Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5(j) (ii), 6 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 -- POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Parties have settled the dispute amicably and have also verified the contents of the compromise -- Cognizance/ summoning order, charge-sheet as well as the entire proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-4)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 319, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498-A, 323, 504, 506 – Dowry case -- Summoning of additional accused – Quashing of -- Acquittal of main accused – Effect of -- If main accused are acquitted, no criminal proceedings can be sustained against other co-accused on the same set of witnesses – Whenever, there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction valuable time of the Court should not be wasted -- Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue – Petition allowed, summoning the accused u/s 319 Cr.P.C. for facing trial quashed.

(Para 8-10)

Haryana Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1988 (28 of 1988), Section 8, 9 (As amended in 2012) – Minimum sentence prescribed – Effect of -- Section 9 does not prescribe a minimum sentence for the offence punishable under it -- By amendment minimum sentence made 2 years -- Amendment came into effect on 1st October 2012, whereas the offence was committed on 17th June 2010 and the order of sentence was issued on 11/13th November 2010 -- Said amendment would not be applicable -- Appellant has already been granted remission for the main offence u/s 302 IPC -- However, following the date of remission, the appellant has undergone an additional incarceration of approximately 10 months -- Sentence already undergone would subserve the ends of justice for the offence punishable under the Prisoners Act, 1988.

(Para 10-14)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 190, 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 457, 427, 323, 504, 506, 448, 511, 120B -- Cognizance by court -- Summoning order in printed form – Effect of -- Summoning order passed in a printed proforma by filing up the blanks reveals that the Trial Court has not applied its judicial mind and in a very cursory manner the Trial Court took cognizance -- Summoning order is cryptic -- Cognizance/ summoning order quashed, Trial Court directed to exercise discretionary power and decide afresh while taking cognizance on the charge sheet after taking into consideration the entire materials and pass appropriate order in accordance with law.

(Para 5-10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376(2)(f), 417, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Rape – Promise to marry -- Discharge of accused -- Appellant and the Complainant came in contact in 2014, during the pendency of matrimonial disputes arising out of the Complainant’s marriage -- It is from day one, she had knowledge and was conscious of the fact, that the Appellant was in a subsisting marriage, though separated – Complainant was receiving financial help from the Appellant for herself and her son --  Complainant cannot plead ‘misconception of fact’ or ‘rape on the false pretext to marry’ -- No evidence to conclude that there was any fraudulent or dishonest inducement – No criminal intimidation -- There is a growing tendency of resorting to initiation of criminal proceedings when relationships turn sour -- Every consensual relationship, where a possibility of marriage may exist, cannot be given a colour of a false pretext to marry, in the event of a fall out -- It is such lis that amounts to an abuse of process of law -- Court deemed fit to terminate the proceedings at the stage of charge itself – Appeal allowed.

(Para 14-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375,  376, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 227 – Rape – Discharge of accused – Rape – Promise to marry -- Mere fact that physical relations were established pursuant to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case -- An offence u/s 375 IPC could only be made out, if promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual relations – Ingredients of offences u/s 375/ 506 IPC not established -- Trial Court discharged the accused – High Court in revision set aside the order of discharge has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of the allegations in the FIR, and the Charge-sheet, while failing to consider that at the stage of framing of charges, the court must only adjudicate on the basis of material on record – Order of High Court set aside – Criminal proceedings terminated.

(Para 14-18)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Acquittal – Last seen theory -- Prosecution relied on last seen evidence, extra-judicial confessions, and circumstantial evidence including recovery of articles and fingerprints –PW-2 (alleged eyewitness) and PW-12 (last seen witness) disbelieved due to delayed statements – Extra judicial confessional statements disbelieved by High court – Recovery of slippers and a wheel spanner with alleged fingerprints of the accused was held insufficient to establish guilt in absence of a complete and credible chain of circumstantial evidence – Benefit of doubt extended to appellant – Conviction u/s 302 IPC set aside, holding prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence.

(Para 6, 7, 19-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheating – Quashing of FIR -- Mere breach of promise to repay per se does not infer dishonest intention -- Appellant had clarified he had suffered continuous business setbacks -- Due to losses, he was unable to pay the 2nd non-applicant -- He had sold the coal to a brick manufacturer and suffered losses thereto -- Failure to pay due to unfortunate business losses cannot be clothed with culpability and the process of criminal law utilized to recover outstanding dues -- Proceeding arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 17-23)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Quashing of FIR -- Promise if any was after the first physical intercourse and even later the allegation was forceful intercourse without any consent -- Allegation of threat and coercion against the victim, to have sexual intercourse with the accused, which even as per the victim’s statement was repeated thrice in the same manner, when she willingly accompanied the accused to a hotel room -- High Court should have interfered u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C -- These proceedings cannot go on -- Proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-13)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 118 -- Interested witness -- First cousins witness -- It is settled position of law that merely because the witnesses are relatives of the deceased and as such are interested witnesses, that alone cannot be a ground to discard their testimony -- The only requirement is that the testimony of such witnesses has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 9)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception IV, 302, 304, Part 1 -- Murder -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Place of incident is near the house of accused persons -- Possibility of a quarrel taking place on account of previous enmity between the accused persons and the deceased; and in a sudden fight in the heat of the moment, the appellant along with the co-accused assaulting the deceased cannot be ruled out -- Weapons used are a stick and the blunt side of the axe, these tools are easily available in any agricultural field -- It therefore cannot be said that there was any premeditation -- Case would not fall under the ambit of Section 302 of IPC and the appellant would be entitled to benefit of Exception IV of Section 300 of IPC -- It is further to be noted that the appellant has already undergone the sentence of 6 years 10 months – Appellant sentenced to the period already undergone.

(Para 12-15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 143, 147, 153 (A), 295, 436, 332 -- Unlawful assembly -- Rioting – Bystander -- Appellants were residents of the same village where riots broke out, therefore their presence at the spot is natural and by itself not incriminating -- More so, because it is not the case of the prosecution that they came with arms or instruments of destruction -- In these circumstances, their presence at the spot could be that of an innocent bystander who had a right to move freely in absence of prohibitory orders -- In such a situation, to sustain their conviction, the prosecution ought to have led some reliable evidence to demonstrate that they were a part of the unlawful assembly and not just spectator -- Here no evidence has come on record to indicate that the appellants incited the mob, or they themselves acted in any manner indicative of them being a part of the unlawful assembly – Appellants’ arrest from the spot is not a guarantee of their culpability -- Mere presence of the appellants at the spot, or their arrest therefrom, was not sufficient to prove that they were a part of the unlawful assembly comprising of more than a thousand people – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 15-18)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 378 – Appeal against conviction/ Acquittal -- Huge pendency of criminal appeals in High Courts – Preference of hearing -- Priority is usually given to the hearing of the appeals where the accused are in prison -- The appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail take a backseat -- However, a right balance has to be struck by taking up for hearing even some of the old criminal appeals against conviction where accused are on bail -- If the appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail and especially where a life sentence has been imposed are heard after a decade or more from its filing, if the appeal is dismissed, the question arises of sending the accused back to jail after a long period of more than a decade -- Therefore, it is desirable that certain categories of appeals against conviction where the accused are on bail should be given priority.

(Para 15)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Preliminary stage of investigation -- There is no absolute rule that even if the investigation is at a preliminary stage, the Court exercising jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot interfere.

(Para 4)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 7(2), 13(1)(d), 20 – Demand and acceptance – Presumption -- Prosecution failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the trap team of the ACB -- In that circumstance there is no question of a presumption u/s 20 arising in the case --  Conviction and sentence set aside.

(Para 16)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 207, 216, 293 -- Framing of charge – Fair opportunity before sending to trial -- On 5th November, 2016, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges against the appellant/ accused even though he had been provided with the copies of the relied upon documents on that very day – Till this date the appellant was neither represented by a privately engaged defence counsel nor did the trial Court offer him the services of a legal aid counsel -- Apparently, proper opportunity was not given to the appellant before framing charges against him and sending him for trial.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Rape – Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Fair trial – Undue haste – Forensic Science Laboratory report was presented on 1st and 3rd December, 2016 and the trial Court took it on record – Order sheets of trial court are  silent  on the aspect of whether the copy of the said FSL report was ever provided to the appellant -- For the first time on 11th January, 2017, on the request being made by the appellant, one Advocate, was appointed as an amicus curiae to represent him in the trial -- Recording of the evidence of prosecution witnesses began on the very same day, i.e., 11th January, 2017, and the process was concluded within 27 days, i.e., on 6th February, 2017 -- During this short period, the amicus curiae appointed to defend the appellant was changed on 31st January, 2017 -- No possibility that the defence counsel could have had a reasonable opportunity to prepare the matter and conduct the cross-examination from the witnesses – Held, trial was not conducted in a fair manner and appellant was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.

(Para 13-16, 58)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Rape -- murder -- Last seen theory -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- FIR does not contain a whisper that anyone from the village had seen the child-victim in the company of the appellant, any time prior to her dead body being found -- Conduct of the witnesses in remaining silent and not disclosing to the police regarding they having seen the appellant taking away the child-victim with himself, completely demolishes the prosecution case regarding the theory of last seen -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 34, 35, 58)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376A, 302, 366, 363, 201 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 5, 6 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 45, 106 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 293 – Rape – Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer (PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner – Very procedure of collection and forwarding of DNA samples to the FSL is full of lacunae and loopholes – Non-examination of the scientific expert who carried out the DNA profiling is fatal, and the DNA report cannot be admitted in evidence -- Appellant is acquitted of the charges.

(Para 38-40, 58)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder -- Recoveries were made after several days of the incident and no bloodstains etc. were found on the weapons -- PW-15, the doctor who had conducted the post-mortem examination, deposed that the seized weapons were not shown to him -- Knives etc. were also not produced in court -- All the seizure witnesses turned hostile -- Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot come to the aid of the prosecution -- Clothes of the accused were not seized and sent for forensic examination to find out whether there were any bloodstains --  Medical evidence confirmed multiple stab injuries on his body leading to profuse bleeding and death -- It is for the prosecution to connect the accused to the murder of the deceased by producing credible and legally admissible evidence -- However, no credible evidence at all to connect the accused persons with the homicidal death of deceased -- Appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt -- Conviction and sentence of the appellants set aside.

(Para 21-25)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 377, 328, 506 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 164, 482 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 183, 528 -- Rape -- Habitual complainant – Quashing of FIR -- Apart from her statement in the FIR and her statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C./ 183 of BNSS, there is no other evidence on record -- Most concerning is that the same respondent has filed nearly identical cases at least against eight other individuals (nine cases in total) -- These FIRs, lodged in different Police Stations across Delhi, involve offenses u/s 34, 328, 354, 354A, 354D, 376, 377, 506, and 509 of IPC 00 -- After lodging the FIR, the complainant has not cooperated with the investigation and has not appeared despite being served with notice -- Appellant is a retired Army officer and the author of five books -- Considering the nature of the case and the cumulative circumstances, the criminal case initiated against the appellant is nothing but an abuse of the process of law -- This is precisely the nature of case where the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (as per new act, under Section 528 B.N.S.S.) and should have quashed the proceedings -- FIR quashed.

(Para 5-9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 452 – Rape – No medical examination -- Acquittal -- Prosecutrix and her parents themselves never fully co-operated with the medical staff, thereby adversely impacting the credibility of their version of events -- Non-allowance of medical examination by an alleged rape-victim raises negative inferences against them – Prosecutrix was 19 years old at the time of the alleged occurrence – High Court has microscopically examined the entire evidence before firmly opining that the accused-respondent deserves the benefit of the doubt – Appeal against judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court, dismissed.

(Para 10-13)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106, 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Circumstantial evidence – Acquittal -- Significant improvements and omissions in the evidence of PW-3 -- Omissions are so relevant that they become contradictions in view of the Explanation to Section 162 of the CR.P.C. -- Thus, it is very difficult to accept the testimony of PW-3 as reliable -- PW-1 is not a witness to the theory of last seen together -- Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the theory of last seen together was proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt -- When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established -- There must be a chain of circumstances so complete as not to leave any ground for any conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused -- Two significant circumstances forming the chain have not been established -- Conviction and sentence set aside

(Para 10-12)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 161, 162 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 145 -- Contradiction in statement – Proof of -- Portion of the prior statement shown to the witness for contradicting the witness must be proved through the investigating officer -- Unless the said portion of the prior statement used for contradiction is duly proved, it cannot be reproduced in the deposition of the witnesses -- The correct procedure is that the Trial Judge should mark the portions of the prior statements used for contradicting the witness -- The said portions can be put in bracket and marked as AA, BB, etc. -- The marked portions cannot form a part of the deposition unless the same are proved.

(Para 11)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating – Acquittal – Money taken for sending abroad -- Incident happened in the year 2001, however, written complaint made after two years -- In the complaint, nowhere, mentioned that complainant or his father had arranged an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- by taking loan or by arranging the same from their relatives -- Nothing brought on record to show that any travel agency is being run by the accused persons -- Prosecution has neither proved source of amount nor the fact that who induced the complainant to pay the amount and to whom the payment was made -- As such, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 5, 7)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 – Appeal against acquittal -- Power of the Appellate Court to unsettle the order of acquittal on the basis of re-appreciation of the evidence is subject to the settled law that where two views are possible and out of the two, one points towards the innocence of the accused, the view which favours the accused should prevail over the other pointing towards his guilt -- Presumption of innocence further gets entrenched on the acquittal of accused by the trial Court.

(Para 6)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Domestic violence -- There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation -- Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

(Para 35)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 3, 4 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Domestic violence – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants -- Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details -- Appellants do not live with the principal accused -- While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 37-41)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 482 -- Abetment of suicide – Quashing of proceedings -- Charge-sheet, as it stands, appears to have proceeded in an unidimensional manner by accepting the version of the complainant and his family members as the gospel truth – Whether any investigation to explore any other angle was pursued, a stoic silence of State -- None of the ingredients required in law to make out a case u/s 306 IPC to be even remotely mentioned in the charge-sheet or are being borne out from the material on record – Held, charge-sheet filed by the police and the cryptic order of cognizance, the proceedings cannot be allowed to be carried on against the appellants -- Proceedings quashed – SIT constituted for re-investigation.

(Para 15-24)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping -- Age of prosecutrix -- There are two contradictory opinions given by two medical experts – Doctor/ PW-3 states that according to the X-ray reports, the age of the prosecutrix was around 14 years, however, Chief Medical Officer/ DW-2 opined that the age of the prosecutrix was around 18 years -- In view of the two conflicting medical opinions, we are of the opinion that the benefit ought to have been given to the appellant-accused.

(Para 14, 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366 – Kidnapping – Acquittal -- From the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is clear that she had voluntarily gone along with the appellant, travelled to various places and also resided as husband and wife at Dehradun – Held, High Court was not justified in upholding the conviction for the offences punishable u/s 363 and 366 of the IPC – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-22)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 448, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation – House trespass – Quashing of FIR -- Allegations in the FIR are totally absurd -- When complainant has not filed any suit, there is no question of appellants threatening him of dire consequences if he does not withdraw the suit – Complainant and his relatives are in the habit of filing false and malicious cases against the appellants only on account of long-standing civil dispute pending between them – Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellants would be nothing else but an abuse of the process of law – Chargesheet and summoning order quashed and set aside.

(Para 16, 19, 24, 25)

A. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 374, 389 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Appeal – Suspension of sentence -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- Petitioners/ convicts directed to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by trial Court by the Appellate Court -- No reason given by the Court while issuing directions -- Condition of depositing of 20% of compensation amount awarded by the trial Court imposed for the purpose of suspension of sentence, set aside -- Appellate Court directed to re-consider the same after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties and then to pass appropriate order in accordance with the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari’s case (SC) 2024(2) L.A.R. 323 = (2023) Law Today Live Doc. Id. 18509 and till then not to take any coercive action against the petitioners.

(Para 7, 8)

B. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 148(1) -- Deposit of 20% compensation – Requirement of -- According to Section 148 NI Act, the requirement to deposit a minimum 20% of the fine or compensation during an appeal is not mandatory, instead, it is discretionary power vested with the appellate Court meaning the said Court can choose to waive the said deposit in certain exceptional circumstances depending on the facts of the case.

(Para 7)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 375(2), Exception 2, 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape with wife – Quashing of FIR -- As per Exception 2 u/s 375 of IPC, sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife cannot be termed as rape and, hence, a charge under Section 376 of IPC cannot be sustained against the appellant -- The conduct of the Respondent No. 2 and 3 in failing to enter appearance despite sufficient notice is reflective of the fact that it is a dead case where no purpose shall be served in continuing the criminal proceedings alleging charges of rape against the appellant -- No prima facie case constituting any offence is made out against the appellant and—FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom deserve to be quashed – Appeal allowed.

(Para 17)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 24 -- Duty of Public Prosecutor -- A Public Prosecutor is not expected to show a thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts of the case -- The expected attitude of the Public Prosecutor while conducting prosecution must be couched in fairness not only to the Court to the investigation agencies but to the accused as well -- If an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during trial, the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it -- On the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it to the fore and make it available to the accused -- Even if the court or defence counsel overlooked it, the Public Prosecutor has the added responsibility to bring it to the notice of the Court, if it comes to his knowledge.

(Para 96)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 401 – Murder – Acquittal by trial court -- Conviction in revision – Power of -- Sub-section (3) of Section 401 CrPC prohibits/ bars the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction -- Defence counsel as well as the Public Prosecutor owes a duty to correct the Court if the Court is falling in some error and for all this, the State Government is responsible -- It is the State Government who appointed the concerned Public Prosecutor -- High Court committed an egregious error in reversing the acquittal and passing an order of conviction in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and that too without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellants -- Appeals allowed -- Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court set aside -- State Government directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- each to the three appellants towards compensation within a period of four weeks.

(Para 1-3, 40-46, 97-99)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300 Exception-4, 304, Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Sudden fight -- From the evidence, as placed on record, it is difficult to come to a finding that the appellant had come with a premeditated mind to kill the deceased -- Possibility of an altercation taking place between the appellant and the deceased for some reason and the appellant assaulting the deceased in the heat of passion on account of a sudden fight, cannot be ruled out -- Appellant would be entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC -- As such, the conviction of the appellant under Part I of Section 304 IPC would meet the ends of justice.

(Para 10-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 -- Murder -- Common intention -- For convicting the accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC the prosecution must establish prior meetings of minds -- It must be established that all the accused had preplanned and shared a common intention to commit the crime with the accused who has actually committed the crime -- It must be established that the criminal act has been done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused -- Prosecution failed to show that the accused Nos. 2, 3 and 4/ appellants had common intention with accused No.1-JS prior to the accused No.1-JS’s shooting at the deceased resulting in her death – Conviction set aside.

(Para 1, 2, 18-20)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Recovery of weapon --  Investigating Officer neither proved nor exhibited the disclosure statement of the appellant accused during his deposition -- Investigating Officer did not distinctly identify the accused persons at whose instance, the particular weapon, i.e., axe (kulhari) or dagger (katari), was recovered -- No indication in the testimony that he took the signatures of the accused persons on the recovery memos -- Not even this, the said witness did not even state that he signed and attested the memorandums under which the recoveries were effected -- Therefore, the substratum of the prosecution case regarding the disclosure statements rendered by the appellant-accused and the recoveries allegedly made in furtherance thereof remains unproved for want of proper evidence.

(Para 32)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8, 27, 106 – Murder – Circumstantial evidence – Motive – Murder of six innocent persons -- Investigating Officer did not examine even a single of the villagers living adjacent to the crime scene for establishing the presence of the appellant-accused at or around the crime scene, corresponding to the time of the incident -- Investigating Officer failed to collect any evidence regarding the safe keeping of the recovered articles/ material objects, till the same reached the Forensic Science Laboratory -- Prosecution failed to prove even one of the three so-called incriminating circumstances i.e., ‘motive’, ‘last seen’ and ‘recoveries’ in its quest to bring home the guilt of the appellant-accused -- Even if, for the sake of arguments the evidence of recovery of weapons were to be accepted, the fact remains that the FSL report does not give any indication regarding the grouping of the blood found on the weapons and hence, the recoveries are of no avail to the prosecution -- The fabric of the prosecution case is full of holes and holes which are impossible to mend -- Conviction of the appellant-accused and death sentence handed down to him can also not be sustained -- Appellant acquitted of the charges.

(Para 33-39)

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 364, 366, 376(2)(m), 376A, 392, 397, 201 -- Extra-judicial confession – Recovery – Murder – Rape -- Acquittal -- Extra judicial confession, by its very nature, has been held to be a weak piece of evidence -- Normally it is given to persons who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the accused – Not on evidence that PW-9 enjoyed the confidence of the accused so as to safely infer that the accused would have made a clean breast of things to PW-9 -- PW-22 does speak of Police taking PW-9 into custody in connection with this case -- So many omissions in the statement of PW-9 -- Moreover, there is no corroboration in material particulars and hence Court rejected the extra judicial confession -- Merely based on the recovery no conviction for the offence charged could be sustained against the appellant – Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted.

(Para 108-110, 117-124)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323 – Hurt – Complainant was forcibly ejected from the Company’s office by security personnel, who allegedly attempted to assault, physically harass, and threaten her with dire consequences – Therefore, the complaint does not directly attribute any voluntary act of causing hurt to the complainant by any of the two accused – Ingredients of offence u/s 323 of the IPC have not been made out, prima facie.

(Para 17-19)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 504, 509 – Insult the modesty of woman – Appellants were accused of scolding the complainant in a “filthy language” and forcibly terminating her employment -- Following the complaint, a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) was initially registered and later converted into an FIR after two months later -- The term "filthy language," when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC -- Prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC not disclosed.

(Para 4, 5, 28)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 319, 321, 323, 504, 506, 509 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of criminal proceedings – Criminal intimidation -- Insult the modesty of woman – After the complainant filed the complaint, a NCR was registered, indicated that no cognizable offence -- Subsequently, an FIR was lodged (fifty-eight) days after the initial complaint was filed, u/s 323, 504, 506, 509, and 511 of the IPC -- Only Section 509 constitutes a cognizable offence, whereas Sections 323, 504, and 506 are noncognizable offences -- FIR does not contain any allegations that would substantiate a charge u/s 509 of the IPC -- Chargesheet is the sole document that alleges the use of "filthy language" by the appellants in scolding the complainant -- Discrepancies and variations, suggest a deliberate attempt to reclassify the nature of the proceedings from non-cognizable to cognizable or to transform a civil dispute into a criminal matter, potentially aimed at pressurizing the appellants into settling the dispute with the complainant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 40-45)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, (28 of 1961), Section 4 – Dowry case – Cruelty – Sentence reduced to already undergone -- Appellant sentenced to two years imprisonment for the offence u/s 498-A of IPC and one year imprisonment for the offence u/s 4 of DP Act, sentence to run concurrently -- Appellant has undergone approximately 3 months in custody – Incident pertains to the year 2006, marriage was solemnized on 31.03.2006 and the couple lived together exactly for three days -- Complainant is married and settled abroad -- Case prolonged for a period of nearly 19 years -- Sentence set aside, substituted for the period already undergone and Rs. 3,00,000/- payable as compensation.

(Para 13-16)

A. Criminal jurisprudence – Conviction of accused -- It is a fundamental principle that a court can convict an accused only if their guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on the possibility of guilt -- The gap between “may be guilty” and “must be guilty” is significant, separating uncertain speculations from definitive conclusions -- Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to elevate its case from the realm of ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’.

(Para 15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder –Circumstantial evidence -- Conviction on a charge of murder may be based purely on circumstantial evidence, provided that such evidence is deemed credible and trustworthy --  In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards the accused person’s guilt -- The chain of incriminating circumstances must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 34 – Murder – Acquittal -- Circumstantial evidence -- Prosecution failed to conduct the Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, thereby, bringing the identification of the material objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt -- Material omission on part of the Investigating Officer in not conducting a Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend -- Chain of circumstantial evidences in the case cannot be held to be so complete, so as to lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused which is totally inconsistent with their innocence – Conviction set aside.

(Para 22-27)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 323, 504, 506 -- Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(5a), 3(2)(v) – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Offence under SC/ST Act – Promise to marry -- Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Complainant agreed to indulge in intimate relations with the appellant on the accord of her own desires and not on the basis of any false promise of marriage made by the appellant -- Present case may involve a breach of promise, it does not constitute a case of an inherently false promise to marry -- Appellant himself had asked the complainant to elope with him and get married, but it was the complainant who insisted on waiting till he secured a job -- In her statement, the complainant has not uttered a single word which shows that she was maligned or abused by the appellant for belonging to a particular caste – Allowing the prosecution of the appellant would tantamount to sheer abuse of the process of law and nothing else -- Summoning order quashed.

(Para 18-23)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 90, 376 -- Rape – Promise to marry – Only because physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it will not amount to rape -- For the offence of rape to be attracted, the following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of marriage.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Sections 417, 376 & 506 Part I -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Rape – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Promise to marry – Consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix – It does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with -- Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances -- Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered -- Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court -- This cannot be permitted -- Criminal proceedings arising out of FIR quashed.

(Para 7-9)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- The provocation must be both grave and sudden -- In order to invoke the benefit of the exception, it must be established that the act committed by the accused was a simultaneous reaction of grave as well as sudden provocation which deprived him of the power of self-control -- If the provocation is grave but not sudden, the accused cannot get the benefit of this exception -- Likewise, he cannot invoke the exception where the provocation though sudden is not grave.

(Para 20)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- In order to bring the case within Exception 1, the following conditions must be complied with:

(i) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused;

(ii) The provocation must be grave;

(iii) The provocation must be sudden;

(iv) The offender, by reason of the side provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control;

(v) He should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control; and

(vi) The offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.

(Para 22)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation -- Accused must establish the following circumstances:

(i) there was a provocation which was both grave and sudden;

(ii) such provocation had deprived the accused of his power of self-control; and

(iii) whilst the accused was so deprived of his power of self-control, he had caused the death of the victim.

(Para 23)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 105 -- Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Burden of proof -- It is for the accused who seeks to reduce the nature of his crime by bringing his case under Exception 1, to prove that the provocation received by him was such as might reasonably be deemed sufficient to deprive him of self-control, and that the act of killing took place whilst that absence of control was in existence and may fairly be attributed to it.

(Para 27, 28)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, Exception 1, 304 Part 1 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Sudden provocation – Deceased is said to have uttered some bad words and it appears that he also raised his hand & slapped the appellant -- However, that by itself may not be sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of grave and sudden provocation -- The incident occurred at a spur of a moment -- The act was not pre-planned or pre-meditated -- What is important to note is that the appellant had no weapon in his hands -- He picked up a cement stone which was lying beneath the bridge and hit the same on the head of the deceased -- Therefore, it could be said that the appellant did not take any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner – Conviction u/s 304 Part 1 of the IPC, upheld – Sentence reduced to already  undergone.

(Para 30-33)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366A – Kidnapping -- Procuration of minor girl – Acquittal -- Age of girl -- Prosecutrix herself indicated that she was not forcibly taken away by the appellant -- Age of the prosecutrix as per the opinion of the Doctor ranged between 16-18 years and in the absence of any contrary evidence, the possibility of the prosecutrix, being of 18 years age, cannot entirely be ruled out -- Evidence of the prosecutrix not supported the case of the prosecution -- Independent eye-witness (PW-4) also did not support the prosecution’s case on recovery -- Prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of both Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-12)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 498A – Dowry death – Acquittal -- For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv) the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand for dowry -- Both the witnesses have not deposed about the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating that there was a demand for dowry -- Version regarding the demand for dowry is an omission -- No legally admissible evidence of the demand for dowry  -- There is no specific evidence of any cruelty – Conviction set aside.

(Para 9-13)

Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 – Compromise after conviction – Compounding of offence -- Recalling of order of SLP – Trial court convicted the appellant u/s 326/ 34 IPC, sentencing R.I. for two years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- -- High Court reduced the sentence to 1 year R.I., while enhancing the fine to Rs. 2,00,000/- -- Special Leave Petition dismissed -- Subsequently, the applicant/ petitioner compromised, Miscellaneous Application filed seeking relief for compounding the offense --  Order dismissing the SLP in limine recalled -- Leave granted, appeal partly allowed -- Conviction confirmed, however, the sentence of one year R.I. reduced to the period already undergone.

(Para 2-8)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 -- POCSO – Rape – Acquittal -- Prosecutrix 16 years and four months old -- In medical examination no injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix though her hymen was torn -- Prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she was raped by the accused but the fact remains that she has contradicted her statement at more than one place -- She stated statement u/s 164 CrPC that she hit the accused on his head by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the accused on his foot -- When the accused had surrendered none of these injuries were noticed on the body of the accused -- When a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness -- Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, under these circumstances, Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Outrage modesty -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Record is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant – Held, mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court -- No direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant -- It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-12.4, 14-17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 503, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence --  For an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should be clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on record -- At least the results of the investigation and the material gathered should disclose somewhat of an offence -- FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant – No prima facie offence is made out on the part of the appellant -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 13-17)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 58 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256 -- NDPS case -- Punishment for vexatious entry, search, seizure or arrest – Jurisdiction of Special Judge -- Special Judge could not have conducted the proceedings against the appellant/ Superintendent of Police  for the offence punishable u/s 58 of the NDPS Act inasmuch as such proceedings could have been conducted only by a Magistrate -- Procedure as required under Chapter XX i.e. Sections 251 to 256 of the Cr.P.C. has also not been followed -- Notice issued by the learned Special Judge to the appellant u/s 58 of the NDPS Act and all subsequent proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 2, 26)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) -- Criminal trial -- Interested witness – Evidence of -- Merely because a witness is an interested witness, it cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such a witness -- However, the testimony of such a witness has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Acquittal – Deposition of witness – Parity for all accused -- High Court comes to a conclusion that it is difficult to believe that the witness could have witnessed the incident in the manner narrated by him and granted benefit of doubt to co-accused persons then conviction of accused on the basis of the evidence of the very same witness only on the basis of conjectures and surmises is not permissible -- Seizure of knife, testimony of Inspector of police would show that the recovery was made from an open place accessible to one and all -- As such, only on the basis of the circumstance of such a recovery, the conviction could not have been based – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 14-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 463, 464 – False document -- Forgery -- Document containing a false recital does not amount to forgery.

(Para 33)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d) -- Forest Rules of Kullu Division of 1878, Rule 4A -- Cheating – Corruption -- Acquittal -- Gift of land by accused – Sanction of Timber distribution right thereafter -- Mere gift of the half share did not amount to divestment of her forest right as per Rule 4A – Accused had not made any false representation, and she cannot be held to be guilty of cheating -- Accused/ Donor, being the right holder, was entitled to get the Tinder Distribution/ TD and the sanction of TD in her favour is not illegal; hence, the offence punishable u/s 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not made out – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 2, 36-40)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 406 – Constitution of India, Article 142 – Transfer petition -- Rape – Quashing of FIR -- Contents of the FIR clearly suggest that both the parties being adult had consensual relations for years before the complaint was filed alleging that there was backing out of promise to marry -- No case is made out u/s 376 IPC -- FIR and all proceedings subsequent thereto quashed.

(Para 2, 6, 8)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cruelty – Quashing of FIR -- Whether demand of dowry is pre-requisite – Held, an unlawful demand for dowry is not a pre-requisite element to constitute "cruelty" under Section 498A IPC -- High Court's decision to quash the proceedings primarily influenced by the lack of a dowry-related demand in the case -- Allegations made by the Appellant, which detail instances of physical abuse and harassment, fall within the scope of "cruelty" as defined under clause (a) of Section 498A IPC – Appeal allowed, decision of High Court set aside.

(Para 13-18)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 239 -- Dowry -- Cruelty – Abetment of suicide – Discharge/ Quashing of charge -- Deceased committed suicide after twelve years of marriage -- Around twelve months prior to her death, the appellants had sold the deceased’s streedhan and had tortured her when she demanded them back -- No proximate link between the alleged facts, instances of harassment and her subsequent death by hanging -- Appellants did not have the requisite mens rea and neither did they commit any positive or direct act or omission to instigate or aid in the commission of suicide by the deceased -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 306, IPC are not made out – Appellant discharged from section 306, however charge u/s 498A of IPC upheld.

(Para 13-15, 26-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Dowry case -- Cruelty -- ‘cruelty’ simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence, rather it must be done either with the intention to cause grave injury or to drive her to commit suicide or with intention to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands.

(Para 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- To bring a conviction u/ s 306, IPC it is necessary to establish a clear mens rea to instigate or push the deceased to commit suicide -- It requires certain such act, omission, creation of circumstances, or words which would incite or provoke another person to commit suicide.

(Para 19)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Essential ingredients to be fulfilled in order to bring a case under Section 306, IPC are: the abetment; the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

(Para 20)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient to establish guilt -- For a conviction, there must be evidence of a positive act by the accused, closely linked to the time of the incident, that compelled or drove the victim to commit suicide -- It is essential to establish that the death was a result of suicide and that the accused actively abetted its commission -- Prosecution must prove beyond doubt that the accused played a definitive role in the abetment -- Without clear evidence of an active role in provoking or assisting the suicide, a conviction u/s 306 IPC cannot be sustained.

(Para 21, 22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Appeal against acquittal – Change in law – Ground of -- Change of law by itself cannot be a ground for finding fault with the acquittal judgment rendered in favour of the appellant as far back as on 10.12.2018 -- Impugned order dated 23.06.2023 of the High Court cannot be sustained and set aside.

(Para 3-10)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence – Onus on accused -- Onus to explain would shift on to the accused only after the prosecution succeeds in establishing the basic facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused – If the prosecution fails to establish a complete chain of circumstances in the first place, then the accused's failure to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act becomes irrelevant.

(Para 17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Acquittal -- Murder -- Circumstantial evidence – Last seen theory -- Onus on accused -- One of son of deceased’s testimony remotely suggest that any or all of the three accused persons were present in the house or that they had quarrelled with his mother when he left for school -- None of the neighbours had seen the accused present with deceased or that they were seen fleeing away on the fateful morning – Prosecution has not explained as to where the girl child was on the date of the incident -- Likewise, the prosecution also failed to provide any explanation, as to why the other son was not examined in evidence -- Failure to examine them in evidence calls for drawing of adverse inference thereby, further denting the credibility of the prosecution case -- Prosecution failed to prove the chain of incriminating circumstances against the accused-appellants by convincing evidence and beyond the shadow of doubt, so as to affirm their guilt -- Accused-appellants acquitted of the charges by giving them the benefit of doubt – Appeal allowed.

(Para 18-38)