A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- Significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of PW-3 -- Omissions are so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162 of the CR.P.C. -- Thus, it is very difficult to accept the testimony of PW-3 as reliable -- PW-1 is not a witness to the theory of last seen together -- Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the theory of last seen together was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt -- When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established -- There must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to leave any ground for any conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused -- Two significant circumstances forming the chain have not been established -- Conviction and sentence set aside

(Para 10-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Proof of -- Portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer -- Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is duly proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses -- The correct procedure is that the Trial Judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness -- The said portions can be put in bracket and marked as AA, BB, etc. -- The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition unless the same are proved.

(Para 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Domestic violence -- There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation -- Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic violence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants -- Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details -- Appellants do not live with the principal accused -- While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 37-41)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- Petitioners/ convicts directed to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by trial Court by the Appellate Court -- No reason given by the Court while issuing directions -- Condition of depositing of 20% of compensation amount awarded by the trial Court imposed for the purpose of suspension of sentence, set aside -- Appellate Court directed to re-consider the same after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties and then to pass appropriate order in accordance with the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari’s case (SC) 2024(2) L.A.R. 323 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and till then not to take any coercive action against the petitioners.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- According to Section 148 NI Act, the requirement to deposit a minimum 20% of the fine or compensation during an appeal is not mandatory, instead, it is discretionary power vested with the appellate Court meaning the said Court can choose to waive the said deposit in certain exceptional circumstances depending on the facts of the case.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375(2), Exception 2, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape with wife – Quashing of FIR -- As per Exception 2 u/s 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape and, hence, a charge under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained against the appellant -- The conduct of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice is reflective of the fact that it is a dead case where no purpose shall be served in continuing the criminal proceedings alleging charges of rape against the appellant -- No prima facie case constituting any offence is made out against the appellant and—FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed – Appeal allowed.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Section 24 -- Duty of Public Prosecutor -- A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts of the case -- The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the Court to the investigation agencies but to the accused as well -- If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial, the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it -- On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused -- Even if the court or defence counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the Court, if it comes to his knowledge.

(Para 96)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Murder – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction in revision – Power of -- Sub-section (3) of Section 401 CrPC prohibits/ bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- Defence counsel as well as the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to correct the Court if the Court is falling in some error and for all this, the State Government responsible -- It is the State Government who appointed the concerned Public Prosecutor -- High Court committed an egregious error in reversing the acquittal and passing an order of conviction in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants -- Appeals allowed -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside -- State Government directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- each to the three appellants towards compensation within a period of four weeks.

(Para 1-3, 40-46, 97-99)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception-4, 304, Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Sudden fight -- From the evidence, as placed on record, it is difficult to come to a finding that the appellant had come with a premeditated mind to kill the deceased -- Possibility of an altercation taking place between the appellant and the deceased for some reason and the appellant assaulting the deceased in the heat of passion on account of a sudden fight, cannot be ruled out -- Appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC -- As such, the conviction of the appellant under Part I of Section 304 IPC would meet the ends of justice.

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder -- Common intention -- For convicting the accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC the prosecution must establish prior meetings of minds -- It must be established that all the accused had preplanned and shared a common intention to commit the crime with the accused who has actually committed the crime -- It must be established that the criminal act has been done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused -- Prosecution failed to show that the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4/ appellants had common intention with accused No.1-JS prior to the accused No.1-JS’s shooting at the deceased resulting in her death – Conviction set aside.

(Para 1, 2, 18-20)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Recovery of weapon --  Investigating Officer neither proved nor exhibited the disclosure statement of the appellant accused during his deposition -- Investigating Officer did not distinctly identify the accused persons at whose instance, the particular weapon, i.e., axe (kulhari) or dagger (katari), was recovered -- No indication in the testimony that he took the signatures of the accused persons on the recovery memos -- Not even this, the said witness did not even state that he signed and attested the memorandums under which the recoveries were effected -- Therefore, the substratum of the prosecution case regarding the disclosure statements rendered by the appellant-accused and the recoveries allegedly made in furtherance thereof remains unproved for want of proper evidence.

(Para 32)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Motive – Murder of six innocent persons -- Investigating Officer did not examine even a single of the villagers living adjacent to the crime scene for establishing the presence of the appellant-accused at or around the crime scene, corresponding to the time of the incident -- Investigating Officer failed to collect any evidence regarding the safe keeping of the recovered articles/ material objects, till the same reached the Forensic Science Laboratory -- Prosecution failed to prove even one of the three so-called incriminating circumstances i.e., ‘motive’, ‘last seen’ and ‘recoveries’ in its quest to bring home the guilt of the appellant-accused -- Even if, for the sake of arguments the evidence of recovery of weapons were to be accepted, the fact remains that the FSL report does not give any indication regarding the grouping of the blood found on the weapons and hence, the recoveries are of no avail to the prosecution -- The fabric of the prosecution case is full of holes and holes which are impossible to mend -- Conviction of the appellant-accused and death sentence handed down to him can also not be sustained -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 33-39)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392, 397, 201 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery – Murder – Rape -- Acquittal -- Extra judicial confession, by its very nature, has been held to be a weak piece of evidence -- Normally it is given to persons who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the accused – Not on evidence that PW-9 enjoyed the confidence of the accused so as to safely infer that the accused would have made a clean breast of things to PW-9 -- PW-22 does speak of Police taking PW-9 into custody in connection with this case -- So many omissions in the statement of PW-9 -- Moreover, there is no corroboration in material particulars and hence Court rejected the extra judicial confession -- Merely based on the recovery no conviction for the offence charged could be sustained against the appellant – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 108-110, 117-124)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323 – Hurt – Complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences – Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused – Ingredients of offence u/s 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie.

(Para 17-19)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 509 – Insult the modesty of woman – Appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in a “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment -- Following the complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) was initially registered and later converted into an FIR after two months later -- The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC -- Prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC not disclosed.

(Para 4, 5, 28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323, 504, 506, 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings – Criminal intimidation -- Insult the modesty of woman – After the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was registered, indicated that no cognizable offence -- Subsequently, an FIR was lodged (fifty-eight) days after the initial complaint was filed, u/s 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC -- Only Section 509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are noncognizable offences -- FIR does not contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge u/s 509 of the IPC -- Chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use of "filthy language" by the appellants in scolding the complainant -- Discrepancies and variations, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 40-45)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Dowry case – Cruelty – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Appellant sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offence u/s 498-A of IPC and one year imprisonment for the offence u/s 4 of DP Act, sentence to run concurrently -- Appellant has undergone approximately 3 months in custody – Incident pertains to the year 2006, marriage was solemnized on 31.03.2006 and the couple lived together exactly for three days -- Complainant is married and settled abroad -- Case prolonged for a period of nearly 19 years -- Sentence set aside, substituted for the period already undergone and Rs. 3,00,000/- payable as compensation.

(Para 13-16)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Conviction of accused -- It is a fundamental principle that a court can convict an accused only if their guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on the possibility of guilt -- The gap between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty” is significant, separating uncertain speculations from definitive conclusions -- Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to elevate its case from the realm of ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder –Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction on a charge of murder may be based purely on circumstantial evidence, provided that such evidence is deemed credible and trustworthy --  In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person’s guilt -- The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.

(Para 15)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution failed to conduct the Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, thereby, bringing the identification of the material objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt -- Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend -- Chain of circumstantial evidences in the case cannot be held to be so complete, so as to lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused which is totally inconsistent with their innocence – Conviction set aside.

(Para 22-27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Offence under SC/ST Act – Promise to marry -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Complainant agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant -- Present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry -- Appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job -- In her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 90, 376 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape -- For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 376 & 506 Part I -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Promise to marry – Consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix – It does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with -- Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances -- Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered -- Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court -- This cannot be permitted -- Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- The provocation must be both grave and sudden -- In order to invoke the benefit of the exception, it must be established that the act committed by the accused was a simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden provocation which deprived him of the power of self-control -- If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the accused cannot get the benefit of this exception -- Likewise, he cannot invoke the exception where the provocation though sudden is not grave.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the following conditions must be complied with:

(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused;

(ii) The provocation must be grave;

(iii) The provocation must be sudden;

(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control;

(v) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control; and

(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- Accused must establish the following circumstances:

(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and sudden;

(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his power of self-control; and

(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power of self-control, he had caused the death of the victim.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Burden of proof -- It is for the accused who seeks to reduce the nature of his crime by bringing his case under Exception 1, to prove that the provocation received by him was such as might reasonably be deemed sufficient to deprive him of self-control, and that the act of killing took place whilst that absence of control was in existence and may fairly be attributed to it.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1, 304 Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Deceased is said to have uttered some bad words and it appears that he also raised his hand & slapped the appellant -- However, that by itself may not be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of grave and sudden provocation -- The incident occurred at a spur of a moment -- The act was not pre-planned or pre-meditated -- What is important to note is that the appellant had no weapon in his hands -- He picked up a cement stone which was lying beneath the bridge and hit the same on the head of the deceased -- Therefore, it could be said that the appellant did not take any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner – Conviction u/s 304 Part 1 of the IPC, upheld – Sentence reduced to already  undergone.

(Para 30-33)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Kidnapping -- Procuration of minor girl – Acquittal -- Age of girl -- Prosecutrix herself indicated that she was not forcibly taken away by the appellant -- Age of the prosecutrix as per the opinion of the Doctor ranged between 16-18 years and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the possibility of the prosecutrix, being of 18 years age, cannot entirely be ruled out -- Evidence of the prosecutrix not supported the case of the prosecution -- Independent eye-witness (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution’s case on recovery -- Prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of both Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Dowry death – Acquittal -- For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv) the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand for dowry -- Both the witnesses have not deposed about the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating that there was a demand for dowry -- Version regarding the demand for dowry is an omission -- No legally admissible evidence of the demand for dowry  -- There is no specific evidence of any cruelty – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 – Compromise after conviction – Compounding of offence -- Recalling of order of SLP – Trial court convicted the appellant u/s 326/ 34 IPC, sentencing R.I. for two years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- -- High Court reduced the sentence to 1 year R.I., while enhancing the fine to Rs. 2,00,000/- -- Special Leave Petition dismissed -- Subsequently, the applicant/ petitioner compromised, Miscellaneous Application filed seeking relief for compounding the offense --  Order dismissing the SLP in limine recalled -- Leave granted, appeal partly allowed -- Conviction confirmed, however, the sentence of one year R.I. reduced to the period already undergone.

(Para 2-8)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 -- POCSO – Rape – Acquittal -- Prosecutrix 16 years and four months old -- In medical examination no injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix though her hymen was torn -- Prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she was raped by the accused but the fact remains that she has contradicted her statement at more than one place -- She stated statement u/s 164 CrPC that she hit the accused on his head by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the accused on his foot -- When the accused had surrendered none of these injuries were noticed on the body of the accused -- When a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness -- Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, under these circumstances, Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Outrage modesty -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Record is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant – Held, mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court -- No direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant -- It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-12.4, 14-17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 503, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence --  For an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should be clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on record -- At least the results of the investigation and the material gathered should disclose somewhat of an offence -- FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant – No prima facie offence is made out on the part of the appellant -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 13-17)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 58 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256 -- NDPS case -- Punishment for vexatious entry, search, seizure or arrest – Jurisdiction of Special Judge -- Special Judge could not have conducted the proceedings against the appellant/ Superintendent of Police  for the offence punishable u/s 58 of the NDPS Act inasmuch as such proceedings could have been conducted only by a Magistrate -- Procedure as required under Chapter XX i.e. Sections 251 to 256 of the Cr.P.C. has also not been followed -- Notice issued by the learned Special Judge to the appellant u/s 58 of the NDPS Act and all subsequent proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 2, 26)

A. Criminal trial -- Interested witness – Evidence of -- Merely because a witness is an interested witness, it cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such a witness -- However, the testimony of such a witness has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Acquittal – Deposition of witness – Parity for all accused -- High Court comes to a conclusion that it is difficult to believe that the witness could have witnessed the incident in the manner narrated by him and granted benefit of doubt to co-accused persons then conviction of accused on the basis of the evidence of the very same witness only on the basis of conjectures and surmises is not permissible -- Seizure of knife, testimony of Inspector of police would show that the recovery was made from an open place accessible to one and all -- As such, only on the basis of the circumstance of such a recovery, the conviction could not have been based – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 14-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 463, 464 – False document -- Forgery -- Document containing a false recital does not amount to forgery.

(Para 33)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d) -- Forest Rules of Kullu Division of 1878, Rule 4A -- Cheating – Corruption -- Acquittal -- Gift of land by accused – Sanction of Timber distribution right thereafter -- Mere gift of the half share did not amount to divestment of her forest right as per Rule 4A – Accused had not made any false representation, and she cannot be held to be guilty of cheating -- Accused/ Donor, being the right holder, was entitled to get the Tinder Distribution/ TD and the sanction of TD in her favour is not illegal; hence, the offence punishable u/s 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not made out – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 2, 36-40)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Constitution of India, Article 142 – Transfer petition -- Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Contents of the FIR clearly suggest that both the parties being adult had consensual relations for years before the complaint was filed alleging that there was backing out of promise to marry -- No case is made out u/s 376 IPC -- FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed.

(Para 2, 6, 8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 239 -- Dowry -- Cruelty – Abetment of suicide – Discharge/ Quashing of charge -- Deceased committed suicide after twelve years of marriage -- Around twelve months prior to her death, the appellants had sold the deceased’s streedhan and had tortured her when she demanded them back -- No proximate link between the alleged facts, instances of harassment and her subsequent death by hanging -- Appellants did not have the requisite mens rea and neither did they commit any positive or direct act or omission to instigate or aid in the commission of suicide by the deceased -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 306, IPC are not made out – Appellant discharged from section 306, however charge u/s 498A of IPC upheld.

(Para 13-15, 26-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Dowry case -- Cruelty -- ‘cruelty’ simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence, rather it must be done either with the intention to cause grave injury or to drive her to commit suicide or with intention to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands.

(Para 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- To bring a conviction u/ s 306, IPC it is necessary to establish a clear mens rea to instigate or push the deceased to commit suicide -- It requires certain such act, omission, creation of circumstances, or words which would incite or provoke another person to commit suicide.

(Para 19)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Essential ingredients to be fulfilled in order to bring a case under Section 306, IPC are: the abetment; the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

(Para 20)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient to establish guilt -- For a conviction, there must be evidence of a positive act by the accused, closely linked to the time of the incident, that compelled or drove the victim to commit suicide -- It is essential to establish that the death was a result of suicide and that the accused actively abetted its commission -- Prosecution must prove beyond doubt that the accused played a definitive role in the abetment -- Without clear evidence of an active role in provoking or assisting the suicide, a conviction u/s 306 IPC cannot be sustained.

(Para 21, 22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Appeal against acquittal – Change in law – Ground of -- Change of law by itself cannot be a ground for finding fault with the acquittal judgment rendered in favour of the appellant as far back as on 10.12.2018 -- Impugned order dated 23.06.2023 of the High Court cannot be sustained and set aside.

(Para 3-10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Onus on accused -- Onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused – If the prosecution fails to establish a complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then the accused's failure to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Onus on accused -- One of son of deceased’s testimony remotely suggest that any or all of the three accused persons were present in the house or that they had quarrelled with his mother when he left for school -- None of the neighbours had seen the accused present with deceased or that they were seen fleeing away on the fateful morning – Prosecution has not explained as to where the girl child was on the date of the incident -- Likewise, the prosecution also failed to provide any explanation, as to why the other son was not examined in evidence -- Failure to examine them in evidence calls for drawing of adverse inference thereby, further denting the credibility of the prosecution case -- Prosecution failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances against the accused-appellants by convincing evidence and beyond the shadow of doubt, so as to affirm their guilt -- Accused-appellants acquitted of the charges by giving them the benefit of doubt – Appeal allowed.

(Para 18-38)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Instigation – Mens rea -- ‘instigation’ to do a particular thing is necessary for charging a person with abetment -- ‘Instigation’ is to provoke, incite or encourage a person to do an act -- Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a particular thing and without the positive act on part of the accused there would be no instigation -- To convict a person for abetment of suicide u/s 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea on the part of the accused to abet such a crime and it requires an active act or a direct act leading to the commission of suicide.

(Para 21-23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Discord and differences in domestic life are quite common in society -- Until and unless some guilty intention on the part of the accused is established, it is ordinarily not possible to convict him for an offence u/s 306 IPC.

(Para 25)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Refusal to marry – Mens rea – Acquittal -- Accused-appellant simply refused to marry the deceased and thus, even assuming there was love between the parties, it is only a case of broken relationship which by itself would not amount to abetment to suicide -- Accused-appellant had not provoked the deceased in any manner to kill herself; rather the deceased herself carried poison in a bottle from her village with a predetermined mind to positively get an affirmation from the accused-appellant to marry her, failing which she would commit suicide -- No guilty intention or mens rea on the part of the accused-appellant had been established – Conviction set aside – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 29-32)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 -- NDPS – Independent witness – Relevancy of -- Non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal and the prosecution case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses -- However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinize the testimonies of the police officials.

(Para 24)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS – Acquittal -- Recovery of contraband – Doubt upon – Independent witness – Non-examination of – Effect of -- Police party was not carrying any sewing machine with them -- Police officials also admitted that the parcel was machine stitched from two sides -- No explanation was given by the police official as to how the parcel could have been machine stitched on the spot without any sewing machine -- This shows that either the parcel was already lying with the police official or the proceedings were not conducted on the spot and the testimonies of the police officials regarding the fact that the proceedings were conducted on the spot is highly suspect -- Prosecution witnesses have given different versions regarding the circumstances surrounding the recovery -- Inconsistencies would assume significance in the absence of independent witnesses – Acquittal, upheld.

(Para 30)

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958), Section 3, 4, 12 – Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 3, 25 – Conviction under Arms act – Release on Probation -- Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction -- When a person who is found guilty, is extended the benefit of Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, then he shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction of an offence under such law.

(Para 10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive -- Motive on its own cannot make or break the prosecution case.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Time gap – Relevant factor – It is a vital link in the chain of other circumstances but on its own strength it is insufficient to sustain conviction unless the time-gap between the deceased being last seen alive with the accused and recovery of dead body of the deceased is so small that possibility of any other person being the author of the crime is just about impossible -- Where the time-gap is large, intervening circumstances including act by some third person cannot be ruled out -- In such a case, adverse inference cannot be drawn against the accused merely because he has failed to prove as to when he parted company of the deceased.

(Para 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Walking in public street -- Time gap – Effect of -- No evidence led by the prosecution to demonstrate that the place where the deceased was last seen alive with the accused was near the place from where deceased’s body was recovered -- Further, the time gap between 4.30 PM of 2.2.1997 and 8.30 AM of 3.2.1997 (i.e., when the dead body was recovered) is so large that third party hand in the crime cannot be ruled out -- If two or more persons are seen walking on a public street, either side by side, or behind one another, it is not such a circumstance from which it may be inferred with a degree of certainty that those were together or in company of each other -- Likewise, a person may exchange pleasantries with another person walking on the path, but that by itself is not sufficient to infer that the two are in company of each other – Last seen circumstance not of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused-appellants – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 27, 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Disclosure Statement – Recovery -- Disclosure statement not admissible in evidence because the alleged discovery was not made pursuant to that statement -- Disclosure statement was recorded at the police station whereas recovery was made from the place pointed out by the accused enroute to the police station -- It was, therefore, a case of recovery from the place allegedly pointed out by the accused and not based on a disclosure statement.

(Para 37)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Recovery of currency note from accused -- Nothing on record to show that the money belonged to the deceased -- Currency notes are commonly available and there is nothing in the statement of the witness to show that the currency notes shown to him during his examination had any distinguishing mark which would enable him to identify them; hence, his testimony that the currency notes handed over by him to the deceased were the same currency notes, which were shown to him in the Court is not acceptable.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Recovery on disclosure statement – Exclusive knowledge – Requirements of -- Disclosure statement shows that the stone was not concealed anywhere and was lying in the open -- Where the recoveries were effected from a place accessible, the same cannot be relied upon -- Since, there is no evidence of the exclusive knowledge of the accused, therefore, the stone cannot be connected to the accused.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Other articles and stick was recovered from the spot at a distance of 200 metre from the dead body by I.O. -- As per the statement of the accused recorded u/s 27, he had thrown the stone and the stick at the same place -- It is difficult to believe that the investigating officer would not have discovered the stone when he had inspected the spot and found other articles on the spot – These circumstances cast reasonable doubt on the recovery of the stone at the instance of accused.

(Para 27-29)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Disclosure statement -- Statement u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be used to prove that the accused had killed the deceased.

(Para 39)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 287 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 359, 528 – Death by electrocution in Rolling Mill – Non-compoundable offence -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- When the deceased’s family absolves the accused of any negligence or rash act, it would be impossible for the prosecution to succeed during the trial -- Thus, quashing of cases u/s 304-A IPC, other than roadside accidents, can be quashed depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the role assigned to the accused, mens rea, and the guilt of the such person -- After the death, the petitioners helped the complainant family financially and emotionally -- Accident occurred in broad daylight, and as an adult, the victim should have been more careful while performing his duties -- It is not a case where the acts of the Rolling mill or the Manager can be termed as rash or negligent -- Inherent jurisdiction u/s 528 BNSS, 2023 invoked, the FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-18)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 323(4), 324(5), 333, 191(3), 190, 305 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – House trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint/ 333-BNS – Rioting armed with deadly weapon/ 191(3)-BNS – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at between the parties verified and confirmed -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-6)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 305(a), 331(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – House-trespass or House breaking/ 331(4)-BNSS -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at between the parties verified and confirmed -- FIR and all consequential proceedings, quashed.

(Para 1-6)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27, 30 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 309 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to commit suicide – Use of arms without license -- Petitioner No.1 was handling the licensed revolver of respondent no. 2 and while doing so, an accidental shot was fired -- Petitioner No.1 was having no mens rea to kill himself by committing suicide -- Illegal use of a licenced weapon per se does not constitute an offence u/s 27 of Arms Act – Alleged weapon used was having licence in the name of petitioner No.2 and thus no case is made out u/s 25 of the Arms Act -- Prima facie no offence u/s 30 of Arms Act is made out against the accused, as there was no breach of condition of the arms licence -- FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 441, 442, 452 -- House trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint – Incident at restaurant – Acquittal -- Incident had taken place in a restaurant run by the injured PW-1, which cannot be said to be either a place used for human dwelling or for worship or for the custody of the property -- Appellant could not have been convicted for the offence under Section 452 IPC – Conviction set aside -- Appellant acquitted for the offence u/s 452 IPC.

(Para 10-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 441, 442, 452 -- House trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- The “house trespass” being an essential ingredient for convicting a person under Section 452, it has to be proved by the prosecution that the accused committed the house trespass and criminal trespass by entering into or unlawfully remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, as contemplated in Section 442 IPC.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 , Section 304 Part I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Benefit of doubt -- Previous enmity between the parties -- A month prior to the date of the incident, an FIR was lodged by the wife of the appellant No.1 against the deceased since he had tried to dispossess the appellants -- Place of the incident is adjacent to the field in possession of the appellants -- Weapons used by the accused persons are axe and sticks commonly used by the agriculturists -- No material to show that there is any premeditation – Possibility of offence being committed by the appellants without premeditation in a sudden fight in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out -- It cannot be said that the appellants have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- Appellants would be entitled to benefit of doubt, conviction u/s 302 IPC needs to be altered Part I of Section 304 IPC.

(Para 18-21)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 77, 115(2), 117(2), 190, 191(2), 351(3), 352 – Voyeurism – Rioting – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners do not involve offences of moral turpitude or any grave/ heinous crime, rather same are petty offences -- FIR as well as consequent proceedings  quashed and set aside.

(Para 10,11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 420, 468, 471 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(d) – Cheating and forgery – Corruption case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Matter compromised between the borrowers and the Bank -- Upon payment of the amount under the OTS, the loan account of the borrower has been closed -- Only question would be, as to whether the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present appellants would be justified or not -- In Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.4353 of 2018, it was held that when the matter has been compromised between the borrower and Bank, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would not be justifiable – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 14-17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Matrimonial dispute – Financial matters -- In the matters arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute, the High Court should exercise its powers under Section 482 CrPC for giving an end to the criminal proceedings.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Ingredients fulfilled if the suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming encouragement/ incitement by the accused leaving no option but to commit suicide.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Quashing of FIR -- Extreme action of committing suicide on account of great disturbance to the psychological imbalance of the deceased such incitement can be divided into two broad categories. First, where the deceased is having sentimental ties or physical relations with the accused and the second category would be where the deceased is having relations with the accused in his or her official capacity.

-- In the case of former category sometimes a normal quarrel or the hot exchange of words may result into immediate psychological imbalance, consequently creating a situation of depression, loss of charm in life and if the person is unable to control sentiments of expectations, it may give temptations to the person to commit suicide -- Relation of husband and wife, mother and son, brother and sister, sister and sister and other relations of such type, where sentimental tie is by blood or due to physical relations.

-- In the case of second category the tie is on account of official relations, where the expectations would be to discharge the obligations as provided for such duty in law and to receive the considerations as provided in law.

Former category leaves more expectations, whereas in the latter category, by and large, the expectations and obligations are prescribed by law, rules, policies and regulations -- It is for the police and the courts of law to look into the matter and see that the persons against whom allegations have been levelled are not unnecessarily harassed or they are not put to trial just for the sake of prosecuting them.

(Para 10-22)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Deceased humiliated in the official meeting -- Quashing of FIR – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court – Appellant-Senior officers convened a meeting with the employees of the company -- Company wanted around fifty to sixty office employees to opt for Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) --  Alleged that in the course of the meeting the deceased was humiliated by the appellants & he felt very bad about it and he committed suicide – No case against the appellants made out – Appeal allowed, Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4, 23-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (2 of 2013), Section 13 – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Human Smuggling – Cheating – Compromise effected between the parties without any pressure or coercion and out of their free will -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 5-7)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 389, 34 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Putting person in fear of accusation of offence, in order to commit extortion (Section 389 IPC) – Offence for which the accused have been charged are not of serious nature – Compromise will go a long way in ironing out the differences for betterment of future life of the parties – FIR alongwith all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise quashing of conviction and sentence – Back-out from compromise – Effect of -- As per compromise, the petitioner has already paid Rs.3,00,000/- to the complainant and the complainant pleaded no objection -- Held, resiling from the compromise by the complainant is immaterial and the continuation of the case would be an abuse of the process of the Court -- Petition allowed, complaint alongwith the judgment of conviction and order of sentence quashed on the basis of compromise.

(Para 5-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

A. Expert evidence – Conviction -- Without independent and reliable corroboration, the opinion of the handwriting experts cannot be solely relied upon to base the conviction.

(Para 13)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12(2) – Facilitating second passport – Acquittal -- Abetment – Burden of proof -- Burden is cast on the prosecution to prove that the accused had knowingly furnished false information or supressing known material information with the intent of securing a passport or travel document to a person and thereby had abetted in the commission of offence punishable under Section 12(1) and thereby punishable under Section 12(2) of the Passports Act – Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 2, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 114, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Obscene act – Abettor – Employee/ Waiter of Bar -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Petitioner in the present case was a mere employee of the owner of Bar and he is found to be discharging his duty of serving the customers food and drink as per his employment profile -- No offense made out qua the Petitioner -- Petition allowed.

(Para 1, 8-11.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113A – Abetment to suicide – Presumption – Acquittal -- Marriage on 14.11.2011 – Suicide on 11.05.2012 -- Accused went to Assam in the month of April, 2012 for joining his duty -- Deceased had died while she was in her parents’ house and at that time the accused was in Assam -- General allegations of harassment, no independent witness to prove that any demand of dowry was made by the accused in their presence -- No evidence led by prosecution that there was abetment of such grave nature which was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide -- Suicidal death may be the deceased's own act, being of hyper sensitive nature, for which, the husband cannot be held guilty -- Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 2(a), 18, 36-39)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to stand -- However as a rule of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other dependable evidence on record -- It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his/her evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable -- The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because he/she is susceptible to tutoring.

(Para 23)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- Incident taken place on 13.10.2014 whereas the FIR was lodged on 05.12.2014 -- Delay in lodging the FIR could not be explained by the prosecution which creates a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution -- Since the evidence of the parents of the victim has been discredited by the defence in their cross- examination and there is no corroboration to the evidence of the child victim (PW12), therefore, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of the child victim to convict the appellants.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Medical evidence – Acquittal -- Doctor had given the opinion that the possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled-out, but on that day the victim was not produced before her -- As per the FSL report, no blood and semen were detected on the shirt, pajama/ slacks, underwear, brassiere, vests, perineal swab and vaginal swab of the victim --  As there is no medical evidence on record to support the theory of the prosecution that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, it becomes difficult to uphold the conviction granted by the trial Court.

(Para 30)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 29 – POCSO – Presumption – Rebuttal of presumption -- It cannot be countenanced that the presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute -- Unless the prosecution is able to prove foundational facts in the context of the allegations made against the accused under the POCSO Act, the presumption u/s 29 of the said Act would not operate against the accused -- Statutory presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act must be understood and tested on the anvil of the golden thread which runs through web of our criminal jurisprudence system that an accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 33-35)

E. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(xii) &3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Offence u/s 3(1) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, would be attracted only if the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will are promoted or attempted to be promoted against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a class and not on criticizing an individual member -- An offence u/s 3(1) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of the scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

(Para 37, 38)

A. Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927), Section 41, 42 – FIR under Forest Act – Acquittal -- Non-mentioning of botanical name of forest produce – Effect of -- Legislature has consciously used the botanical name with some purpose and in the absence of any evidence of the botanical name, the prosecution version that the accused had violated the Rules framed under Section 41 and thereby violated Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act is not acceptable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 1, 17, 19, 22, 23)

B. Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927), Section 41, 42 – FIR under Forest Act – Guchhies-forest produce -- Mere fact of not handing over the permit to the accused is not sufficient to implicate the accused when the person who had handed over the Guchhies had a valid permit with him.

(Para 21)