Search By Topic: Acquittal/ Quashing of FIR/ Comp./ Sentence undergone

1. (SC) 25-07-2025

A. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application under Section 156(3) CrPC – Procedure of -- Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated.

(Para 19, 33)

B. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 190 – Registration of FIR -- Application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC – Procedure of -- Application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned -- Mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable -- In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.

(Para 27-30)

C. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3) -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Reasoned order – Requirement of -- A reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.

(Para 35-41)

D. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 156(3), 482 -- Application u/s 156(3) of Cr.P.C. – Procedural lapses -- Quashing of FIR – Not obligatory upon the court to exercise the inherent power in each and every case, even if the order impugned suffers from minor procedural irregularity, provided there is no miscarriage of justice -- In a case where pursuant to the order of the Magistrate, which is not illegal or without jurisdiction, an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence and, thereafter, upon investigation, chargesheets have been submitted, there is apparently no justification for the court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction so as to quash the FIR or the order of the Magistrate.

(Para 42, 43)

E. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- Quashing of FIR – Dispute of civil nature – Effect of -- Once allegations are made out, it is difficult for the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature which may or may not be having any criminality attached to it.

(Para 45)

F. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 154, 300 -- Successive FIR -- Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial -- This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again -- Successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.

(Para 52-55)

3. (SC) 14-07-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – Permissibility of -- Offence u/s 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature --  Ordinarily, quashing of proceedings involving such offences on the ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should not be permitted lightly -- However, the power of the Court u/s 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the facts of each case.

(Para 6)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 376 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 – Rape case -- Compromise quashing of FIR – FIR invoking Section 376 IPC, was filed immediately following an earlier FIR lodged by the opposing side -- This sequence of events lends a certain context to the allegations and suggests that the second FIR may have been a reactionary step -- More importantly, the complainant in the second FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire not to pursue the case -- She has submitted that she is now married, settled in her personal life, and continuing with the criminal proceedings would only disturb her peace and stability -- Her stand is neither tentative nor ambiguous -- Parties have amicably resolved their differences and arrived at a mutual understanding -- Continuation of the trial would not serve any meaningful purpose -- It would only prolong distress for all concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts without the likelihood of a productive outcome -- Continuation of the criminal proceedings would only amount to abuse of process -- FIR along with all proceedings arising therefrom, including Sessions Case, quashed.

(Para 7-9)

7. (Kerala HC) 17-06-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 354A(1)(i) – Sexual harassment -- In order to attract Section 354A(1)(i) IPC, it has to be shown that the petitioner has resorted to physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures – Thus it is of prime importance to show that the offender had committed the act with sexual intention.

(Para 5)

B. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7 – POCSO – Sexual assault -- To establish the offence of sexual assault as envisaged u/s 7 of the POCSO Act, it has to be shown that the offender had done the act with sexual intent.

(Para 5)

C. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012), Section 7 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 482 -- POCSO – Allegation of sexual assault against Doctor – Quashing of Criminal proceedings -- Victim complained about chest pain and abdominal pain -- Medical examination of the victim was conducted by the petitioner in the presence of the mother of the victim on the first occasion, and in the presence of the elder sister of the victim on the second occasion -- It is too hard to believe that the petitioner would have resorted to sexual advances upon the victim in the close presence of the victim’s mother and elder sister -- Neither the statement given by the victim to the Police, nor her statements to the learned Magistrate u/s 164 Cr.PC, contained any indication that the alleged act committed by the petitioner was with sexual intent – Chances of that adolescent girl getting misunderstood about the act of the petitioner, cannot be ignored -- Section 41 of the POCSO Act assumes much relevancy -- Provisions of Sections 3 to 13 shall not apply in case of medical examination or medical treatment of a child when such medical examination or medical treatment is undertaken with the consent of his parents or guardian – Criminal proceedings quashed.

(Para 5, 6)

9. (J&K&L HC) 06-06-2025

A. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 77, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) -- Commission of offence under FSS Act – Filing of complaint – Relevant date -- It is only when report of the Food Analyst is received declaring the sample as unsafe or sub-standard that commission of offence takes place and the sale of such food article by the accused is prohibited -- Corrected report of Food Analyst was received by the complainant on 07.12.2022, therefore, the offence can be stated to have been committed on 07.12.2022 -- Impugned complaint has been filed on 30.11.2023 -- Thus, the same has been filed by the respondent/ complainant within the prescribed period of one year from the date of commission of the offence.

(Para 17, 18)

B. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 42 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Non-following of time prescribed in Section 42 of FSS Act – Provisions contained in Section 42 of the FSS Act, which provide for timelines for taking certain actions by the Food Analyst and the Designated Officer, are mandatory in nature -- Respondent has violated these timelines without explaining the reasons for delay in the complaint filed by him -- Prosecution against the petitioners cannot sustained.

(Para 26)

C. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), Section 66, 26(1)(2)(i)(ii), 59, 3(1)(zz), Section 51, 3(1)(zx) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (46 of 2023), Section 223, 528 -- Quashing of complaint -- Complaint against Incharge of operation of Company – Maintainability of -- Without impleading Company, of which petitioner No.3 is claimed to be the person incharge of operations could not have been impleaded as an accused and proceeded against -- Prosecution against petitioner No.3 is, therefore, not sustainable in law -- Impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom quashed.

(Para 31)

14. (J&K&L HC) 22-05-2025

A. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985), Section 8, 22 – Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- NDPS – PMLA – Discharge in NDPS case – Continuity in Money laundering offence – Permissibility of -- Money laundering itself is a separate crime, distinct from the original (or scheduled) offence like corruption, drug trafficking, fraud, etc. -- Even if the scheduled offence is tried under Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 Act, etc., money laundering is prosecuted separately under PMLA -- Offence u/s 3 is dependent on the scheduled offence, but it is a separate and independent offence once the activity of laundering begins -- Mere discharge or quashing  of a FIR by a competent court does not automatically result in the quashing of an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) filed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 -- Discharge in the predicate offence may influence the procedures under the PMLA; however, it cannot be regarded as an automatic or definitive basis for nullifying the ECIR.

(Para 30, 40, 41)

B. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- PMLA – Not an accused in scheduled offence – Effect of -- A person can be prosecuted for money laundering even if they are not directly involved in the commission of the scheduled offence, so long as they are involved in the laundering process -- A person accused of an offence u/s 3 PMLA need not necessarily be shown as an accused in the scheduled offence.

(Para 31, 32)

C. Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (15 of 2003), Section 3, 50 -- Discharge in the predicate offence -- Summon u/s 50 of PMLA – Nature of -- Enforcement Directorate's authority to summon individuals u/s 50 is intended for the acquisition of factual evidence pertaining to money laundering offences; obtaining a summons under this section does not inherently indicate that one is an accused in a money laundering investigation -- This indicates that the individual may have information or documents pertinent to the investigation -- Issuance of summons is a fundamental component in the execution of a fair and unbiased investigation -- It affords the relevant parties an opportunity to be heard, to articulate their case, and to address the allegations levied against them -- Issuance of summons under the PMLA should be regarded as an essential element of due process, intended to advance the rule of law and bolster public trust in the legal system -- Discharge in the predicate offence, albeit substantial, does not, as a legal principle, impact the ongoing validity of the summons -- Mere discharge of the petitioner concerning the predicate offence does not, in itself, grant the Court the power to annul the summons.

(Para 34-39)

20. (SC) 08-05-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 351, 353, 356 – Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Criminal force – Assault – Use of criminal force or assault on a public servant is essential to attract Section 353 IPC -- Physical movement of the labourers would not amount to use of force far less criminal force on a public servant – Offence u/s 353 IPC not made out -- Obstruction to a public servant must be done with the requisite mens rea i.e. to prevent the latter from discharging his official duty -- Members of the social organization were of the impression that bonded labourers/ children ought to be interrogated at a neutral place i.e. Police Station whereas the officers wanted to interrogate them at the site -- When profile of the allegations emerging from the factual matrix of the case renders existence of mens rea patently absurd or inherently improbable, such prosecution is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

(Para 22-28)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186, 353 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 155(2) -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Section 186 is a non-cognizable offence and in absence of ingredients of Section 353 (cognizable offence) disclosed in the FIR, prior permission of Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Cr.PC was necessary to register FIR -- No such permission was obtained rendering the registration of FIR and ensuing investigation bad in law.

(Para 31)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 186 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), Section 173, 195 -- Obstruction in discharge of official duties – Non-cognizable offence – Procedure of -- Cognizance of offence u/s 186 IPC was taken on a police report in breach of Section 195 Cr.PC -- Section 195, inter alia, provides no court shall take cognizance of offence u/s 186 save and except on a complaint in writing by the aggrieved public servant or his superior -- Cognizance taken of the offence u/s 186 on a police report/chargesheet is impermissible in law.

(Para 32)

23. (P&H HC) 03-05-2025

A. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii) -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B -- Corruption case -- In a case of alleged criminal conspiracy, the prosecution is duty bound to prove by cogent, credible, and admissible evidence that the accused persons had a meeting of minds and participated in a common design.

(Para 14)

B. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Corruption case – Demand and acceptance of bribe -- In the absence of demand and acceptance, the presumption u/s 20 of the P.C. Act does not arise and conviction cannot be thus sustained.

(Para 18)

C. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 13(1)(d)(ii), 20 -- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 120-B – Corruption case – Conspiracy – Presumption – Reversal of burden -- Tehsildar, who employed co-accused BK and was shown to be one of the primary beneficiaries, was not accorded sanction and therefore, did not face trial -- Appellants, despite not being shown to be actual beneficiaries or participants, were convicted on a generalized theory of “connivance” – Held, mere association or presence of a person in a place where a crime is committed does not ipso facto establish participation or conspiracy -- Reversal of burden, in a trial u/s 13(1)(d)(ii) of the P.C. Act and Section 120-B of the IPC, where prosecution has not discharged its primary burden is certainly not permissible in law – Appellant acquitted.

(Para 18-20)

29. (P&H HC) 24-04-2025

A. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Acquittal -- Delay of 5 days in FIR – Non providing of ownership of mobile -- Appellants were not named in the FIR – No Test identification parade/ TIP – If no test identification parade is held, then it will be totally unsafe to rely upon the bare testimony regarding the identification of an accused for the first time in the Court -- Small recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- -- Inordinate and unexplained delay in reporting the matter to the police -- Recovery of money is not sufficient to prove the allegations of snatching -- Held, the trial Court had committed a grave error in convicting the appellants-accused – Conviction and sentence u/s 379-A read with Section 34 of IPC set aside.

(Para 11-21)

B. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case -- Identity of snatchers – Proof of -- PW-2, stated that accused present in the Court were the persons who had snatched his mobile phone, but he had not given details of physical description of the snatchers like their complexion, height or features or about the clothing as worn by them in the complaint -- Occurrence took place at 11 PM and it was dark at the time -- It was not explained by this witness as to what was the basis on which he could identify the accused persons -- Possibility of this witness having seen the miscreants and identifying them in dark seems very remote -- Identification of the accused persons not established beyond doubt and this fact has created a serious dent in the story of the prosecution with regard to the involvement of the accused in the subject crime.

(Para 17)

C. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), Section 379A, 34 -- Mobile snatching case – Recovery of small amount – Identity of currency notes -- Recovery of sums of Rs.1600/- and Rs.1400/- at instance of accused --  Not proved to be having any specific identification mark -- Small amount could easily be planted -- Alleged recovery was effected on 28.07.2020 whereas the occurrence had taken place on 09.07.2019 -- It does not appeal to reason that the appellants would keep such small amounts of money for such a long time with them fully knowing that the same being incriminating piece of evidence could be used against them for proving commission of the subject crime -- Such like currency notes could be easily available in market -- Recovery of money at the instance of the accused could not be considered to be a circumstance sufficient to prove that the appellants had snatched any mobile phone.

(Para 18, 19)