Constitution of India, Article 136 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 326 – Compromise after conviction – Compounding of offence -- Recalling of order of SLP – Trial court convicted the appellant u/s 326/ 34 IPC, sentencing R.I. for two years and fine of Rs. 2,000/- -- High Court reduced the sentence to 1 year R.I., while enhancing the fine to Rs. 2,00,000/- -- Special Leave Petition dismissed -- Subsequently, the applicant/ petitioner compromised, Miscellaneous Application filed seeking relief for compounding the offense --  Order dismissing the SLP in limine recalled -- Leave granted, appeal partly allowed -- Conviction confirmed, however, the sentence of one year R.I. reduced to the period already undergone.

(Para 2-8)

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 363, 366, 376, 342, 506 -- POCSO – Rape – Acquittal -- Prosecutrix 16 years and four months old -- In medical examination no injuries were detected on the body of the prosecutrix though her hymen was torn -- Prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to the fact that she was raped by the accused but the fact remains that she has contradicted her statement at more than one place -- She stated statement u/s 164 CrPC that she hit the accused on her head by Danda whereas in her examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the accused on his foot -- When the accused had surrendered none of these injuries were noticed on the body of the accused :

-- when a person can be convicted on the testimony of a single witness the Courts are bound to be very careful in examining such a witness and thus the testimony of such a witness must inspire confidence of the Court.

-- It is not believable that when the prosecutrix was caught by the accused who is known to the prosecutrix, she went with him quite a distance in the Bazaar and then to a shop, she never raised any alarm. The only reason she gave is that there was a knife with accused and he had threatened her that if she raises an alarm her brother and father would be killed.

Testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence, under these circumstances, Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 9-12)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Outrage modesty -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Record is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant – Held, mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court -- No direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant -- It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 12-12.4, 14-17)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 503, 506 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Criminal intimidation -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence --  For an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should be clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on record -- At least the results of the investigation and the material gathered should disclose somewhat of an offence -- FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant – No prima facie offence is made out on the part of the appellant -- Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 13-17)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 58 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256 -- NDPS case -- Punishment for vexatious entry, search, seizure or arrest – Jurisdiction of Special Judge -- Special Judge could not have conducted the proceedings against the appellant/ Superintendent of Police  for the offence punishable u/s 58 of the NDPS Act inasmuch as such proceedings could have been conducted only by a Magistrate -- Procedure as required under Chapter XX i.e. Sections 251 to 256 of the Cr.P.C. has also not been followed -- Notice issued by the learned Special Judge to the appellant u/s 58 of the NDPS Act and all subsequent proceedings quashed and set aside.

(Para 2, 26)

A. Criminal trial -- Interested witness – Evidence of -- Merely because a witness is an interested witness, it cannot be a ground to discard the testimony of such a witness -- However, the testimony of such a witness has to be scrutinized with greater caution and circumspection.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Acquittal – Deposition of witness – Parity for all accused -- High Court comes to a conclusion that it is difficult to believe that the witness could have witnessed the incident in the manner narrated by him and granted benefit of doubt to co-accused persons then conviction of accused on the basis of the evidence of the very same witness only on the basis of conjectures and surmises is not permissible -- Seizure of knife, testimony of Inspector of police would show that the recovery was made from an open place accessible to one and all -- As such, only on the basis of the circumstance of such a recovery, the conviction could not have been based – Appeal allowed, impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashed and set aside -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 14-17)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 463, 464 – False document -- Forgery -- Document containing a false recital does not amount to forgery.

(Para 33)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d) -- Forest Rules of Kullu Division of 1878, Rule 4A -- Cheating – Corruption -- Acquittal -- Gift of land by accused – Sanction of Timber distribution right thereafter -- Mere gift of the half share did not amount to divestment of her forest right as per Rule 4A – Accused had not made any false representation, and she cannot be held to be guilty of cheating -- Accused/ Donor, being the right holder, was entitled to get the Tinder Distribution/ TD and the sanction of TD in her favour is not illegal; hence, the offence punishable u/s 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not made out – Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 2, 36-40)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 239 -- Dowry -- Cruelty – Abetment of suicide – Discharge/ Quashing of charge -- Deceased committed suicide after twelve years of marriage -- Around twelve months prior to her death, the appellants had sold the deceased’s streedhan and had tortured her when she demanded them back -- No proximate link between the alleged facts, instances of harassment and her subsequent death by hanging -- Appellants did not have the requisite mens rea and neither did they commit any positive or direct act or omission to instigate or aid in the commission of suicide by the deceased -- Ingredients for the offence u/s 306, IPC are not made out – Appellant discharged from section 306, however charge u/s 498A of IPC upheld.

(Para 13-15, 26-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A -- Dowry case -- Cruelty -- ‘cruelty’ simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence, rather it must be done either with the intention to cause grave injury or to drive her to commit suicide or with intention to coercing her or her relatives to meet unlawful demands.

(Para 11)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- To bring a conviction u/ s 306, IPC it is necessary to establish a clear mens rea to instigate or push the deceased to commit suicide -- It requires certain such act, omission, creation of circumstances, or words which would incite or provoke another person to commit suicide.

(Para 19)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Essential ingredients to be fulfilled in order to bring a case under Section 306, IPC are: the abetment; the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide.

(Para 20)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment of suicide -- Mere allegations of harassment are insufficient to establish guilt -- For a conviction, there must be evidence of a positive act by the accused, closely linked to the time of the incident, that compelled or drove the victim to commit suicide -- It is essential to establish that the death was a result of suicide and that the accused actively abetted its commission -- Prosecution must prove beyond doubt that the accused played a definitive role in the abetment -- Without clear evidence of an active role in provoking or assisting the suicide, a conviction u/s 306 IPC cannot be sustained.

(Para 21, 22)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 378 -- Appeal against acquittal – Change in law – Ground of -- Change of law by itself cannot be a ground for finding fault with the acquittal judgment rendered in favour of the appellant as far back as on 10.12.2018 -- Impugned order dated 23.06.2023 of the High Court cannot be sustained and set aside.

(Para 3-10)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Instigation – Mens rea -- ‘instigation’ to do a particular thing is necessary for charging a person with abetment -- ‘Instigation’ is to provoke, incite or encourage a person to do an act -- Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a particular thing and without the positive act on part of the accused there would be no instigation -- To convict a person for abetment of suicide u/s 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea on the part of the accused to abet such a crime and it requires an active act or a direct act leading to the commission of suicide.

(Para 21-23)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Acquittal -- Discord and differences in domestic life are quite common in society -- Until and unless some guilty intention on the part of the accused is established, it is ordinarily not possible to convict him for an offence u/s 306 IPC.

(Para 25)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 306 -- Abetment to suicide – Refusal to marry – Mens rea – Acquittal -- Accused-appellant simply refused to marry the deceased and thus, even assuming there was love between the parties, it is only a case of broken relationship which by itself would not amount to abetment to suicide -- Accused-appellant had not provoked the deceased in any manner to kill herself; rather the deceased herself carried poison in a bottle from her village with a predetermined mind to positively get an affirmation from the accused-appellant to marry her, failing which she would commit suicide -- No guilty intention or mens rea on the part of the accused-appellant had been established – Conviction set aside – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 29-32)

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 -- NDPS – Independent witness – Relevancy of -- Non-association of independent witnesses is not fatal and the prosecution case cannot be discarded due to the non-association of independent witnesses -- However, the Court will have to carefully scrutinize the testimonies of the police officials.

(Para 24)

B. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 20 – NDPS – Acquittal -- Recovery of contraband – Doubt upon – Independent witness – Non-examination of – Effect of -- Police party was not carrying any sewing machine with them -- Police officials also admitted that the parcel was machine stitched from two sides -- No explanation was given by the police official as to how the parcel could have been machine stitched on the spot without any sewing machine -- This shows that either the parcel was already lying with the police official or the proceedings were not conducted on the spot and the testimonies of the police officials regarding the fact that the proceedings were conducted on the spot is highly suspect -- Prosecution witnesses have given different versions regarding the circumstances surrounding the recovery -- Inconsistencies would assume significance in the absence of independent witnesses – Acquittal, upheld.

(Para 30)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 8 – Motive -- Motive on its own cannot make or break the prosecution case.

(Para 25)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Time gap – Relevant factor – It is a vital link in the chain of other circumstances but on its own strength it is insufficient to sustain conviction unless the time-gap between the deceased being last seen alive with the accused and recovery of dead body of the deceased is so small that possibility of any other person being the author of the crime is just about impossible -- Where the time-gap is large, intervening circumstances including act by some third person cannot be ruled out -- In such a case, adverse inference cannot be drawn against the accused merely because he has failed to prove as to when he parted company of the deceased.

(Para 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Last seen evidence – Walking in public street -- Time gap – Effect of -- No evidence led by the prosecution to demonstrate that the place where the deceased was last seen alive with the accused was near the place from where deceased’s body was recovered -- Further, the time gap between 4.30 PM of 2.2.1997 and 8.30 AM of 3.2.1997 (i.e., when the dead body was recovered) is so large that third party hand in the crime cannot be ruled out -- If two or more persons are seen walking on a public street, either side by side, or behind one another, it is not such a circumstance from which it may be inferred with a degree of certainty that those were together or in company of each other -- Likewise, a person may exchange pleasantries with another person walking on the path, but that by itself is not sufficient to infer that the two are in company of each other – Last seen circumstance not of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused-appellants – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 27, 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Disclosure Statement – Recovery -- Disclosure statement not admissible in evidence because the alleged discovery was not made pursuant to that statement -- Disclosure statement was recorded at the police station whereas recovery was made from the place pointed out by the accused enroute to the police station -- It was, therefore, a case of recovery from the place allegedly pointed out by the accused and not based on a disclosure statement.

(Para 37)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Recovery of currency note from accused -- Nothing on record to show that the money belonged to the deceased -- Currency notes are commonly available and there is nothing in the statement of the witness to show that the currency notes shown to him during his examination had any distinguishing mark which would enable him to identify them; hence, his testimony that the currency notes handed over by him to the deceased were the same currency notes, which were shown to him in the Court is not acceptable.

(Para 20, 21)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Recovery on disclosure statement – Exclusive knowledge – Requirements of -- Disclosure statement shows that the stone was not concealed anywhere and was lying in the open -- Where the recoveries were effected from a place accessible, the same cannot be relied upon -- Since, there is no evidence of the exclusive knowledge of the accused, therefore, the stone cannot be connected to the accused.

(Para 25, 26)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Other articles and stick was recovered from the spot at a distance of 200 metre from the dead body by I.O. -- As per the statement of the accused recorded u/s 27, he had thrown the stone and the stick at the same place -- It is difficult to believe that the investigating officer would not have discovered the stone when he had inspected the spot and found other articles on the spot – These circumstances cast reasonable doubt on the recovery of the stone at the instance of accused.

(Para 27-29)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder -- Disclosure statement -- Statement u/s 27 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be used to prove that the accused had killed the deceased.

(Para 39)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A, 287 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 359, 528 – Death by electrocution in Rolling Mill – Non-compoundable offence -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- When the deceased’s family absolves the accused of any negligence or rash act, it would be impossible for the prosecution to succeed during the trial -- Thus, quashing of cases u/s 304-A IPC, other than roadside accidents, can be quashed depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, the role assigned to the accused, mens rea, and the guilt of the such person -- After the death, the petitioners helped the complainant family financially and emotionally -- Accident occurred in broad daylight, and as an adult, the victim should have been more careful while performing his duties -- It is not a case where the acts of the Rolling mill or the Manager can be termed as rash or negligent -- Inherent jurisdiction u/s 528 BNSS, 2023 invoked, the FIR and all subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 7-18)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 323(4), 324(5), 333, 191(3), 190, 305 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – House trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint/ 333-BNS – Rioting armed with deadly weapon/ 191(3)-BNS – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at between the parties verified and confirmed -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 1-6)

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Sections 305(a), 331(4) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – House-trespass or House breaking/ 331(4)-BNSS -- Compromise quashing of FIR -- Compromise arrived at between the parties verified and confirmed -- FIR and all consequential proceedings, quashed.

(Para 1-6)

Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), Section 25, 27, 30 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 309 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Attempt to commit suicide – Use of arms without license -- Petitioner No.1 was handling the licensed revolver of respondent no. 2 and while doing so, an accidental shot was fired -- Petitioner No.1 was having no mens rea to kill himself by committing suicide -- Illegal use of a licenced weapon per se does not constitute an offence u/s 27 of Arms Act – Alleged weapon used was having licence in the name of petitioner No.2 and thus no case is made out u/s 25 of the Arms Act -- Prima facie no offence u/s 30 of Arms Act is made out against the accused, as there was no breach of condition of the arms licence -- FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed.

(Para 8-14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 441, 442, 452 -- House trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint – Incident at restaurant – Acquittal -- Incident had taken place in a restaurant run by the injured PW-1, which cannot be said to be either a place used for human dwelling or for worship or for the custody of the property -- Appellant could not have been convicted for the offence under Section 452 IPC – Conviction set aside -- Appellant acquitted for the offence u/s 452 IPC.

(Para 10-12)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 441, 442, 452 -- House trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint -- The “house trespass” being an essential ingredient for convicting a person under Section 452, it has to be proved by the prosecution that the accused committed the house trespass and criminal trespass by entering into or unlawfully remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, as contemplated in Section 442 IPC.

(Para 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 , Section 304 Part I – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Benefit of doubt -- Previous enmity between the parties -- A month prior to the date of the incident, an FIR was lodged by the wife of the appellant No.1 against the deceased since he had tried to dispossess the appellants -- Place of the incident is adjacent to the field in possession of the appellants -- Weapons used by the accused persons are axe and sticks commonly used by the agriculturists -- No material to show that there is any premeditation – Possibility of offence being committed by the appellants without premeditation in a sudden fight in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out -- It cannot be said that the appellants have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- Appellants would be entitled to benefit of doubt, conviction u/s 302 IPC needs to be altered Part I of Section 304 IPC.

(Para 18-21)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (45 of 2023), Section 77, 115(2), 117(2), 190, 191(2), 351(3), 352 – Voyeurism – Rioting – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners do not involve offences of moral turpitude or any grave/ heinous crime, rather same are petty offences -- FIR as well as consequent proceedings  quashed and set aside.

(Para 10,11)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B, 420, 468, 471 -- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(2), 13(1)(d) – Cheating and forgery – Corruption case – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Matter compromised between the borrowers and the Bank -- Upon payment of the amount under the OTS, the loan account of the borrower has been closed -- Only question would be, as to whether the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present appellants would be justified or not -- In Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.4353 of 2018, it was held that when the matter has been compromised between the borrower and Bank, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would not be justifiable – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 14-17)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Matrimonial dispute – Financial matters -- In the matters arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute, the High Court should exercise its powers under Section 482 CrPC for giving an end to the criminal proceedings.

(Para 15)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Ingredients fulfilled if the suicide is committed by the deceased due to direct and alarming encouragement/ incitement by the accused leaving no option but to commit suicide.

(Para 21)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Quashing of FIR -- Extreme action of committing suicide on account of great disturbance to the psychological imbalance of the deceased such incitement can be divided into two broad categories. First, where the deceased is having sentimental ties or physical relations with the accused and the second category would be where the deceased is having relations with the accused in his or her official capacity.

-- In the case of former category sometimes a normal quarrel or the hot exchange of words may result into immediate psychological imbalance, consequently creating a situation of depression, loss of charm in life and if the person is unable to control sentiments of expectations, it may give temptations to the person to commit suicide -- Relation of husband and wife, mother and son, brother and sister, sister and sister and other relations of such type, where sentimental tie is by blood or due to physical relations.

-- In the case of second category the tie is on account of official relations, where the expectations would be to discharge the obligations as provided for such duty in law and to receive the considerations as provided in law.

Former category leaves more expectations, whereas in the latter category, by and large, the expectations and obligations are prescribed by law, rules, policies and regulations -- It is for the police and the courts of law to look into the matter and see that the persons against whom allegations have been levelled are not unnecessarily harassed or they are not put to trial just for the sake of prosecuting them.

(Para 10-22)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 107, 306 -- Abetment of suicide – Deceased humiliated in the official meeting -- Quashing of FIR – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court – Appellant-Senior officers convened a meeting with the employees of the company -- Company wanted around fifty to sixty office employees to opt for Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) --  Alleged that in the course of the meeting the deceased was humiliated by the appellants & he felt very bad about it and he committed suicide – No case against the appellants made out – Appeal allowed, Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 4, 23-26)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Punjab Prevention of Human Smuggling Act, 2012 (2 of 2013), Section 13 – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Human Smuggling – Cheating – Compromise effected between the parties without any pressure or coercion and out of their free will -- FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed.

(Para 3, 5-7)

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 389, 34 – Compromise quashing of FIR – Putting person in fear of accusation of offence, in order to commit extortion (Section 389 IPC) – Offence for which the accused have been charged are not of serious nature – Compromise will go a long way in ironing out the differences for betterment of future life of the parties – FIR alongwith all consequential proceedings arising therefrom quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise quashing of conviction and sentence – Back-out from compromise – Effect of -- As per compromise, the petitioner has already paid Rs.3,00,000/- to the complainant and the complainant pleaded no objection -- Held, resiling from the compromise by the complainant is immaterial and the continuation of the case would be an abuse of the process of the Court -- Petition allowed, complaint alongwith the judgment of conviction and order of sentence quashed on the basis of compromise.

(Para 5-8)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR/ Complaint – Duty of High Court -- Beyond holding that there are specific allegations, there is no other analysis by High Court -- Duty of the High Court, when its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution is invoked on the ground that the Complaint/ FIR is manifestly frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, to examine the allegations with care and caution.

(Para 8)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- While the husband institutes the civil suit, his wife has chosen to initiate criminal proceedings -- Interestingly, there is no reference of one proceeding in the other -- On 27.02.2013, the husband filed the Special Civil Suit against the three appellants, i.e. his father, stepmother and stepbrother seeking for a declaration that the property is ancestral in nature and that the father has no right to alienate or dispose of the property and also sought a declaration that he is entitled to use the trademark of the family business – Complainant/ wife filed the criminal complaint on 01.03.2013 alleging demand of dowry and threat by appellants that she and her husband will be denied a share in the property -- Provocation for the Complaint/ FIR is essentially the property dispute between father and son – FIR and Chargesheet quashed.

(Para 9, 18)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 323, 504, 506, 34 – Dowry case -- Quashing of FIR/ Charge-sheet – Husband not accused in criminal case -- Allegations are vague, lacking in basic details -- The essence of the complaint is in the alleged threat to deprive the husband any share in the property with respect to which the husband has already filed the suit for declaration – In DV complaint identical allegations were examined in detail, subjected to strict scrutiny, and rejected as being false and untenable – The case is instance of abuse of criminal process and it would not be fair and just to subject the appellants to the entire criminal law process – FIR and charge-sheet quashed.

(Para 9-18)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1989 (XXIII of 1989), Section 482 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Charge-sheet filed -- There is no prohibition against quashing of the criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed.

(Para 16)

A. Expert evidence – Conviction -- Without independent and reliable corroboration, the opinion of the handwriting experts cannot be solely relied upon to base the conviction.

(Para 13)

B. Passports Act, 1967 (15 of 1967), Section 12(2) – Facilitating second passport – Acquittal -- Abetment – Burden of proof -- Burden is cast on the prosecution to prove that the accused had knowingly furnished false information or supressing known material information with the intent of securing a passport or travel document to a person and thereby had abetted in the commission of offence punishable under Section 12(1) and thereby punishable under Section 12(2) of the Passports Act – Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Appellants acquitted.

(Para 2, 14-16)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 294, 114, 34 – Constitution of India, Article 226 – Obscene act – Abettor – Employee/ Waiter of Bar -- Quashing of criminal proceedings -- Petitioner in the present case was a mere employee of the owner of Bar and he is found to be discharging his duty of serving the customers food and drink as per his employment profile -- No offense made out qua the Petitioner -- Petition allowed.

(Para 1, 8-11.1)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113A – Abetment to suicide – Presumption – Acquittal -- Marriage on 14.11.2011 – Suicide on 11.05.2012 -- Accused went to Assam in the month of April, 2012 for joining his duty -- Deceased had died while she was in her parents’ house and at that time the accused was in Assam -- General allegations of harassment, no independent witness to prove that any demand of dowry was made by the accused in their presence -- No evidence led by prosecution that there was abetment of such grave nature which was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide -- Suicidal death may be the deceased's own act, being of hyper sensitive nature, for which, the husband cannot be held guilty -- Acquittal order, upheld.

(Para 2(a), 18, 36-39)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of such witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to stand -- However as a rule of prudence, the court always finds it desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other dependable evidence on record -- It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his/her evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable -- The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because he/she is susceptible to tutoring.

(Para 23)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Victim/ Child witness -- Incident taken place on 13.10.2014 whereas the FIR was lodged on 05.12.2014 -- Delay in lodging the FIR could not be explained by the prosecution which creates a serious doubt about the case of the prosecution -- Since the evidence of the parents of the victim has been discredited by the defence in their cross- examination and there is no corroboration to the evidence of the child victim (PW12), therefore, it would not be safe to rely upon the testimony of the child victim to convict the appellants.

(Para 28)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4 -- POCSO – Medical evidence – Acquittal -- Doctor had given the opinion that the possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled-out, but on that day the victim was not produced before her -- As per the FSL report, no blood and semen were detected on the shirt, pajama/ slacks, underwear, brassiere, vests, perineal swab and vaginal swab of the victim --  As there is no medical evidence on record to support the theory of the prosecution that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant, it becomes difficult to uphold the conviction granted by the trial Court.

(Para 30)

D. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 29 – POCSO – Presumption – Rebuttal of presumption -- It cannot be countenanced that the presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute -- Unless the prosecution is able to prove foundational facts in the context of the allegations made against the accused under the POCSO Act, the presumption u/s 29 of the said Act would not operate against the accused -- Statutory presumption u/s 29 of the POCSO Act must be understood and tested on the anvil of the golden thread which runs through web of our criminal jurisprudence system that an accused is presumed to be innocent till the guilt is conclusively established beyond reasonable doubt.

(Para 33-35)

E. Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (33 of 1989), Section 3(1)(xii) &3(2)(v) – Offence under SC/ST Act -- Offence u/s 3(1) of the SC & ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, would be attracted only if the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will are promoted or attempted to be promoted against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a class and not on criticizing an individual member -- An offence u/s 3(1) is not established merely on the fact that the victim is a member of the Scheduled Caste, unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of the scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

(Para 37, 38)

A. Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927), Section 41, 42 – FIR under Forest Act – Acquittal -- Non-mentioning of botanical name of forest produce – Effect of -- Legislature has consciously used the botanical name with some purpose and in the absence of any evidence of the botanical name, the prosecution version that the accused had violated the Rules framed under Section 41 and thereby violated Section 42 of the Indian Forest Act is not acceptable – Acquittal order upheld.

(Para 1, 17, 19, 22, 23)

B. Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927), Section 41, 42 – FIR under Forest Act – Guchhies-forest produce -- Mere fact of not handing over the permit to the accused is not sufficient to implicate the accused when the person who had handed over the Guchhies had a valid permit with him.

(Para 21)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 71, 87, 378 – Appeal against acquittal – Closing of evidence – Remanding back of case for re-trial -- Trial Court acquitted the accused as material witnesses did not appear for their cross-examination and thus, their deposition could not be read in evidence -- Trial Court without resorting to the coercive method for summoning of witnesses, closed the evidence of the prosecution -- Trial Court would proceed with the trial with the examination of the witnesses afresh as per the directions given by learned Appellate Court in the impugned order -- Revision petition dismissed.

(Para 5-8)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 82, 195 (1) (a) (i), 482 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A – Proclaimed person – FIR u/s 174A of IPC – Sustainability of -- No complaint by the Court which had passed order declaring the petitioner as a proclaimed person -- Requisite application of mind by the Court by invoking criminal liability of the petitioner for offence u/s 174-A of IPC was apparently lacking order forming the basis of FIR -- FIR u/s 174-A of IPC quashed.

(Para 9, 10)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B, 306 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death -- Suicide with in seven years of marriage -- Deceased faced cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband which compelled her to commit suicide -- However, witnesses did not state that such cruelty and harassment was in connection with the demand for dowry -- With respect to the demand for dowry, witnesses have just made some general statements -- It has not been proved by the prosecution that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death in connection with the demand of dowry -- Trial court erred in raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, even though the demand for dowry was not established.

-- A case of abetment of suicide u/s 306 of IPC and cruelty u/s 498A of IPC made out against the husband, although the offence u/s 304B is not made out and consequently, conviction u/s 304B of IPC set aside – Appellant/ husband convicted u/s 306 and 498A of IPC, sentenced to three years of R.I. and a fine of Rs. 25000/- on each count -- Both the sentences ordered to run concurrently.

(Para 4-8)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Cheating -- For attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR/complaint discloses: (i) the deception of any person; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and (iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement.

(Para 14)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Fleeing away from marriage -- Cheating -- Quashing of FIR -- A hapless young woman who went along with her parents’ decision to marry  but at the last minute developed cold feet to enter a charade of a marriage – It cannot be construed to as ‘cheating’ as an offence under the IPC nor can it foist a prosecution on her -- Decision to remain silent can at best be injudicious but not dishonest -- FIR does not disclose commission of a cognizable offence of ‘cheating’ – At best, offences under Sections 417, 418 and 500 of the IPC can be said to have been made out against the Applicants -- Said three Sections are non-cognizable in nature -- FIR quashed, with liberty to initiate appropriate action as may be permissible under the law in respect of the said offences i.e., Sections 417, 418 and 500 of the IPC so advised and if he so desires.

(Para 15-17.1)

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Sections 20, 29 – NDPS -- Acquittal – Recovery of 1.25 kg of Charas in random check – As per Logbook entry, the police party was traveling during the relevant point of time towards a different destination -- This is also the evidence of DW-1 and 2 -- DW-1 is the SHO and DW-2 was the driver of the official vehicle -- All the witnesses belonged to the police department -- No independent witnesses to support the case of the prosecution -- Even the undisputed document marked and the statement given by the two police witnesses do not support the case of the prosecution -- Conviction set aside and the appellants acquitted.

(Para 5-9)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 161, 162 -- First Information Report (FIR) -- First version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable would be required to be treated as the FIR -- FIR was lodged much later based on the statement of PW-11, it would be relegated to the category of a statement u/s 161 CrPC -- Same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162 CrPC -- Prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count.

(Para 21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302, 120B -- Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Daily diary report  (Roznamcha) -- Since the Police Constable (PW-12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station -- A reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of (PW-12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record -- Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution -- Neither the disclosure statements made by the accused were proved as per law nor the same resulted into any discovery which could be accepted as incriminating inasmuch as the requisite link evidence was never presented by the prosecution so as to establish that the recovered articles remained in the self-safe condition from the date of the seizure till the same reached the FSL -- Court gave the benefit of the doubt to the appellant-accused and acquitted them of the offence charged.

(Para 20, 48)

C. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 21, 26, 27 – Admission to doctors – Confession to Medical officer -- Admissibility of -- Confessions are ex-facie inadmissible in evidence for the simple reason that the accused persons were presented at the hospital by the police officers after having been arrested -- As such, the noting made by the Medical Officer (PW-2) in the injury reports of accused/ appellant would be clearly hit by Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Court not inclined to accept the said admissions of the accused as incriminating pieces of evidence relevant under Section 21 of the Evidence Act.

(Para 40. 41)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 27 – Disclosure statement -- Identification of crime place -- The circumstance regarding identification of place of incident at the instance of the accused is inadmissible because the crime scene was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in pursuance of the disclosure statements -- This disclosure is irrelevant.

(Para 41, 45)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 300, 302, 304 Part-I -- Murder – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder -- Taking into consideration the nature of injuries sustained by both the accused persons as well as the deceased, the possibility of the incident taking place in a sudden fight in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel cannot be ruled out -- No evidence that the appellant has taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner -- Weapon used is a pocketknife -- Injury caused by the said knife is a single injury -- Appellant held entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC -- Conviction u/s 302 IPC altered to the one under Part-I of Section 304 IPC -- Appellant sentenced to suffer R.I. for 8 years.

(Para 16-20)

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427, 482 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379 – Electricity Act, 2003 (36 of 2003), Section 136 – Conviction in 21 case – Concurrent running of sentence – All cases decided on the same day -- Total period of sentence awarded to petitioner would come to 21 years in respect of the period of convictions so awarded -- Petitioner is entitled for benefit of discretion contained in Section 427 of Cr.P.C. and the same deserves to be exercised to meet the ends of justice.

(Para 4, 6)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 427, 482 – Conviction in 21 case – Default sentence – Concurrent running of sentence – Permissibility of -- For default sentences, the provisions of Section 427 of Cr.P.C. did not direct for concurrent running of the sentences -- Default Sentences in default of payment of fine shall run consecutively if he does not pay the fine.

(Para 7)

National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (53 of 1987), Section 29A -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 200 -- Cognizance in complaint -- Vicarious liability of Directors of Company – Role of -- In the absence of the averments as contemplated by sub-section (1) of Section 50 in the complaint, the Trial Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence against the third to seventh accused, who are allegedly the directors of the first accused company -- Complaint stand quashed against the third to seventh accused.

(Para 8, 9)

A. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940), Section 22, 27, 32 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – FIR under Drugs Act -- Quashing of FIR -- Police did not have the powers to register an FIR or even conduct an investigation concerning offences u/s 27 of the 1940 Act -- FIR quashed.

(Para 10-15)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 420 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 – Cheating -- Deliberate false representation with an intent to deceit, leading to the delivery of property, is an essential requirement to attract mischief of an offence u/s 420 of IPC -- Statements u/s 161 of the Cr.P.C. indicates that the petitioners offered injections at inflate prices without a valid licence aiming to deceive them -- However, there are no allegations of delivery or sale of actual property -- Thus, the essential elements to attract an offence under Section 420 of the IPC are missing – FIR quashed.

(Para 7, 15)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482, 401 -- Outraging modesty of women – Female accused – Quashing of criminal proceedings -- A female cannot be an accused under Section 354A of the IPC -- This offence is gender specific and only a male can be prosecuted under this offence – Proceedings against petitioner quashed.

(Para 2a, 20, 21)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138, 142 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 174A, 420 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Cheque bounce complaint – Withdrawal of complaint -- Quashing of FIR u/s 174A IPC -- Proceedings u/s 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act read with Section 420 IPC have culminated in a settlement with the withdrawal of the aforesaid complaint -- Petition allowed subject to a deposit of Rs.25,000/- as costs -- FIR u/s 174-A IPC and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

(Para 12, 13)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Murder – Acquittal -- Prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence as there is no eye witness – Statement of PW2/ mother of the deceased is based on suspicion --  She has not seen the deceased going to the house of the accused – No other evidence available on the file connecting the accused with the offence -- Dead body of deceased was recovered from the house of the accused which is not sufficient to connect all the accused with the offence -- Prosecution case is also doubtful as the prosecution has withheld the best evidence -- No reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal – Revision dismissed.

(Para 13, 14)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Offence u/s 304-B IPC is such wherein presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act may be drawn against the accused and the onus to establish innocence shifts upon the accused -- The necessary ingredients of Section 304-B IPC may be spelt out as follows:

(i) that deceased died due to burning or bodily injury or any other un-natural death;

(ii) that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives;

(iv) that such cruelty or harassment was in connection with demand of dowry;

(v) that such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

(Para 13)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption – Death within 7 years of marriage – Proof of -- Nikahnama assailed by the accused on the ground that the same has not been duly proved, but no such objection as regards exhibiting of said document was raised when the same was exhibited -- Although the DW examined by the accused has attempted to project that the marriage of deceased was solemnized more than 7 years prior to date of death, but there is no documentary evidence to support the said assertion – Nikahnama accepted so as to hold that death occurred within less than 7 years of marriage of the deceased.

(Para 14)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Cruelty by father-in-law – Acquittal -- A perusal of the FIR would show that when the husband had come to take back his wife from her parental home, it was he who raised the demand of Rs.10,000/- -- Whenever any mishap occurs, it is very common that parents and relatives of the deceased-girl, would name not only her husband who would be the prime accused, but other members of the family also so as to wreak vengeance -- Father-in-law given benefit of doubt, his conviction for offence u/s 498-A set aside.

(Para 21, 26, 27)

D. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 498A – Demand of cash post marriage – Whether qualify as dowry -- Demands of cash would qualify to be termed as ‘demand of dowry’ and that any such demand even if made post marriage would not lose the character of ‘demand of dowry’.

(Para 23)

E. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304B – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 113B – Dowry death – Presumption -- Marriage had taken place barely about 4 years prior to the death -- As per the testimony of the witnesses, whenever the deceased/ husband used to come to her parental home she used to disclose the demand of Rs.10,000/- by the accused -- It is further borne out from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-4 that the deceased had last visited her parental home about 2 months back and even at that time she had disclosed about the demand of dowry made by the accused -- Demand of dowry which were raised even two months prior to her death cannot escape from his liability on account of unnatural death of the deceased in matrimonial home on account of poison which will fully qualify to be termed as a ‘dowry death’.

(Para 24-26)

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Murder – Acquittal -- Test identification parade (TIP) – TIP not done during investigation -- All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court were not known to the appellant -- They had not seen the appellant prior to the said incident -- TIP had become necessary particularly when both the accused, who are alleged to have committed this murder were arrested within two days -- Inspite of being questioned as to what the reasons were for not holding TIP in this case, no satisfactory reply was given by him -- Identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP which has not been done -- Appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a very doubtful evidence as to the appellant’s identity -- Appeal allowed.

(Para 10-16)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test identification parade (TIP) – TIP is only a part of Police investigation -- The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence -- Not conducting TIP in a given case may prove fatal for the prosecution.

(Para 12)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881), Section 138 -- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 397 – Conviction in cheque bounce complaint – Compromise thereafter – Quashing of conviction/ sentence – Trial court convicted and sentenced the petitioner to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of eight months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.2,25,000/- to the complainant – Appellate court affirmed the same -- Matter ordered to be compounded and impugned judgments of conviction and sentence quashed and set aside -- Petitioner-accused acquitted subject to deposit of 10% of the Cheque amount with the HPSLSA.

(Para 1, 8, 9)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – POCSO – Rape – Compromise quashing of FIR -- Since the parties have married each other, the petition is allowed -- FIR and consequential proceedings arising therefrom ordered to be quashed.

(Para 1-4)

A. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Victim’s age – Birth and death register of Gram Panchayat -- Proof of -- Victim’s date of birth was recorded as 28.10.2002 -- During cross-examination of the victim, on the suggestion given to her, she had specifically stated that her date of birth was 28.10.2002, which corroborates the entry in the birth and death register of the concerned Gram Panchayat – Held,  the evidence led by the prosecution is conclusive to prove that the date of birth of the victim was 28.10.2002.

(Para 12)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 134 -- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Sole witness of prosecutrix -- Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without corroboration from any other evidence -- If the Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial which would lend assurance to her testimony.

(Para 14)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape – Victim travelled a long distance in the company of accused persons throughout the night and had many opportunities to disclose her fate to the world at large --  As per her statement recorded u/s 164, Cr.PC, a police man met her at some place at Una-Hoshiarpur road, however, she had not disclosed anything to the police man also -- This conduct of the victim is unusual -- Statement of victim u/s 164 Cr.P.C. is not in consistence with her deposition before the Court -- Her deposition does not inspire confidence.

(Para 21, 39)

D. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- It is not a substantive piece of evidence and such tests are meant for the purpose of helping the investigating agency in order to ensure that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding in the right direction -- The Test Identification Parade is not a substantive evidence but it can only be used in corroboration of the statements in Court

(Para 32)

E. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 9 -- Test Identification Parade (TIP) -- When the accused persons were produced before the ACJM, the photographs of the accused persons were annexed to the conviction slip -- Thus the possibility of the victim having seen the photographs of accused persons during their custody with the police and also subsequently before the TIP cannot be ruled out -- There is no record to suggest that non-suspected selected for the parade were of the same age, height, general appearance and position as that of the accused persons -- Moreover, there is a delay in conducting the TIP as the accused persons were taken in custody on 13.02.2018, but the application for conducting of TIP was moved by the Investigating Officer on 16.02.2018, which delay the prosecution has failed to explain -- Father of the victim, in his cross-examination, admitted that a lady police having two stars on her shoulders, was also present at the time of TIP -- Thus, it cannot be said the TIP was conducted in accordance with the guidelines -- As such, it cannot be held to be sustainable in the eyes of law and no reliance could be placed upon the Test Identification Parades.

(Para 33-37)

F. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 4, 34  -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376D – POCSO – Gang rape -- Acquittal of accused – Disciplinary action against Investigation Agency -- Investigation in the case was conducted in a casual and perfunctory manner -- Prosecution has withheld the CCTV footage, SFSL reports with respect to the medical examinations of the victim as well as the accused persons and also with respect to the articles which were seized from the vehicles allegedly involved in the commission of the crime in order to connect the accused persons with the commission of the offence -- Director General of Police directed to take appropriate disciplinary and departmental inquiry against the erring police officials for having conducted a shoddy investigation, that eventually led to the acquittal of the appellants herein.

(Para 46)

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 304A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 190, 200, 482 -- Complaint against doctor – Death by rash and negligent act of doctor -- Cognizance by Magistrate – Quashing of criminal proceedings – Opinion of another doctor – Requirement of -- A private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence in the form of credible opinion given by another doctor to support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused doctor -- To allow the proceeding to continue, will amount to an abuse of the process of law -- Entire criminal proceeding u/s 304-A of IPC quashed.

(Para 10,11)

A. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 302 -- Murder – Circumstantial evidence -- Last seen theory -- Provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act are not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt -- Mere fact that the dead body of the deceased was found two kilometers back from place where the appellant had left him, could not be a ground to doubt the statement -- False explanation cannot be used as an additional link to fortify the prosecution case -- Suspicion, howsoever strong, it may be, cannot take the place of proof -- A moral conviction, however, strong or genuine cannot amount to a legal conviction supportable in law -- The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence in a case can be stated to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction – Findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse and do not in any manner re-concile with the evidence on record -- Appellant acquitted.

(Para 17, 19-24)

B. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), Section 106 – Circumstantial evidence -- If the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established and that those circumstances must be conclusive in nature unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused -- Moreover all the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a complete chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence -- Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.

(Para 23)