to the same area and have their business premises nearby – Petition allowed, FIR u/s 285 and 34 of IPC alongwith consequent criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 6-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 489C – Fake currency -- Recovery of two fake currency notes of Rs.100 each – Acquittal by Trial Court -- Judgment of acquittal strengthen the presumption of the innocence of the accused -- Articles recovered in Dharamshala were not sealed on the spot – No independent witness examined -- Prosecution has neither disclosed the name of the manager and the staff of the said Dharamshala, in whose presence the alleged recovery is said to have taken place, nor the signature of any of them is on the recovery memo, nor the register of Dharamshala has been produced by the prosecution – Acquittal order by the Trial Court, upheld -- Appeal dismissed.

(Para 13-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 25, 26 -- Section 25 of the Act, 1872 is broadly worded and it excludes from evidence a confession made by the accused to a police officer under any circumstances and a confession made by a person while he was in the custody of the police is also inadmissible u/s 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.

(Para 15)

Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 135 – Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code and Related Matters) Regulations, 2007, Regulation 21.2(c), 37.2 (a)(ii) – Theft of electricity -- Complaint of meter burnt was given by the appellant to the respondent department -- Entire material washed out and is not available -- Case of the respondent department becomes doubtful that whether wire was connected by the appellant or by the respondent Department and therefore, appellant is liable to get the benefit of the extended scope of Regulation 21.2(c) of the Supply Code 2007 – Procedure regarding seizure of equipments used for the purpose of theft or tampering was not followed by the raiding team -- Meter in question was not taken into the possession, no photography or videography of the incident was conducted – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 8-12)

A. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Mens rea -- Delay of two days in FIR -- Except abusing the complainant with her caste name, there is no allegation that the appellant with a view to intentionally insult or intimidate or humiliate the complainant, abused her and that too in a place within the public view -- To attract the offence punishable u/s 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST Act, the mens rea is the essential ingredient -- If in the course of a quarrel or due to some other grouse, the accused abused the complainant by using the caste name, the said act by itself does not automatically attract the offence Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST Act -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 10-14)

B. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Public view -- The expression “public view” as enshrined in Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST, has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties.

(Para 10)

C. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(x) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Offence under SC/ST Act -- Incident of 08.00 PM on 22.05.2005 -- Complainant had ample opportunity to report the matter to the police, still the report was lodged at about 7:30 PM on 24.05.2005, after a delay of about two days and there is no explanation for the said delay -- Prosecution did not lead any evidence to indicate the sufficient reasons for reporting the matter so late -- Lodging of the complaint after an unexplained and inordinate delay is also a strong circumstance to doubt the commission of offence.

(Para 11)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 243 -- Defence witness – Evidential value -- Deposition of a defence witness cannot be discarded or disbelieved only on the ground that he was supporting the case of the accused -- Every defence witness has to be treated at par with a prosecution witness and if the deposition of a defence witness is found to be creditworthy, the same can always be believed and relied upon by the courts.

(Para 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 141 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378(4) -- Dishonour of cheque -- Maintainability of the complaint – Company not impleaded as party/ accused -- Complaint against Director in absence of the company – Held, for maintaining prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, the company must be joined as an accused -- The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself --  Trial court acquitted the accused -- Application for leave to appeal rejected.

(Para 2, 8, 9, 14)